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For my parents
Abstract
This thesis comprises a series of ethnographic perspectives on China’s largest city, 
Shanghai. It is based primarily upon seventeen months anthropological research conducted 
in Shanghai between 1992-94. As befits an ethnography of a contemporary metropolis it 
draws upon a diverse array of research data from electronic media to magazines and local 
drama productions. Above all, I focus upon and privilege the voices of local residents as 
they engaged in reflexive encounters with the ethnographer and other inhabitants. This 
account, then, is my fabrication of their constructions o f their lives and their city.
In the 1990s far-reaching economic reforms have been implemented which are 
designed to recreate Shanghai as a cosmopolitan, world financial and commercial centre. 
Policy makers and citizens are engaged in the difficult and potentially hazardous task of 
"crossing the stream" from a "socialist state planned economy" to a "socialist market 
economy", a transition which often involves adopting policies dramatically opposed to those 
which went before. This thesis aims to furnish, in an ethnographically evocative manner, 
new perspectives and insights on the parameters of that transition, and especially upon how 
social boundaries and identities are becoming reconfigured.
In 1990s Shanghai many former certainties such as the Communist Party’s 
monologic meta-narrative and boundaries, both spatial and social, are being dismantled, 
fractured, undermined or crumbling. Increasing choice, mobility and fluidity are unpicking 
and fraying the once encloistered texture of everyday life. Increasing pluralism, diversity 
of lifestyles and modes of livelihood provide new opportunities and risks. In the midst of 
a great deal of flux, ambiguity, uncertainty and juxtapositioning there seems to be evidence 
of newly emergent social contours such as the shift from predominantly ascribed statuses 
to greater scope for "aspirational identities".
My narrative reflects these processes, and is critical of discourses which are prone 
to homogenization or dichotomization, both products of a misplaced urge to over­
systematize and essentialize. Inter alia, this thesis explores changing representations of 
"society" and personal relationships; consumption and consumerism; the (perceived) 
consequences of Shanghai’s half-open "door" to intra-national and global cultural flows; 
the differential markings of spaces within the city; and the emergent discourse of share 
dealers. Where possible I draw broad brush strokes but always with attention to the 
craquelure - those cracks and fissures which comprise them but which may have their own, 
different, stories to tell.
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Introduction
Bus to Xujiahui, two hours standing, crushed, dripping sweat, conductress monotone "kaimen qing dangxin" (doors opening, take care). The "Grand Gateway" at Xujiahui 
Centre, brand new plate glass and concrete shopping cathedral, air conditioning blasts 
onto the street, the latest imports, name brands, Gucci, Clarks, Rolex. Instant 
gratification, at a price. Shanghai’s new rich buying, the rest gazing, watching. A trip 
on the newly opened underground, four stops now open. Intense volume o f  noise in the 
carriage, everyone engaged in separate conversations. The train, clean, new, swish, room 
to breathe, arrived at its destination. On the platform a row o f  people, waiting to board. 
The train stops, the instant the doors open, they begin to fight their way into the train, 
battling with the passengers trying to disembark. Later, at dusk, a bus back to the centre 
o f  town, somewhere near the old city.
Walking back across the city in the early evening, people everywhere. Reading 
newspapers, playing with electronic toy games, playing cards, eating, sleeping, drinking, 
smoking, fanning themselves. Scrawny ribbed old men, podgy children. Suddenly a small 
restaurant with Arabic calligraphy, incongruous amongst the Chinese characters. Men 
with unshaven faces, thick set, swarthy, asking to change money, sell hashish. People 
everywhere, lolling in deck chairs, picnic chairs, bamboo chairs lashed together with rope, 
large chairs, tiny stools a few  inches high, lying in a deck chair feet up on a small stool.
Houses cramped, ding)’; bright, bare neon o f  the shops contrasting with the 
houses, dimly lit, darkened, impenetrable interiors. Alleyways, ragged, descend into 
gloom. Narrow, dense, thick, dank smells, rotting piles o f  rubbish flowing onto the streets. 
A man with a whicker basket on his back uses a pair o f  tongs to sift through decaying 
mounds o f  rotting vegetation. Fruit stalls immaculately, beautifully stacked, shiny yellow  
bananas, polished apples and pears. Restaurants, empty, full, droning, plaintive voices 
o f  karaoke singers. Waitresses watching in short yellow skirts and white shirts. Noises, 
sounds everywhere. An impossible density o f  people. More than could ever f i t  into the 
tiny houses, like an unwrapped child’s toy that somehow never fits  back into its original 
box.
In the restaurant dowmstairs, brass coloured pottery figures o f  Guan Gong - 
protection. Incense, fo o d  smells, cans o f  beer. Crowned, red-faced, long black beard, gongxi facai, his right hand wields a heavy sword. Illuminated by two red lamps up 
behind the bar, perhaps Mao was there once. Side rooms, carved dragons and phoenixes, 
a single television, karaoke eye waiting fo r diners. Outside, black car, an Audi, darkened 
windows, the manager’s.
Retrieve my bicycle, chained up fo r  the day in a side street, cycle back to the 
university. Freedom o f  the dark, unseen, unrecognized. The campus gates, dismount by 
the watchmen, watching. Back on the bike, past silent classrooms to the foreign students 
building. Lock up the bike, a separate compound for foreigners’ bicycles. The old 
watchman, watches the bikes, the foreigners’ bikes, looks over, makes sure I ’m not 
Chinese. Over seventy, cropped hair, speaks with a thick Jiangsu accent, thinks I  should 
be a cadre when I  go home, says it was better in the old days, when Mao was around. 
Into our building, past the watchmen, drinking tea from a clay pot through the spout, 
wears a Mao cap, no problem. Up the lift, onto our floor, aiyi watching. Another door, 
close the door, no people, alone.
This thesis is based primarily upon seventeen months anthropological research conducted 
in Shanghai between 1992-94. It draws upon a diverse array of research data, with an 
especial and deliberate emphasis upon the voices o f local people, their constructions of 
their own lives, of others, and of their city. In addition to consulting the ever-accelerating 
number o f Western sources, I have also examined intensively local magazines, 
newspapers, radio and television programmes and plays. In producing a distinctly urban 
ethnography I take the city of Shanghai as a whole as my fieldwork site. Inevitably I 
make no claims for "representativeness", but provide both original accounts of, and new 
perspectives upon, Shanghai and its people. In this somewhat experimental project I am 
in accord with David Parkin’s (1987: 64) suggestion that ethnography is analogous to 
impressionist painting, for it too provides a series of perspectives upon a theme.
As a topic for research Shanghai is a veritable cornucopia. Until the late 1940s, 
it had an ambivalent reputation as a cosmopolitan, semi-colonial entrepot based upon 
laissez-faire capitalism. Under Communist Party rule it then became the centre o f a 
socialist state-planned economy with a greatly diminished international role. The rhetoric 
of the Maoist period, especially during the Cultural Revolution, divided Chinese society 
into a limited range of unambiguous categories, stressed equality and egalitarianism and 
actively sought to "cut off all tails of capitalism". By contrast, current policies - 
"socialism with Chinese characteristics" - accept (indeed, encourage) that some may get 
rich first, criticize egalitarianism and permit the emergence of new modes of livelihood. 
In the last decade the Chinese government’s attitude toward Shanghai and other large 
coastal cities has undergone a striking and radical change. After three decades of official 
rhetoric which emphasized the need to reduce the economic dominance of cities such as 
Shanghai, and the neglect of their infrastructure which accompanied this, the government 
has begun to promote these cities as models of development.
Since 1990 and spurred on especially in 1992, measures have been implemented 
which are intended to recreate Shanghai as an international financial and commercial 
centre. Shanghai now retains more of the huge profits made in the city, although still far 
less than Guangzhou. There has been considerable domestic and foreign capital 
investment. The latter includes arrangements to lease land to foreigners, joint ventures 
or projects with foreign companies such as the current construction of an underground 
system.
The Pudong area in the south east of the city is being redeveloped at tremendous 
cost and vigorous attempts made to attract foreign investment. An increasingly important
3private sector has re-emerged and private markets, restaurants and bars have proliferated 
along with many joint ventures. The stock market has returned and Shanghai has regained 
some of its pre-1949 cosmopolitanism. Fortuitously my fieldwork period coincided with 
this latter phase and I was present during some of the most significant changes to have 
taken place in Shanghai for at least twenty years. A local writer, a strong supporter of 
reform, commented to me that the changes in Shanghai during 1991-3 were o f an "extent 
that a person such as myself could never have imagined." Similarly, another informant 
told me that "now it is not only very interesting for foreigners to be in China but also for 
us as change is extremely rapid."
In contrast to Maoist China, a welter of statistics now emerges from the PRC. The 
party-state is particularly keen to flaunt its achievements. China’s President, Jiang Zemin, 
recently announced that from 1979 until the end o f 1994, foreign investment in China 
totalled US $95.6 billion.1 Jiang added that China’s Gross Domestic Product had grown 
at an average of 9.44% per annum between 1979 and 1994.2 Figures for Shanghai are 
even more impressive - in the first half of 1995 the city’s GDP grew by 13.3% over the 
same period in 1994, in the same period exports increased by 41.74%.3 Occasionally, 
even official statistics indicate severe problems; a one paragraph-long article on page 
eight of the Beijing published China Daily Business Weekly announced that "[ajbout 2.5 
million textile workers will have to be laid off and find jobs in other sectors."4
Inevitably I have incorporated a range of statistical data into this thesis. However,
I consider that there are two crucial limitations to such bald statistics. Firstly, PRC 
statisticians and economic planners have continually faced profound problems in the 
collection of data. Those who provide the "raw" data have all manner o f reasons to 
provide inaccurate figures, a situation the Chinese state now openly acknowledges. In the 
last seven months of 1994, a survey uncovered 70,000 fraudulent statistics, including the 
"blatant falsification" of 20,000 government reports.5 Zhang Sai, Director of the State 
Statistical Bureau is reported to have said that figures reported, for example, of industrial
'Figures cited in BBC  Summary o f  World Broadcasts A sia-Pacific (hereafter SW B ), 17 July 1995, 
F E /2357/G /1.
2Ibid: G/2
3SW B W eekly Econom ic Report 19 July 1995, FEW /0393 W G/1.
428 February-6 March 1993.
sCited in "Lies, Damned Lies and C hinese Statistics" The Independent 18 July 1995: 10.
4production, price rises, and population growth are all often inaccurate.6 Secondly, 
statistical data, with its seductive averages and mind-bewildering millions and billions, 
tells us little or nothing about the situation of individuals’ lives. Average figures can 
smooth over vast disparities - if  one person’s income rises by 1000%, how many people’s 
may fall and still produce an average rise of 10%? Moreover, statistics provide little 
indication of the, often contradictory, perceptions, values and experiences o f actual people. 
The great benefit o f qualitative, ethnographic research is that it can provide much richer 
insights and more nuanced portrayals of lives as they are daily lived, experienced and 
reflected upon. My intention in this thesis is to provide an ethnographic study which 
highlights the increasing diversity, flux and uncertainty in urban China as experienced by 
a range of informants and commentators at the micro-level and thereby to contribute to 
a fuller understanding of trends and processes at work in a period of rapid socio-economic 
change.
This introduction is divided into six sections: the first situates my research with 
regard to regional and urban perspectives; the second outlines issues of access; the third 
explores epistemological issues associated with the status of anthropological "data" and 
the practice of ethnographic writing; the fourth introduces the sources o f data and 
research strategies employed; the fifth sketches an overview of Shanghai’s history; and 
the final section provides an outline of each chapter.
Regional and Urban Perspectives: Shanghai as a Locus of Study 
Regional Perspective
Whatever is said o f  China...will probably be true only o f  some parts.
Rev. Hardy (John Chinaman at Home. 1907: 10)
This ethnographic account of Shanghai is firmly located within the regional 
specialization on the Chinese speaking world and, in particular, studies o f the People’s 
Republic of China. I have chosen this "local engagement" (Fardon 1990: 21) rather than
concentrate upon a single theoretical issue for two prime reasons. Firstly, I wish to pursue 
an innovative and original approach which presents a broad brush ethnographic account 
of a metropolis which takes the city itself as the unit of study. Secondly, I consider that 
anthropological study demands a cross-disciplinary approach. By focusing upon a city 
which has been of albeit fluctuating global importance for many decades the sheer volume 
of relevant texts on Shanghai, let alone China generally, restricted the amount of time and
6Ibid.
5thesis space available to refer to anthropological texts on other regions.
In this thesis I focus upon the distinctiveness of Shanghai as a city. Elizabeth 
Perry comments that "[w]hile the field of Chinese history...has been busy developing a 
nuanced picture of local diversity, the contemporary China field lags far behind in its 
understanding of geographical and structural variation" (1989: 583). Contemporary 
scholars of Chinese society generally refer, unambiguously, to "the Chinese" as a single, 
homogeneous, and undifferentiated group - an approach the PRC government would also 
favour.7 I suggest that there are good reasons to dismantle this homogeneity. Typically, 
sinologists have highlighted diversity among China’s ethnic minorities (e.g. Crossley 1990, 
Elliot 1990, Zhang & Wu 1987). However, among the majority Han Chinese population 
there are also many indications of cultural differences such as the extensive indigenous 
discourses which essentialize the character and nature of people from different parts of 
China (see Eberhard 1965) and the degree of linguistic diversity within China. In the case 
of Shanghai, for instance, the city’s population is diaglossic. Whilst putonghua is the 
"dominant language" (Grillo 1989) Shanghai dialect is the language of "the street" and 
many homes.8 Although considered a dialect, Shanghainese is more different from 
standard Chinese than is Spanish from Italian and a dialogue in the dialect would be 
largely incomprehensible to an ordinary resident from Beijing.
Perry observes that even when studies of contemporary China have focused on 
particular areas, the authors have usually presented their cases as representative of China 
as a whole, rather than highlighting local diversity. The historian Paul Cohen also 
remarks on the extent o f regional and local variation in China and writes o f the 
importance in investigations o f "breaking the Chinese world down into smaller, more 
manageable spatial units" (1984: 161-2) so as "to gain a more differentiated, more 
contoured understanding of the whole" (Ibid). By focusing upon a particular city and its 
distinctiveness I hope to discern to what extent we ought to dissolve notions of "China" 
and "the Chinese" as overly-monolithic homogeneous categories.
Urban Context
Till recently anthropologists have often gone to great lengths to find remote
7There is a similar trend in the study o f  Japan. Brian Moeran criticize’s B enedict’s generalizing about 
"the Japanese-all one hundred m illion o f  them", but adds "that this holistic approach is one that has 
frequently been favoured by the Japanese them selves" (1990: 342).
d ic t io n a r ie s  o f  the Shanghai dialect include Creamer 1991, Min et a l 1991, Pott 1924, Qian 1987, 
Silsby 1911.
locations for research. Even when they have come closer to "home", ethnographers of 
European societies tend to chose field sites as far removed as possible from urban centres. 
Malcolm Chapman writes that a map of Europe "with the size of its parts determined by 
the proportion of the collective anthropological brain that has been devoted to their 
study...would be grotesque indeed" (1982: 142). An ethnographic map o f China would, 
most likely, produce a similarly misshapen depiction.
Since the 1960s anthropologists have begun to pay more attention to urban contexts 
although relatively little attention has been given to cities.9 With a world-wide trend 
towards urbanization it would seem incumbent upon anthropologists to address and 
examine the diversity of the urban experience (cf. Harvey 1989). In seeking to understand 
the processes at work in the contemporary world it is vital to investigate urban life. With 
their concentration o f people, goods, services, wealth, power, information and 
communications, cities are of particular interest. With their "critical mass" o f population 
cities can support forms of knowledge which could not be supported elsewhere (Hannerz 
1992: 202). As Hannerz points out, where "the cultures of small-scale societies are 
cultures of face-to-face, oral flows of meaning. The cultures of complex societies...now 
make use of writing, print, radio, telephones, telegraph, photography, film, disk and tape 
recording, television, video, and computers" (27).
Many anthropological studies on the PRC concentrate upon rural China (e.g. Chan 
et al 1992, Mosher 1983, Parish & Whyte 1978, Potter & Potter 1990). It seems 
particularly important to pay specific attention to urban China since in the view of one of 
the most experienced researchers of contemporary China: "In explaining contemporary 
patterns of social and cultural life in the PRC...rural versus urban appears to be the 
primary cleavage in China’s contemporary social landscape" (Whyte 1993b: 358). If  this 
is the case, and I believe this to be an accurate assessment, then the specificities of urban 
dwelling and city life demand the attention of anthropologists. This necessity has begun 
to be recognized and in an introductory chapter to a recent volume Urban Anthropology 
in China. Gregory Guldin comments that ethnographic research in urban China is now a 
"field in gestation" (1993: 5).
It seems particularly appropriate to conduct research in an urban context in the 
PRC since town and city dwelling are increasingly the experience of Chinese people 
themselves. Kirkby states that in 1980, the population of urban China was c.140 million
ySee Sanjek’s (1990) review o f  urban anthropology in the 1980s.
(1985: 59) and accounted for c.15% of China’s total population (202).10 Estimates for 
the urban proportion of China’s population in 1990 differ widely, from 26% to 56% 
(White 1994: 64).11 Population statistics, like all statistics in China, must be treated with 
great caution. However, there can be little doubt that China has a rapidly urbanizing 
population. Kam Wing Chan, for instance, anticipates that in the coming two decades, the 
urban percentage of China’s population will almost double (1994: 153).
In 1992, the population of Shanghai was 12,893,700 (White 1994: 68). Shanghai 
has a three-tier household registration system - with "city", "town" and "rural" zones. The 
city zone, with which I am most concerned, is divided into ten districts beneath which are 
neighbourhoods and street units. According to Huang Ju, Shanghai’s Mayor, by the year 
2010, the city will have an area of 6,300 square kilometres and a population o f nineteen 
to twenty million.12 Once again, these figures may not be wholly accurate but they do 
constitute official acknowledgement of the sharply rising trend of Shanghai’s population. 
Moreover, at the same time as Shanghai is becoming (once again) a city to which migrants 
flow, so the city is exerting an increasingly powerful centrifugal influence both nationally 
and globally. It is notable that a recent BBC2 television series should focus upon 
Shanghai as one of the "cities of the future".13
The growing body of urban anthropological studies of China, as elsewhere, 
generally deals with discrete, small-scale units or defined segments of society. Examples 
o f this include Walder’s (1986) study on work units, Rofel’s (1992) study in a silk 
factory, Henderson & Cohen’s (1984) study of a hospital, Rai’s (1991) study on university 
politics and Honig’s researches on Subei people in Shanghai (1986, 1989a, 1989b, 1990, 
1992). Studies on women are also popular (e.g. Croll 1983, Honig & Hershatter 1988, 
Stacey 1983, Wolf 1985). I have deviated in the direction of Hannerz’s suggestion that 
urban anthropological analysis may take the city as a whole as the unit o f focus instead 
of "rather limited assemblages of social relationships...lesser units within the city...in 
which the city itself recedes into the background" (1980: 296-7). This, then, is
l0Kojima g ives a higher percentage 22-3%  in 1982 and estim ates that by 2000  urban dw ellers w ill 
constitute over 40%  o f  C hina's total population (1987: 24-5). W hite notes estim ates for 1970 o f  17% and 
18% (1994: 64).
"G ittings claim s that by 1986 the urban population had already reached 37.1%  o f  C hina’s total (1989:
4).
l2"City o f  Future" SS 2 July 1993: 1.
' ’"Cities o f  the Future" B B C 2, 29 N ovem ber 1995.
ethnography o f  a city, not ethnography in a city.14
By focusing upon a single city my approach also differs from Parish and Whyte’s 
Urban Life in Contemporary China (1984). This account remains the most comprehensive 
and systematic study of post-1949 urban China. The data in this study, based mainly upon 
interviews with refugees from the PRC in Hong Kong, relates primarily to the early and 
mid-1970s and it provides a useful background to more specific comments on Shanghai 
and as a point of comparison with contemporary developments. In a recent edited volume, 
Urban Spaces in Contemporary China (Davis et al 1995), Deborah Davis comments that 
in recent studies on China "no one focused on altered roles of cities or attempted an 
integrated study of urban life in the 1980s comparable to what Martin Whyte and William 
Parish did for the 1970s" (9). She suggests that "as the twentieth anniversary of Mao’s 
death approaches, such broad overviews of the social consequences o f the post-Mao 
reforms should begin" (Ibid). I have taken up this challenge for the city o f Shanghai in 
the early 1990s.
I view the city as "the result of particular historical or contemporary economic, 
social, political, and cultural forces that form a unique urban context" (Eames & Goode 
1977: 34). My concern is to examine and illustrate the distinctiveness of a particular city 
"stressing the differences in cultural traditions, resources, and historical processes" (Ibid: 
35). One of the few attempts at an "inclusive ethnography" of a city is William 
Jankowiak’s (1993) study of Huhhot in Inner Mongolia. Based upon research in the 
1980s, Jankowiak adopts a symbolic interactionist approach. In my study of China’s 
largest Han Chinese city I adopt similar research methods. However, unlike Jankowiak 
I not only build upwards from "street level" perspectives but also stress ways in which the 
quotidian lives of Shanghai citizens are co-implicated with wider historical, political and 
economic phenomena.
Shanghai As A Locus Of Study
[Shanghai is]... the chief seat o f  commerce, the home o f  progress, in short the nerve-centre 
o f China, whose influence reaches out to the remotest corners o f  the land.
Mary Gamewell (1916: 19)
There are compelling reasons to study Shanghai. It is a city which "has had, and 
will have, a pivotal role in the evolution of modern China" (Howe 1981: ix). This claim 
is endorsed by Lucian Pye who writes that "serious analysis of nearly all important aspects
l4A distinction drawn by Eames & G oode (1977: 30-35).
of life in China must, eventually, confront Shanghai and its special place in the Chinese 
scheme o f things" (1981: xi). With the gathering pace of change in the fifteen years since 
this comment, and in view of Shanghai’s renewed global attraction, study o f the city is 
even more warranted. In addition to its intrinsic importance, 1990s Shanghai appears to 
be undergoing fundamental and rapid, even frantic, social change. It is a particularly 
timely point at which to conduct an ethnographic study of Shanghai.
Carrying out research in China’s largest, most crowded and populous city involved 
particular problems which were very different to those in rural contexts. A brief contrast 
between urban and rural China may help to illustrate the kinds of differences involved for 
researchers. I make this comparison by referring to a village I visited in rural Anhui. The 
village had no road to it, no electricity or running water, and most o f the population were 
illiterate. With a predominantly subsistence economy the villagers were largely dependent 
upon the seasons and the vagaries of nature. After two or three months in the village I 
would have been able to recognize and know by name most of the two hundred or so 
inhabitants. If I had lived with a local family I would immediately have been drawn into 
a web, a "close-knit" network (cf. Bott 1957: 59) of relationships. I travelled to the 
village from Shanghai and although I was seen as a foreigner, in local notions the "foreign 
world" (waiguo) seemed to be conceived of as a place simply somewhat beyond the 
already distant Shanghai. I was told that I was the first foreigner seen there in the sixty 
years since Japanese soldiers in the Anti-Japanese War. Friends, relatives and neighbours 
dropped in at will to the house of the family with which I stayed to examine this object 
of curiosity. One morning I awoke to find a group of people in my room - some 
squatting on the floor, one or two sat at the end of my bed - some chatting, others sitting 
quietly. At the risk of raising the ire of rural researchers, it seems that research in this 
context would have been so easy. Once I had come to grips with the local dialect, I need 
only lie on my bed and my research data would come to me!
As a researcher in the metropolis of Shanghai, unable to live with a family, unable 
even to live in accommodation where local people could visit, the problems I faced were 
of a quite different order. Far from being able to recognize every person, after having 
lived in Shanghai for three and a half years there were still many roads I had never visited 
and could not name. I had no natural network into which I could fit; everything 
depended upon contacts I could make and chance encounters. Shanghai is a large, 
complex metropolis. It is a highly literate society and a media-saturated environment 
where one must be cognizant, for instance, of "broadcasting’s capture of time and space
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in everyday life" (Moores 1985: 391). People’s understandings of themselves and the 
world around them are influenced and informed by education, television, newspapers and 
films. Since these sources contribute to (and are constitutive of) people’s cultural capital - 
their commonsensical notions and everyday discourses, it was important to make myself 
as familiar as possible with all these spheres. To partake of this diet - in its original sense 
o f "way of life" - 1 also had to consume the latest television soap, keep abreast o f political 
events and follow fashions in music and clothing.
Village, community type studies have tended to portray their object of study as 
bounded and, therefore, encompassable in an all-embracing ethnography. The practice of 
urban research has an alerting quality to this anthropological fiction. Faced with the 
complexity and diversity of Shanghai, I make no pretence of inclusivity or 
comprehensiveness. It is a paradox of the anthropological enterprise that ethnographic 
accounts often systematize research data that is partial, inconclusive and frequently 
contradictory. In Shanghai, this would make anthropology a strange bedfellow of a 
(another?) discourse of power, that of the party-state. The latter, in its official rhetoric, 
also abrogates to itself the ability to systematize experiences in Shanghai. At the same 
time, were I to present a thesis which fully conveyed the sheer unruliness and 
"incoherence" of the situation encountered "on the ground" it would, I fear, be unreadable. 
Inflicting an incoherent and unreadable tract on unsuspecting readers has little to 
recommend it. My approach, in the trade-off between verisimilitude and readability, is 
to investigate a series of themes of importance in contemporary Shanghai. Throughout 
my fieldwork I sought systematicities and I show evidence of tendencies and sociological 
patterns where this is warranted. However, in other instances, rather than impose alien 
theories and a non-existent systematicity upon my research data I have adopted a dialogic 
approach in which contradictions and inconsistencies remain.
The sheer size of the city in association with its crowded transport network 
presented problems. For example, if I met interesting people who lived on the other side 
o f Shanghai to me, this involved a bicycle journey of three to four hours or a round bus 
trip o f anything up to six or seven hours. Numerous telephone calls and occasional letter 
writing were two vital research tools in this urban context.15 Another problem was local 
people’s lack of time. Most people worked a six day week. Moreover, since my first stay
l5I did not have a m obile phone or a pager. With hindsight 1 regard this as a m issed opportunity. It 
w ould have been interesting to have had a m obile phone not only as a com m unications device but also to  
assess how its role in my presentation o f  se lf  w ould have affected peop le’s reactions to me.
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in Shanghai from 1988 to 1990 many people had become busier, all around me there was 
evidence of increased business and "busy-ness". Friends who had then been in Chinese 
work units (danwei) and seemed able to take days off at will now worked for joint 
ventures with strict working hours or were undertaking a second or third job and/or 
evening classes. In addition, the colonization of leisure (Sahin & Robinson 1981) and of 
the night by television and pursuits such as karaoke singing provided people with 
alternative forms of entertainment than talking to a foreign researcher - although one 
informant did suggest that I interview him in a discotheque with one of the loudest sound 
systems in town!
Access
Anthropological research in a country with its door only half open to the Western 
world presents a range of problems and complexities which researchers such as 
Malinowski never had to contend with. Between 1949 and the early 1980s it was not 
generally possible to conduct long-term field research within the PRC. During these years 
anthropology was one of those disciplines which "languished" (Harding 1993a: 17).16 
For those interested in China the main alternatives were: i) research in another Chinese 
society such as Hong Kong (e.g. Baker 1968) and Taiwan (e.g. Harrell 1982, W olf 1972); 
ii) to study China "at a distance" either through written materials (e.g. Croll 1981, White 
1978) or interviews conducted in Hong Kong (e.g. Chan et al 1992, Parish & Whyte 1978, 
1984). Each approach has its own advantages and disadvantages. For example, although 
refugee interviewing in Hong Kong has some advantages over research in the PRC, as one 
o f its best exponents observes, in this type of interviewing it is particularly difficult to get 
a "rounded picture" of attitudes, values and emotions (Whyte 1983: 71).
Since the late 1970s new possibilities have emerged.17 Those engaged in 
documentary research now have far more materials. For instance, Western researchers 
now have access to numerous public-opinion polls conducted in the PRC (see Rosen 
1989) and there is a diversification and proliferation of literature and films (see Pickowicz 
1989, 1995). In addition, "[s]ince the late 1970’s, opportunities to conduct interviews and 
fieldwork within the People’s Republic of China (PRC) have made it possible to explore
lfT h e  collected essays in Shambaugh (1993 ) - especially Gold (1993b), and Kallgren & Sim on (1987) 
provide a com prehensive overview  o f  the state o f  American studies o f  contemporary China.
l7This includes the reem ergence o f  indigenous anthropology. The first C hinese doctorate in 
anthropology was awarded in 1986 (Guldin 1994: 219).
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aspects of popular thought...that were previously inaccessible" (Honig 1989a: 139). 
Despite this, China remains a country relatively under-studied by anthropologists which 
accentuates the originality and (I hope) significance of my street-level research.
In 1983, Anne Thurston wrote of "the strong constraints placed on contact between 
Chinese and foreigners and the suspicion with which foreigners continue to be viewed" 
(24). Norma Diamond records how during her 1979-80 research in Taitou "all the 
interviews were arranged for me by the brigade leadership who always had to be advised 
in advance about the topics to be covered in the interview. Moreover, interviews were not 
private" (1983: 125). Margery Wolf also recounts lack of privacy as one amongst many 
restrictions on her research in China in 1980-1 (1985: 28-55). In 1984, when I first 
visited Shanghai, a foreign presence aroused great interest. Even on Shanghai’s main 
shopping street, Nanjing Road, any attempt at window shopping was soon curtailed by the 
staring crowds which surrounded a stationary foreigner within a couple of minutes. Later, 
as an ethnographic researcher, I was often conscious that I was being observed as much 
as observing.
Following the normalization of US-Chinese relations in 1979 Western research in 
China has been steadily increasing, albeit with the friction caused by the "Mosher 
affair".18 Initially, exchanges "required the cooperation of official gatekeepers in China" 
(Madsen 1993a: 173). By the late 1980s, the exchange process had become much more 
"decentralized" (Ibid) and access "had become highly idiosyncratic and dependent on 
many factors, including personal and institutional guawci" (Bullock 1993: 292), trends 
which parallel the more general decentralization and pluralizing tendencies in 
contemporary China. Equally indicative of recent trends is the way in which "[f]oreign 
students and scholars are increasingly viewed primarily as revenue opportunities" (Ibid: 
297).
Despite the increased opportunities for access, especially since the mid-1980s, in 
1992-4 there were still significant restrictions upon foreigners in China. Controls over 
where foreigners may live were particularly pertinent and hampering. Favoured options 
of anthropologists in other societies such as living in a local household or renting private 
accommodation were not permitted. Thurston suggests that "[u]rban-based researchers in 
China should consider the possibility of living in a campus dormitory or a small guest
l8In the early 1980s, the rural researcher Steven M osher was accused o f  transgressing C hinese law and 
expelled from both China and his doctoral programme at Stanford. A four-year-long moratorium on rural 
fieldw ork ensued (see Madsen 1987, Shambaugh 1993a: 6, 13 note 4).
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house open to both Chinese and foreigners" (1983: 25). In Shanghai, I found that all 
smaller hotels had received instructions from the city government prohibiting them to 
accept foreigners (including "fellow country persons" such as Taiwanese) as guests. I was 
told that this was for the "safety" of foreigners. Thus the only practical alternative was 
the first o f Thurston’s options, living on campus.
Even at a university there were walls within walls. Foreign students were not 
permitted to live in the accommoclation for Chinese students. Instead foreigners had to 
live in a building set aside for their use. The only Chinese people permitted to enter this 
segregated accommodation were teachers and students of the same university, and even 
these exceptions were only allowed access at certain hours of the day. Students had to 
show their student cards and register at the reception desk; teachers must show their work 
cards. In practice, these regulations applied only to Chinese citizens, for foreign guests 
could come and go at will. This could give rise to curious anomalies. For instance, on 
one occasion a Chinese friend resident in the UK planned to visit me. I asked the official 
in charge of the building if he would be allowed in and I was told that he would not. 
However, I also observed instances when local people were permitted to enter our building 
on production of a Chinese passport!
At various times foreign students protested at the visitors regulations. The official 
response was that these regulations were intended to preserve (baohu) the study 
environment and were for our safety. From informal conversations I gained the 
impression that preventing sexual relations between Chinese women and the large 
contingent of African students was also a consideration. Despite these restrictions the 
freedom granted to foreign students was greater than that allowed to Chinese students. 
For instance, the dormitories of Chinese university students were locked at 11pm and 
lights switched off at 11.30 - neither of which restrictions applied to foreign students. It 
seemed to me that the laxity of controls over foreign students paralleled the indulgence 
typically shown to small children in China. There was also a sense in which they 
paralleled the pre-1949 extra-territoriality which foreign residents in China claimed for 
themselves19 I could not live with a family nor could I invite visitors but I was free to 
come and go at will. I could frequent the same shops, markets, cinemas, parks and 
restaurants as local people and take the same buses and walk and cycle along the same
|gAt tim es, the unw illingness o f  C hinese authorities to intervene in matters between foreigners had 
serious consequences. For instance, I was told o f  a case in a B eijing foreign students com pound where an 
African student raped an Italian student. The Chinese authorities w ere extrem ely reluctant to becom e  
involved in this incident between foreigners and only expelled the man under pressure from foreign students.
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streets. Above all, I could visit people’s homes for daytime visits and, occasionally, stay 
overnight.
In view of my relatively free access to Shanghai citizens and the limited range and 
"depth" of official representations of the city and its people I have incorporated many 
local "voices" into my text. It is my hope to have produced a thesis which is informative, 
provides new perspectives, is evocative and conveys some sense of the dense texture of 
everyday life and the thoughts and feelings o f people in Shanghai. In a state where 
"neither outright collective defiance nor rebellion is likely or possible" I was able to 
observe many instances of what James Scott describes as "weapons of the weak" (1990: 
27). In Shanghai people say that "the higher authorities have a policy, those below have 
a counter strategy" (shangmian you zhengce, xiamian you duice). I present many 
examples of such "everyday forms of resistance" as ridicule, truculence, irony, petty acts 
o f non-compliance, foot dragging, dissimulation and "disbelief in elite homilies" (Scott 
1990: 350). Also of particular interest are those instances where local people took 
"imposed knowledge and symbolisms" and "made something else out of them... [and] 
subverted them from within" (Certeau 1984: 32).
Epistemological Concerns
Sunday afternoon, looking through the old m an’s fam ily photograph album - a record o f  
places visited, relatives and friends - 1 wondered at the random gaps and torn fragments. 
He told me that various prints had been ripped out at random by the Red Guards who had 
searched his flat. These young students, more than fifty  years his junior, had also 
confiscated all o f  his twenty diaries spanning six decades. Months later some o f  the 
photographs were returned, along with tw>o diaries - another survived at a relative’s home 
in America.
Before outlining how data was gathered it is important to deal with the epistemological 
issue: what is the status of the knowledge in this account? I am keen to avoid the two 
overlapping criticisms of ethnographic accounts which Richard Fardon distinguishes as: 
the "critique of representation from power" and the "literary critique" (1990: 6-8). The 
former relates to the inequality of political and economic relations which "were the 
conditions for others to be construed in specific terms and as particular types of objects 
of knowledge" (6). The latter refers to textual features such as the seeming objectivity 
and absence of the first person (cf. Clifford & Marcus 1986).
Much has been written on the implication of anthropology in unequal power 
relationships. Writers such as Asad (1973), Said (1978) and Inden (1990) have criticized 
the way in which representations of others by Western Orientalists are implicated in
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unequal power relationships. Such notions appear to consign anthropologists to an 
immutable place within a predetermined (and determining) nexus of power relations. 
Even were this to be the case, and I find such a stance overly simplistic, my own 
experience as a foreigner in China over the course of ten years suggests subtle yet 
significant changes.
During 1992-4 I became increasingly aware of a distinct difference compared to 
my first stay in Shanghai from 1988-90. At this earlier time, I had been aware, often 
uncomfortably so, of an unequal economic power relationship. It was automatically 
assumed that all foreigners were rich and this assumption coloured interpersonal 
relationships between foreigners and Chinese infusing them with an unequal quality. Few 
local citizens had the self confidence to treat a foreigner on a basis of equality. By 1992- 
4 this sense of inferiority (zibeigan) was far less apparent. With the rapid emergence of 
nouveaux riches in Shanghai the simple "foreigner = wealth assumption" was now only 
one equation of a far more disparate and confused range of possibilities. In encounters 
with local people I was aware of this change, and several informants also remarked upon 
it. Abu-Lughod writes that ethnography "is inevitably a language of power" (1991: 150). 
As a research student, dependent upon the good will and help of Shanghai residents whose 
social and cultural (and often economic) "capital" was greater than mine I certainly did 
not feel myself to be in a position of power. I was, moreover, well aware that the Chinese 
authorities could, potentially, revoke my visa at any time.
For several decades anthropologists employed the nineteenth century natural 
science paradigm in which the scholar presupposes that his (sic) knowledge uses the 
highest form of reason and the epistemology used "assumes that true knowledge merely 
represents or mirrors...the separate reality which the knower transcends" (Inden 1990: 15). 
An interesting variation on this is Rev. Doolittle’s (1868) Social Life of the Chinese which 
he subtitled "A Daguerreotype of Daily Life in China". Similarly, Arthur Smith (1892: 
10-11) described his impressions in Chinese Characteristics as like "photographic 
negatives". Despite criticism of positivism, the epistemology used by Western social 
scientists often appears little changed. Graham, for example, accepts Said’s basic thesis 
and comments that after Said "we can never be quite sure that our understanding o f China 
is not tainted" (1983: 42). However, this still leaves us in the paradigm of a natural 
science of society. It remains the approach of scientific realism which "says that the 
entities, states and processes described by correct theories really do exist" (Hacking 1983: 
21). Even though nineteenth century approaches to the depiction of other societies have
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been criticized, the assumption is that some new model of society can be produced which 
will enable us to represent the "reality" of other societies in a manner somehow untouched 
by the human mind.
I fully accept that the "knowledge of the knower is not a disinterested mental 
representation of an external, natural reality. It is a construct that is always situated in a 
world apprehended through specific knowledges and motivated by practices in it" (Inden 
1990: 33). In the case o f China, historians and geographers (e.g. Appleton 1951, Dawson 
1967, Mackerras 1989, March 1974) have shown how representations o f China by 
Western writers have changed over the years in response to shifting cultural trends within 
Europe. The tainted/untainted dichotomy becomes meaningless when one recognizes that 
the conditions under which knowledge is gathered constitutes an inextricable part of that 
knowledge. It is, therefore, important to situate the conditions under which the data for 
this thesis was gathered and to provide an account o f "that human experience which is 
field work" (Berreman 1962: xviii). Throughout this thesis I have sought to remind the 
reader that both my informants and myself were "social being[s] actively emplaced in 
space and time in an explicitly historical and geographical contextualization" (Soja 1989: 
1 1 ).
I am aware of criticism that such "self-conscious attention to the circumstances of 
fieldwork" may "open the possibility of yet more labyrinthine strategies for the creation 
of authority" (Fardon 1990: 12-3). Similarly, my decision to include diverse local 
"voices" may be construed as "orchestrated textual authority" (Ibid: 12) and as a post 
structuralist device in which the ethnographer becomes "the agent who enables people in 
other cultures to speak and...in a sense to exist" (Hobart 1990: 309).
Clearly these are criticisms which strike at the very roots of ethnography. In part 
my rejoinder is that the responsibility for the finished work must, ultimately, be that of 
the ethnographer. Moreover, it is my hope that by deliberately avoiding the urge to over­
systematize and by presenting divergent views that the ethnography in this thesis remains 
particularly open to multiple "readings".
It seems to me that a fundamental dilemma lies in the disjunction between 
anthropological research and ethnographic writing. As Hobart notes "we simply cannot 
represent things as they are, rather we represent something as something else...to an 
audience on a particular occasion" (1990: 309). No matter how much an ethnographer 
aims for "thick description" (Geertz 1973: 27) a process of selection is inevitable since 
"society and culture consists of endless discursive possibilities" (Parkin 1987: 66).
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Selectivity occurs at many levels. In an interview situation, for instance, note-taking is 
always partial with limitations of both time and linguistic competence. A comparison 
between verbatim notes and conversations tape-recorded and transcribed in "full" (in so 
far as this is possible) highlights the extent of grammatical errors, repetition and 
redundancy in many verbal encounters. Moreover, in the abstraction from human 
interaction of written notes there is a tremendous attrition of the meanings conveyed via 
the forms of non-verbal communication which saturate such encounters. This situation 
may be especially relevant in a society with China’s political landscape where "[i]n place 
o f explicit verbal conversation, officially proscribed interpretations may rely heavily on 
gesture, facial expression, tone of voice...[and] an elaborate mixture o f innuendo, 
metaphor, and allegory" (Madsen 1993b: 193-4). Madsen may be right when he argues 
that "anthropologists are the outsiders best able to enter such worlds o f hidden (sic) 
interpretation" (194). However, a truly "thick description" would need to contain all this 
and more, something beyond the format of a written account. Moreover, I would argue 
against the presumption that there is ever complete comprehension in human 
communication, by either native or non-native listeners.
Field notes written-up from memory are more selective still, with problems both 
of forgetting and an irresistible drive to systematize and make comprehensible random 
comments. In addition, much of my data relied upon verbal accounts which were 
themselves re-presentations and re-membered "fragments of the fragments of what was 
initially on view" (Lowenthal 1985: 204). Moreover, "[a]ll memory transmutes 
experience, distils the past rather than simply reflecting it" (Ibid). Eye witness accounts 
are refracted through re-learning including social and peer group pressures, media accounts 
and so forth - there is an ongoing intertextuality. Even the vocabulary people use to 
describe events often matches that used by other people and in media representations. I 
would argue that not only is the present interpreted in the light of past experiences but 
past experiences are also reinterpreted in response to encounters with the contemporary.
At this point I refer the reader to the description, provided above, o f that peaceful 
Sunday afternoon in Shanghai. Months later, recalling the scene, I discerned an analogy 
between the elderly man’s photograph album and diaries, and my manufacture of this 
ethnography. My representations of Shanghai are also images out of place, dislocated, 
fragmented, disjointed, sifted, re-ordered reconstructions with sometimes unaccountable 
sudden gaps. As Clifford Geertz has it, "[t]here is no general story to be told, no synoptic 
picture to be had... What we can construct, if we keep notes and survive, are hindsight
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accounts o f the connectedness of things that seem to have happened: pieced-together
pattemings, after the fact" (1995: 2).
Bearing these thoughts in mind I regard this project in terms o f a metaphor 
supplied by a retired worker in Shanghai. After an evening spent discussing his life 
experiences he showed me out. As we descended the uneven, narrow, unlit wooden 
staircase he commented that he felt it had been "just like telling a story" (xiang jiang 
gushi yiyang - cf. Geertz’s description of anthropological writings as "fictions" 1973: 15). 
The data we use constitutes "our own constructions of other people’s constructions of 
what they and their compatriots are up to" (Ibid: 9). What follows, then, are the stories 
people told me about themselves and their city.
David Parkin’s suggestion of impressionism as a metaphor for the anthropological 
project seems particularly apposite, implying as it does "variations on a theme" (1987: 64). 
There is the possibility "of a potentially endless creation of complementary perspectives" 
(65). I hope to have produced such an ethnography by following a series of different 
themes in each chapter. As the author of this text I have sought to tread a line between 
editorial dictatorship and drift and cacophony. In Shanghai, I heard many contradictory 
views. A refrain echoed by one of my most insightful informants, focused on how 
complicated (fuza) Shanghai was becoming and his inability to understand current socio­
economic trends. Rather than gloss over discrepancies and incoherencies or pretend to a 
panoptican-like overview I have attempted to retain a sense of flux and indeterminacy in 
my text, whilst, at the same time, providing a clear, readable account.
As early as 1962, Berreman noted the differential effects o f his association with 
different assistants and the way that each determined the kinds of data to which he was 
able to gain access. In stressing that ethnographic research is an ongoing, dialectical 
process, it is important to state that the accounts I was given were affected by many 
context-dependent factors. These include my gender, age and relationship to the person 
(as a friend, student, teacher, researcher etc). My status as a (British) foreigner invariably 
affected informants’ perceptions of what I should, could or ought to be told or would want 
to hear. Infinitely subtle factors such as emotional and physical states, time o f day, and 
location all affected encounters. I find particularly useful Ien Ang’s portrayal of the 
researcher as "someone whose job is to produce historically and culturally specific 
knowledges that are the result of equally specific discursive encounters between researcher 
and informants in which the subjectivity of the researcher is not separated from the 
'object’ s/he is studying" (1989: 105). Thus it is incumbent on me to provide some senses
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of the "encounters" involved. The account in this thesis, therefore, comprises "tableaus, 
anecdotes, parables, tales: mini-narratives with the narrator in them" (Geertz 1995: 65).
Research o f this kind is learning "how to be a person" (zenme zuoren), a key 
Chinese conceptualization, in a different cultural environment. My interactions with local 
people and language learning exerted subtle and often imperceptible influences on my 
thinking and character (qianyi mohua). I was, and still am, involved in a constant 
process of learning and reflexivity in which "previous knowledge is continually being 
reworked in the light of experience" (Hobart 1987: 44). The new expression heard one 
day became the basis for the next day’s interview. One is always building on what one 
has just learnt and the same held true for "informants", one’s co-discussants. Presumably, 
all human life is constantly like this, but it may be that the interrelated projects of 
anthropological research and language learning make one particulary conscious of this 
process, and it is a process which should be written into, rather than out of, my account.
My attempts to study Shanghai dialect with a private teacher illustrate the agentive 
role an anthropologist can play whether wittingly or unwittingly. As we progressed he 
told me that he was discovering ever more vocabulary items and realizing that Shanghai 
dialect is very "colourful" (secai) and "rich" (fengfu). After several weeks he confided 
that he had originally considered the dialect as only involving pronunciation differences 
from putonghua and had anticipated that these could easily be taught within five or six 
weeks. Now, however, he realized that there was far more to it than this and that "when 
one speaks it all the day one pays no attention and does not realise this." He became 
increasingly aware of and to relish the distinctiveness of the dialect. In this interaction, 
at the same time as I was learning, I was also being instrumental in altering my teacher’s 
perceptions and understanding of the language he spoke everyday. In facilitating this shift 
of his non-discursive knowledge to the realm of discursive awareness, it could even be 
that I was helping to foster his (new) sense of Shanghainese identity.
Sources of Data - Research Strategies and Tactics
Hannerz writes that "[pjerhaps urban life, by its very nature, implies a demand for 
an even higher degree of...methodological flexibility on the part of the researcher" (1980: 
310). A strategic feature o f my research was to accumulate and utilize data derived from 
an eclectic array of research gathering techniques and strategies. The voices of local 
people, noted from diverse contexts ranging from structured, tape-recorded interviews to 
chance overheard remarks, are the main category of research data utilized in this thesis.
20
However, being cognizant of the "mediazation of modern culture" (Thompson 1990: 3), 
I also collected items in published and other media such as television, films, huajixi 
(comic dramas) and xiangsheng (comic dialogues) - the latter two being popular forms 
of local entertainment which use the Shanghai dialect. The official media can be taken 
as a good source o f representations o f how things should be, such media are intended to 
have a propaganda function. Hu Yaobang wrote that "journalism should make itself a 
successful mouthpiece of the party" (1986: 182). An editorial in Renmin Ribao of July 
1, 1990 made clear the current policy: "Mass media must adhere to the principle of the 
Party spirit, and be politically identified with the Party Central Committee" (cited in Li 
1991: 354-5). The Party produces and sanctions media items which they intend viewers 
to "read" in one way. However, I often found that actual viewers sometimes made 
interpretations which did not accord with the Party’s. Some local people were ironic 
readers of such messages - as one man told me "when you see the television news, the 
reality is the opposite of what is actually said."
In the early 1980s, Margery Wolf found that many people either consciously, or 
often unconsciously, responded to questions using current political slogans. She adds that 
respondents were distinctly uneasy about revealing their personal views but that 
nonetheless often they "casually" revealed instances which were quite contrary to the 
official line (1985: 32). I encountered far fewer instances of this "official speak". In part 
this was due to my much more relaxed and "natural" research context. In addition, this 
relaxation was indicative of the proliferation of, and new diversity in, the Chinese media 
since the late 1970s which has been "significantly expanding the volume, variety and 
reach of cultural services" (Fitzgerald 1984: 114).20 I would draw particular attention 
to the importance o f local television. During the 1980s urban Chinese joined the world’s 
television viewers and the potential "audience" in China now exceeds 650 million 
people.21 By 1986, television penetration in Shanghai had reached 95% (Lull & Sun 
1988: 197). Watching television has become the most popular leisure time activity and 
it "diffuses its messages into the culture in a way that has no parallel" (Lull 1990: 145). 
Moreover, it "has influenced the audience’s thinking on topics that range from sports and 
consumer activities to the most profound political, economic, and cultural issues" (Lull
:oSee, for instance, B ishop 1989, Chang 1989, Evans 1989, Kraus 1995, Landsberger 1985/6 , P ickow icz  
1995, W omack 1986.
21 U seful references on television  in China include B ishop 1989 Ch. 7, Chang 1989 Ch. 6 & 8, Dunnett 
1990 Ch. 9, H ow kins 1982 Ch. 3, Lull & Sun 1988, Li 1991, Lull 1991.
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1991: 172-3). Observing what the local population are regularly observing must be a part 
o f the contemporary anthropologist’s research. Media representations constitute valuable 
ethnographic data in their own right.22 They were also useful as a basis for formulating 
hypotheses and addressing issues less amenable to more direct questioning.
Interviews. Observation and Interaction in Everyday Situations
Robert Weller writes of the PRC that "[r]arely has any state developed such 
powerful institutions to impose and foster unified interpretations" (1994: 188). Thus there 
is a countervalent value to be derived from qualitative research in China. Research on 
unofficial viewpoints using documentary sources (e.g. Arkush 1989, Link 1984, 1989) 
tends to be based upon speculation and the imputation of indigenous viewers’ responses 
by the researcher. Interviews and conversations with local people of differing generations 
and backgrounds were my most valuable source of material. They yielded insights into 
many activities which, as an outsider or through lack of opportunity, I could not 
participate in or observe at first hand. Interviews provided access not only to respondents’ 
conscious opinions and statements but also to the linguistic terms and categories through 
which they constructed their worlds and their own understanding of their activities 
(Morley 1989: 25). A tentative finding is that the institutions Weller refers to are now far 
less powerful than he suggests, and that unofficial viewpoints are now more readily held, 
and certainly more readily voiced.
Interviews were of differing degrees of formality, ranging from encounters in 
officials’ offices to friendly chats in people’s homes. For the most part, interviews were 
semi-structured, that is, I would begin with a set of prepared questions but follow up lines 
o f enquiry as alluded to or hinted at by "informants". My concern was that informants 
should not just follow an agenda and answer a list of questions which were based solely 
upon my presuppositions. Rather, I sought to ask open-ended questions which would 
allow respondents the opportunity to set the agenda and me to be sensitive to their 
concerns and interests in my supplementary questions. Some interviews were 
tape-recorded and transcribed later. In most instances I took notes at the time and 
supplemented them from memory later. Only on one occasion did a respondent ask me 
not to record his words, saying that it would make him "nervous".
Shanghai homes are crowded and in a typical interview situation several people 
would be in the same room. An advantage of this was that often "[a] performance for the
22See, for exam ple Fiske 1987, Fiske & Hartley 1978, W illiam s 1990.
22
ethnographer would be abandoned as tension, conviviality, concentration on a topic of 
conversation, or some other intensification occurred among the participants" (Berreman 
1962: 1). To provide a flavour of the conditions under which data was often gathered I 
reproduce here notes on the difficulties of note-taking in such a situation made after one 
such occasion: 1) people speak faster than I can write; 2) one respondent spoke
putonghua with a heavy Pudong accent; 3) xxx speaks putonghua very badly; 4) often 
one person is talking and somebody else interrupts them in mid-sentence; 5) two or three 
people may talk simultaneously; 6) the television is on at the same time;23 7) children 
talk to me or other people at any time; 8) people come in and out of the room; 9) 
conversations switch back and forth from the variations of putonghua and Shanghai 
dialect; 10) people use expressions I do not understand.
Despite the difficulties in note-taking in such circumstances, it also meant that I 
was often in situations where my "foreignness" would be forgotten or, at least, recede into 
the background. My presence could bee me peripheral, even irrelevant, and people 
engaged in the same activities and conversations as if I were not there. In these "home 
encounters" I was a participant observer/listener/talker in "real situations" which lacked 
the artificiality of many more formal one-to-one interviews. I would stress again 
Shanghai’s crowded situation - privacy, being apart from other people, is not the norm.
As other researchers (e.g. Honig 1989a: 139), I found that "unobtrusive methods" 
(Dahlgren 1988: 293-7) such as conversations, chats on buses and at parties, interaction 
in and observation of everyday situations provided significant research data. At times this 
was similar to the type of "guerilla interviewing" engaged in by Tom Gold (1989), which 
he describes as "unchaperoned, spontaneous but structured participant observation and 
interviews as opportunities present themselves" in which notes are written up afterwards 
(180). Snatches of overheard conversations in buses or elsewhere also provided insights 
and useful material. It was, for instance, whilst cycling and travelling by bus in Shanghai 
that I first became aware of the depth of feeling against migrant workers in Shanghai. 
Local residents, my fellow commuters, often vocalized their disdain for the "outsiders" 
who, as they saw it, crowded the buses and clogged-up the streets.
It was my intention to meet local people from as many different backgrounds as
2;*During an interview with five people in the room (hom e to three o f  them ), at one point when 1 was 
speaking to an interview ee, one person was listening to the radio, another w atching television , and third was 
using the telephone!
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possible. Inevitably, certain categories of person figured more prominently in my 
research. The two main biases in this respect are the age and educational level of my 
informants. People I spoke most with were younger people in their twenties or early 
thirties and retired people. The former group I had the most access to since I had been 
based at a university in 1988-90 and was again during 1992-4. They were also my 
"natural” peer group. The second group, of elderly people, were those with the most free 
time to speak to me. The bias for those with higher education can be accounted for partly 
by my university location. Moreover, there is, I suggest, a tendency for Western 
researchers to associate with local intelligentsia - both habitually theorize sociological 
phenomena.
Often reactions to the ethnographer reveal cultural biases. Local people I 
encountered held a notion of research strikingly similar to that of nineteenth century 
European positivism. It was seen to involve the collection of facts - history books, for 
instance, were said to consist of facts. Even though I would explain that I was interested 
in ordinary people’s understandings, informants often prefaced their comments by saying 
"what we say is not necessarily correct." This self-denigration of agency and expertise 
is. in itself, significant. I often had the sense that people considered correct knowledge 
as a discrete, unambiguous category. It is interesting to speculate how far such notions 
derive from several decades of compulsory Marxism. Associated with this was the notion 
of the containerization or departmentalization of knowledge. In situations where one 
person had a higher education than others, this person would typically be "designated" to 
speak to me as a cultural "expert" who could represent (in dual senses) them.
A particularly interesting aspect of the way informants often represented their 
views was the use of the term laobaixing. When I asked people about events in Shanghai 
they often spoke about "the laobaixing" (the common people, the ordinary people - 
literally "the old one hundred names"). The laobaixing often appeared to be reified as 
an essentialized patient or victim (less often as an agent). At times it was evident that 
informants were verbalising their own feelings or experiences in terms of "the laobaixing" 
although this distinction was not always clear. To retain this ambiguity and to highlight 
the frequency of deployment of this term 1 retain the Chinese usage throughout. I posed 
the question, "Who are the laobaixing?" to various people. A standard response was that 
laobaixing includes everybody apart from high officials. A man in his sixties pointed out 
that "during the Cultural Revolution the laobaixing were called ‘the masses’ (qunzhong)". 
With the recent stress upon material incentives and consumerism old terms may be re­
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cycled and re-invested with meanings. The response of an engineer in his twenties was 
illustrative of this, for he described the laobaixing as "those who use their own ability 
(ziji de bensbi) and blood and sweat (xuehan) to make money" whilst non-laobaixing 
are "those who use power to make money."
Making Contact
Foreigners don’t know the truth [o f matters in China]. We Chinese (a la zong ku nin, women zhongguoren), including professors, have all been fooled  (shangdang). After 
forty years in this environment [i.e. post 1949 China], I  understand a little (wo you yidian mingbai), but there is still much that I  don’t understand. So how can a foreigner who 
knows little Chinese and stays here fo r  only a short period o f  time know very much? I t ’s 
easy to cheat foreigners.
Informant’s comment
A local sociologist remarked to me that it is very difficult for both Chinese and 
foreigners to conduct research in China because "there are many walls and curtains." The 
ways in which I was able to meet people and the kinds o f networks I used to negotiate 
these boundaries are indicative of the nature of human relations in Chinese society. It is 
important to note some of the particular problems and also the advantages faced by 
researchers and especially a foreign ("outside country person") researcher in China.
"Na ku nin, na ku nin" - the dialect term for "foreigner" (waiguoren) is invariably 
the first word of Shanghai dialect an overseas visitor learns in the city. When a flaneur 
in the city, I often heard this term used in the gossip around me. Parents would point me 
out to their children, and young children would tug at their parents, point, and tell them 
"na ku nin, na ku nin". This was not only a linguistic initiation but also an introduction 
to a different cultural environment. It revealed a key organizing factor in Chinese society 
- nei-wai you bie - the distinction made between inside and outside.24 In this instance, 
the distinction was between "inside country" (guonei) and "outside country" (guowai or 
waiguo). This distinction is drawn so clearly that I could never become "Chinese" but 
must learn how to be a "foreigner" in Shanghai. The inside/outside dichotomy permeates 
Chinese society - at its most intimate level is the family (women ziji ren - our own 
people) and everybody else. During Mao Zedong’s time a crucial distinction was between 
"the people" and "enemies o f the people". This dichotomy can also drawn between 
Communist Party and non-Party members, an increasingly hazy distinction - especially at 
the level of ordinary Party members - but still important nonetheless. It can also be 
Shanghainese {a la Sang he mn/women Shanghairen) in contrast to non-Shanghainese
24See Yang 1989a: 40 -1 , also chapters 2 and 3 below .
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{na di mn/waidiren - "outside land people").
At least two important considerations may lead Chinese people to be particularly 
circumspect in interactions with foreigners: fear and nationalism. Each makes people 
especially reluctant to mention shortcomings of Chinese society. Until at least the mid- 
1970s - many informants said the early/mid 1980s - it was dangerous to have contact with 
foreigners. A visit by a foreigner would be followed by a visit from the police. The less 
politically charged atmosphere in contemporary Shanghai allowed for a much more 
relaxed and spontaneous interchange between foreigners and Chinese. However, legacies 
o f the fear and caution instilled in the past remained, especially amongst older people. 
A particular worry was that a foreigner may publish items when they return home which 
would place them in danger. One informant represented the prevalent view that "it is no 
longer frightening to meet a foreigner, but it can still bring trouble. If one does not know 
somebody, why look for trouble?"
A second important consideration involves nationalistic feelings, what local people 
described as "national face". For instance, one friend told me "if a foreigner asks me 
about Beijing getting the Olympics I will say that it should. If another Chinese person 
asks me, I will say it shouldn’t." When I inquired into the reason for this discrepancy I 
was told "it’s because of face (mianzi)." People may consider pointing out China’s 
shortcomings as jia chou bu ke wai yang - domestic shame which should not be made 
public. This may be related to a general distaste for foreigners who smear (chouhua) 
China. A combination of face and fear meant that I had particular problems in trying to 
meet workers who had been laid off (xiagang). One contact who knew several xiagang 
workers none of whom were willing to speak to me, explained that "they are very angry. 
They have nothing good to say about this society and are afraid of getting into trouble if 
they speak to you."
People I encountered not only had their own ideas about what foreigners should 
not be told but also differing ideas about what they could understand. In conversations 
and interviews which touched upon diverse aspects of Chinese society I was frequently 
told "you foreigners cannot understand" (nimen waiguoren bu neng lijie). Using the 
notion of ethnography as a performance, it often seemed that there was a construction of 
the audience - in this instance foreigners/myself - as a paedocracy (Hartley 1987). That 
is, many informants believed that Chinese society is inherently too complex for foreigners 
to understand - a notion which serves as a kind of boundary maintenance device. I 
vividly recall an interview with a university lecturer who knew that I had studied Chinese
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for several years, lived in Shanghai for almost three years, and was a research student 
studying contemporary China. At one point in our conversation he asked me whether I 
had heard of Mao Zedong!
It will, however, be evident from the comment on the Olympics that I was not 
solely related to as a foreigner.25 At times, my knowledge of Chinese language, 
Shanghai dialect and local customs enabled me to straddle the shifting insider-outsider 
boundary. This cultural capital made me an outsider with inside knowledge. People 
would describe me as "half Chinese", "like a Shanghainese" or "almost Chinese". A 
popular Chinese song points out, Chinese people have "black hair, black eyes and yellow 
skin".26 With my brown hair, blue eyes and white skin, no amount o f cultural capital 
(or a Chinese passport for that matter) would be sufficient to make me fully "Chinese".
Chinese society is highly stratified. It was noticeable in local television news 
reports that when people were interviewed the caption beneath them usually described 
only their appropriate categorical status such as "customer", "neighbour" or "factory 
manager" rather than their given name. In the same way as Chinese surnames precede 
given names so introductions of people commence with their appropriate social status and 
then their personal name. As an "outsider" I needed to negotiate various inside/outside 
parameters and had to "fit somewhere into the known social system" (Berreman 1962: 
xxi). When introduced it was important that I be assigned to a meaningful category, 
whether it be "schoolmate/teacher/friend of xxx, "student studying abroad (liuxuesheng)" 
or "student of London University". At times even "my friend from England" was 
sufficient. In each instance, the ascribed title would precede my name.
The contact mentioned above who knew several xiagang workers added that if 
there is a basis of trust (xinren) and if people felt I was concerned (guanxin) about China 
they would talk openly. Before detailing bases of trust, it is appropriate to note some of 
the advantages of being a foreigner in China. A foreigner is likely to be outside a 
person’s regular circle o f acquaintances - it may be "safer" to speak to. an outsider.27 
One respondent told me that in certain respects he felt less of a demarcation line (jiexian) 
with foreigners than with other Chinese. In particular, he referred to social and political
2<iPeople w ould often discuss "foreigners" - including "English people" - in m y presence, im puting to 
them w ays o f  behaving, characteristics or world v iew s they knew I did not possess. These disjunctures 
rarely seem ed to im pinge upon the stereotypes.
260 n  the "discourse o f  race" in China generally see Frank Dikotter (1992).
27ln rural research the degree o f  ‘encapsulation’ w ould probably be much greater.
27
ideas which Chinese friends may consider "unbearably (jieshoubuliao) extreme" and 
could only be mentioned to very close friends. Examples of this included the notion that 
China should give Tibet and Xinjiang independence and that Zhou Enlai - still a popular 
"hero" - was as much to blame for the Cultural Revolution as Mao Zedong. As a 
foreigner, I could be told since I had no preformed "barrier" against such ideas.
Foreigners in China are often described as "foreign friends" and treated as "exalted 
guests" (Butler 1983: 119). In many interactions I was treated with more politeness and 
received more cooperation as a Westerner than a Chinese stranger would. As a Chinese 
speaker, I tended to lose the category of "guest" and some of the politeness due to this 
category of person. At times, when I was with Chinese friends and a need arose to 
approach an official they would suggest that it would be most efficacious if I made a 
request for help. Often, too, they would suggest that it would be best if  I use English on 
such occasions, prestige appeared to be attached to not being able to speak Chinese. 
Finally, one academic felt Chinese people should tell foreigners as much as possible about 
China and "especially the life and thoughts of the laobaixing (‘common people’)." It was 
my impression that he regarded it as a moral imperative to tell foreigners what China is 
"really like" and not leave them reliant upon official representations which he regarded 
as partial and inaccurate.
In Exploring the City. U lf Hannerz (1980: 192) remarks that contact-making in 
many non-Western cities is much more personalized than in contemporary Western cities. 
He adds that "in some societies there is a widespread agreement that to accomplish things 
you need particularistic linkages" (Ibid). These insights accord with the situation in China 
where there are highly elaborated indigenous notions of networking and people have a 
high degree of "network awareness" (Ibid: 196). In her research into guanxi 
("relationships") Mayfair Yang relied heavily upon a string of dyadic relationships 
(guanxi) to make contact with people. (1986: 93-4). Similarly, Helen Siu reports that she 
depended upon "an informal network" (1983: 150). In a similar fashion I built upon 
contacts I had made during my stay in Shanghai from 1988-90. I also adopted the "rolling 
approach" used by Frank Pieke in Beijing (1991a, 1991b). Pieke describes how he 
successfully built up a network "by asking informants to introduce me to a friend who 
might be willing to talk to me" (1991a: 8). I did make some contacts via chance 
encounters but most were made via intermediaries. Contacts made during my two years 
residence in Shanghai from 1988-90 were extremely useful. This prior residence, 
alongside short visits to the city in 1984 and 1985, also gave me some familiarity with the
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city and a basis on which to assess the comments informants made on the processes 
underway in the city.
Important bases of trust are those of tong or sameness such as classmate, relatives, 
work colleagues and teacher-student (see chapter 4). Friendship is important but is usually 
based upon one of the latter relationships. In establishing a basis of trust it was important 
to create friendly relations (jiaoqing). Becoming a "friend" is a vital element for 
successful research in China (Thurston 1983: 26-8). This is a relationship built upon trust 
in which "the human element-intangible factors of personality, adaptability, geniality, 
sensitivity, and decorum" all play an important part (Ibid: 26).
The relationship o f tongxue was especially valuable in my research. As a student 
I made contact with fellow students (tongxue) and teachers. On one occasion I was 
introduced by a fellow student’s wife to four university classmates whom she described 
as shuren (friends). One of them subsequently told me that if I had been introduced to 
her in any other context she would not have been prepared to speak to me. As she 
expressed it, I was "dependent upon the face" of our mutual friend (kan xxx de mianzi).
I could also be introduced to colleagues, relatives and other current or former students of 
my own teachers. The teacher-student relationship was also fruitful. As an occasional 
teacher of English I made contact with students who would introduce me to their friends 
and relatives as their "teacher".
A distinct disadvantage of conducting research in a society where particularistic 
values dominate is that without personal contacts it can be extremely difficult to penetrate 
"circles" of relationships. An advantage of such a society is that once accepted by one 
link in an interpersonal circle of trust one often gains access to a much wider number of 
people than would be the case in England. People will help others on the strength of 
sometimes very tenuous links. For instance, a former middle school classmate of a friend 
introduced me to his sister’s husband. In instances where one "depends upon the face" 
of a mutual acquaintance contacts could be built upon in ways which would be unusual 
in England. My networking - described by one informant as a "chain reaction" (liansuo 
fanying) - stretched across a gamut of different bases of trust which may cross back and 
forth across the generations. As an example, I once met the parents o f a Chinese 
classmate. The father subsequently introduced me to a work colleague who felt indebted 
to him for having helped him secure his present job. The work colleague then introduced 
me to a colleague from his previous job and to a schoolmate of his son. Via this 
schoolmate I met his girlfriend and another schoolmate...
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An important part of "networking" in China is reciprocity, although the nature and 
degree of conscious calculation involved in particular interactions is difficult to gauge. 
Providing help (bangmang) is a prime means for creating a basis of trust. In the initial 
stages of some interactions the reciprocal exchange of name cards forms a part of the 
etiquette of introducing oneself. Dining is an important part of human relations, often 
considered vital in creating and maintaining connections. For example, if  I invited 
somebody for a restaurant meal this was generally followed by an invitation to a meal at 
their home. When invited in this way, I followed local politeness and took a small gift, 
often of fruit.
Relations can also be built upon a basis of common interest - a li-hai relationship. 
I engaged or became embroiled in such relations to a limited extent. Offset against my 
wish to acquire information could be the following: a chance to practise English and 
acquire information about the West; the notion that "one more friend is one more ‘path’"; 
the possibility of future material advantages, for example, a belief that one day I may be 
employed in a position o f influence (in the diplomatic service and able to issue UK visas 
was one suggestion!); a degree of prestige derived from association with foreigners - for 
instance, my visit to a newly established private school was felt to be good publicity.
An interview with a local government official provides a good instance o f the 
differential information obtained once a basis of trust has been created. In interactions 
with officials one is especially likely to encounter "officialese" (guanhua) where the most 
interesting aspects are often those which remain unsaid. On this occasion a young man 
introduced me to his father, a worker in a trade union who had recently applied to join 
the Communist Party. He explained that his prime motivation was to improve his career 
prospects but swiftly added that during the course of his application he would, o f course, 
convey an impression of pure altruism. To demonstrate his facility in providing what 
would be required, he proceeded to recite paragraphs of the prevailing dogma. If, as a 
stranger, I had met this man in his official capacity I would undoubtedly have heard only 
the latter official-speak.
During conversations, especially with people I did not know very well, it was 
important to create bridgeheads of contact, common points which could be understood. 
These included information about myself or England which evoked in people a sense of 
common feeling or experience and a shared idiom for communication. In other instances 
"television talk" acted as a "social facilitator" which enabled me both to establish common 
ground with local people and to address issues which may be awkward to approach by
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more direct questioning (Lull 1990: 35-44).
Language facility played a vital part in attempting to bridge the "inside-outside" 
distinction. Use of standard Chinese, which I had previously studied for three years full­
time and two years on a part-time basis, was essential. Beyond this, my attempts to study 
and use the distinctive Shanghai dialect were helpful in creating closer relationships. 
Finally, in one instance, I was introduced to a man of about seventy by a former 
schoolmate. He recalled that he first met an English person in 1936, when a business 
colleague of his father came to his house. I was the second English person to visit his 
home and he said that he felt a close connection to England because of this. I sensed that 
his kindness to me was imbued with the sense of affection (qing) he felt for his old school 
friend, his home, his father, even a generalized nostalgia for his childhood.
More generally, my being an "English person" constituted an important part of 
local people’s perceptions of me. I heard a stock range of descriptions o f "English 
people" repeated to me on hundreds of occasions. For instance, I would be told that 
England had been a great power but was now in decline. It remains a country ruled by 
a Queen and aristocrats and, until recently, by the much admired Prime Minister, Margaret 
Thatcher. Its people were honest and deeply conservative and its capital city, my home 
town, perennially sunk in a "nether sky of fog" (Dickens 1971 [1853]: 49). The way in 
which people related to me on a daily basis was undoubtedly influenced by such 
stereotypes and consequent expectations. The import of this for the data I gathered is, I 
believe, impossible to unravel. Suffice to say that in some way it and my own 
presentations of self in daily encounters must surely suffuse this thesis.
Historical Background to Shanghai28
This outline is intended to provide background information on Shanghai and to 
highlight aspects of historical and contemporary significance. These aspects include 
Shanghai’s: "forgotten" pre-Opium War history as an entrepot; post-Opium War
development as a cosmopolitan, semi-colonial city and a major industrial, financial, 
cultural and political centre; distinctive organizational structure under Communist Party 
rule; limited post-Mao reforms; and rapid socio-economic changes initiated during the
:8This section draws upon Bergere 1989, C hinese Repository (hereafter CR), Cameron 1970, C h’en 
1979, C lifford 1991, Johnson 1995, D avidson-H ouston 1962, De Jesus 1909, H onig 1986, 1992, H ow e  
1981, Johnson 1993, Lanning & C ouling 1921, M aclellan 1889, Murphey 1953, 1974, Perry 1994, Pott 
1928, Sutherland 1984, Wakeman & Yeh 1992, Wasserstrom 1991, W hite 1978, 1981, 1994, W hite & 
Cheng 1993.
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1990s and especially since 1992.
Pre-Colonial Shanghai
At a conference in Shanghai, a paper by one Shanghai academic commenced an 
examination of the city’s importance with the words: "Over 150 years since the founding 
of Shanghai in the middle of the 19th century..." (Xu 1993: 3). However, there has been 
a town on the site of contemporary Shanghai for over 2,200 years. By the thirteenth 
century the city was a regional trade centre. It declined during the Ming dynasty but 
revived in the Qing. It was given its present name in AD 1280. A city wall - three and 
three quarter miles long and 18-20 feet high - was built in 1554 as protection against 
Japanese pirates. The first documented European contact appears to have been in the 
sixteenth century when the missionary Matteo Ricci stayed there. De Jesus (1909: xxviii) 
estimates that the population was 528,000 in 1812.29 In the early 1830s foreign visitors 
described Shanghai as a prosperous trading city with its port handling a volume of 
shipping equal to or exceeding that of London (Murphey 1974: 40).
Substantial British trade with China began in the early eighteenth century. For 
over eighty years, from 1760, European residence was restricted to a 24 acre site in 
Canton with trade conducted under stringent regulations applied by the Chinese 
authorities. In 1832 a Mr Lindsay was sent from Canton to Shanghai to request that the 
city be opened up to foreign trade. He was unsuccessful in this but sent the East India 
Company a report with "glowing impressions of Shanghai’s wealth and prospects" (De 
Jesus: 1-9).
In June 1842, during the Opium War, Shanghai was occupied by British troops. 
Under the Treaty of Nanking, signed on 29 August 1842, the city was one o f five treaty 
ports opened to British residence and trade (the other four were Canton, Amoy, Fuzhou 
and Ningbo, with Hong Kong also ceded to Britain). Under the Treaty, British citizens 
were given rights of extraterritoriality, a privilege ultimately granted to the citizens of 
some seventeen countries. A visitor to Shanghai in 1843 described it as a "mercantile 
emporium" with trade between ports within China and also international trade with, for 
example, Manilla, Siam, Malacca, and Bali (CR 1846 15(9): 466-9). Lt. Forbes, who was 
with the British force which captured Shanghai, provides a glowing account o f the city
^'Population figures for this period vary dramatically: Lieutenant-General Sir Hugh G ough w ho led the 
1842 attack on Shanghai estim ated a population o f  60 ,000 -70 ,000  (CR 1843 12(7): 344); Fortune estim ates 
27 0 ,0 0 0  in 1843 (1853: I, 91); and an article in the CR suggests 300 ,000  in 1843 (1846  15(9): 467).
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within its walls, its "very large suburbs" and "extensive trade" (1848: 10-54). He also 
described the expanse of country around Shanghai, "its rich cultivation, and numerous 
canals, teeming with wealth, beauty, and ague" (15).
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Map 1. The Main Treaty Ports of China
Source - E.R. Hughes The Invasion of China Bv The Western World. London: Adam & 
Charles Black. (1937: 3)
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Map 2. Late Nineteenth Century Sketch Map of Shanghai
Source - C.J.H. Halcombe The Mvstic Flowerv Land London: Luzac & Co (1896: 9)
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Map 3. Plan Showing Development of Shanghai by 1940 
Source - F.C Jones Shanghai and Tientsin OUP. (1940).
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Semi-Colonial Shanghai
By the late 1840s "an out-line European town" had begun to emerge on the 
Concession site (CR 1847 16(8): 406). In 1849 the French and in 1854 the Americans 
were granted land. The British and American zones amalgamated in 1863 to form the 
International Settlement. Shanghai rapidly grew from a "prosperous domestic port into 
one of the truly great cities of the world" (Perry 1993: 115). The foreign community set 
up their own Municipal Council in 1854, although White describes the ensuing fifty year 
period in Shanghai as one of "maximum modernization with minimum administration" 
(1981: 31). By 1919, Shanghai had become the major industrial, commercial, and 
financial centre of China and was one of the five or six largest cities in the world.
Writers such as Said (1978) and Inden (1990) have highlighted regularities in 
Western representations of so-called "Oriental" peoples. Post-Opium War British 
representations of China can be firmly placed within the wider discourse o f Orientalism. 
China was portrayed as a country frozen in time, isolated from the beneficent influences 
of the West, its population in a somnambulant torpor. Once Shanghai came under the 
aegis of British domination it was readily absorbed into this Orientalist discourse. Writers 
such as A.E. Moule describe "the former isolation of Shanghai" and comment that 
Shanghai was "formerly somewhat obscure, difficult of access, and unimportant" (1911: 
213). A common assertion is that Shanghai’s development was "all due to European 
initiative" (Bigham 1901: 103) and "a splendid example of what British energy, wealth, 
and organizing power can do " (Bishop 1899: 24). Shanghai’s success is attributed to "the 
public spirit", "honesty of purpose", "power of brain", "tact and indomitable will" (4) of 
its foreign residents who overcame "the difficulties which faced them on all sides" 
including the "visible inertia o f the native character" (4). Contrasts were increasingly 
drawn between the native walled city and the foreign settlement - sometimes referred to 
as the "model settlement" (cf. Dyce 1906).30 The foreign concession was described as 
"an object-lesson of modern civilization among the benighted millions of China" (De Jesus 
1909: i). In a more recent work, David-Houston dedicates his history of Shanghai, Yellow 
Creek, to "The men from the West who Built Asia’s Greatest City" (1962). He comments 
that by 1870, "in the face of sullen obstruction from the Chinese authorities, Shanghai had 
emerged from the slime, and was already, in terms of trade, the fifth port in the world"
30For com parisons o f  the Settlem ent and the C hinese city, see, for instance, CR 1847 16(11): 542-65, 
Bigham 1901: 103-4, B ishop 1899: 24 -26 , Cum m ing 1886: 3-7, Darwent 1904: 106-21 and W ilson 1887: 
20-5.
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(91).
By the 1920s and 1930s Shanghai had become one of the most "modern" cities in 
Asia with major trading companies, factories, universities, department stores, modern 
public utilities and banks. The city developed an extensive "civil society" composed of 
both non-governmental private economic activities and "political society". These included 
an extensive range of both Chinese and foreign corporate groups, voluntary associations, 
newspapers and publishing houses. Shanghai was the leading cultural centre in China. 
China’s film industry began in the city and in 1906 the first cinema was opened. Writers 
such as Xu Zhimo, Mao Dun and Lu Xun all gravitated to Shanghai. During the 1930s 
there was a flourishing school of literature (haipai wenxue) in Shanghai.
Shanghai became an important point of cultural contact with numerous foreign' 
companies, schools and universities (e.g. St. John’s University set up in 1879), missions, 
publishing houses, bars, shops, intellectual and political movements. Western thought had 
considerable impact both through its direct agents such as missionaries and educators and 
also more diffuse cultural influences such as Western literature and films - by 1935, 18 
o f Shanghai’s 37 cinemas showed only foreign films (Ch’en 1979: 220).
Many Western observers saw Shanghai as increasingly part of the "modem" world 
(e.g. Hughes 1937: 268-74, Lang 1946: 93, 99, 120). Hughes described Chinese families 
in Shanghai as "increasingly cut off from their ancestral village" and notes how the middle 
classes "have through education, come to a modern rationalist position, and see the ideals 
of old China as a lost cause" (268). With approval, he noted that "Miss Shanghai" now 
wears short skirts, has permed hair and participates in "sex romance" (269-71). Gaulton 
also describes emulation of the West. He writes that "Shanghai’s middle and upper 
classes cultivated a distinctively Europeanized cultural style" (1981: 40).
Alongside commerce and industry, diverse underworld activities flourished in the 
city. Overseas visitors described it as the "Sodom of China" (Gamewell 1916: 172) or 
"the Paris of the China" a city where "many young men [were] ruined by its attractions" 
(Hardy 1907: 70). With a predominantly migrant population and three separate policing 
authorities Shanghai became the centre of organized crime in China (see Martin 1992). 
In Perry’s estimation gangsters were "the effective rulers of early twentieth century 
Shanghai" (1993: 89). Prostitution was recognized as a major problem. One estimate puts 
the number of prostitutes in Shanghai in 1935 at 100,000, making it "the largest single 
employer of female labor" (Hershatter 1992: 145).
In the West it often seems that the abiding resonances of pre-1949 Shanghai are
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of sing-song houses, gambling, prostitution, opium dens and kidnapping. This is the. 
Shanghai of novels such as Shanghai: City For Sale (Hauser 1940) and Shanghai.
Paradise of Adventurers (Miller 1937). Miller wrote (critically) that "Shanghai laughs, 
drinks and...loves outrageously, impudently" (1937: 22). Such images persist in post-1949 
studies. For instance, Murphey writes that "[m]orality was irrelevant or meaningless in 
Shanghai" (1953: 9). In her semi-fictionalized account Gangsters in Paradise (1984) Pan 
Ling mentions the "showiness of Shanghai" (4), that it was "an outlaws dream" (12), the 
"opium emporium of China" (28) and "a city that catered to all sexual tastes" (13).
As China’s largest and most dynamic city and with relative freedom of expression 
Shanghai was home for many Chinese radical movements. Often these were inspired by 
nationalism such as the Chinese Communist Party founded in the city’s French Concession 
in 1921. The city was the site of many demonstrations against colonial rule (see 
Wasserstrom 1991). In addition, in the period between 1919-49, Shanghai had "one of 
the most aggressive labor movements in world history" with strikes and labour disputes 
reaching a peak in 1926-7, 1946 and in late 1949 (Perry 1994: 1, see also 1993).
On March 25, 1927 the Nationalist forces of Chiang Kai-shek entered Shanghai. 
On April 12 he launched an attack on CCP members and supporters with the intention of 
eradicating Communist influence in the city. This aim was largely achieved and the CCP 
was forced to seek a rural power base. Chiang had "grandiose plans to turn Shanghai into 
a modern urban settlement" and aimed to make it a fully "modern" metropolis 
(Wasserstrom 1991: 151). However, civil war and war against the Japanese meant that 
such plans made little progress and were, effectively, shelved until resuscitated in the 
1990s. In 1932 there was Sino-Japanese conflict in and around Shanghai. At the start of 
the 1937-45 Anti-Japanese War, in October 1937, Shanghai’s Zhabei district was 
practically destroyed by Japanese bombers. The International Settlement was 
overwhelmed by Japanese forces following the attack on Pearl Harbour in December 1941.
In 1945, the Nationalist government regained control of Shanghai. Wasserstrom 
comments that in 1945, the KMT were "greeted warmly" but that by 1949 they "had 
squandered this initial goodwill" (1991: 155). The period from 1945-9 has gone down in 
Shanghai history as marked by inflation, official corruption and civil strife. However, 
Shanghai’s new' government in 1949 came not as a result of these pressures but as the 
result o f battles fought elsewhere. On May 25, with scarcely a shot fired, Shanghai fell 
to a largely peasant army.
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Shanghai Under Mao
Shanghai presented the victorious CCP with some extremely difficult problems. 
As a semi-colonial, cosmopolitan city it represented a threat (also an affront) to the new 
government but it also contained a substantial proportion o f the nation’s productive 
capacity and skilled work force. After the purge of 1927 the CCP even lacked effective 
propagandists who spoke the dialect to help consolidate its power in the city (Gaulton 
1981: 50).
The new authorities established (or revived) highly effective means of 
organizational control and surveillance. The Cultural Revolution/Maoist model of 
urbanization is noted by Parish and Whyte as having the following distinctive structural 
features (358):
1. Strict migration controls and minimal urbanization.
2. A penetrating residential work unit organizational system.
3. A highly developed bureaucratic allocation system.
4. An emphasis on production rather than consumption.
5. A relatively egalitarian distribution system.
6. A rejection of schools as a basic mechanism for sorting talent.
7. Much stress on citizen involvement in public health, social control etc.
8. Rigid taboos on all forms of dress, expression, ritual life, and communication that does 
not conform to the official ideology.
These structural features had distinctive social consequences, most notably a high 
stability in jobs and residence, minimal differentiation of consumption patterns and life 
styles, extreme bureaucratization and the creation of a sharp urban-rural divide. This 
pattern made the cities of that period distinct from the past in China and from urban areas 
elsewhere. It is also important to note the extent to which policies in urban and rural 
China diverged and "two distinctive organizational and economic forms were established" 
(Whyte 1993b: 359).
Between Autumn 1950 and December 1957, the proportion of Shanghai’s industrial 
workers employed in privately owned factories was reduced from 75% to zero (Perry 
1994: 7-8). By 1951 almost all foreigners had left and foreign and Chinese capitalist 
enterprises were gradually taken over, a process completed by the 1956 nationalizations. 
Workers were employed in state or collective work units called danwei.
From the early 1950s until the late 1970s citizens were divided into four discrete
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classes - workers, peasants, the military and intellectuals (gong, nong, bing, xue). The 
degree to which individuals’ lives were encapsulated within bureaucratically organized and 
policed structures during the Maoist era severely limited the extent o f "civil society" 
which "operates according to a logic and an organizational structure that is different from 
that of the centralized state and its administrative, military and legal arms" (Yang 1989b: 
35). Organizational changes were backed up by the Party’s moves "to introduce and 
popularize a set o f symbols, including a new political vocabulary, which it expected the 
people to use to structure their response" (Gaulton 1981: 48).
In 1949, Shanghai suffered a loss of capital and expertise to Hong Kong. Between 
1949-79 the status of the city was undermined through various measures including: i) 
government policies designed to reverse the concentration of the nation’s productive 
capacity in coastal cities and to relocate the economic "centre of gravity" to inland 
provinces; ii) the centralization of political power in Beijing; iii) the government’s policy 
of autarky; iv) China’s diplomatic isolation vis-^-vis the West and relative closure to 
foreign trade; and v) the lack of significant investment in Shanghai. Until the 1980s, the 
main exceptions to this policy were the founding of the vast Jinshan Oil and Chemical and 
Baoshan Steel Plants both founded in suburban Shanghai in the 1970s. In addition, 
considerable quantities of the city’s resources both in terms of material resources and 
skilled manpower were transferred from Shanghai. Between 1950-83, Shanghai gave 
86.8% of its tax revenues to the central government and retained just 13.2% (Jacobs & 
Hong 1994: 231). Despite this, there was still significant economic growth in the city and 
it remained China’s pre-eminent industrial centre.
Post-Mao Shanghai'1
In 1979 the CCP Vice-Chairman Ye Jianying announced that the "basic goal of 
revolution is to liberate and develop the social productive forces" (cited in Tsou 1983: 69). 
Rather than the former emphasis on class struggle, egalitarianism and autarky the Chinese 
government began to stress the "Four Modernisations" (in industry, agriculture, defence, 
and science and technology) - a policy first proposed by Premier Zhou Enlai in January 
1975. These were to be achieved by reforms such as allowing some people and places 
to get rich first and the "Open Door" to Western capital and technology.
Initially, most reforms were instituted in the countryside. In 1987 Gordon White 
wrote that policy and institutional changes implemented in rural areas since 1978 were
3IA general overview  o f  the period 1979-89 is presented in Saich (1992).
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"transforming fundamentally the character of rural society" (264). At this time there had 
been only relatively modest changes in urban China, such as the re-legalization o f small- 
scale private enterprises.
The state began to implement a more concerted range of urban reforms from the 
m id-1980s. However, the scope, scale and impact of these reforms was still quite limited. 
In this respect they accorded with the prescripts of Chen Yun, a long-standing member 
o f the CCP Politburo and a Vice-Premier of the State Council. In the early 1980s, Chen 
"declared that the relationship between the planned economy and the...market was like a 
bird and a cage. The plan was the cage and the bird the market. If the cage was too 
small, the bird would suffocate. If  there was no cage, the bird would fly away" (Bachman 
1985: 152). Thus the urban reforms constituted a tinkering at the margins o f the socialist 
state planned economy. There was no fundamental economic restructuring but, rather, 
new forms and types of employment were grafted onto the existing system. In Shanghai, 
these reforms had a gradual and piecemeal effect.
Despite the limited extent of urban reforms, by the mid-1980s there was already 
evidence o f prosperity in Chinese cities, especially those on the eastern seaboard which, 
it seemed, were "fast becoming depoliticised, modernized and westernized" (Chan 1989: 
67). Between 1980-87 industrial growth averaged 10% per annum and between 1978-87 
the average urban resident’s real income doubled.32 A World Bank (1990: 129) report 
estimated average per capita incomes for different provinces in 1986: Shanghai was
highest of all at 3,471¥, next was Beijing with 2,130¥, the national average was 746¥, and 
Anhui just 599¥.
By 1988 inflation became a serious problem for the first time since before the 
Communist takeover and this was a prime underlying cause of the demonstrations which 
erupted in many Chinese cities in Spring 1989. In Shanghai, as in most Chinese cities, 
there were large-scale demonstrations with overt demands for greater democracy and an 
end to corruption by officials. After its clampdown on demonstrators in Beijing on June 
4, the party-state sought to reassert its authority across China through the use o f terror and 
an intensive propaganda campaign. At the same time, attempts were made to slacken the 
pace of economic reform and many of my informants described the period between mid- 
1989 and 1991 as one of stagnation.
'l:Kirkby writes that after tw o decades o f  deteriorating urban conditions, urban housing has been the 
"single greatest beneficiary" in the post-1978 re-allocation o f  state resources (1985: 170).
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Shanghai In The Nineties
Today, under Deng Xiaoping’s reforms, the city [Shanghai] is once again trying to draw 
_ foreigners and their enterprise, once again dreaming o f  becoming one o f  the great 
international centers o f  the world.
Nicholas Clifford (1991: 38)
I was resident in Shanghai in the year after June 4, and the atmosphere often felt 
very depressing. When I next returned to Shanghai in Summer 1992, I expected there to 
have been little change in this gloomy scenario. It therefore came as a surprise to find 
a quite different atmosphere and to discover that a main topic of conversation was stocks 
and shares!
From 1990 the central government had begun to promote Shanghai and Pudong. 
But the main changes took place after Deng Xiaoping’s now famous January 1992, Spring 
Festival, "inspection tour of the south" which included stops in Shenzhen and Shanghai. 
A handful of brief comments Deng was reported to have made on this tour translated into 
dramatic shifts in policy and the morale of many Shanghainese citizens. Throughout my 
research period in Shanghai, the slogan gaige kaifang ("reform and the Open Door"), the 
dominant paradigm for China’s social and economic policies, was endlessly repeated in 
the city's media.
In measures announced in March 1992, Shanghai Municipality was given more 
authority to make decisions regarding investment approval. In addition, the central 
government granted permission to issue stocks and shares and to permit trading in 
Shanghai of stocks issued elsewhere in China. Foreign stores were allowed in Pudong and 
income taxes on Shanghai enterprises lowered from 55% to 33% (Jacobs & Hong 1994: 
234). In addition to these preferential policies "the centre...[gave] Shanghai an explicit 
regional leadership role" (Ibid: 239) as the "Dragon Head" of the entire Yangzi River 
Valley. Two major suspension bridges have been built to link Pudong with central 
Shanghai and much foreign and domestic capital has flowed into Shanghai. At a national 
level, the new policy direction was underlined in late 1992 at the 14th Communist Party 
Conference with its call for the development of a "socialist market economy".
On January 1, 1993 Pudong New District (Pudong xinqu) was established. This 
has a population of 1,380,000 and an area of 518 km2 - about five-sixths the size of 
Singapore (Ibid: 235-6). A recent paper stressed that a key objective for Shanghai by 
2010 is to "[c]reate a modern city of the first order in world terms" (Zhao 1993: 2). This 
agenda appears, belatedly, to bear out Pye’s anticipation that with the "Four 
Modernizations" policy Shanghai would "again assert itself as the country’s most advanced
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and dynamic city" (1981: xv).
In three years, 1991-4, Shanghai’s GDP grew by approximately 15% per annum.33 
In 1993, 3,650 foreign investments were approved for Shanghai totalling US $7 billion.34 
Living standards for many Shanghainese have risen and this has fostered a consumer 
boom. In the first six months o f 1993, retail sales were 24% higher than the same period 
in 1992 (Ho & Leigh 1994: 22). Shanghai’s sociological "landscape" is being radically 
altered by the newly adopted economic policies and the trends associated with them. 
There has already been a reversal or dilution to varying degrees o f Parish and Whyte’s 
eight distinctive structural features of Maoist cities outlined above. The radical 
transformations which Gordon White described as having taken place in rural China in the 
early 1980s are now being matched by equally fundamental changes in urban China. The 
"more complex, ambiguous, competitive and potentially conflictual rural process" White 
(1987: 250) discerned now has its parallel in urban China.
Since June 1989 the party-state has successfully controlled public displays of 
dissent in urban China. However, the reforms are allowing an increasing diversity of 
ways of life and categories of people who increasingly operate in a realm beyond (though 
constrained by) that controlled by the state. The new "space" between the government and 
the populace has allowed a relative pluralization and blurring of social categories and 
representations. In this thesis I investigate these changes and the new diversity, flux, 
contradictions and ambiguities which I found in China’s largest metropolis.
Overview of the Thesis
To an extent the themes I pursued and the questions I asked people were strongly 
influenced by the tenor o f conversations and responses during the initial stages o f my 
fieldwork and not solely based upon preconceived foci built up through previous residence 
and reading. I consider this type of reflexive and flexible approach implicit in the very 
nature of long-term anthropological fieldwork.
My first chapter examines changes taking place in Shanghai by tracing a range of 
indigenous metaphors which residents use to express, and in part, constitute them. The 
themes which are addressed in the following chapters all stem from concerns and topics 
outlined in this first chapter. The second and third chapters are drawn along a spatial
” FT Survey - China 7 N ovem ber 1994: V.
14Ibid.
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dimension: the second focuses upon the consequences for identities of Shanghai’s
increased permeability to global and intra-national flows; the third focuses upon the way 
places and spaces within the city itself are differentially marked and trends which are 
affecting work places and home "styles". In chapter four I examine personal relationships. 
Local people frequently assert the centrality of "human relations" (renqing) and 
"connections" (guanxi) to their everyday lives. Given the state’s involvement in 
attempting to change human behaviour this is a significant topic.
The two remaining chapters examine topics which were of particular moment and 
especially obtrusive as phenomenon during my research period in Shanghai. The state’s 
legitimacy (especially after June 4, 1989) - military power aside - resides largely in its 
ability to bring economic improvements for the majority of citizens. In 1990s Shanghai, 
the rise of popular consumerism and the rapid emergence of a share market were topics 
of definite importance. In view of informants frequent discussion of them and their 
obvious and far-reaching effects upon the fabric o f the city both of these topics demand 
attention. Additionally, these are fascinating topics for academic study since they both 
appear to constitute developments in Chinese society which are radically opposed to 
policies pursued during the Maoist period. Each of these themes also highlights the new 
dimensions o f choice and uncertainty in the lives of many Shanghainese.
Chapter five investigates changing patterns and representations of consumerism and 
consumption, themes which are constitutive of and central to an understanding of the 
socio-economic changes which are underway in contemporary Shanghai. Chapter six 
focuses upon the social impact of the introduction and rapid growth o f the recently 
reopened share market, one of the "crazes" (re) in 1990s Shanghai which touched and 
influenced the lives of millions. In this chapter, as in others, I explore ways in which the 
social contours of Shanghai are changing and provide new perspectives on an Asian 
metropolis in flux.
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Chapter 1 Opening the Door, Crossing the Stream: Representations 
and Metaphors of Reform in Contemporary Shanghai
The dregs o f  the old civilization are like the sand and mud accumulated in the Yellow 
River; they have built up in the blood vessels o f  our people. We need a great tidal wave 
to flush them away. This great tidal wave has already arrived. It is industrial 
civilization. It is summoning us!
Commentary from Heshang television documentary (Su & Wang 1991: 116)1
Our coastal areas, silent fo r  centuries, this Gold Coast o f  the Chinese people, with an 
appetite long held in check, are now the first to rush towards the Pacific. The Chinese 
people at this moment are more eager than ever before to enter the world market. And  
yet this people has been isolated fo r  too long and is still unfamiliar with the [uncharted] 
seas o f  the commodity economy.
Ibid: 173
In 1984 I  came to Guangdong. At that time the rural reforms had been underway for  
several years, the urban reforms had just begun, and the first steps had been taken in the 
'special economic zones’. Eight years have since passed. On this visit I  fin d  that 
Shenzhen and Zhuhai ‘special economic zones ’ and several other places have developed 
extremely rapidly, and much more rapidly than I  had expected. After seeing this, my 
confidence has increased. Revolution is the liberation o f  productive forces; reform is 
also the liberation o f  productive forces... Unless we maintain socialism, unless we 
institute reform and the Open Door (gaige kaifang), unless we develop the economy, and 
unless we improve the lives o f  the people, we will be headed up a blind alley (silu yi tiao 
- literally a "dead road")...
Why has our country been able to be so stable since 'June 4 ’? It is because we 
have carried out reform and the Open Door policy, promoted economic development, and 
lives o f  the people have been improved... Have greater courage in reform and the Open 
Door, dare to experiment, and do not be like a woman with bound feet... I f  great strides 
are not taken in reform and the Open Door, i f  we lack courage to be path-breakers (chuang), it is because we fear that there are too many capitalist things, that it is taking 
the capitalist road. On the crucial question o f  whether something is called ‘capitalism ’ 
or ‘socialism ’, the main criteria fo r  making this judgement should be whether it is o f  
benefit to developing the productive capacity o f  socialist society, whether it is helpful with 
regard to increasing the sum total o f  a socialist s ta te’s national strength, and whether it 
is beneficial with regard to increasing the peop le’s living standards...
Taking the socialist road, is none other than step by step bringing about common 
prosperity. The proposed blueprint fo r  common prosperity is that: those areas with the 
conditions can develop first, other areas will develop more slowly. The areas which 
develop first will spur on the less advanced areas, and ultimately all will achieve common 
prosperity. I f  the rich become richer, and the poor poorer, a polarization will be created, 
but the socialist system should and, furthermore, is able to avoid this polarization...
Now, several nearby countries and regions ’ economies are developing faster than 
ours. I f  we do not develop, or develop too slowly, as soon as the common people 
compare [China’s economy with those o f  these other regions] there will be problems... 
The opportunity o f  the moment must be seized, now there is a good opportunity. I  am 
worried that this opportunity will be lost. I f  it is not seized, the opportunity before us will
'The controversial six part documentary series, H esh ang ("River Elegy"), was transmitted in China in 
1988. Many o f  its makers were criticized in the aftermath o f  June 4, 1989.
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disappear, in an instant the time will have passed by... Shanghai now definitely has the 
conditions to go faster [in development]... Looking back, my one great mistake was not 
to include Shanghai when we set up the four 'special economic zones’.
Deng Xiaoping2
Shanghai o f  the future must be a metropolis equal to New York or London, said Mayor 
Huang Ju as he outlined revisions to the city’s development plan designed to create an 
'oriental M anhattan’... He was addressing the City Planning Meeting, the third since 
1949...marking the city government’s efforts to revive the past glories o f  Shanghai and 
make the city an international metropolis in the 21st century.
"City of Future" Shanghai Star 2 July 1993 front page
My main interest in this chapter is to explore the changes (or lack o f change) local 
residents I encountered described as having taken place in Shanghai city during the post- 
Mao era. A phrase which dominates official rhetoric in 1990s Shanghai is gaige kaifang 
("reform" and the "Open Door"). These are the policies designed to make China a 
"modernized" (xiandaihua) nation and Shanghai a thriving international commercial and 
financial centre. I therefore undertake this investigation by concentrating upon this phrase 
and the discourses which surround it. In particular, I highlight the sustained and 
systematic metaphors which saturate these representations and pursue my investigation by 
following some of the trails of these indigenous terms. In the first section of this chapter 
I examine ways in which the term gaige kaifang was understood and, after a theoretical 
discussion on the role of metaphor, draw attention to the key "watery" and socio-spatial 
metaphors of which the "Open Door" is itself an example.
One informant’s memorable description of gaige kaifang was to liken it to the 
opening of a sluice gate (dakai shuizha), adding that "like when a sluice is opened, a 
great wave bursts forth." Following this metaphor and that of the "Open Door" involves 
an investigation of representations of when, why and by whom this sluice or door was 
opened, what "flow" this has permitted and with what consequences. I investigate the first 
set o f these questions in the second section. Informants often characterized everyday life 
in pre-reform Shanghai as presenting few "roads" or opportunities - the city had become 
stuck in a rut. Many local people depict policies pursued under the current official 
version of "the socialist road" as radically different from those o f the Maoist era. I 
explore portrayals of this as constituting a sharp "about-turn", which some see as leading 
in a loop back to the polices o f the KMT in pre-1949 Shanghai and others as forging a
2Com m ents made by D eng during January 18-February 21, 1992 during his Spring Festival "southern 
inspection tour" (n an xu n ) and reported in "Zai W u chan g, S henzhen , Z h u h ai, Sh an gh ai D en g d id e  T anhua  
Y aodian"  (Important Points o f  Talks in Wuhan, Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Shanghai and Other P laces) XM W B  
front page N ovem ber 6, 1993. M y translation.
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course tangential to both these models. Others stressed distinct continuities between the 
Maoist past and the present. In examining the motives behind the opening of the sluice, 
I note representations of gaige kaifang as initiated by the state or as adopted reactively 
by the state because it had no option but to legitimize popular practice.
In the third section I outline the new "roads" and the "flows" which have been 
permitted by the opening of the sluice. This includes that o f information, capital and 
people to and from abroad and also within China. As implied by this term, a stream of 
pent up energy appears to have been released with many new opportunities and choices 
but also unprecedented risks and uncertainties. Several million Shanghainese had begun 
to side-channel their energies into second jobs and/or brave the storms of the "share sea" 
(guhai). Many intellectuals had seized the opportunity to "take to the sea" of business 
(xiahai). However, others were sinking in the flood of commercialism or were marooned 
in danwei where little appeared to have changed. Despite this, "water levels" (shuiping), 
that is living standards, generally had risen and this promoted a "tide" o f consumerism.
When irrigating fields great care must be exercised - water is vital to promote 
vigorous growth but if not channelled properly it may be squandered whilst too much 
water can also cause devastation. Both uncontrolled, surging waves and a proliferating, 
criss-crossing tangle of roads may create chaos - a great fear of many informants. In the 
fourth section I examine some of the effects of the flood water and the dangerous currents 
and murky depths of gaige kaifang. There is evidence that this flow has washed away 
or, at least, diluted much of the Party’s power and influence over everyday life. Some 
complained that the tide o f commercialism is washing away even those dregs of China’s 
traditional culture and morality left behind after the Cultural Revolution and other political 
campaigns. Certainty and stability is also being drained away leaving behind a residue 
of anxiety and short-termism. Amongst the currents and turbulence were complaints over 
growing inequalities and notions that the undeserving prosper most. In the television 
series Heshang ("River Elegy"), the sea is depicted as blue - pure, clean and refreshing. 
However, I heard views which contest this image and portray the sea as dirty, dangerous 
and murky. From my informants I was often presented with a description o f Shanghai in 
which much is believed to be hidden from view and inchoate. Amongst the flotsam and 
jetsam deposited on "Shanghai beach" (Shanghai tan - a name sometimes used for the 
city) was a widespread belief that morals are deteriorating and that there is increasing 
corruption and sleaze.
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In the fifth and final section I examine briefly some of the new formations and 
channels which were becoming apparent. This includes the ways in which gaige kaifang 
was said to have changed the "roads in people’s minds" (silu) with changes in behaviour 
and attitudes, a renewed stress upon education and the reproduction of inequalities through 
differing educational opportunities. Finally, I note some of the expectations my 
informants had for the future of Shanghai.
1.1 Gaige Kaifang
Deng Xiaoping has described gaige kaifang as "crossing the river, feeling the 
boulders" (mozhe shitou guohe). In much the same way my piloting of the reader 
through the shoals and currents of this chapter has a broad and ambitious remit. Where 
present I mark out clear trends which emerge in local residents’ discourses on 
contemporary Shanghai and hope to convey a sense of the potential range and parameters 
of discourses. As a caveat to this I note the following divergent views on the impact of 
gaige kaifang on the city:
Kaifang was like a tidal wave (chaoshui). Its impact was fa r  greater than the leaders 
ever expected.
In recent years many things have changed in a way one could not have believed possible.
Talk in the foreign press about China's turn for the better (haozhuan) is nonsense. 
China 's economic prosperity is fake. Foreigners see only the tall buildings, numerous 
restaurants and good clothing in Shanghai but the social and economic system has not 
changed.
The Communist Party hangs the sheep’s meat o f  socialism but sells the dog meat o f  
dictatorship.3 There has been no change at all. It is just like a conjuring trick.
To muddy waters further, I should add that these are the comments o f a single 
person. With further explication it would be possible to unravel some of the apparent 
inconsistencies. Beyond this I suggest that these apparently and mutually contradictory 
views are not simply illogical but highlight the degree o f flux and tensions inherent in the 
changes underway in Shanghai. Responses and reactions to the changes are still being 
"composed", there is an ongoing process of adjustment, of finding one’s bearings.
3This is an adaptation o f  the phrase: gua yan gtou , m ai gourou  - hang up a sheep’s head and sell dog  
meat - try to palm o f f  som ething inferior to what it purports to be (C E P  1988: 247).
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1.1.1 Understanding Gaige Kaifang
During 1992-4 the term gaige kaifang was ubiquitous and repeated like a mantra 
in all forms of state propaganda - its use a dozen or more times was typical on the daily 
six o’clock television news. Gaige kaifang is claimed as the means to achieve the "Four 
Modernizations" advocated as national policy since the late 1970s and intended to make 
China a rich and prosperous nation. Attempts at urban reform were begun during the mid- 
1980s but most informants considered the degree of change in Shanghai as minimal until 
after Deng Xiaoping’s southern tour (nanxun) in Spring 1992. This visit coincided with 
central government plans to change Shanghai from being the centre o f the planned 
socialist economy to an international financial and commercial city at the centre of a 
"socialist market economy".
Even in official use the term gaige (reform) tends to be applied indiscriminately 
to any type of administrative change or innovation in sectors ranging from housing to 
labour policies, enterprise management and politics. Kaifang - the "Open Door" policy - 
may be viewed as one o f the reforms. It refers primarily to allowing an inflow of foreign 
capital, technology, expertise and goods and to promoting export of the latter. I found 
that local residents often used these key slogans, and especially kaifang, in a range of 
different ways and sometimes in radically different senses to those they encountered daily 
through broadcast and other media.
When I asked a young employee in a joint venture company what he understood 
by the term "gaige" ("reform") he replied immediately "make money". I next asked his 
understanding of "kaifang", his response was the same. This interpretation is the most 
baldly materialistic I was given and is a view criticized in the Chinese media as money 
worship. An older academic I asked the meaning of gaige remarked "nobody knows" {me 
nin xiaodeIm tiyou  ren zhidao) and added that Deng Xiaoping himself has described 
China as "crossing the stream, feeling the boulders (mozhe shitou guohe)" - suggesting 
his own lack of a clear definition. This expression also suggests some sort of necessary 
feedback processing, a dialectic, if "progress" is to be maintained. When referred to as 
a policy the term kaifang is translated as the "Open Door", although this is not its literal 
meaning - a significant distinction which I discuss further below. Amongst its dictionary 
definitions kaifang has the meaning "lift a ban" and I heard it used to refer, for instance, 
to allowing the installation o f telephones in private homes in the early 1980s and the sale 
of nude photographs later in the decade. In one instance, which stretched this dictionary 
definition and is presumably not what Party leaders have in mind, a retired nurse
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commented that "with kaifang the laobaixing can complain and even curse them [i.e. the 
Communist Party] - this is now kaifang."
In everyday use kaifang often indicates a sense o f being "modern" and/or open- 
minded. Kaifang also has an implicit sense of being open to Western ideas. Somebody 
who is kaifang is less bound by "traditional" practices whether this be parental 
involvement in choosing a marriage partner or acceptance o f cremation in funeral rites. 
Young people often described themselves as kaifang and older people as conservative. 
On one occasion, when I followed local courtesy and took a gift o f oranges to an 
interviewee’s home, he remarked that this was unnecessary because his home was 
kaifang. People prepared to talk openly and frankly with a Western observer such as 
myself could be described as kaifang. At a more general level Shanghainese often 
described their city and its people as kaifang, especially when contrasted to other parts 
of China such as Beijing. This sense of kaifang draws upon an historical imagination of 
Shanghai as a city which was open to the West and whose people retain an openness to 
the outside world and a willingness and ability to accept new ideas. There is also an 
important parallel in the way in which - as all Chinese schoolchildren are taught - "the 
Chinese door was forced open by British cannons" in the 1840s and the way the Chinese 
authorities now open this door themselves from the inside, on their terms.
1.1.2 Metaphor
Metaphor is a fundamental feature of language. Lakoff and Johnson write that it 
is a "way of conceiving of one thing in terms of another, and its primary function is 
understanding" (1980: 36). As William Taylor states in an exploration of metaphors in 
education. "[f]ar from being a mere linguistic decoration, metaphor comes to be seen as 
a ubiquitous feature of our thinking and our discourse, the basis of the conceptual systems 
by means of which we act within our worlds" (1984: 5). Through a series o f examples 
Lakoff and Johnson demonstrate that "metaphor is pervasive in everyday life" and that 
"[o]ur ordinary conceptual system, in terms of which we both think and act, is 
fundamentally metaphorical in nature" (3).
As an anthropologist seeking to explore and explain the cultural values and 
understandings of another society it is of great value to explore indigenous metaphors. 
In some instances English and Chinese share similar systematic metaphorical concepts. 
An obvious example are orientational metaphors in which, for example, up is good, bad 
is down, high status is up, low status is down, virtue is up, depravity is down (Ibid: 14-
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2 1).4 Similarly, there is a shared metaphor o f politics as drama. In Chinese, for instance, 
shangtai - "appear on the stage" also means to "assume power", conversely, xiatai means 
both to "step down from a stage" and to "leave office". Chinese people would also feel 
an affinity with Shakespeare’s analogy of life itself as a drama. They too may describe 
life as lived on a stage (wutai) with people acting out diverse roles (yan juese). The 
conception of Chinese people as "actors" was elaborated upon by Arthur Smith who wrote 
that "[a] Chinese thinks in theatrical terms... Upon very slight provocation, any Chinese 
regards himself in the light of an actor in a drama" (1892: 16). O f particular interest, 
however, are those systematic metaphors which differ from those of English. These may 
provide us with insights into differing ways o f perceiving, understanding and, ultimately, 
behaving. It is to an examination of such metaphors that I turn in the next section.
1.1.3 Metaphors of Reform
China generally is not at all like the willow-pattern plate. I  do not know i f  I  really had 
expected it to be blue and white; but it was a disappointment to fin d  it so very brown and 
muddy.
Mrs Archibald (1899: 5)
Thirty or forty years ago [Shanghai] was a huge mud flat, that the high tides continually 
invaded, so that the lower rooms o f existing houses were often flooded and made useless 
for habitation. Low grounds, where stagnant pools and green, slimy water abounded, 
existed everywhere.
Rev. Macgowan (1897: 69) 
A contributor to Shanghai's Wenhui Bao wrote that "[n]ew China was born in the 
gunfire of the war of liberation."5 He remarks upon the way military vocabulary and 
"military consciousness" (junshi yishi) permeated daily life from the early 1950s (see also 
Gaulton 1981: 56), and especially in the Cultural Revolution. At that time military 
clothing was the most fashionable, Shanghai’s "Peace Cinema" (heping dianyingyuan) 
was renamed "Combat Cinema" (zhandou dianyingyuan) and words such as fangong 
("counterattack"), zhenxian ("ranks, front") and douzheng ("struggle, combat") were used 
in civilian affairs. In the reform era, the writer notes an "inevitable" diminution of this 
military consciousness and use o f military language - this was evident to me in the much 
greater use of such langauge amongst those above the age of about 35. This would appear 
to be part of a paradigmatic shift in metaphor. The Maoist notion of "politics in
T o r  exam ple, ga oshang  - noble, lofty and xialiu - lower reaches o f  a river; low -dow n, mean, obscene, 
dirty. Sim ilarly, shangji - higher level, higher authorities and x iam ian  - below , underneath; low er level, 
subordinate.
SW HB 7 August 1993: 6.
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command" (zhengzhi guashuai) has been replaced by a stress upon economic efficiency 
(jingji xiaoyi). A party member in his sixties described the Communist Party under Mao 
as "war-natured" (dazhangxing) and as running the economy badly. Under Deng 
Xiaoping he considered that this "war-effect" (zhanzheng yinxiang) has reduced and been 
replaced by economics. As I point out below, the language of the reform era often draws 
upon analogies of natural forces, of irrigation and cultivation rather than warfare. 
Although replaced in some contexts and diluted by a proliferation of terms it is important 
to note that military metaphors still persist. Examples include zhanltie - strategy ("battle 
tactics"), nanxun ("southern patrol") the name given to Deng Xiaoping’s Spring Festival 
1992 visit to southern China, and xiagang ("come or go off sentry duty") which has 
entered civilian life in the 1990s to describe a worker who has been laid-off.
Changes in metaphor are matched by a radical shift from the "revolutionary gaze" - 
epitomized in statues of Mao Zedong, eyes focused on the distance and arm outstretched 
- to the promise o f rewards now (cf. Croll 1994). A university student commented to me 
that in the past "horizons were very limited, now there is much more scope." This 
comment suggests that while Mao looked toward the fulfilment of his distant dream 
ordinary people were "looking at the sky from the bottom of a well" (zuo jing guan tian), 
that is, they had a very narrow and restricted view. In the imagery of state rhetoric the 
revolutionary gaze and arm reaching for the future has been replaced by Deng’s 
admonition for Shanghai people to "grasp" the opportunities they see before them. The 
shift to materialism and pragmatism is encapsulated in the homonym of "look to the 
future" (wang qian kan), which by changing a single character, becomes "look towards 
money".
The key metaphors which seeped through everyday discourse and appeared to 
structure the discourse on change in Shanghai were of two main kinds, the first socio- 
spatial, the second "watery" metaphors. The term "open door" is a significant generative 
metaphor in its own right. As I note above, this is not a literal translation o f kaifang. 
However, in media reports and in everyday conversation people did talk about the opening 
of China’s "door" (men) or "window" (chuangzi or chuangkou) in just this way. I will 
investigate issues o f who opened this door or window, when and why and then turn to 
representations of who or what has come through this door, or simply what can be seen 
through them, and with what consequences. At times people spoke of the feng - the 
"wind" that had blown in. Once again, this is an inadequate and partial translation of a 
Chinese term. In Chinese, feng has a diverse range of meanings and connotations in a
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wide variety of contexts. It can, for example, mean "style, practice, custom; scene, view; 
news, information". It combines with many other characters such as fengcai (elegant 
demeanour), fengchuan (rumour), fengjing (scenery), fengliu (dissolute), and fengsu 
(custom). Now that Shanghai is being promoted as one of China’s most open "doors" it 
is interesting to note briefly the title of books by Western writers such as Mary Gamewell 
who described Shanghai as the Gateway to China (1916) and Rhoads Murphey’s 
Shanghai: Key to Modem China (1953).
From the etymology of kaifang one gains an insight into what it may involve 
beyond the usual translation "Open Door". Kai has a range of meanings including "open" 
as in kaisuo "open a lock; make an opening, open up; open out, come loose" as in 
koukai le "the knot has come untied". Fang also has various meanings such as "let go, 
set free, release; let out, expand; blossom, open". From this etymology one gains a 
sense of unleashing, untying, loosening and opening. The portrayal o f gaige kaifang 
noted earlier and discussed in more detail below as like the opening of a sluice gate 
becomes all the more apposite.
Another set of socio-spatial metaphors refers to roads and routes. At a macro level 
the route metaphor is used to describe the "road" taken in national policy. China is 
officially described as "taking the socialist road". In the late 1950s China failed in an 
attempt to make a "Great Leap Forward" towards communism. In the Cultural Revolution 
people battled between the "two roads" of capitalism and socialism. One of the 
propaganda slogans for National Day, October 1, 1993 written on a long red banner hung 
from the old colonial buildings on the Bund visible to the millions of people on the streets 
below stated that: Reform and the "Open Door" are the essential means (literally "road") 
to liberate and develop socialist production! (Gaige kaifang shi jiefang he fazhan 
shehuizhuyi shengchanli de biyou zhi lu!). The "socialist market economy" is the latest 
version of the "socialist road" designed to bring progress (jinbu - literally "steps 
forward"). The Shanghai Party boss, Wu Bangguo, commented on Deng Xiaoping saying, 
"[t]his [1993] Spring Festival...he encouraged us to liberate our thinking, seek truth from 
facts...have a little more courage, take rather faster steps (bufa). He said, now Pudong’s 
development can only advance and cannot retreat, moreover you have no way back 
(tuilu)."6 Many Shanghainese I spoke with felt that the city had embarked upon a quite 
different route from that advocated by Mao Zedong and that the economy was "galloping 
ahead" (tengfei).
MFRB 3 July  1993: 1
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At a more mundane level, opportunities and people are roads (see chapter 4) as is 
made clear in the popular local phrase duo yi ge pengyou, duo yi tiao lu - one more 
friend, is one more road. Somebody without a "road" (meiyou lu) has few choices whilst 
somebody with "thick roads" (luzi hen cu) - which may involve the "backdoor" or even 
bribery (pulu - "spreading the path") - can achieve their aims. Since Shanghai was given 
the "green light" (ludeng) for economic development by the Politburo in the early 1990s, 
new "roads" have opened up. There are increasing opportunities not only for those who 
take the "right way" (zhenglu) but also those who seek to prosper by "crooked roads" 
(wailuzi) such as the "path of prostitution" (huanglu) or the "path of money" (i.e. bribery 
-jinlu).
Flying over southern China, one is reminded of the importance o f water to people’s 
livelihoods. Rivers and streams are abundant and everywhere there is evidence o f human 
endeavour to bound and channel this vital but potentially destructive force. For millennia 
the main form of long distance transportation was by inland waterway or coastal boats. 
It is not surprising, therefore, that the Chinese language should be "drenched" with the 
symbolism of water, the sea, rivers, tides and waves. The Chinese term for each of these 
phenomena has a range o f meanings and exists within a much wider semantic field (sea?) 
than the English equivalents. For instance, meanings of the term for "flow" - liu - 
include: "moving from place to place; spread, circulate; degenerate; banish; class,
grade". It joins with other characters to form terms such as liumang - hooligan, liuli - 
fluent, smooth, liushi - passing time, liuyan - rumour, gossip, and liuxing - popular, 
fashionable. The (water?)course of a person’s life and the past can be likened to a river, 
for example, in the term huisu wangshi ("recall past events" - huisu means both "to 
recall, trace back" and to "go against the stream"; wangshi - "past events").
During my research period in Shanghai "watery" metaphors seemed to be 
particularly important generative metaphors of people’s portrayals of the impact o f gaige 
kaifang, the policies adopted after the passing of the "great helmsmen", Mao Zedong. 
This is all the more apt in Shanghai, which was originally a small fishing village, and 
whose name itself means "above the sea". Nautical allusions are used by Deng Xiaoping, 
who remarked that "the economy should develop faster, and it cannot be expected to sail 
in quiet and plain waters all the time... It’s like a boat sailing against the current which 
must keep forging ahead or will fall behind.7 Similarly, a China Daily article published 
during Spring Festival 1993 titled "Deng Says to ‘Seize the Chance’" recorded that Deng
7CD 12 November 1993: 4.
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"urged Shanghai leaders and people to ‘brave the wind and the waves, do a solid job, 
overcome difficulties and scale new heights’."8 In portrayals of the rapid (rapids?) 
changes brought about by gaige kaifang references to the "sea", "tides" and "waves" were 
common in the local media and the everyday conversations of Shanghainese I 
encountered.
In the Chinese television documentary series Heshang its writers (Su & Wang 
1991), strong supporters of the "Open Door" policy, contrasted the turbulent, muddy 
Yellow River and the clear blue water of the Pacific. Commenting on the symbolism of 
Heshang, Richard Bodman remarks, "[t]he overall message is clear: just as the Yellow 
River must flow into the sea and its murky yellow waters merge with the clear blue ocean, 
so too must China abandon isolation, open up to the world, eliminate the "sediment" of 
its traditional culture, and seek for more "transparency" in the workings o f society and 
government" (1991: 16). This contrast is especially clear in the sixth part o f the series, 
"Blueness", written by Xie Xuanjun and Yuan Zhiming who promote a theory of "human 
civilization split into two great divisions, of land-based civilization and sea-faring 
civilization" (Su & Wang 1991: 204). They contrast the insularity and conservatism of 
the "yellow culture" of "orientals with a deep tradition of despotism" (220) with 
"blueness" which represents the values of modern western civilization, transparency,9 
democracy, individualism, vitality and acceptance of a broad variety of different cultures 
and new ideas. The authors note that "[bjarely a century has passed since the ancient 
spirit of the Yellow River has clearly seen the face of the sea and recognized its vastness 
and strength" (212). They believe that "only when the sea-breeze of ‘blueness’ faintly 
turns to rain and once again moistens this stretch of parched yellow soil, only then will 
this awesome vitality, previously released only during the happy days o f the Spring 
Festival, be able to bring new life to the vast yellow soil plateau" (213). This programme 
and the series concludes with the belief that "[t]he surging waves of the sea will here meet 
head on with the Yellow River... After a thousand years of solitude,10 the Yellow River
8CD 25 January 1993: 1.
°N ote that "transparency" (to u m in g d u ) - a term used by Zhao Ziyang - is the C hinese equivalent o f  the 
Soviet g lasn ost ("openness") (Su & W ang 1991: 219-20 , note 59).
l0This is an allusion to Gabriel Garcia M arquez’s novel, A Hundred Years o f  Solitude (Su & Wang 
1991: 222, note 69).
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has finally seen the blue sea" (222)."
A final metaphor which it is interesting to mention is the official description of 
Shanghai as the "dragon-head". It is said, for instance, that Shanghai "has entered a new 
era by playing a "dragon-head" role, that is leading the way in China’s economic 
growth."12 However, this metaphor, which owes more to geomancy than socialism, had 
not spread far beyond media reports. However, it may be worth noting that the term 
longtou - dragon-head - also means a tap or faucet.
1.2 Opening the Sluice - Representations o f the Place of Gaige K aifang in Modern 
Chinese History
For approximately twenty-odd years in the middle o f  this century, China once again faced  
a good opportunity fo r  economic development. And yet locking our country’s door and 
blindfolding ourselves we set o ff to ‘surpass England and America’, never ceasing to 
engage in one great political movement after another...so that in the end our national 
economy w>as on the brink o f  collapse.
Heshang documentary (Su & Wang 1991: 171)
The majority of Shanghai residents I encountered portrayed the reform policies as 
constituting a radical departure from previous policies. One intellectual described kaifang 
to me as the opposite of Mao’s policies of self reliance (zili gengsheng) and closing the 
country to international intercourse (biguan zi shou). The fact that it was actually at 
M ao’s instigation that China "opened" its door by renewing contacts with the United 
States and taking China into the United Nations in the early 1970s (see Segal 1992: 163) 
seems largely to be glossed over. A Party member in his sixties described Mao’s 
approach to me as "closing the door to become a big king" (guanmen cheng dawang) - 
Chinese rulers could purvey an image of China as a model of socialist success without 
fear of contradiction by comparisons with alternative images. He believed that "gaige 
kaifang is a change (zhuanbian) of 180 degrees from Mao’s time. So Deng Xiaoping 
is quite right when he says that we must ‘change our thinking’ (huan naozi - literally 
"change brains"), [almost to himself he added] heaven and earth turned upside down 
(tianfan difu)." As an instance of this he noted that "where there was once ‘dictatorship
"O ne o f  the more intriguing aspects o f  H eshang are the profound sim ilarities in its ideology to that o f  
the colonial discourse on China. Lanning & C ouling, for instance, wrote o f  the pre-Opium War 
"stagnation... in C hina’s progress" and described it as due to "the lack o f  suitable stim ulation from without" 
(1921: 15). The makers o f  H esh an g  appear to desire just such a "stimulation". The portrayal o f  "the West" 
in H esh an g  is idealized, even romantic. A s I w ill show , it is not only pure blue water that may flow  
through.
I2SS 24 Septem ber 1993: 1.
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of the proletariat’ now many stores are run by Hong Kong bosses." He observed that 
"from a theoretical point of view many people feel confused (mihuo)." Like most 
informants he considered the Third Plenum of the Eleventh Central Committee of the CCP 
in December 1978 as the crucial turning point in the course of events (zhuanzhe).13 In 
his estimation this Plenum marked China’s "second liberation", the first having been the 
1919 May Fourth movement - "a great liberation from feudal thought." In 1985, Deng 
Xiaoping stated "reform is China’s second revolution" (1993: 113). My informant’s views 
would seem to constitute a slippage from the rhetoric which privileges 1949 as the point 
of dramatic change. A man in his fifties told me that since this Plenum, China had 
"extricated itself from the ‘leftist road’." He commented that "previously people were 
locked-in [he indicated the meaning by miming a locking motion]. There was no freedom. 
Now' it is kaifang and liberation (jiefang)." The term jiefang is usually reserved to 
describe the CCP’s takeover of power in 1949.
In promoting its latest version of the "socialist road" the Communist Party faces 
considerable difficulties. On the one hand, many of the policies this involves appear to 
be diametrically opposed to those of the preceding era, yet to criticize and repudiate all 
of those policies would undermine its legitimacy. There is a limit to how much blame for 
"leftist" policies such as egalitarianism can be heaped onto the "Gang of Four". In such 
circumstances, there is a premium upon vagueness and opacity. Current policies - the 
"socialist market economy" - are described as "socialism with Chinese characteristics". 
However, a common view o f people I spoke with was summed-up by one informant who 
noted that "although current slogans all talk about socialism and Marxism the laobaixing 
are very clear that the socialist market economy is actually capitalism. The higher levels 
(shangji) cannot say this because they would have to repudiate all they have been doing 
for the last forty years." It was not unusual to hear people speak of "capitalism with 
Chinese characteristics". One man who used this expression told me that he had first 
heard it on the BBC World Service. Shanghainese I encountered would undoubtedly agree 
with Richard Madsen’s assessment that the CCP is "ideologically dead" (1993b: 183). At 
times Party rhetoric itself indicates the distinct change of tack with calls for people to 
"liberate their thinking" (jiefang sixiang) and "change their minds" (huan naodai). There 
is also a distinct contrast between the Cultural Revolution rhetoric of slogans such as: we 
would rather have the grass of socialism, than the jewels of capitalism (ningyao 
shchuizhuvi de cao, bu yao zibenzhuyi de bao) and Deng Xiaoping’s pragmatic
n A view  shared by Western observers such as Tsou (1983).
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approach summed up in his advocating that "practice is the sole criterion o f truth" and 
more recent comments that: it does not matter if  something is called capitalism or
socialism, so long as it raises the living standards of the ordinary people."14
I found general agreement that the years since the late 1970s could be divided into 
four stages: 1) late 1970s to mid-1980s - de-politicization, legalization of getihu,15
agricultural reforms,16 but otherwise limited urban reforms; 2) 1984-5 to mid-1989 - 
gaige kaifang advocated with limited, steady reforms;17 3) m id-1989 until 1991 - 
"economic adjustment" and retrenchment following June 4, 1989;18 4) Spring Festival 
1992 onwards. As Jacobs and Hong point out "Shanghai had been sacrificed at the 
beginning of the reform programme" (1994: 232). After limited reforms in the 1980s 
there was a retrenchment for almost two years after June 4. Several local people 
described this time as men - depressing (also "tightly closed, sealed") - the character is 
of a heart enclosed within a gate. Most informants felt that the main moves o f gaige 
kaifang in Shanghai, the unlocking of this "gate", followed Deng Xiaoping’s southern tour 
(nanxun) to Shenzhen and Shanghai at Spring Festival 1992 through which he sought to 
"re-energise the reform process" (Shambaugh 1993b: 488). Comments Deng was reported 
to have made at this time (see start of this chapter) provided the crucial impetus to a 
quantitatively and qualitatively greater scope and pace of reform in Shanghai. In 
particular, Deng called for Shanghai to take "greater steps" and have "more courage" in 
reform and even indicated his regret that he had not included Shanghai as one of the 
original Special Economic Zones established in 1979.19 People were to "seize the 
opportunity (zhuazhu shiji)." Shanghai, along with fourteen other coastal cities, was
l4A reformulation o f  his com m ent that: It does not matter if  it’s a w hite cat or a black cat, it’s a good  
cat so long as it catches mice" - a statement made as early as March 1961 (Li 1994: 376).
I50 n  getihu  see Bruun 1988, G old 1989, 1990, Gates 1991, Y oung 1991. In 1988, larger private 
enterprises (s iy in g  q iye) w hich could em ploy over eight people were permitted.
lbA policy  w hich one informant described as similar to that fo llow ed  earlier in Taiwan o f  "land to the
tiller" (gen gzh e you qi tian).
l?The Third Plenum o f  the Twelfth Central Com m ittee in October 1984 endorsed urban reforms such 
as the developm ent o f  the com m odity econom y and advocated learning from capitalist countries.
I80 n  June 4 generally see Barme 1991, Chan 1991, Chan & Unger 1991, N im ing 1990, Sullivan 1990,
Unger 1991. On events in Shanghai see Forward 1991, Warner 1991.
l9Special econom ic zones were described by Premier Zhao Ziyang in 1984 as "bridgeheads in our 
opening to the outside world" (cited in Fewsmith 1986: 78). As Jacobs & H ong point out (1994: 226), 
D eng’s "mistake" was due to Shanghai’s importance for central governm ent revenues. Shanghai has just 
1.1% o f  C hina’s population but provides one-fifth to one-fourth o f  central governm ent revenues.
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"opened" to foreign investment in April 1984.
During his January 1993 Spring Festival visit to Shanghai, Deng is reported to 
have said that Shanghai should "make some change in one year, and a great change in 
three years" (yi nian bian ge yang, san nian da bian yang).20 Similarly, in a speech 
at the end of 1993 Jiang Zemin stated that "we must seize the opportunity, and speed up 
the steps (bufa) in gaige kaifang and modernization"21 A local sociology lecturer told 
me that Deng’s comments "represented the aspirations (xinyuan) of the laobaixing" - it 
was exactly what they wanted to hear. As an outside observer who had been in Shanghai 
between 1989-90 and had also felt the constricted atmosphere then, I found a palpable 
difference when I next returned in 1992.
Many people depicted policy changes in Shanghai as constituting a return to 
policies promoted by the KMT before 1949. A company manager who held this view 
added that "all Shanghai lacks is the race track" - he expected that eventually one will be 
built. A young designer felt that with gaige kaifang "China has returned to an old circle 
(lao quanzi). The policies of Chiang Kai-shek are now followed by Deng Xiaoping. The 
Communist Party criticized the KMT for selling land to foreigners and called it ‘betraying 
the country’ (maiguo). Now the Communist Party does the same thing." Another 
informant remarked that "if anybody but Deng Xiaoping had advocated selling land to 
foreigners they would have been called ‘counter-revolutionaries’." Despite Deng’s 
endorsement of this policy it still provoked considerable resentment. A university student 
commented that "many laobaixing feel strongly that renting land to foreigners is 
‘betraying the country’ (maiguo) and similar to the days of the foreign concessions." A 
young lecturer complained that "leasing land to foreigners is selling the property of 
Shanghai’s children and grand children." However, he considered that the state has few 
powers to prevent land being leased in this way since localism (difanghua) has become 
much stronger with gaige kaifang.
The sense of returning to the past was accentuated by the revival of pre-1949 terms 
such as dzi ka!qianke (broker), yezonghui (nightclub) and maiban (comprador). Many 
Shanghainese expressed regret that several decades had been wasted. On several 
occasions informants expressed this regret using a phrase from the classic novel The 
Dream of Red Mansions - zao zhi jinri, hebi dangchu. A dictionary translation is "if I
:oX M W B 23 January 1993 headline article.
: |XMWB 5 December 1993: 1.
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had known it would come to this, I would have acted differently" (CEP 1988: 135). 
However, in these instances it could best be rendered as: "if the policies currently being 
pursued are correct, why were they not followed from the start [i.e. 1949]." One man 
who expressed this lament told me "I saw the corruption of the KMT before 1949 and the 
good things done by the Communist Party in the early 1950s. Now China has undergone 
all kinds of shifts and changes to return to a situation worse than when the whole thing 
started forty years ago. If China had developed in the way it was before 1949 things 
would be much better now." Many informants had sympathy for such views, expressing 
a sense of waste and squandered opportunities with two "lost" generations. Often 
comparison was drawn between Shanghai and the "Four Little Dragons" and Japan. From 
being the most developed of these places in 1949 Shanghai had slipped to being the most 
backward. An interesting aspect of notions of returning to the past was that many people 
evaluated this in positive terms. It is a telling comment when, after decades of educating 
the populace on the evils of the KMT and colonialism, people such as a young lecturer 
expressed the hope and expectation that in the future "Shanghai will be like it was in the 
1940s, a lively international city."
A Party member who broadly accepted the official line commented that "from the 
eyes of the past what is happening now is all capitalism." He remarked that "before even 
growing flowers or keeping a goldfish was criticised as a bourgeois lifestyle. Now 
everyone goes in for share dealing and the son [Rong Yiren] of a Shanghai capitalist is 
Vice-President!" He noted that in the 1950s hooliganism, prostitution and gambling had 
been eradicated, but had now all returned. With a tone of incredulity and irony he added 
"for three decades China struggled for the sake of socialism, now we go in for capitalism. 
Now Deng Xiaoping says it doesn’t matter if something is called socialism or capitalism. 
Some feel their decades fighting for the revolution were all for nothing."
The makers of Heshang point out that the "closed-door policy" originated in the 
Ming dynasty (Su & Wang 1991: 164). One intellectual I spoke with also located gaige 
kaifang policies within a broader historical framework. For him, gaige kaifang 
constituted a new direction not only in terms of the Maoist past but also when compared 
to "traditional" China. He noted that in imperial times the Chinese economy did not 
develop because Confucian values stressed agriculture and looked down upon business 
(zhongnong yashang). Observing that "now everyone wants to go into business", he 
considered this a highly significant change in people’s way of thinking (sixiang gaibian) 
that had occurred with gaige kaifang. In other words, he considered gaige kaifang to be
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bringing about more fundamental changes in "Chinese culture" than had occurred during 
the Maoist era. In his estimation, Maoist policies and the commercialism of the reform 
era have coalesced to produce an unbalanced/deformed (jixing - literally a medical 
deformity, malformation) and abnormal (fanchang) society.
Set against these portrayals of profound change were views which stressed 
continuities and lack o f change. An interesting instance of this is provided by a 
contributor to Meizhou Wenvi Bao who grew up during the Cultural Revolution and who 
describes his thinking (silu - "mental roads") as having been "contaminated" (zhanran - 
literally "soaked and dyed") by the Cultural Revolution. He describes how he compares 
his early experiences to the "new environment he encounters before him" and he clearly 
sees distinct parallels. For instance, numerous shops have suddenly emerged at many high 
schools,22 which reminds him of the way all kinds of "combat units" and 
"counterrevolutionary troops" sprang up at these schools during the Cultural Revolution. 
Similarly, he likens Shanghai’s "three million share dealers" to participants in previous 
political campaigns. In both cases, people gathered in Shanghai’s alleys and doorways 
passing on and discussing the latest information, seeing who has gained and who lost 
"political or economic capital." Another example, could be the way each danwei aimed 
at self sufficiency, a feature derived from the Communist Party’s origins as a guerilla 
organization. A university, for instance, may have a bakery, printing factory, hospital, 
laundry and a lorry division. With the reduction of state funding each section now 
independently attempts to engage in commercial activities to try and make a profit.
1.2.1 Why gaige kaifang?
In the same way as the terms "gaige" and "kaifang" were understood in varying 
ways, so divergent explanations were proposed for the motive behind the state’s adoption 
of these policies. These accounts extended from two extremes. The first I characterise 
as passive, the second as conspiratorial. By passive, I mean those accounts which 
accepted and closely resembled the Party line. Put simply, this version is that the 
Communist Party recognized certain mistakes had been made in the past and now 
promoted new, improved policies designed to increase the living standards and well-being 
of the populace. Conspiratorial accounts, by contrast, construed these policies as having 
been adopted solely in an attempt to maintain the Party’s rule. As one informant
“ Since 1988 schools have been allow ed to set up enterprises such as shops, factories and set up courses 
in order to make m oney.
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expressed it, "the party had no other way out (chulu). The closed door policy (bise 
zhengce) was no good, it had to change. The point of gaige kaifang is to save the skin 
of the Communist Party and not for the sake of the laobaixing." A similar view was that 
"without gaige kaifang the Communist Party would have collapsed. Gaige kaifang is 
advantageous for the ruling class (tongzhi jieji), but not the laobaixing." A factory 
worker noted that "previously the government used power to control the laobaixing, now 
it uses money." In his estimation, Deng Xiaoping’s intention with gaige kaifang is that 
"his children will have advantages." An intellectual wondered whether "the government 
sees kaifang as a kind of release - like loosening the belt o f one’s trousers - in this way 
they feel there is less of a threat (weiji) to themselves." However, he believed that there 
"could not now be a return (tuibu - literally "backward steps") to the old policies." In his 
estimation, the Party could open the door but lacked the power to close it again.
It appears that what are promoted as "reforms" by the state are often a post hoc 
recognition of what is already being done on the ground or a response to a situation the 
state cannot control. A state danwei worker commented on the pace of change that 
"things which were illegal two or three months ago are now promoted." As an example 
she cited roadside night stalls. Press reports initially told people not to set up these stalls. 
A couple of months later these activities were being encouraged. The major increase in 
moonlighting began especially in 1991 and appears primarily to have been a response to 
state enterprises laying off workers. Similarly, in November 1993, it was announced that 
individuals would be allowed to trade foreign currency. A China Daily Business Weekly 
report cites a local official as saying that "it will be a severe attack" on the city’s black 
market in foreign exchange and underground foreign exchange trading companies.2j The 
stock market also shows state policy as following on behind popular practices (see chapter 
6).24 Initially most stock trading was carried on in black market or semi-legal deals. 
Only later did the state permit the establishment of the Shanghai Stock Exchange. It 
should be added that the central government may, of course, have turned a blind eye to 
such practices as the early moonlighting and stock trading regarding them as experiments 
which it could suppress if need be.
2’7-13 N ovem ber 1993: 3.
24The introduction o f  the rural responsibility system is another instance o f  this. The journalist Jasper 
Becker found that in many parts o f  China peasants spontaneously divided up land before the state policy  
was announced (personal com m unication).
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1.3 Opening the Floodgates - Changes Brought About bv Gaige Kaifang 
Before the Flood
A local social science researcher commented to me that under the socialist planned 
economy until the late 1970s "food, accommodation, household registration, child bearing, 
school attended, employment, work done and salary were all decided by the state - there 
was no other way (meiyou qita chulu). What each person could do or obtain was more 
or less the same." Other informants described pre-reform Shanghai as ninggu - congealed 
or coagulated - and its economy as si - dead. Similarly, Parish and Whyte depict early 
to mid-1970s urban China as characterized by residential stability and "extreme 
bureaucratization and equality" (1984: 6). Writing on Cultural Revolution Shanghai, Lynn 
White concluded that [t]he daily lives of many Shanghai citizens are largely determined 
by political decisions" (1978: 11). Gaige kaifang is designed to unblock restrictions, 
open up new channels and enliven (bianhuo) the economy. By 1994, it had begun to 
make changes in each of the sectors mentioned.
An opened door suggests the possibility for both ingress and egress, and to be able 
to both gaze out and be gazed upon. The sluice gate metaphor seems especially 
appropriate since it suggests a build up of pressure, with a powerful inflow, followed, 
perhaps, by some backwash. In this section I follow through and investigate indigenous 
notions of such movement. A particular concern is to highlight those areas o f "slippage" 
where new channels have formed or seepage has permeated established courses.
1.3.1 Information
Elisabeth Croll describes the former "revolutionary enclosure" in the Chinese 
countryside with a "scarcity of information" and a singular, vertical channel o f information 
and a single line of authority (1994: 118-20). Although it was harder to enforce such 
controls in a city like Shanghai, information flow was still highly restricted and access to 
it "highly stratified" (Parish & Whyte 1984: 299). During the 1950s media were 
centralized (see Nathan 1986: 153). Broadcasting was regarded primarily as a political 
tool - the PLA were stationed outside media centres and broadcasters read from censored 
statements. The arts generally were officially intended to serve politics and the 
Communist Party. A high level of surveillance and fear of repercussions prevented the 
voicing of many complaints. Parish and Whyte found that "[m]ost residents simply 
remained in the dark about what was really going on in their country" (1984: 295).
An early "flow" was the grumbling, complaining and muttering of the populace,
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a simmering discontent which bubbled to the surface towards the end of the Cultural 
Revolution. Such weapons o f the weak (cf. Scott 1990) like "water constantly dripping 
wears holes in stone" (di shui chuan shi). At this time many people began to "abandon 
their former trust in the paternalistic benevolence o f the system" (Whyte 1992: 86). My 
findings support those o f Martin Whyte who argues that "the reemergence o f a civil 
society was set in motion by developments in the late Mao era" (85). These murmurings 
became magnified after the death of Mao and, in particular, once criticism of the Gang 
of Four was allowed and it was admitted that Mao had shortcomings much suppressed 
anger came out. One intellectual recalled that "the cursing of the whole nation burst forth 
like a tidal wave." It appears that the sea-wall of Communist Party power could not resist 
the "tide" of popular grumbling and complaining at the end of the Cultural Revolution. 
In losing its moral authority the Communist Party seems to have lost some o f its ability 
to control the populace - it had no other choice but to permit this freedom to speak.
By the late 1970s there was a "much greater degree of openness among the 
Chinese people today than a decade ago" (Parish & Whyte 1984: 298). As with the 
changes in economic policy noted above, it seems that this new freedom did not flow 
from any liberal sentiments on the regime’s part but, rather, was indicative and 
constitutive of a loss of state control over popular practices. People were able to voice 
grievances (fa laosao) and this reduced the degree of "mental pressure" (sixiang yali) felt 
by many in the Maoist era. I frequently heard complaints being made by people in semi­
public contexts such as crowded buses or restaurants which formerly could only have been 
voiced, if at all, to the most trusted of intimates. As one man expressed it "before one 
could not complain, one dare not speak. Now I have liberation (jiefang). The wall 
(qiang) of the past has gone." It is notable that here the term jiefang is used not to 
describe a social release but an individual emancipation.
During the reform period there has been a significant depoliticization of everyday 
life. This includes a reduction of controls over the media which has allowed a 
proliferation of magazines, music, television and radio programmes with a much greater 
range of styles and themes.25 During 1992-3, for example, live television and radio 
phone-in programmes became extremely popular (liuxing - "flow" and "prevail/be 
current"). Topics I heard discussed included consumer rights, sexual fulfilment and
2SOn the proliferation o f  popular media in China see B ishop 1989, Chang 1989, Crowthall 1988-9, 
Evans 1989, Fitzgerald 1984, H ow kins 1982, Kraus 1989, 1995, Landsberger 1985-6, P ick ow icz 1995, 
W omack 1986.
65
redundancy. A local theatre director remarked to me that such changes were a significant 
departure from the past when there was "only the voice of the government". An 
interesting aspect of the popularity of live programmes was that the local dialect was 
heard more frequently on local media - another type of "voice". For a few days in May 
1989 "the dike o f censorship itself seemed to have been washed away" (Faison 1990: 
147). In particular, from May 13-19 the "media’s detailed and sympathetic reporting 
rivetted attention on the drama of the hunger strikers" (Walder 1989: 38).26 Following 
through the watery, irrigation metaphor and bearing in mind that the Chinese term for 
broadcasting "bo" also means "sow, seed" one may see gaige kaifang as bringing life to 
many new shoots.
The proliferation of media is bound up with the commercialization o f the economy 
and the "emergence of a cultural market" (Kraus 1995: 177). John Fitzgerald (1984) 
observes the commercialisation of a "significant portion of the cultural network in China" 
(105), with "the market place now calling the tune" (114). Rather than promote Party 
messages the popular media, which is increasingly dependent upon advertising revenues, 
must produce items which appeal to consumer tastes. Within the freer media environment 
it is harder for the state to prevent the appearance of critical items. Censorship controls 
prevent blatant criticisms of the regime, but newspaper articles and television programmes 
may tang tsa bi dziu/da ca bian qiu an expression derived from ping-pong which 
describes when a ball glances off the edge of the table. One informant likened the 
increasing frequency with which such items now appear as like a bowl with a leak 
(loudong).
The flow of information in China in the form of talk and a liberalization of the 
media has been greatly fostered by the opening of China’s national door.27 A retired 
man told me that in the Maoist era there "was a news blockade (xinwen fengsuo) and 
foreign broadcasts were jammed, so we did not know what the outside world was like. 
Only the higher levels (shangci) had access to foreign media." Another informant told 
me "Mao Zedong had a closed door policy. Deng Xiaoping threw open the window and 
let the wind in. People could see what the West was like." As noted above, the term for 
"wind" - feng - has a range of meanings including "news, information" and "style,
26Four years later one informant recalled these few  days o f  press freedom with a distinct sense o f  
nostalgia. Publications at this tim e indicate what a free and "open" C hinese m edia w ould look like.
27The increasing re-intem ationalization o f  Shanghai and the increased perm eability o f  the c ity ’s 
boundaries are addressed more fu lly  in the fo llow in g  chapter.
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practice, custom". A 38 year old saleswoman made a direct link between changing values 
and ideas and the "opening" of China’s "door". She told me that "previously people’s 
thinking was conservative and closed up. Mao Zedong did not allow us to see the outside 
world, we were blind (mangmu). When the door opened, we saw the discrepancy [with 
the West] and could not bear it."
Through the "open door" has flowed information and "strange tales from over the 
seas" (haiwai qitan). Local people are, for instance, now free to tune-in to the BBC 
World Service and the Voice o f  America and other broadcasts which drift in on foreign 
air-waves (sic). Television (dianshi - "electronic vision") enables people to gaze upon 
other people and places from their own living rooms and provides the main channel for 
images of other countries. Having been told for years that China was outstripping the 
capitalist West and hearing only of the sufferings of those in capitalist countries, people 
were often truly surprised by what they saw. A local economics professor commented 
that "until gaige kaifang Shanghai was regarded as the most modern (xianjin) city in 
China. After gaige kaifang it was revealed as backward." The makers of Heshang also 
remarked upon this noting that "[t]en years ago, when we finally opened our closed 
bamboo curtain and once again rejoined the world, the Chinese people—who for so long 
had lived in the hardship of ‘transitional poverty’ and the isolation o f cultural despotism— 
were surprised to discover just how developed the capitalist West and Japan were and how 
comfortably their people lived" (Su & Wang 1991: 162).
A teacher felt that an important reason students demonstrated in 1989 were changes 
caused by gaige kaifang. In the past they had not seen or even heard about the outside 
world. With gaige kaifang they could compare with the rest of the world and see China’s 
true state. In addition, the "open door" allowed the outside world to gaze upon China. 
This dialectic was evident during the demonstrations when many students carried banners 
in English obviously designed for consumption abroad (see chapter 2). Since 1989, the 
state has continued to actively promote the "Open Door" policy. On June 9, 1989, during 
his congratulatory speech to army commanders who had suppressed demonstrations in 
Beijing, Deng Xiaoping stated that "[w]hat is important is that we should never change 
China back into a closed country" (cited in Rai 1991: 123). The official objectives for 
Shanghai by 2010 are to "achieve an international scale and breadth o f economic 
development. Create a modern city of the first order in world terms. Create a society that 
is open and outward looking with respect to China and the world" (Zhao 1993: 2).
Such slogans may be regarded as unleashing and fostering expectations for the
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future. Those who expect Shanghai to develop rapidly and successfully point to factors 
such as its well trained workforce, favourable geographic location and the state’s support 
for its development - one view was that the government wants to develop Shanghai at the 
expense o f Hong Kong. A young businessman told me that he expects Shanghai will 
reach a similar level to New York and was confident that, at the very minimum, it will 
surpass Hong Kong within ten years. A retired teacher commented, ’’Napoleon called 
China a sleeping lion, it is now awakening. Once fully awake, the world will not be able 
to look down on this race (minzu)." He noted the size of China’s market adding that 
"now America gives China special economic status, in five years time it will be the other 
way round." His expectation, voiced using terms (ironically) reminiscent o f many 
Orientalist views of China, is that the outside world will be able to gaze upon a newly 
assertive, rich and powerful China.
1.3.2 Flows of Capital
Many Shanghainese complained about the lack of infrastructural work carried out 
in the city in the decades after 1949. Until the 1980s there was no new architecture to 
compare with the early twentieth century colonial structures on the Bund. One woman 
described how her uncle had left Shanghai and gone to Hong Kong in 1949. When he 
next returned in 1979 he found Shanghai "exactly the same, except that everything was 
older than before." On his most recent visit, in 1993, he noticed distinct changes and his 
niece commented that this redevelopment "gives people a feeling of newness." When
asked what changes gaige kaifang had brought, local residents often responded by
pointing to changes in the city’s outward appearance (waiguan) or "face" (mianmao). 
In the mid-1980s the construction of such buildings as the Hilton Hotel and Union 
Building and the modern architecture of the new Hongqiao development zone near the 
airport were obvious signs of change. More recently, the development o f Pudong, the 
construction of the Nanpu and Yangpu bridges - now attractions on all tourist itineraries - 
numerous hotels, share dealing centres, commercial entertainment centres, new roads and 
the underground were all visible markers of change.
These changes are due in part to a greater retention of profits made in the city. In
1985 the amount of tax revenues retained in the city increased from 13.2% to 23.2% 
(Jacobs & Hong 1994: 231). There has also been a significant inflow of domestic and 
foreign capital. A Wenhui Bao article stated that "[nineties Shanghai, has opened wide 
(changkai damen) its great door, and welcomes investors from every country to come and
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invest in Shanghai... Shanghai is now deepening reform (shenhua gaige), and enlarging 
the Open Door (kuoda kaifang)... Shanghai is in a period of development, it is extremely 
bustling (renao) and flourishing (xingwang)."28 In 1992, for instance, Shanghai 
introduced US $3.35 billion in foreign investment, equal to the total of the previous twelve 
years.29 With the "[d]oor opening wide on the real estate market" land prices in 
Shanghai have rocketed.30 In 1993, the 460 metre high Shanghai Radio and Television 
Tower on the east side of the Huangpu River was completed. It is in keeping with the 
sustained watery metaphors noted in this chapter that this structure which "is set to 
become a new symbol of Shanghai" should be described as "The Oriental Pearl".31
Despite such visible changes in Shanghai’s appearance not all residents were 
content. A magazine editor commented to me that "with gaige kaifang there appear to 
have been many changes. For instance, there are many tall buildings. But for salaried 
laobaixing like me they are too expensive, we cannot afford them. They might as well 
not be there." A similar view was expressed by a local journalist who asked rhetorically, 
"when it comes down to it, where has there been change?" Answering his own question 
he continued, "the Communist Party likes superficialities (gao biaomian wenzhang). 
The laobaixing want larger homes and wider roads. Instead what gets built are big, 
expensive buildings for foreigners to live in."
1.3.3 Flow of People 
International
The tide of news and information was soon followed by products and people. 
Opening China’s door has allowed a flow of people into and out of the country. A 
Confucian saying describes an option when one’s path is blocked: "If the way is not
accepted, get on a boat and take to the seas" (dao bu xing, cheng cha fu yu hai). A 
"going abroad craze" (chuguore) began in the early 1980s with "large numbers o f talented 
people turbulently flowing out of the national door (xiongyongpengpai de liu chu 
guomen)."32 In addition to citizens sent abroad by the Chinese government for study
:8W HB 26 May 1993: 1.
:;CD 6 July 1993: 4.
"CD 28 April 1993: 1.
3'CD 15 N ovem ber 1993: 5.
3:"‘C h u g u o r e ’ J ian g  W en Le!" ( ‘G oing Abroad Craze’ C ools!) JFRB 29 October 1993.
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and training, better educated young Shanghainese seek scholarships in America, Australia 
and Western Europe, and other emigrants go abroad to work (dagong), often in Japan.33 
One commentator described this behaviour to me using a traditional proverb: water runs 
to low places, people move toward high places (shui wang dichu liu, ren wang gaochu 
zou). There is considerable evidence of a "brain drain". Many of Shanghai’s most able 
intellectuals, especially university and scientific staff aged between 30-40 have gone 
abroad. Some seek to marry foreigners to go abroad, a few simply using them as a 
"spring board" (tiaoban) to leave China. Sometimes the wish is to obtain a foreign 
passport since, as one young businesswoman told me, "it is difficult to predict (yuce) what 
will happen when Deng Xiaoping dies. Having a foreign passport is a kind o f insurance." 
A Jiefang Ribao article described Shanghai in 1992-3 as like Taiwan in the 1970s - since 
1992 the "going abroad craze" appeared to have been "cooling" with fewer people leaving 
and "an irresistible tide returning to China" (bu ke zudang de guiguochao).34 This shift 
was trumpeted as indicative of the "excellent opportunities" brought by the "continuing 
deepening of gaige kaifang" in Shanghai. For instance, young people may have the "wild 
ambition...unthinkable a few years ago of...oneself being a boss" (ziji zuo laoban).35 
This article may overstate the case somewhat but amongst young people I encountered this 
trend was borne out.
Businessmen, teachers, students and tourists have increasingly flooded into the city. 
In the first nine months of 1993, 908,000 overseas visitors came to Shanghai. O f these
605,969 were foreigners, 165,891 from Taiwan, and 123,153 from Hong Kong and
M acao/6 A saleswoman commented that "recently many foreign businessmen 
(waisheng) come to Shanghai. Shanghai is returning to how it was in the 1940s, a shi 
li yangchang (a metropolis infested with foreign adventurers - usually referring to pre­
liberation Shanghai CED 1988: 800). There is now an international feel (guoji de
ganjue)." Foreign made products were tangible evidence of China’s new direction,
whether it be Japanese cars and electrical equipment, American toothbrushes or British 
cosmetics. As one man pointed out "at the worst time, in the Cultural Revolution, I dared 
not have any foreign things visible in my home. Recently there have been many changes,
” See Hooper 1985 Chapter 9 "Temptations from the West".
’■’See footnote 32.
"Ibid.
3bSS 5 N o v em b er  1993: 4.
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often o f 180 degrees. For example, in the past American things were described as 
especially bad, now even the smallest shop likes to stick up a sign saying ‘China-US Joint 
Venture’."
Intra-National Flow
During the reform era the city boundaries have become much more permeable. 
One notable effect is that "a ‘Southern window wind (nanchuang feng)’ has already 
blown into Shanghai."37 This "wind" takes the form of cultural influences from 
Guangdong and Hong Kong including music, food and linguistic expressions. A 
particularly significant flow is that of migrant workers from other parts o f China (see 
White 1994). This has been made possible by the end of rationing and the reduced 
effectiveness of the household registration system. An article in Wenhui Bao reported 
that "[w]ith the increased dynamic development o f Pudong and Shanghai’s current great 
strides (bumai) towards being an internationalized great metropolis, for the second time 
in Shanghai’s history there is a rush of great fervour (rechao - literally a "hot wave") 
towards ‘Shanghai beach’". By 1993, Shanghai’s floating population (liudong renkou) 
had already surpassed 2.5 million.38 This article noted that of this "floating population"
500.000 were construction workers and that Shanghai has plans to implement a "green 
card" (luka) system for such people. A 1994 report suggested that the figure had already 
reached 3.3 million.39 According to Shanghai’s Mayor, Huang Ju, by the year 2010, the 
city will have a population of 19 to 20 million, including a 5 to 6 million floating 
population.40
A Xinmin Wanbao article described migrant workers as a "guerilla 
force...stealthily entering [Shanghai’s] factories."41 This article noted that around
100.000 female textile factory workers had been made redundant (xiagang) in Shanghai 
and that they were being replaced by a "tide" of non-Shanghainese migrant workers (waidi 
mingong chao) which "blindly flows and surges (mangliu yongru) into this city." The 
willingness of these workers to do dirty and unpleasant jobs for low wages is described
37X M W B  5 N ovem ber 1993: 14.
18W HB 13 N ovem ber 1993: 6.
'"Cited in W hite 1994: 86.
4U"City o f  Future" SS 2 July 1993: 1.
4l"‘Y o u j id u i’ Q iao q ia od e  J in  Chang" 22 July 1993: 12.
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as presenting a "threat" and a "challenge" to redundant Shanghai women workers getting 
work again.
1.3.ff Flow Within Shanghai
In addition to an increasing topographical flow of people there was also flow 
within Shanghai in terms o f greater social mobility and the opening up of new routes and 
channels. At the end of 1978 almost all workers were employed by the state either 
directly or in collective enterprises. Even in the 1980s state employees generally were 
"stuck" both residentially and occupationally (Davis 1990: 87). During the early 1990s, 
in particular, significant changes in the economic base occurred which allowed a greater 
range of choice. Many of the areas of life mentioned above as having been regulated are 
now subject to far fewer restrictions. The informant who described Shanghai as having 
been solidified (ninggu) considered that as a result of gaige kaifang "the social structure 
is more dynamic, for example, somebody without wenhua42 can get rich." Another 
informant remarked that gaige kaifang provides individuals with opportunities to become 
useful people (chengcai - also "grow into useful timber").
A key shift marking a more tolerant attitude towards the "tails of capitalism" was 
the re-legalization in the late 1970s of small scale private entrepreneurs (getihu).43 The 
services they provide - such as bicycle repairers and fruit stalls - alongside allowing 
peasants to sell their produce in the city brought significant and qualitative changes to 
inhabitants' daily lives. The most common explanation I was given for allowing small- 
scale entrepreneurs was that these were primarily people who had been in prison (chi 
guansi - "ate a lawsuit") and had no jobs when released - they were allowed to set up as 
getihu in order to give them a "road out" (chulu) and to maintain social order.
Many informants felt that initially gaige kaifang only brought new opportunities
4:The term w enh ua presents great difficu lties in translation. This term is defined as "civilization, 
culture" or "education, culture, schooling, literacy" (C E P  1988: 721-2). A s this defin ition  suggests - and 
as its use makes apparent in everyday contexts - a clear linkage, even a conflation, is often made between  
the English concepts o f  "culture" and "education". 1 suggest that this indicates the priority w hich  has 
traditionally been given to the written word in China. H ow ever, it should be added that there is a lso  a term 
for "education" (jiaoyu ). Since "wenhua" defies easy translation 1 use the C hinese term throughout.
41In 1993, som e 183,000 people were reported to be em ployed in private enterprise in Shanghai (W HB
7 May 1993: 2). In the same year, a report stated that 1.5% o f  Shanghai’s workforce was em ployed in the
private sector, compared to a national figure o f  2.4% (W H B 28 July 1993: 2).
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to getihu.44 In 1980s Huhhot, Jankowiak found "an attraction and a repulsion" toward 
the private sector" (1993: 78). In Shanghai, before about 1991 getihu were invariably 
described in morally negative terms as criminals (fan ren), crafty (huatou), improper (bu 
zhengdang), low class people (xiaceng ren), with low wenhua (culture/education)45 and 
low moral quality (suzhi di) who rip people off (/se/zhan), fool around with women, 
gamble and evade tax.46 A local sociologist agreed that until recently people, and 
especially intellectuals, looked down on getihu. However, he noted a recent marked 
change in attitudes towards them. He explained that "gaige kaifang has introduced a new 
standard (biaozhun) and a new value (jiazhi), that of money - with money one can travel, 
go abroad, eat in big hotels and be a consumer of luxury items." In the consumerist 
nineties, money, rather than "good class" or party status has become a key determinant of 
social status. As a clerk in a state danwei told me, "everyone is thinking o f ways to make 
money, because money is the most important thing now." A joint venture employee told 
me that "before only hooligans (xiao liumang) were getihu, now university intellectuals 
may be getihu."
More generally, a young businessman noted that previously manual and service 
work had been regarded as low status, but that now, for example, a hairdresser may be 
seen as high class (gaodang) and a bar worker have a high income which gives him 
status. It is ironic that in the Maoist era when state rhetoric advocated narrowing the gap 
between mental and manual labour that this distinction appears to have been reinforced. 
During the reform era, when such rhetoric has been jettisoned, comments such as this 
suggest progress in this direction, although my own impression is that this trend is limited. 
For instance, many people still expressed negative attitudes towards getihu. On one 
occasion, however, an intellectual who had outlined the usual negative stereotype added 
that "people usually say getihu have lots of money and are slippery types (huatou). But 
in practice, many are not wealthy and they face many problems such as arbitrary taxes and 
corrupt officials."
Several informants told me that an early indication of the start of gaige kaifang 
was the announcement that class struggle was over and that economic construction was
44In 1988, the annual w age o f  salaried staff and workers in Shanghai w as estim ated to be 1,747¥, that 
o f  private entrepreneurs over 5 ,000¥  with som e 10% having an annual incom e in excess o f  10 ,000¥ (W ilson  
1990: 58).
45See footnote 42  above.
46See also Susan Y oung (19 9 1 ) on negative perceptions o f  getihu.
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the central policy. The cessation of class labelling began to loosen up the social system. 
As one teacher told me, under the old system "many students’ fate (mingyun) was fixed 
by the class label of their parents." The increased possibility to choose and change jobs 
were important new elements of choice. During the Maoist period workers had a high 
degree o f job security but could also "be stuck forever in a very unpleasant work 
situation" (Parish & Whyte 1984: 33). From 1991, what is officially called the "mobility 
(literally "flow") of talent" (rencai liudong) and popularly referred to as tiaocao (literally 
"jump from one trough to another") became quite common. A state danwei employee 
contrasted the possibility to tiaocao with the situation "in Mao’s time" when one could 
not change jobs but was just a "revolutionary screw" - a term which highlights both 
limited labour mobility and lack of individual choice. Even the term "labour market" now 
used by officials, would have been anathema until recently, implying, as it does, that 
labour is a commodity. Instead of being channelled into a job, graduating students can 
now find their own jobs. Policy changes have increased the range of choice by allowing 
part or wholly foreign-funded enterprises and private companies. Occupational mobility 
has also increased with job advertisements and, for instance, a removal of restrictions on 
moves from collective to state enterprises. In the past such moves could usually only be 
made via the "backdoor".
As a result of increased job mobility and the "flow of talent" educational 
establishments and professions such as medicine have lost staff to commercial companies 
which can pay higher salaries. A Guangming Daily article described this "brain drain" 
as caused by the move to the market economy and observed, for instance, that the "once 
preeminent Fudan University is beginning to stagnate."47 The article concluded that the 
way to resolve this problem is to "let the market completely redistribute talented workers, 
putting them into jobs that give them the best opportunities to use their abilities." 
Following through the irrigation metaphor, one may see this as a notion that the waters 
unleashed by the sluice will naturally find their own level and not be wasted by being 
poured down the drain.
Side-Channelling Energies
[T]he rigid personnel system in the State sector still limits labour mobility and restrains 
talent flow' [but] moonlighters can try whatever they think they are good at... Shanghai 
has about 5 million moonlighters...working in their free time as peddlars, waiters, private 
tutors, editors, PR sta ff members and consultants... Some sociologists say second jobs
47Translated in CD 17 July 1993: 4.
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are, ultimately, a rebellious move against rigid administrative systems in the State sector... 
So far, the central government has kept its mouth shut on the issue. This tacitness, 
analysts say, has to do with the S tate’s current policy to nurture its fledgling tertiary, or 
service industry.
China Daily 8 March 1993: 4 
This China Daily article further described the low wages and limited promotion 
prospects o f state employees as key causes o f moonlighting, citing a survey by the 
Ministry of Labour which "shows that State employees are idle for at least half of an 8- 
hour day." Finally, it noted that "most moonlighters do not really wish to discard their 
"iron rice bowls" and that "first jobs grant a sense of security." If  the staggering figure 
o f 5 million moonlighters is correct, and certainly many people I met were moonlighting, 
then most Shanghainese workers are engaged in this activity. Moreover, the list given 
does not even include those who deal in shares in the city’s newly reestablished share 
market. At least 1-2 million Shanghainese have "thrown themselves into the share sea" 
(touru le guhai).48 After a visit to Shanghai in 1843 Robert Fortune described the city 
as "essentially a mercantile city, and all the residents engaged in active business" (1853, 
Vol 1: 104). At times I felt that Shanghai could once again be described in this way.
48"Yongjin G u ch ao  de N urenm en" (The W omen Who Surge into the Share W ave) NFZM  18 June 
1993: 1.
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Cartoon 1 Caption "The True and 
and the False"
Dozing figure is at his danwei 
job. second figure carries a 
suitcase labelled "second job". 
(XMWB 8 December 1993)
Cartoon 2 Caption "Deformed" 
The bucket in the left hand is 
labelled "own job", the one in 
the right hand "second job". 
(XMWB 29 April 1993)
Cartoon 3 C aption "Illegally Overtaking"
The first truck is labelled "second job", the second 
truck "one's job" [i.e. one’s state allocated job] 
(XMWB 30 March 1993)
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Viewed from one perspective increased job mobility is a new opportunity. However, 
many people changed jobs or took on second jobs because their salaries were insufficient. 
Furthermore, the policy allowing employees from collective enterprises to move to state 
danwei was indicative of the declining status of state danwei. State danwei employees 
told me that the sense of superiority (youyuegan) they once felt has disappeared since the 
mid-1980s. The main impediments to leaving a state danwei were the loss o f welfare 
benefits (laobao) and job security. Reduced funding of state enterprises and the 
introduction of a contract system for new employees had eroded these entitlements or, at 
least, engendered the belief that they will deteriorate (see O’Leary 1992). On one 
occasion, during a conversation with a factory worker, a television news report mentioned 
that some state fruit stores have taken to other occupations because they cannot compete 
with getihu. He commented that "the state cannot outdo getihu."49 This passing remark 
is a telling comment on the state’s declining economic role.
Interstices
Before the reform period organizational and information structures were 
predominantly vertical, hierarchical and relatively discrete although mediated to an extent 
by personal connections (see chapter 3). Informants also described a situation where the 
reach of the state touched directly upon each individual. Space has now opened up for 
new forms of association. By the late 1980s a process was underway "that was 
fundamentally changing the nature of the state-society relationship" and "a nascent civil 
society was emerging and consolidating" (Whyte 1992: 93). In place o f the former direct 
Party-unit/employee link various types of intermediary (zhongjie) organizations emerged. 
The state’s role in enterprise management has been reduced and the former direct link 
replaced by a government-trade association-factory chain.50 Similarly, the former direct 
government-individual link is now mediated by various organizations such as scholarly 
institutes and commercial federations. The role of broker has also been revived (see 
chapter 4). A flood of advice and "how-to" books has emerged with titles such as The 
Managing Strategy of Broker (sic) (Jingjiren Jingying FangliieT
4<;In 1978, c.90%  o f  urban retail sales were conducted in state stores; by 1987 on ly  c.40%  (Hartland- 
Thunberg 1989: 22).
MjIn 1993, there was a subtle but significant change in term inology - g u oy ing  q iye  ("state enterprises") - 
im plying state management - became g u o  you q iye ("state-owned enterprise") w hich are responsible for 
paying tax to the state.
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There is greater space for civil society, particularly o f a diffusely organized kind. 
The world of share dealers (see chapter 6) is a significant example o f this. Share dealers 
rely upon contacts and information for their trading activities. Amongst wealthy dealers 
and share exchange managers I encountered, lunch at expensive restaurants appeared to 
be a frequent event. To these were invited colleagues and friends often employed in 
government departments and/or financial institutions. These meetings were clearly aimed 
at maintaining and creating "connections" and "oiling the hinges". More generally, some 
informants pointed to Shanghai’s burgeoning restaurant scene as indicative o f the city’s 
revived role as a commercial "window" (chuangkou) - these are the places where business 
deals are done. However, such positive assessments of this conspicuous public eating 
were much rarer than negative comments by informants who regarded it, at best, as 
wasteful and often as evidence of corruption (see chapter 5).
Setting Sail
A term which has become fashionable since 1991-2 is xiahai (literally - put out 
to sea). It refers to cadres and intellectuals - people with wenhua) - who engage in 
business. Originally xiahai referred to an intellectual who went from being an amateur 
enthusiast of Peking opera (a piaoyou) to becoming a professional actor - this was called 
piaoyou xiahai. This dramatic analogy accords closely with the view of one informant 
that gaige kaifang provides a "stage" (wutai) on which individuals have the opportunity 
to give free reign to their talents. Xiahai had a derogatory connotation since actors were 
looked down upon by intellectuals. Some informants were unaware of this derivation of 
xiahai and provided imaginative etymologies. One teacher speculated that xiahai 
originally referred to pirates setting out on a raid. On a subsequent visit he again raised 
the topic of xiahai. It was worse, he noted, than he had realized. From conversations 
with friends he had "discovered" that xiahai originally meant for a girl to enter a brothel 
and become a prostitute.
Although such imaginative etymologies indicate that xiahai possesses at least a 
resonance of illicit behaviour most informants denied that xiahai retains a derogatory 
meaning. However one intellectual, well aware of the literary origin o f xiahai, considered 
that the term is linked to xiashui meaning to "enter the water" or "take to evil doing" - 
he explained that "it is like when one is clean (ganjing) and then gets into water (shui), 
which is dirty." Both xiahai and xiashui share the meaning of "to head for the place with 
money" (wang qian de difang zou). I protested that water is clean but he drew attention
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to a phrase which may describe a person who seeks self improvement: ren wang gaochu 
zou, shui shang dichu liu - humans aim for high places, water runs to low places. His 
interpretation is that water is ignoble (bu guangcai) and does not want face (bu yao 
mianzi), it runs downwards towards the xialiu - the lower reaches (also meaning "low- 
down, mean, obscene, dirty") - where all the dirty (zang) things are to be found.
Various factors provoked people to xiahai. A key motive was financial. Some 
considered prospects at their danwei too limited. Peer group pressure and media 
examples of successful money-makers could also be a spur to "set sail". By decreeing that 
workers’ bonuses must now be earned by commercial activities within danwei, the state 
appeared to encourage such entrepreneurship. Informants also described xiahai as 
providing an opportunity to use personal talents (fahui ziji de caineng), some 
characterizing it as an opportunity to temper (duanlian) themselves. This reference to 
duanlian is an interesting instance of a word being given new content in a changed social 
environment. This term was popular in the Maoist era when people would "steel 
themselves" in "great revolutionary movements" (CED 1988: 169). Writing on rural 
Guangdong in the Cultural Revolution, Richard Madsen comments that duanlian was a 
term used by village leaders and activists and that it included the notion o f "asceticism - 
spiritual exercise consciously and deliberately undertaken" (1984: 29-30)
Sinkine
In contrast to those Shanghainese who have succeeded in the commercial "sea" 
many faced another type of xia - xiagang. Workers in unprofitable enterprises were given 
"early retirement" or laid off (xiagang) and told to "find their own way out" (ziji zhao 
chulu) of this problem. Workers who "stepped down from their posts" (xiagang) retained 
welfare entitlements but received only a percentage of their salaries. Typically, those who 
xiagang were less well-educated, middle aged women from the "lost generation" whose 
education had been disrupted during the Cultural Revolution. The number o f xiagang 
workers is secret - the state closely guards such information. However, occasional news 
items mentioned factories laying off workers and my informants generally knew of people 
who had been laid off. As I note above, one Xinmin Wanbao article stated (in a small 
article buried on page 12) that around 100,000 female textile factory workers had 
"recently" xiagang in Shanghai. One informant described the extent of xiagang as 
analogous to a bowl with a crack in it through which its contents leak out - the "bowl" 
here being Shanghai’s socio-economic structure. This would seem to be an apposite
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analogy for the fate o f the "iron rice bowl" in Shanghai.
The situation o f xiagang workers, who in 1992-3 generally received less than 200¥ 
pcm, was extremely difficult especially if both spouses were laid off. The way in which 
xiagang was discussed confirms the conception of the danwei as a bounded, all 
encompassing entity. Workers who "come down" (xialai) are said to "go to society" (dao 
shehui). Many sought work in service sectors, setting up a street stall being a common 
"road out". The better qualified sought work in joint ventures. Some units set up 
subsidiary enterprises (san zi qiye) such as restaurants and redeployed workers in these. 
Xiagang workers who could not find alternative work often returned to their original jobs 
since danwei retain ultimate responsibility for them. I asked a share dealing room 
manager about the prospect of enterprise bankruptcies - which would sever such 
responsibilities. He responded that these were unlikely since the Party "still wants ‘peace 
and stability’ (anding tuanjie)" - an ironic comment upon a current Party slogan.
Although xiagang was a great threat for many workers, some considered it a 
welcome opportunity to leave a job they disliked. Drivers, in particular, often welcomed 
xiagang since their skills were in great demand. One factory worker told me that he was 
happy to xiagang since he would get half his wages, retain welfare entitlements and be 
able to take on a part time job which paid more than his original salary. In another case, 
a worker in a state danwei planned to volunteer to xiagang for several months in order 
to try out a job in a trading company. In this way xiagang provided a crucial security net.
1.3.5 Backwaters and Stagnant Pools - Lack of Change
One state worker commented that "gaige kaifang provides a stage (wutai) on 
which people can give full play to their talents (shizhan caihua)." However, she added 
that this was of little benefit to those who lacked talents and that this "stage" could often 
only be entered via the backdoor. Another young state worker told me, "there have been 
some big changes in Shanghai, but for those with no opportunities (meiyou lu) and 
without a way to make money their situation may be deteriorating." Desirable jobs 
included state trading and financial companies, joint venture and foreign-owned companies 
in which most of the best opportunities were open only to the young and well educated. 
Structural limits to occupational mobility still remained. In particular, the provision of 
housing and welfare benefits was still largely tied to danwei membership. In addition, 
some workers who moved jobs and, for instance, trainee teachers, who did not take up job
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assignments, had to pay compensation.
State danwei workers I encountered often conveyed the impression that little had 
changed in their enterprises. One informant described them as "like machines whose 
motor has stopped, and which continue to move only through residual momentum 
(guanxing)." A young man who had moved from a state danwei to a joint venture 
observed that gaige kaifang had brought few changes to his former danwei. He added 
that "the changes one sees in Shanghai are due to joint ventures and foreign owned 
enterprises." Similarly, a local government cadre told me that "despite the constant talk 
about gaige kaifang, it’s still just the same old situation" (lao yangzi). It seems that the 
stereotypical state danwei where workers "have a cup of tea, smoke a cigarette, and read 
the newspaper" still survived. Indeed, when I asked this cadre if he was busy at work he 
responded "not at all, now it’s gaige kaifang. The government is relaxed now, it doesn’t 
want us to do much." He added that "gaige kaifang brings some problems" including 
plans for cuts in local government bureaucracy. He considered his future prospects 
difficult to predict (yuliao) but was not worried since "there is always food to eat, the 
state will always arrange something - they won’t make you unemployed." This man was 
in the process of applying for Communist Party membership. He expected that this would 
"make everything rather better." For example, he would get a higher salary, an increased 
bonus and more chance of promotion. It is notable that few younger informants 
considered this strategy. Indeed, this man remarked that his own son considered his 
joining the Party as "stupid".
Many state workers appeared to have a lackadaisical attitude to their jobs. With 
little opportunity to vent their frustrations workers may chugong bu chuli - go to work 
but not expend energy. A factory worker in his early thirties told me that in his job he 
just hun - wastes time - all day (cf. Scott 1990). Instead of working contentedly (anxin 
gongzuo) many workers’ efforts and energies were channelled into a second job or 
sideline activities such as share dealing. In addition, the possibility of making money 
elsewhere had introduced subtle changes into the workplace. For instance, a woman with 
various sideline occupations commented that she would not obey her danwei leader since 
her salary was too low. However, not all workers could engage in such activities. A 38 
year old electrician on a salary of 280¥ who described his danwei as "still an ‘iron rice 
bowl’" told me that he had neither the time nor the energy for a second job - each day he 
spent four hours crossing the city by bus commuting from his home to his danwei.
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1.3.6 Rising Tides - Living Standards and Consumerism
For many, probably a majority of Shanghai residents, the most important 
consequence, and indeed the very connotation of gaige kaifang was that living standards 
(shenghuo shuiping - literally "life water level") had risen.51 As a proverb states: when 
the river rises the boat goes up - particular things improve with the improvement of the 
general situation (shui zhang chuan gao). Incomes generally were higher, with an average 
monthly income of 343 .71 ¥ in the period January-September 1993, a rise of over 19% after 
inflation from the same period in 1992.52 Along with a much greater range and quantity 
of consumer items there has been a "consumer flood in the 1990s."53
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Cartoon 4 Caption "What The Eyes Don't See, Does Not Perturb One" 
The articles have labels such as "Parisian perfume 26,000V", "famous 
brand name shirt 1,800V", "imported leather jacket 25,OOOV",
"luxurious diamond watch 120,000V", and "English lipstick 22,000V". 
(XMWB 5 December 1993)
5lS im ilar l \  in the Ch inese  countryside  (sec  Croll 1994: 2 20) .
5:"Gap Between Poor and Rich Growing" CDBW  28 N ov-4 Dec 1993: 3.
y,"Jiushi N iandai X iaofe ich ao  Toushi" (Perspectives on the Consumer Flood in the 1990s) W H D Y SB
5 June 1993: 7.
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Alongside increasing prosperity were complaints that those who relied upon salaries 
could not join the "flood of consuming famous brand names which are ‘gushing’"54 into 
Shanghai or enjoy the proliferation of entertainments such as karaoke. One informant noted 
that he saw consumption levels increase whilst he collected his pension and his income 
decreased. Some informants described the vast increase in restaurant consumption as 
"abnormal" (bu zhengchang) and beyond the pockets of ordinary salaried people. Lavish 
restaurant eating was associated primarily with private entrepreneurs or the (mis)use of 
public funds. Growing commercialization had brought what one informant described as an 
"economic pressure" (jingji yali) and an increasing pressure of material goods (wuzhi yali).
1.4. Flood Water. Dangerous Currents. Murky Depths and Whirlpools
In official Chinese rhetoric the Cultural Revolution was "ten years of chaos". Many 
people I encountered in Shanghai endorsed this view. However, I also heard people 
describe their present as "chaotic". Indeed some asserted that there was more "chaos" in 
the early 1990s than during the Cultural Revolution. I consider that following through the 
watery metaphors and attention to the differing meanings of the term luan can help to 
account for these seemingly irreconcilable representations.
The term luan has a wide range of meanings which include: "in disorder, in 
confusion; upheaval, chaos, riot, unrest; confuse, mix up, jumble; confused (state of 
mind); indiscriminate, random, arbitrary; promiscuous sexual behaviour, promiscuity" 
(CEP 1988: 447). When people described the Cultural Revolution as luan this may be a 
different kind of luan to that portrayed in early 1990s Shanghai. For instance, Cultural 
Revolution luan referred primarily to political campaigns. In contemporary Shanghai the 
term was used, for example, of declining public morality, rising crime, the transportation 
system and increasing prostitution. The demonstrations of May-June 1989 are officially 
described as "chaos" or "turmoil" (dongluan), a term most informants also used - although 
a minority called it a "student movement" (xuechao - "student wave").
A magazine editor told me that gaige kaifang in Shanghai lacks order (wuxu) and 
used a local saying to describe its unpredictable effects: when you step on a water melon 
peel, where you fall is where you end up (jiao ta xiguapi, huadao nali suan dao nali). 
People often seemed to conceive of gaige kaifang as having a momentum of its own. Like 
water surging through a sluice it may bring life giving energy to parched earth but it may
54"‘M in g p a i’ X iaofe ich ao  N en g fo u  Chijiu?" (Can the F lood o f  C onsum ing ‘Fam ous Brand N am es’ 
Endure?) W HB 13 May 1993: 7.
also wash away seedlings and even the soil itself. In the first part of this section I examine 
three aspects which many informants felt had been washed away or, at least, diluted in the 
flood - the power of the Communist Party, culture and morality, and certainty and security. 
I then turn to some of the dangerous currents and murky depths of the reform era.
1.4.1 Washed Away in the Flood
The reform period has been marked by a dilution of the power and influence (sic) 
of the Communist Party with a "tremendous erosion in the central government’s control 
over basic financial and administrative levers" (Swaine 1990: 24).1 During the 1980s there 
was evidence of "political society" reemerging. Anita Chan perceived a mushrooming of 
lobby and interest groups independent of CCP control and commented that "a nascent civil 
society is emerging in China" (1989: 81). A common way to express this depoliticization 
and withdrawal of the Party from people’s everyday lives was that China now had a "large 
society" and a "small government" (da shehui, xiao zhengfu). My ability to conduct 
research in the PRC and visit people’s homes was (as informants often noted) indicative of 
depoliticization. Many of the previous forms of surveillance and indoctrination had become 
ineffective.2 "Class" labelling, which was dominant as a distinctive classificatory and 
organizing feature of social life from the early 1950s ceased in the late 1970s. Political 
study used to be compulsory and frequent in Shanghai danwei. One woman told me that 
during the Cultural Revolution her danwei had spent three and a half days and three 
evenings per week o i political study but "now only half a day per week." Some state 
danwei had ceased study sessions altogether. I was told by workers at one large state 
danwei that their uni', had not had study sessions even in the period after June 4.
In educational units Friday afternoon was still reserved for political study. 
However, its effectiveness was clearly limited. On one occasion I asked a teacher to 
explain the meaning of several propaganda phrases used daily in the media. To my surprise 
she did not know. She explained that although her school still had political study it was 
very different to that in the past. She characterized these sessions as "someone reads some 
document for a while, we then all begin to grumble about how long it took to get there on 
the bus and how much food prices have risen." It would seem that, at least at times, the
'In June 1995, Hu Anyang, senior fellow  o f  the Beijing Academ y o f  Science warned that "China is risking  
collapse from fiscal weakness". In 1994, central governm ent revenues accounted for 5.1%  o f  G D P , against 
6.8%  in 1992 and over 9% in 1992; in Britain the equivalent figure w as around 35% (FT 16 June 1995: 6).
: "Space" beyond the reach o f  the state seem s to have begun to grow  from the late 1960s onwards w ith the 
em ergence, for exam ple, o f  juvenile gang subculture (Parish & W hyte 1984; 272-3 ).
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Communist Party speaks a language ordinary people literally do not understand. They are 
no longer taught it, nor is it required or enforced that they should know it. In joint 
ventures, foreign owned companies and for Shanghai’s newly emergent economic status 
groups such as share dealers and getihu the Party had even less relevance.
A common view was that until after the Cultural Revolution extra caution had to be 
exercised in comments made when a Party member was present. This was no longer the 
case with ordinary Party members. A retired man recalled that in the early 1950s Party 
members were said to be "special material" (tesu cailiao). However, in his estimation, if 
one said this to a Party member now they would suspect sarcasm! In popular perceptions 
people now joined the Party to gain some personal advantage and may be embarrassed 
about their membership. Party membership still brought certain advantages - party 
members generally were described to me as being "one level higher" than everybody else. 
For instance, they had more chance to obtain jobs in the media. It was also a source of 
complaint that retired cadres (lixiu) received higher entitlements than ordinary retired 
(tuiviu) people. However, during the reform era alternative routes to success had emerged. 
A Party member in his early sixties told me that "until the reform era there was an official 
standard (guan benwei - benwei = standard, as in gold standard) but now there is a money 
standard (jinqian benwei)." He explained that social status had been dependent upon the 
level of a person's official title (zuo guan duoshao), but "now one’s income is the main 
criterion just like in the West."
k_________________________________________________________J
Cartoon 5 Caption "Before Retiring (lixiu)"
A cadre busy making the most of his power as 
a bureaucratic gatekeeper before he retires. 
(XMWB 12 November 1993)
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Residents’ Committees formerly acted as neighbourhood surveillance units. If one adopts 
Vivienne Shue’s (1988) notion of the reach of the state, these basic level organizations 
constituted its eyes, ears and fingertips. In Shanghai these Committees had lost their 
political role - although some informants felt that this could be reactivated if the state 
considered it necessary. Instead, with gaige, many Residents’ Committees engaged in 
commercial activities. There was visible evidence in countless alley entrances which had 
small enterprises such as shops, noodle stalls or hairdressers run by Residents’ Committees. 
Profits paid the bonuses of Committee workers and helped fund their activities. Older 
women were the main activists in these Committees and the elderly the main beneficiaries 
of their activities. Often these recipients complained that local Committees entrepreneurial 
activities conflicted with their primary functions, for instance, of maintaining standards of 
hygiene - making money rather than serving the people had become their key concern. As 
Parish and Whyte I too found that Residents’ Committees generated "little enthusiasm, 
interest, or loyalty" (1984: 290).
Despite the depoliticization outlined above and the general "decline of ideologically 
sanctioned authority" (Walder 1992: 113), there remained barriers and limits to political 
reform.57 One local level cadre, keen to join the Party for his own personal advantage, 
told me that political reform was limited since it always came up against the interest of 
officials (pengdao guan de li). Many people had limited expectations of political reform. 
Apathy and a sense of helplessness were the main reactions to politics. The more 
politically engaged contrasted the extent of change in the economic structure with the lack 
of political change. The limits to change are made clear in the state’s retention of the 
"Four Basic Principles" enunciated by Deng Xiaoping in March 1979: to keep to the 
socialist road, to uphold the dictatorship of the proletariat, the continued leadership of 
the CCP, and adherence to Marxism, Leninism and Mao Zedong thought. Some perceived 
a fundamental contradiction between the continued enunciation of these Principles and 
future economic progress. One academic told me that "if the Communist Party does not 
collapse it will break (weifan) historical laws (lishi guilu - others spoke of economic laws - 
jing ji guilu)." It is interesting to speculate on the degree to which such commonly held
57cf. Tony Saich’s (1991) essay "Much A do About N othing: Party R eform  in the 1980s". In retrospect, 
the high tide for political reform appears to have been reached during the 13th CCP C ongress in October 1987  
(see Oksenberg 1987). In his report to the Congress the CCP General Secretary Zhao Ziyang - w ho lost this 
position after June 4, 1989 - proposed various political reform s including a separation o f  party and 
governm ent. H e also broke new  ground by suggesting that " [d ifferen t groups o f  people may have different 
interests and v iew s, and they too need opportunities and channels for the exchange o f  ideas" (Ibid: 13). The 
im plications o f  Z hao’s remarks w ere profound since they represented a tacit acceptance o f  the virtues o f  
pluralism .
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beliefs in economic determinism, here invoked for the demise of the Communist Party, are 
derived from several decades of compulsory classes in Marxism.
Although many informants believed that a replacement of "rule by man" (renzhi) 
with "rule by law" (fazhi) would improve problems such as corruption it was widely felt 
that democracy and a free press would be detrimental. Informants generally considered 
Western style democracy an admirable ideal but impractical for China where it would 
promote chaos (luan). Factors cited to support this view included the Communist Party’s 
antipathy to democracy - one informant remarked that "the Communist Party fears 
democracy as it wants to use power to gain personal advantage (yiquan mosi). They do 
not want to lose the opportunity to make money." Intellectuals described the laobaixing 
as neither wishing, nor being ready, for democracy since their wenhua level (wenhua 
shuiping) and moral quality (suzhi) were too low. "The result of direct elections would 
be chaos" one university lecturer told me. He saw a crucial contradiction in that he 
considered corruption the key problem in China and that this required democratization 
(m inzhuhua) and press freedom to deal with it. But he also believed political stability to 
be essential and that press freedom would undermine this. A younger lecturer noted that 
"in China now money can do everything. So even if there was a democratic system the big 
bosses would buy votes and those with the most money would form the government."
One informant hoped that the tidal wave of gaige kaifang would "flush away" 
(chongdiao) the Communist Party altogether. Some anticipated that the reforms will wash 
away the Communist Party within some Fifteen or twenty years. The path to this end was 
portrayed in widely divergent ways from gradual development bolstered by an inevitable 
logic of the deepening of the market economy to bloody confrontation resulting from a 
growing contradiction between economic change and lack of political reform. A man who 
had studied abroad in the 1920s felt that "China is still a sleeping lion. One day it will 
wake up. However, it will need a great revolution for this to happen." In his view this 
political reform will only come some decades hence when a younger generation of political 
leaders who have studied in the West hold the reins of power.
Culture and Morality
Complaints were often made, especially by older people, that traditional culture, 
values and morality had been washed away. In the 1970s in Chen Village in Guangdong, 
Madsen described a "disintegration of the village’s public spirit" (1984: 242). Intellectuals
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pointed to ideals of earlier periods such as those of Confucianism,58 the "Three People’s 
Principles" proposed by Sun Yat-sen or those of socialism - they considered that these 
ideals had all been rejected or devalued and only the desire for money had replaced them. 
Madsen writes of the "moral vacuum created by the destructive cultural chaos o f the 
Cultural Revolution" (28). In 1970s urban China, Parish and Whyte found "increasing 
disillusionment" and that "the emphasis on class struggle and random political attacks had 
destroyed a sense of participation in a grand national purpose" (1984: 320). Amongst 
youth, in particular, they found evidence of increased alienation (323-31). A common 
assessment of my informants was that even those moral values which were sustained in the 
Cultural Revolution had withered in the rush for money of the reform era (see also chapter 
4). One academic, using the expression made famous by Sun Yat-sen, described China as 
like a plate of loose sand (yi pan san sha - in a state of disunity) with people just going 
after money. Even those supportive of gaige kaifang felt that values still upheld during 
M ao’s time had been lost. For example, a university lecturer remarked that in the past 
"people were modest (qianxu), now what counts is who can boast (ziwo chuipeng) the 
most, now the self is much stronger (ziwo qiang de duo)." Rising divorce statistics and 
extra-marital affairs were cited as evidence of this.
Commercialism was felt to have entered many aspects of life (see Gold 1985: 662- 
4), from cultural activities to the choice of marriage partners. University students, for 
instance, eschewed courses in history and philosophy for "hot" subjects such as English, 
business and accountancy. Intellectuals complained that "serious literature" could not get 
published whilst pulp fiction including pirated foreign novels with sex and violence 
dominated the market. One elderly man thought that China had adopted only the negative 
features of capitalism such as speculative share buying. State rhetoric urged citizens to 
seize the opportunity provided by the times (zhuazhu shiji). Enterprising individuals had 
taken this advice and "pushed the boat along with the current" (shunshui tui zhou - make 
use of an opportunity to gain one’s end) - they attempted to make as much money as 
possible. Many complained that people made money by improper means (/o/lao - also 
dredge, fish for, scoop up from the water). Concerns were expressed about the way that 
everyone was now supposed to make money. For instance, many considered it 
inappropriate for doctors and teachers to engage in business. It was seen as detrimental, 
even immoral, for them to expend their time and energies on making money and neglect 
their proper duties.
58See also Madsen (1990  Chapter 10 "The Spiritual Crisis o f  C hina’s Intellectuals").
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C artoon  7 Caption "The Face of the MarketC artoon  6 "Untitled"
Child is saying "Teacher Crammed in-between "fresh sea food hot
this is my name card." pot" and a "karaoke" is the "book shop".
(XMWB 16 November 1993) (XMWB 16 November 1993)
A local sociologist likened Shanghai's indigenous culture during gaige k a ifa n g  to 
that of American Indians during the period of European colonization - it was being washed 
away. Older informants complained that the influx of "foreign culture" such as karaoke, 
Michael Jackson records and disco dancing had edged out indigenous arts. However, one 
expectation was that traditional arts (gudai w enhua) which had gone abroad would be 
reimported to China (chu k ou  zh u an  neix iao) once the economy had developed.
Certainty and Security
The washing away of party power and influence, of culture and morality, were key 
factors which had reduced certainty. A stagnant pond may not be especially desirable and 
being stuck in a rut may be monotonous but at least they provide clearly defined boundaries 
and certainties. In Shanghai, as in the countryside there was the "onset of uncertainty, 
unpredictability and anxiety" (Croll 1994: 223). Many Shanghainese 1 encountered looked 
back on the Maoist period, and especially the early 1950s, with nostalgia. It was 
represented to me as a time of good order, moral certainties and clear, shared national and 
community aims. Older people in particular lamented the loss of  these clear distinctions. 
For instance, Chinese society was perceived to have been divided into a limited range of 
clearly differentiated, morally good and bad classes. In the 1990s, many were perturbed 
by the blurring of statuses as the whole population went into business (q u anm in  
j in g sh a n g ). During 1992-94, Shanghainese frequently advised me that "now is the
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ideal tim e to do business in China" and expected me to xiahai. A university lecturer 
observed that "there has to be a division o f  labour in a society , there is in W estern capitalist 
countries and there should be in China too. T hings alw ays go to extrem es in China. In 
the past everyone had to study Lei Feng and D azhai. N ow  everyone is encouraged to 
xiahai." A journalist suggested to me that China was exceed ing the proper lim its in 
righting a wrong (jiaowang guozheng).
There w as increasing uncertainty over remuneration levels - a matter I elaborate on 
b elow . In addition, inflation resurfaced in the 1980s as a significant problem . It was a 
major factor behind the 1989 dem onstrations. W ith the "market econom y" food prices 
varied daily and store prices were no longer fixed but differed from store to store.
Cartoon 8 Caption "Consumer"
The body is labelled "real price" and 
the ever-emerging heads "false price".
(XMW B 18 December 1992)
The fear of unemployment was returning to Shanghai, with many thousands being 
laid-off. Those in previously secure and w ell-provided large state enterprises wondered  
what the future might bring as they saw their job security and w elfare benefits eroded. As 
elsewhere in China, crime is one of the big "grow th industries" (Dutton 1992: 200) o f  the 
reform era and many of my informants expressed concern over rising cr im e.59 M ost o f
‘"’'Parish & W h y te  found ev idence in the earl) 1970s ,  before the reform era, o f  "serious deterioration in 
what wav once  an order!) and safe urban scene" (1984:  256) .
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this was blamed upon Shanghai’s "floating population". As China’s national "door" opened 
so many families I visited had recently installed outer metal doors (tiemen) to their flats. 
A Jiefang Ribao article reported on the increasing number of children who suffered from 
"lonely disease" (gudubing).60 It attributed this to the way that "more and more 
households are becoming closed style (fengbixing)" with families locked in by doors and 
steel gates and "distanced (gekai) from the outside world." The article described this 
pattern as partly due to the one child policy but more importantly as due to improved living 
standards and more household entertainments such as television and video. Clearly these 
are significant factors, though informants’ rationale for fitting such metal doors was 
invariably fear of crime.
A more general uncertainty concerned the future. Many Shanghainese expressed 
concern over chaos in the form of increasing inequality, corruption, inflation and crime - 
problems often considered even more severe elsewhere in China. Such phenomena were 
attributed to an interrelated combination of the party-state’s weakened controls over the 
populace, for example, the increasingly ineffective household registration system and as 
inevitable growths associated with a transitional stage between a planned socialist economy 
and the socialist market economy. Many expressed fear that this chaos may become more 
severe after the death of Deng Xiaoping. In marked distinction to Western concern over 
lack of free speech and democracy in China, I gained the strong impression that many of 
the problems which worried my informants derived not from the party-state being too 
powerful and intrusive but rather its weakness and/or its failure to maintain the firm moral 
guidelines it espouses.
Uncertainty over China’s future national path and Shanghai’s prospects were often 
cited as factors underlying short-termism. The stereotype of rich getihu was that they 
wantonly consumed their wealth (luan chi luan yong) on meals, women and leisure 
activities rather than accumulate it to use in increasing production. Fear of a change in 
policy such as the confiscation of private property in the 1950s was one reason given for 
this short-termism. A worker in a joint venture felt that "people in Shanghai don’t know 
what will happen in two or three years time so they spend freely and have a good time 
whilst they can." Similarly, a retired lecturer told me that he would not buy his flat 
because "in China one cannot make any plans beyond the next three years. Who knows 
what the policy will be then? China is not stable like England or America." Many 
ventures adopted a maximum two or three year time-scale since the opportunity might not
WJFRB 13 June 1993: 10.
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last and there may be troubled times (luanshi) ahead. Ventures such as restaurants were 
said to be particularly popular since they offered a rapid return on capital.
1.4.2 Dangerous Currents
Law-abiding (guigui juju de) laobaixing who rely on a salary are not rich. There are no ordinary laobaixing in Shanghai’s restaurants. All those who eat in them do so at the state’s expense or are getihu. Getihu only make money because they evade tax, cheat people, exploit loopholes in state policy (zuan guojia de kongzi) and have connections with the police. Large scale corruption has the backing of high cadres. The KMT house was rotten (le te/landiao). It had to be demolished and rebuilt from scratch. It has again reached this state.
Retired man’s comment
People I encountered within Shanghai generally supported gaige kaifang and 
acknowledged the improved standard of living associated with these policies. However, this 
did not preclude concern and complaints about problems which were considered to have 
emerged or become more serious during the reform era. This included increasing 
inequality, unfairness, corruption and sleaze. These phenomena were considered 
detrimental to the shehui fengqi ("social atmosphere") of Shanghai. Shehui fengqi is not 
easily translated into English - note the problems outlined above in translating feng. It 
encompasses prevailing norms, morals, standards of behaviour and, more generally, the 
"spirit of the age" or Zeitgeist.  I begin this section by examining popular perceptions of 
increasing unfairness and inequality and then turn to corruption and sleaze - part of an 
"unhealthy tendency" (bu zheng zhi feng - literally "a dishonest or (morally) bad wind") 
which had filled the vacuum where public morality had been washed away.
Inequality
Although average incomes have risen during the 1990s, the gap between rich and 
poor has increased dramatically and complaints about newly emerging inequalities were 
legion. Before the reform era most workers had just one source of income with relatively 
fixed, clear and egalitarian rates of pay. In 1990s Shanghai, a radically different picture 
presented itself. Within state enterprises basic salary differentials had not widened greatly - 
indeed there appears have been convergence between collective and state danwei (see 
Walder 1990: 139). However, enterprises had increased powers to pay differential bonuses 
and other payments and these could differ considerably even within one sector. In early 
1993, middle school teachers I met from different schools were paid from as little as 300Y 
pern to over 1,000¥. In the latter instance, the school made considerable profits from 
leasing out its land as shop fronts - the resulting income of newly recruited teachers at this
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school was higher than that of head teachers in some Shanghai schools. In addition to high 
salary bonuses this school’s teachers also regularly received free products and foodstuffs, 
special bonuses on all public holidays, free restaurant meals and holidays.
Beyond the state sector, income differentials had widened even more dramatically. 
The manager of a factory which became a joint venture in 1992 told me that previously 
managers earned just 5-6% more than shop floor workers. Within one year a middle 
manager’s salary was roughly twice that of a worker’s - whose salary doubled in the same 
period - at about 1,200¥. In early 1993, average salaries of a state factory worker were 
around 400-500¥, about 600-800¥ for a joint venture employee and 1,200¥ in a solely 
foreign owned enterprise. However, comparing income levels is extremely problematic 
since most of the latter two types of enterprise would not provide housing and had less 
extensive welfare benefits.
Hill Gates (1991), with reference to Chengdu, argues that the June 4 massacre 
enabled the leadership to reassert far more stringent controls on the private accumulation 
of capital. However, this was the exact opposite of the situation I found in 1990s Shanghai 
where an especially remarkable feature was the emergence of a new wealthy strata (a 
subject explored further in Chapter 6). At the same time certain sections of society had 
become more vulnerable and face declining incomes, including workers in factories with 
low efficiency, workers laid off from enterprises and the elderly.
A visible sign of inequality (bu pingdeng) was the plethora of recently opened or 
refurbished opulent restaurants - during 1992-3 some 3,600 restaurants opened within one 
year, an average of ten per day. A man of 70 remarked on the way such restaurants have 
huge tables full of food. He believed that those who could afford this had got rich through 
profiteering and speculation (touji daoba) and added that "our flesh is cut out by them" 
(women de rou bei tam en guadiao). In a similar vein, an informant told me about a 
restaurant in Zhapu Road which had just been rented for 200,000¥ per year. He 
commented that "this shows how much restaurant owners must rip-off customers to make 
a profit - 200,000¥ represents one hundred years salary for an ordinary worker."
Many regarded rising inequality as a divisive factor - it clearly aroused considerable 
resentment. Several informants noted a saying of Mencius: do not fear if all are poor, fear 
only inequality (bu huan pin, zhi huan bu jun). A retired teacher, a Party member, told 
me that Deng Xiaoping had tried to get rid of this belief. He added, "Deng says that some 
should get rich first and the rest will become rich later. But the laobaixing do not believe 
this." In the next section I examine complaints of the unfairness which was widely felt to
93
lie behind inequalities.
Unfairness
A common refrain was that "honest" (laoshi) laobaixing who stuck to the rules 
(guigui ju ju  de) remained poorly off, whilst wealthy people had achieved their riches via 
irregular (bu zhengdang) even crooked means (wai luzi). A local playwright in his late 
thirties said that "previously one could not exploit (boxue). Now, with gaige kaifang, if 
you have the ability you can exploit, only those without ability do not exploit." Some 
informants included morally positive factors in their assessment of who had derived 
advantages from gaige kaifang, they were those who have talent (caineng), ability (nengli) 
and work hard (qinlao). More morally ambiguous factors mentioned were those with lots 
of contacts (shehui guanxi) and the sharp witted (tounao huo de ren). Those who lacked 
connections felt themselves to be at a great disadvantage. A journalist complained to me 
that everybody was going into business describing it as a retrograde step (tuibu) since it 
does not contribute to society (dui shehui gongxian bu hao). However, his next remark 
was "I would go into business if I could, but I lack connections."
A more dominant theme was a stress upon negative factors best summed up by the 
expression: ren wu huang, cai wu fa - a person who does not commit some evil act, will 
not become rich. There seemed to be strong popular perception that the rich were often 
those who had transgressed across moral space; they had "crossed the sea by a trick" (man 
tian guo hai - practice deception). The wealthy were described as those with power and 
influence (you quan you shi de ren), speculators (touji), the crooked, those with "black 
hearts" (xinhei) and those able to exploit loopholes (zuan kongzi). One informant 
commented that "zuan goes on at all levels, danwei zuan workers, regions zuan the state 
and so on." In addition, Shanghai’s nouveaux riches were generally considered to make 
little contribution to society.
Two groups often represented as unfairly wealthy were high-level cadres (gaogan) 
and their families, and getihu. Many people expressed resentment at the advantages and 
privileges enjoyed by high-level Party members. They were felt to have access to "roads" 
denied to ordinary people. For instance, one informant noted that "before there were no 
shares, now Deng Xiaoping’s son can get ten thousand unlisted shares and sell them at a 
huge profit when they go on the market." Even once they retire, for instance, they may 
be handsomely paid as "advisors" to danwei.
Intellectuals, in particular, complained that the wrong people (i.e. not themselves?)-
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become wealthy. When I asked one academic about Shanghai’s nouveaux riches he 
responded with the (rhetorical) question sa nin fu  /a/shenm e ren fu le? - who is rich? He 
described remuneration levels as chaotic (hunluan) with, for example, a receptionist 
"without wenhua" in a big hotel earning 2,000¥ a month - three times as much as a 
university professor - "just because she has a pretty face." Popular rhymes expressed 
feelings of unfairness, for example: long naodai limian de qian, meiyou gao naodai 
waimian de duo - those who deal with the outside of the head [i.e. hairdressers] earn more 
than those who deal with its inside [i.e. brain surgeons]. A university lecturer described 
getihu as "mostly ex-criminals who could not get any other sort of job. A getihu makes 
his living by ripping people off. An honest, upright (zhengzheng jingjing) person would 
not become a getihu."
1.4.3 Murky Depths
In the introduction to this thesis I drew attention to informants’ comments on the 
extent of "doors" and "curtains" in Chinese society which mask or hide the "real" situation. 
Some informants, although supportive of gaige kaifang, were sceptical about its apparent 
results describing them as superficial (biaomian), a false appearance (jiaxiang), or simply 
fake (xujia). One interviewee advised me that "in China on the surface things are one way, 
but the reality is always very different." I witnessed this at first hand during the East Asian 
Games. Dilapidated houses beside a main road had their facades painted over or were 
obscured by large, colourful advertising hoardings. At the same time as hiding these 
buildings from the tourist gaze, the occupants were denied light and visibility. The sense 
of being unable to trust the evidence of one’s own eyes was strongly conveyed in an 
informant’s comment that "Shanghai’s economy is like a kaleidoscope (xiyangjing) - 
through the rotating, coloured glass a beautiful scene is revealed. However, if this glass 
is broken the picture looks very ordinary." In this informant’s view one must strip off the 
camouflage (chaichuan xiyangjing) and expose what lies beneath.
Several informants believed that Shanghai has a bubble economy (paomo jingji) 
which may suddenly burst. One intellectual drew a parallel between gaige kaifang and the 
Great Leap Forward when reports were also all of increasing production and successes. 
He felt convinced that current reports presented an equally false appearance and will 
produce a similar result with economic collapse (kuatai). In his view Deng Xiaoping will 
leave behind an awful mess (Ian tanzi - "a rotten or messy [street] stall"), a mess which 
none of China’s future potential leaders appeared capable o^clearing up. He concluded that
'v  • •
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China is like a water melon which looks perfectly sound from the outside but is rotten 
inside. Another informant who felt that Shanghai’s apparent economic flourishing was 
superficial remarked that much money goes on building large hotels and projects such as 
the Nanpu bridge. He considered such projects as designed to make Shanghai appear 
prosperous - especially to foreigners - and likened it to the way a person may gue pa  
diilguan paitou - "display a rich and arrogant manner to show off one’s wealth or status" 
(Creamer 1991: 133). At the same time, the financial state of many state enterprises 
remains secret - published figures being specially doctored and "accurate" figures for 
internal use only. A former Rightist concluded that "China is not stable, the improvements 
are all superficial. For now the problems are all suppressed, who knows what tomorrow 
will bring."
A popular perception was that many joint ventures were fake - set up solely by local 
businessmen because the state gave them preferential treatment such as tax breaks. Some 
of these ventures were believed to be fronts for the offspring of high cadres (gaogan zidi) - 
including the so-called- "princes party" (taizi dang), the children of the highest level CCP 
leaders - to engage in real estate and other deals. In other instances "suitcase companies" 
(pibao gongsi) with no more to their name than business cards wheel and deal "buying 
empty and selling empty" (maikong maikong). A similar problem was the proliferation 
of counterfeit goods such as fake foreign cigarettes and famous Chinese spirits. In popular 
mythology (and considerable evidence supports this) the offspring of high cadres (gaogan) 
were believed to control many highly profitable companies using their private connections 
to enrich themselves. The increasingly "blurred borderline between state bureaucrat and 
private merchant" (Solinger 1992: 126), such as way many government departments set up 
commercial companies - so called "flipped-plate companies" (fanpai gongsi) - was felt to 
involve corruption.61 The military is also a major economic actor controlling many 
enterprises from hotels to clothing factories and discotheques.62 This involvement is often 
secretive, hidden from the public gaze, a distinct case of closed rather than "open" doors. 
As one informant commented, "who knows what the Chinese economy is really like?"
61O fficial rhetoric also accepts this as a problem . See, for instance, ”lF anpai com panies’ M ust Sever 
Their Former Ties" CD 23 N ovem ber 1993: 4.
^'According an FT report the PLA is the largest distributor o f  pharmaceuticals in China ("W hen D oing  
B usiness Can Be Bloody" 18 July 1995: 6).
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Cartoon 9 Caption "A Sudden Change of Identity And It’s Still Mother-in-Law" 
The two-headed figure has two identities - one as "state bureau", the second as 
"corporation". The second figure is labelled "enterprise". (In Shanghai, popo 
(mother-in-law) is a slang term for a boss)
(XMWB 1 August 1993)
One informant described gaige kaifang as having producing great changes which 
were making the situation in Shanghai increasingly complicated (fuza) and dark (heian), 
quite the reverse of the bright, open and clear (guangming) future that many hoped for. 
Many of the aspects he referred to were the consequence of reform measures implemented 
in work units. For example, he noted that previously a danwei head (toutou) could only 
sack somebody for committing some offence, now they could dismiss an employee without 
a reason. Bosses could now recruit relatives and friends, whereas previously they could 
not as workers were assigned. Bonuses and salaries given to each worker were increasingly 
a matter of secrecy. In his view this should be a better means of encouraging workers. 
However, "since the money given out is the state's and not the boss’s own, he can give it 
to those he favours and not necessarily those w'ho w'ork well. In this way with gaige 
kaifang graft (tanwu) is overt (gongkai)." He also criticized the growing and huge extent 
of eating at public expense which often went under the guise of "reception fees for guests."
A factory worker outlined the situation at her danwei. Superficially the factory 
appeared to be prospering - the boss appeared on television, ate leisurely meals at expensive 
restaurants and had a car bought by the danwei. However, she complained that she and 
half the workforce had been laid off and that many Shanghai danwei were like hers - "mere 
skeletons". City workers at the factory were laid off and production secretly transferred 
to the countryside with the profits made going to him personally and not the enterprise. 
This woman remarked that "the bosses just pull connections, eat, drink and have a good 
time (chiht* wanle) while the actual work is done by country bumpkins (a x iang/ah  xiang)."
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Previously everyone knew fairly accurately other people’s incomes. With the "Open 
Door" this openness was being replaced by opaqueness and even concealment with people’s 
incomes shifting from the public to the private sphere. I noted earlier that state enterprises 
had increased powers to pay differential bonuses and other payments. These were 
sometimes described as "indistinct salary" (mohu gongzi). For example, the tradition of 
giving out red packets of money (hongbao) at occasions such as Chinese New Year had 
proliferated. As one informant commented, "the lowest level workers (xiao balazi) may 
receive 200-500Y but no one knows what the bosses (toutou) get. It may be ten or twenty 
thousand yuan." The incomes of those such as getihu and share dealers were particularly 
hard to ascertain - a small sprinkling of multi-millionaires was included in their ranks. 
Many ordinary people also had sources of income apart from their salary. This "outside 
money" (na kua!waikuai) or "grey income" (huise shouru - hui meaning both "grey" and 
"ambiguous") may come from, for example, share dealing, moonlighting or money sent 
from relatives abroad. It could also include more illicitly obtained income, for example, 
from embezzlement.
1.4.4 Dirty Water. Flotsam and Jetsam 
Corruption
Corruption was considered by many Shanghainese to be endemic. It was also an 
"object of constant complaint."63 Frequent newspaper editorials and official 
pronouncements attacked corruption and those who take "crooked roads" (wailu). 
However, people I encountered were sceptical of their efficacy believing that corruption 
originated from and was most serious amongst powerful sectors of society which were 
beyond the reach of investigators. A widespread belief was that high cadres and their 
families were the main beneficiaries of gaige kaifang. During the 1989 protests this 
transgression of moral boundaries, guandao - official corruption - was a central target of 
demonstrators’ anger. A strong current of resentment persisted over officials who used 
their power to enrich themselves (yiquan mosi). This problem was felt to be growing more 
serious with the increasing lack of differentiation between officials - including the military - 
and commerce (guan shang bu fen). Commenting on this intersection (jiaocha) between 
power and money one informant remarked succinctly that "high officials have the most 
money because they have the most power." Similarly, a factory worker who engaged in 
small scale business activities remarked to me that "only one kind of business is easy - that
63"Reform Bringing About Profound Social Changes" CD 27 M ay 1993: 4 .
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is to use power to do business." Those with "special power" (tequan) had access to 
information and social connections (menlu - "doors and roads"). Power could also replace 
money. For example, high officials could invite people to eat at the state’s expense and 
have free trips abroad and other benefits under the guise of "work requirements" (gongzuo 
xuyao). It should be noted that notions of what constituted corruption varied. For 
instance, on one occasion I asked a retired professor in his nineties about corruption. His 
response was "do you know "xiahai"? In his (very Confucian) view intellectuals engaging 
in commerce was tantamount to corruption. For most informants xiahai may have 
problematic aspects but it did not constitute corruption.
In everyday life scams, rip-offs, petty fraud, and double-dealing were considered 
increasingly common. For instance, I was often asked by informants if I had been 
"tte/zhan" at private markets or getihu restaurants. The dialect term tse was employed in 
a similar fashion to the English "fleeced" or "rip-off", although tse is "to cut". It was said 
of those skilled in tse that "their knife is well sharpened" (to mo le lo kual&ao mo de hen 
kuai). Informants would tell me that, for example, "restaurants tse the laobaixing" or 
"schools tse parents" (through extra fees). When disqussing trends in contemporary 
Shanghai with a man in his seventies who had spent many years in prison as a "Rightist" 
he scornfully remarked " ‘socialism with Chinese characteristics’. Bullshit! A woman at 
my factory had to pay a doctor 1,500¥ to get an operation done. This is very common. 
Although medical fees are supposed to be free, people have to bribe (shaoxiang) doctors."
The Lower Reaches - Sleaze
Pre-1949 Shanghai attained international notoriety as a sinful city, the location for 
large-scale prostitution, racketeering and gambling all organized by a criminal underworld 
which kept legal controls at bay by substantial pay-offs. In the words of Rhoads Murphey 
"[i]t was...justly famous as one of the wickedest cities in the world" (1953: 7). Alongside 
a loosening of the puritanical sexual morality of the Maoist era many residents feared that 
such phenomena were returning to Shanghai. Older people especially believed that 
Shanghai was degenerating (duoluo - "sinking") with a proliferation of "obscene, dirty and 
low-down" (xialiu - also "lower reaches of a river") phenomena.
During 1992-4 , numerous entertainment venues such as nightclubs and karaoke bars 
opened. Most Shanghainese could not afford to visit such places but in popular perceptions 
these were the site for prostitution and "rip-offs". They were exemplars of those murky 
depths where, as one informant remarked, "in Shanghai many things are unclear (gao bu
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qingchu)." Such locations were believed to be permitted to continue their business because 
they bribed local officials and the police. Regular news items detailed police operations 
designed to "eradicate pornography" (saohuang - literally "sweep away the yellow"). The 
intention was to keep Shanghai’s streets not only physically, but also morally, clean. 
Female hostesses who accompany customers (peijiu nulaqg) were shown being rounded up 
and herded into police vans. In one scandal a restaurant was fined for adding a cocaine 
related substance to its hot pot! Often informants assumed that there was a murky and 
sinister intersection of power and corruption with state apparatus (guojia jiguan) involved 
in such activities. With such strong backing (houtai hen ying) legal frameworks amounted 
to little more than a "paper tiger". Many feared too that underworld gangs, such as 
prospered before pre-1949, will make a return, either as indigenous growths or transplanted 
from Hong Kong.
1.5 "Where Water Flows, a Channel is Formed" (shuidao qucheng)
Much was believed to have been washed away but new channels were also forming. 
This section investigates a few of the patterns which were emerging in Shanghai and 
concludes with a brief overview of some local people’s expectations for the future of their 
city.
1.5.1 New Roads in the Mind - Changes in Attitude. Behaviour and Thought
In the early 1980s the slogan was the ‘Four Modernizations’ and ‘carry out modernization’ 
(gao xiandaihua). Chinese traditional thought is/was like an iron door (tiemen). It was 
no good just to rap (peng) against it. This conservative iron door (baoshou tiemen) had 
to be forced open. It cannot be closed up again.
Young businessman
Gaige kaifang was frequently described as having changed the thoughts (sixiang)
and thinking (silu - "thought roads") of local people and especially that of the young. The
term sixiang has no direct English translation, it encompasses thought, thinking, attitudes
and outlook. Economic reforms have increased the scope for individual choice,
competitiveness and uncertainty whilst the "Open Door" policy has enabled people to see
alternative ways of doing things. Chan et al write of Chen Village cadres in Guangdong
in the late 1980s that ”[e]xposure to the world and to Hong Kong through the mass media
and through personal contacts has widened their horizons to accept other forms of culture
and other political and economic systems" (1992: 331). A young state employee told me:
"with gaige kaifang people’s thinking is enlivened. Now we have seen the outside world
*
(w aim ian)." Key trends mentioned were increased money orientatedness and individualism.
1 0 0
A typical comment, made by a university lecturer, was that "now people think for 
themselves more (naozi zyi kaolu duo). It is not like before when whatever Mao Zedong 
said went." A corollary of such trends as increasing personal freedom and competition 
were complaints that people were more selfish and interpersonal relationships colder 
(lengmo).
A distinctive youth culture along with a generation gap was emerging in
Shanghai.64 A China Daily article suggested there had been "great change" among young
people between the age of 17 and 37.65 It described them as:
Like passengers boarding a ship sailing into uncharted waters, they expect a happy 
journey even when feeling seasick and restless... drastic [economic] reform has 
changed the social structure and the general mentality of the public. With the 
changes has come the sense of uncertainty and the promises of opportunity. 
Through the open policy, those surveyed have developed a wider knowledge of the 
outside world and have far more choices than their forbears. But like travellers at 
a crossroads, they seem puzzled by the wide-range of choices... [young people] are 
more passionate and practical, more romantic and liberal.
My informants shared the view expressed in this article that the sudden inflow of images
from the West after 1978 had played a crucial part in changing young people’s attitudes and
values by providing them with alternative perspectives and lifestyles. A teacher told me
that he had first heard about the "generation gap" in a television programme about America.
From his relationship with his own young son he realized that China too has a generation
gap - the Chinese term daigou ("generation gap") is a direct translation from English.
Parents sometimes considered the dating behaviour of the young immoral, found it hard to
accept if their offspring changed jobs and incomprehensible if they spent several hundred
yuan on tickets for the concerts of Hong Kong pop singers. A teacher at a key middle
school considered that the sixiang of children was now livelier. He explained that:
In the past students’ minds were closed because the country was closed with the 
closed door policy (biguan zhengce). Now the thoughts (silu) of students are more 
kaifang because they have seen more. In the past they just listened to whatever the 
teacher said. Now children see television and many of their homes have foreign 
magazines and so on. We older generation cannot keep up.
A young university lecturer felt that since 1991-2 people’s attitudes had become more
positive, hopeful and confident. At 28 he felt a difference between his outlook and that of
current university students. He felt that "now students stress themselves more (zhuzhong
ziji), have a greater sense of self (ziwo yidian) and are more individualistic (geren
MOn youth culture and the em ergence o f  a generation gap in China generally see H ooper 1985: 33 -40 ,
Own by 1985, Rosen 1989, 1990.
655 April 1993: 4.
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chengshu)." He added that "they have more opportunities and fewer restrictions on them." 
A young businessmen considered China’s continuing rule by man (renzhi) and not by law 
(fazhi) as problematic. However, he believed that as a result of gaige kaifang "each 
person has learnt to think for themselves (xuehui zyi sikao), they have seen the situation 
outside (waimian de qingjing) and it is not possible for the door to be closed."
1.5.2 When the Water Subsides the Rocks Emerge (shuiluo shichu)
The erosion of the iron rice bowl and the growth of competition presented new 
opportunities, challenges, pressures, uncertainties and risks for each person. A significant 
reaction to this was a renewed stress upon education and the acquisition of skills in order 
to improve career prospects.66 A final year university student remarked that "every day 
gaige kaifang makes greater demands upon one. Before horizons were very limited, now 
there is much more scope. In the past it was ‘60 marks forever’ (liushi fen wansui), now 
even ninety marks is not enough. Many fellow students take extra courses to enable them 
to adapt to the great tidal current of gaige kaifang." Following the adoption of the "Open 
Door" policy many English courses were set up, including preparation courses for TOEFL 
(Test of English as a Foreign Language), a prerequisite for many to fulfilling a dream to 
go abroad. Facility in English resembled a passport - it could open "roads" (opportunities) 
which were blocked and inaccessible to those who lacked knowledge of it. Within 
Shanghai, proficiency in English had become an important requirement in many 
professions. During 1992-4 popular extra curricula courses, English aside, included 
computing, accountancy, Cantonese and Japanese.
Parents were aware that their offspring would have to fit into a very different, far 
more competitive environment. With the one child policy parental resources were 
concentrated upon a single child. Study was seen as a main route to a successful life. A 
shop assistant with a young son told me that education had become much more important. 
She felt that "now it is different. Danwei have contracts, one must have education. If  one 
does not study well, since there are so many people, they will not want you." Parents were 
especially concerned to get their children into key middle schools. From a key middle 
school most pupils could expect to obtain a university place, from other schools only a 
small minority. Parents engaged in various strategies to try and ensure that their children 
got into a key middle school. Some prepared the way for this by enrolling their children
^W alder (1990: 155) found that in the m id-1980s education had increased dramatically as a predictor o f  
incom e and w as, for exam ple, a much more important factor then Party mem bership.
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in unofficial "key" nursery schools, arranging private tutors and extra curricula courses. 
Using language popularized in the reform era, a university student told me that one 
consequence of gaige kaifang was that parents were prepared to pay for their children’s 
education, "they invest a little money and hope to get a return later."
Newly emerged inequalities were being reproduced in educational opportunities. 
Even in the state education sector provision differed widely. At the key middle school 
mentioned above which rented out its land as shop fronts these highly successful 
commercial ventures provided the school with an income several times higher than the city 
education department allocated to it. This school had facilities far superior to schools in 
less central areas of Shanghai. An even more striking instance o f the way in which "where 
water flows, a channel is formed" (shuidao qucheng) was the way Shanghai’s new 
"moneyed classes" were now able to enrol their children in one of the city’s recently 
established private schools. At one private primary school set up in early 1993 the largest 
proportion of parents were enterprise heads, often in companies involved in international 
trade. Other children had parents working in the media, as joint venture company 
managers, high-ranking military personnel, teachers or overseas. There was only one 
getihu parent. In its second term of operation the school required a one-off (zhanzhu) 
payment of 5,000-10,000V per child, termly fees are 600V and even monthly fees for snacks 
and fruit total 400V. Any official concern over such a "school for aristocrats" was 
muted.67 A China Daily article described private schools simply as "filling a gap 
in...demand" and as "more flexible in adjusting to the demands of the employment market 
than their State-funded counterparts."68
/
1.5.3 "Everything Before Us. Nothing Before Us"
Society looks stable and flourishing, bur we do not know what it will be like tomorrow.
Informant’s comment
In this section I look briefly at some expectations for the future of Shanghai. These 
spread across a range from great optimism to fearful pessimism. Despite the economic 
reforms and depoliticization described above informants considered the lot of the laobaixing 
profoundly dependent upon China’s national leaders. A typical response when asked what 
the future holds for Shanghai was that "it all depends upon the policy of the higher
n
67"Schooling A im ed at M oneyed Classes" CD 18 May 1993: 3.
“ Ibid.
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authorities."69 At the same time, in direct contrast to the notion of "open" doors, 
informants stated that "the laobaixing do not know the inner affairs (neiqing) of the state." 
As I mentioned above, expectations that the Communist Party will further political reform 
were limited - this would be to "ask a tiger for its skin" (yu hu mou pi - request somebody 
to act against their own interests). The general impression I gained was that informants 
believed that the populace could prosper under its own steam but that "struggle" amongst 
elite party factions could prevent or destroy this. The Party, as it were, retained the 
ultimate power to misdirect and waste the energy flowing through the sluice.
Even the most optimistic harboured some concern for the period following the death 
of Deng Xiaoping, regarding it as a period of uncertainty and potential danger. The most 
optimistic scenario was for a prosperous and glorious (guangming - "brightly lit and 
visible") future, with the policy of gaige kaifang regarded as irreversible, the only question 
being its pace. According to such views the problems outlined above will gradually be 
resolved. At the opposite extreme pessimistic observers regarded chaos (luan) as extremely 
likely, even inevitable. Increasing income inequality was often considered particularly 
problematic, with informants noting that this was a main cause behind the 1949 revolution. 
Similarly, corruption was considered insoluble since it was endemic from top to bottom. 
In the view of one informant China appeared stable but that "change is like a woman giving 
birth - her stomach must undergo a period of pain before the child is born. The present 
system will definitely collapse but many will die in the process^ Chaos is inevitable." For 
him gaige kaifang was a transitional stage to non-CCP rule.70
The type of chaos envisaged encompassed economic collapse - with the increased 
differentiation (san) of the economic structure making it increasingly impervious to 
government attempts to control economic crises, civil strife including strikes and protests, 
increasing crime - including the development of underworld gangs and threats to public 
order caused by migrant workers, warlordism - as an extension of the local protectionism 
which has developed during gaige kaifang - and even civil war. Even in such worst case 
scenarios the "Open Door" policy was generally considered secure since one result o f gaige 
kaifang was that the military had become too deeply involved in commerce and trade to 
reverse this policy. In addition, China was felt to have a great advantage over the former 
USSR in its relative ethnic homogeneity.
^Elisabeth Croll (1994: 224) notes an identical response in the C hinese countryside.
^See Gordon W hite (1991b) on the notion o f  a gradual transition from totalitarianism to authoritarianism  
and then dem ocracy.
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Since the 1980s there has been a "dramatic revolution of rising expectations" 
(Goodman 1991: 15). Younger people often have especially high expectations. I often 
observed a generation gap where parents expressed themselves relatively content with the 
pace and achievements of reform whilst their offspring considered it too slow. The 
differential expectations and desires of the younger generation were themselves indicative 
o f the changed socio-political environment in which they had been brought up. In 
Shanghai, many looked forward to the "comfortable" (xiaokang) living standards Deng 
Xiaoping has promised to them by the first decade of the twenty first century. Colour 
televisions and fridges were considered essentials by most Shanghainese with video 
recorders and air-conditioning units rapidly becoming so regarded. Car ownership was still 
only a dream for the vast majority but home ownership was spreading rapidly with 
government initiatives to sell housing to sitting tenants.
The demise or modification of the Communist Party, widely predicted after June 4, 
1989, has failed to materialize although there has been "a gradual decline in the regime’s 
power and authority" (White 1991a: 15). Gordon White’s assertion that after June 4 the 
Party’s legitimacy was "shattered" also seems premature (1), The party-state has nailed its 
colours to raising living standards, with a realization that "legitimacy, or simply 
acquiescence in its continued rule, can only be regained thrqugh economic success" (Saicht
1992: 59). It may, perhaps, be said that the Party has "boarded the pirate ship" shang le 
zeichuan),71 and may be unable to get off even if I-fc , wanted to. On the basis of my 
findings in Shanghai the Party has, so far, been successful in this project. However, in the 
event of economic downturn those simmering discontents I have outlined would surely 
provoke profound unrest and coalescence of the aggrieved.
Lakoff and Johnson argue that metaphors structure the actions we perform, for 
example, the "argument is war" metaphor structures the actions we perform in arguing 
(1980: 4). An intriguing aspect of the "watery metaphors" I have outlined is that although 
some are instances of nature controlled and channelled by human agents, as in the sluice 
gate, many portray the consequences of human actions as though they are uncontrolled 
natural phenomenon, such as waves and tides. Lakoff and Johnson describe the 
systematicity of metaphorical concepts as hiding other aspects of concepts (10). Thus to 
see immigration as a "tide" or consumerism as a "flood" seems to involve a denial of 
human agency. Does this relate to the growing sense of uncertainty I have highlighted? 
However, against this are the socio-spatial metaphors of roads, routes and doors, all
71 A lso  "join a reactionary faction".
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phenomena which are constructed and subject to alteration by human design. William 
Taylor cautions that "[mjetaphors can be seductively reductionist" (1984: 11). However, 
the metaphors I have examined seem rich and fruitful enough to permit considerable 
growth, slippage and overspill. They are readily susceptible to more than one interpretation 
and, therefore, symptomatic of the moves on the political and economic fronts from rigid 
"orthodoxy" to the condoning of alternative approaches and a degree of pluralism.
In this chapter I have sketched some of the boulders, tides and shifting currents in 
contemporary Shanghai. A strong consensus of my informants was that the sluice gate 
which has been opened cannot be closed again. A Chinese proverb provides an appropriate 
analogy for the gaige kaifang project: water can support a boat, it can also turn it over 
(shui neng zai zhou, yi neng fu zhou). It is evident from many comments in this chapter 
that there are distinct dangers in the profound and far-reaching socio-economic changes 
which have been embarked upon in Shanghai. However, as another proverb points out: 
when the water is too clear there are no fish (shui zhi qing ze wu yu). In other words, any 
project designed to improve the living standards of over twelve million citizens and to alter 
the economic structure of a major metropolis will inevitably involve risks and pursuing 
paths whose results are not always predictable. I feel that the final comment should be that 
of a lecturer in his mid-fifties. He expressed hope for Shanghai’s future development and 
then added that "the most fearful thing is to be without hope. Now we have hope. This 
is progress."
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Chapter 2 Global and Intra-national Cultural Flows: Renegotiating
Boundaries and Identities in Contemporary Shanghai
An interesting conversation was carried on during dinner between Sing-Hoo and the 
priests... They expressed their opinions freely upon the natives o f  different provinces, and 
spoke o f  them as i f  they belonged to different nations, just as we would do o f  the natives 
o f  France, Holland, or Denmark. The Canton men they did not like; the Tartars were 
good  - the Emperor was a Tartar. All the outside nations were bad, particularly the 
Kwei-tszes, a name signifying D evils’s children, which they charitably apply to the nations 
o f  the western world.
Robert Fortune, 18531
Introduction
In this chapter and the next my main intention is to examine ways in which various 
shifting socio-spatial boundaries were represented by and affected the lifestyles of 
Shanghai residents. This chapter focuses on Chinese migrants, global flow and new 
technologies and their impact upon identities in Shanghai. The following chapter 
examines differential conceptions of spaces within the city itself, the experiences of 
inhabiting different kinds of space within Shanghai and the ways in which different people 
negotiated these spaces.
I have four main aims in this chapter: Firstly, much Western and Chinese literature 
conveys the impression that there is a unitary and invariant Chinese identity, constant in 
both time and place. By contrast, anthropologists such as Anthony Cohen, writing in a 
British context, have sought to "discredit the assumptions of homogeneity and the crude 
stereotypes which popularly characterise views of Britain" (1982b: 2). In a similar way 
I seek to disassemble the homogeneity of "Chinese" identity through an examination of 
the layers of interweaving identities which may be asserted in the specific spatial location 
of Shanghai. Secondly, theorists such as Edward Said (1978) and Ronald Inden (1990) 
have rightly criticised the essentializing tendency in Western representations o f "other" 
cultures. However, they run the risk of perpetuating the very Orientalism they seek to
remove by underestimating the ability of non-European peoples to make their own
definitions. In providing a sociological topography of the world as viewed from the
perspective of Shanghainese residents I demonstrate the extent to which non-Western
people’s may themselves engage in "orientalizing".2 Thirdly, with the "Open Door" 
policy outlined in the previous chapter, Shanghai was rejoining the global economy and
'Fortune Two V isits to the Tea Countries o f  China V olum e II 1853: 193-4.
2By the term "orientalizing" 1 indicate the essentializing and stereotypical defining o f  other ethnic 
groups.
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its boundaries to other parts of China had become far more permeable. This porosity 
permitted a much greater flow of people, capital, technology and images. It therefore 
seems an appropriate time and location to assess the impact o f such processes upon 
identities. Fourthly, at a time when the Soviet Union has been disassembled, the former 
Yugoslavia ridden with ethnic conflicts and discussion on the possibility that China will 
"deconstruct" (cf. Goodman & Segal 1994), I assess the potency of, and potentiality for, 
a specifically Shanghainese identity.
In section one o f this chapter I provide an "ideal type" model o f Shanghai’s pre- 
1949 cosmopolitanism and subsequent closure to international flow. I then provide a 
similar outline with regard to the porosity and closure o f Shanghai’s boundaries within 
China. Section two examines anthropological notions of self/other. I highlight the way 
representations of "others" may be used as a "mirror" to investigate the defining selves - 
a project applicable both to Western Orientalists and representations of others by 
Shanghainese. I then provide a speculative overview of the parameters o f Chinese and 
Shanghainese identities before the reform era. Section three outlines the renewed 
permeability of Shanghai’s intra-national boundaries and some of the consequences for 
identities in Shanghai. Attention is drawn to the way Shanghainese defined themselves 
in contradistinction to Beijingers and especially the rural migrant workers who now 
flocked to the city.
In section four I use this information to help construct a composite sketch o f what 
constitutes "being Shanghainese". I examine the vitality of such an identification in 
contemporary Shanghai. With increasing decentralization of economic powers, the long­
term expropriations of profits made in the city by the central government, and the 
"deluge" of migrant workers there was ample evidence of the fostering o f assertive 
Shanghainese identities. However, I then indicate aspects of Shanghai’s increased porosity 
which facilitated re-fabricated horizontal linkages - these tended to pull in an opposing 
direction to local assertiveness. The "Open Door" permitted an increasing global cultural 
flows. In section five I examine some of the consequences of this for "Chinese" and 
"Shanghainese" identities, pointing to ways in which these flows may (or have the 
potential to) sustain, undermine and redefine these identities. I also highlight the potential 
they provide for other types of identifications.
2.1 Shanghai: Porosity and Enclosure
2.1.1 Shanghai: From World City To Chinese City
108
[AJfter the seventeenth century, the "New World" would come knocking on the tightly- 
closed gate o f  the ancient East., fu ll  o f  vitality and bearing with it a brand-new 
civilization.
Heshang documentary (Su & Wang 1991: 149)
Shanghai was an important coastal port in the Song and Yuan dynasties (Johnson 
1995: 31-42). However, the transfer of the Ming capital from Nanjing to Beijing in 1421 
and imperial prohibitions on sea trade brought some three centuries o f decline for 
Shanghai. The city’s fortunes began to change when the Kangxi emperor lifted these 
restrictions in 1684. Eighteenth century Shanghai flourished as a cross-roads for trade and 
commerce. The Reverend Charles Gutzlaff who visited Shanghai in 1832 described it as 
"the gate of central Asia, and especially of the central provinces o f China" (1833-4: 30). 
After the Opium War and its establishment as a treaty port Shanghai rapidly increased its 
integration into the global economy. By the 1920s and 1930s Shanghai had become one 
of the world’s major cities.
As a thriving entrepot Shanghai attracted "sojourners from all over the globe" 
(Perry 1993: 12). The diverse range of Chinese migrants were joined by many foreign 
companies, workers, missionaries, tourists and refugees creating a highly cosmopolitan 
city. Its shops purveyed goods from every quarter o f the globe and services were 
available to cater to every taste. Despite attempts by sections of the Chinese populace to 
wrest control from them through protests and strikes - especially in the 1920s - foreign 
nationals maintained jurisdiction over large parts of the city. They inscribed their 
domination upon its streets and avenues naming them after the places and heroes of their 
own countries, for example, Broadway, Edinburgh and Edward VII Streets (Clifford 1991: 
60). The city was also a relatively free haven for diverse publications, cultural expression 
and the exchange of ideas.
Chinese nationalism and an antipathy towards imperialist powers were important 
elements of the Communist Party’s support. This was, perhaps, especially significant in 
semi-colonial Shanghai where incursions by foreigners had created a comprador class and 
many intellectuals espoused "Western" thoughts. From the outset the new regime which 
took control of Shanghai in 1949 was hostile to or, at least, deeply suspicious of Western 
nations - sentiments returned in equal measure. In 1960, after the split with the Soviet 
Union - China’s main ally and the model for many of its economic policies - the die was 
cast. This combination of external hostility and a belief in the need for autarky to 
preserve the existence of the state and its new government impelled China’s rulers to 
adopt a policy of closing the country to international intercourse (biguan zishou), and of
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self reliance (zili gengsheng). Shanghai was to be reinscribed as an unambiguously, 
wholly Chinese city, its gaze turning inward rather than outward from the Huang Pu river.
In 1949 most of the foreign nationals and companies which had returned after the 
Second World War fled from Shanghai. By the mid-1950s those who remained had their 
property confiscated and were compelled to leave or permitted to stay "only on sufferance, 
confined to their enclosures and denied access to most of China except by special 
permission" (Jenner 1992: 9 1).3 People’s experiences of interactions with foreigners 
could not be erased, nor could the vast array of colonial architecture, much of it built to 
last for centuries. However, ephemeral forms of Western cultural artifacts were gradually 
removed from the city - for example, cinemas were forced to cease their diet of American 
films.4 Shanghai was still China’s main industrial city but the crossroads of Asia was 
now a cul de sac.
From the early 1950s until the early 1980s contact with foreigners and knowledge 
of the world beyond the borders of the People’s Republic was extremely limited and 
strictly regulated. Media representations of other countries, for instance, were mostly 
limited to propaganda films imported from Eastern Europe.5 Distinctions between the 
inside (nei) and outside (wai) were sharply drawn and the boundaries subject to 
surveillance and strict control. All people with foreign contacts, including overseas 
Chinese, faced suspicion and often persecution as potential spies.6 Fear meant that 
contacts with relatives abroad trickled to a halt, mention of them became taboo even 
within many families. In the words of one Shanghai academic "there was no relationship 
with the outside world."
"Clifford notes that in 1949 there were som e 4 ,000  Britons in Shanghai (1991: 277).
“Gaulton writes that in early 1949, 75% o f  the audience patronized American film s. B y June 1950, this 
figure was down to 28.3% , falling to zero with the start o f  the Korean War (1981: 50).
5Although note Perry L ink’s study on hand-copied volum es (shou ch aob en ) o f  entertainment fiction  
which circulated in urban China during the Cultural Revolution. Link states that "[d]uring the years when 
China has com m only been described, by C hinese as w ell as by foreigners, as sealed o f f  or turned inward, 
it is most interesting to note how  frequently underground entertainment fiction was set in foreign countries 
or otherw ise involved with foreign countries" (1989: 28-9). H ow ever, it is telling, as Link remarks, that 
information about the outside world had to be sought "though an illicit medium like hand-copied fiction"  
(29).
6See, for instance, N ien C heng’s account o f  her experiences during the Cultural R evolution. Because 
o f  her contact with and em ploym ent by foreigners - she had been em ployed by the Sh ell In tern ational 
Petroleum  C om pany  - she was suspected o f  being a spy and still working for the "imperialists" (1986: 19- 
22, 161-8).
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Benedict Anderson’s (1983) notion of an imagined community seems particularly 
applicable for this period.7 Media o f all types were closely controlled and a limited range 
o f messages repeated across different types of media including books, newspapers, 
revolutionary operas, films, and the ubiquitous loud speakers. Alternatives to this 
monologic voice were available only to a selected few. Restricted access (neibu) 
publications were carefully graded and disseminated to party cadres according to their 
level in the CCP hierarchy. At the lowest level of the vertically integrated structure 
controlled by ministries from Beijing, the urban workforce was "enclosed” within work 
units (danwei), all-encompassing, cellular entities (Walder 1988). Even following the 
United States formal recognition of the PRC and its accession to the United Nations in the 
early 1970s the PRC remained a largely closed country. The first major increase in 
porosity occurred - primarily involving Hong Kong - with the establishment o f Shenzhen 
as a Special Economic Zone in 1979.
2.1.2 Shanghai’s Changing Place in China: From Traditional Flow to Revolutionary
Enclosure
In essence, under Mao, an invisible wall kept out the peasantry and protected the urban 
population. In effect, the history o f  walled cities did not end with the demise o f  imperial 
China.
Kam Wing Chan (1994: 147)
Writers on "traditional" Chinese cities (e.g. Mote 1977: 117-9, Skinner 1977a: 268- 
9) emphasize the existence of a rural-urban continuum and of native place identifications 
in cities. Pre-twentieth century China is described as having had a "vague and highly 
permeable boundary between city and countryside" (Parish & Whyte 1984: 26). This 
pattern was still evident to Olga Lang when she conducted research in Shanghai in the 
mid-1930s (1946: 86-7). Shanghai has attracted sojourners since at least the thirteenth 
century (Sang 1982, Johnson 1993). From the second quarter of the eighteenth century 
in particular Shanghai developed as a "broker city" (Johnson 1993: 176). As a "hot, noisy 
place" (renao de difang) it attracted a large transient population and many migrants. 
Early Western visitors to the city often remarked on the proportion of immigrants in the 
city population. In 1843 the population was described as "a mixed, migratory one, 
perhaps not one half of those now resident having been born and bred in this city" (CR
7I realize the problem o f  "over-M aoizing" the years 1949-1976 and ignoring significant shifts in polic ies  
over these years. However, 1 am providing a Weberian ‘ideal type’ m odel w hich, w hilst it may g lo ss  over 
certain nuances, is faithful to the portrayals 1 was provided with by local residents.
I l l
1847 16(11): 564, see also CR 1850 19(2): 107). This diversity is recognized in 
Shanghai’s street names - those running north-south have names of Chinese provinces, 
those running east-west names of Chinese cities. After 1842, Shanghai became an even 
more powerful magnet for both foreigners and Chinese, such that its population increased 
some tenfold within a hundred years. The number of foreign residents in the Settlement 
increased from a mere 50 in 1844 to 36,471 in 1930 (Feetham 1931: 49-53).
Native place identity was an important organizing factor in imperial China, 
especially for the extensive sojourner component of city populations which were typically 
organized along native-place lines and occupationally specialized by place of origin 
(Skinner 1977b: 538-46).8 On the basis of her research into the Ningbo community in 
Shanghai, Susan Jones considers that "prior to the 1930’s, native-place ties provided the 
primary channels through which family, class, and business interests were articulated in 
Chinese cities" (1974: 96). In Shanghai, workers in specific industries were often 
immigrants from particular areas (Johnson 1993: 158-68, White 1978: 100-1), and 
"[hierarchy...was structured largely according to native-place identification" (Honig 1990: 
274). In the thriving underworld of pre-1949 Shanghai, native-place networks were "the 
basic building bloc of gangster organizations" (Martin 1992: 268). Even the hierarchy of 
prostitution in Republican era Shanghai was structured by regionalism (Hershatter 1989). 
Bryna Goodman (1992) writes that native-place organizations played an important role in 
the 1919 May Fourth Movement in Shanghai. Native-place also played an significant part 
in labour disputes where the "politics of place...both opened possibilities and set the 
bounds to the development of collective action" (Perry 1993: 30).
Migrants from Ningbo, Canton, and Jiangsu played a particularly important part 
in Shanghai’s commercial development. In the second half of the eighteenth century 
Shanghai’s flourishing trade and commerce attracted many Ningbo merchants and they 
used ties of native place in their gradual domination of the city’s financial sector.9 The 
Cantonese in the city - some 60,000 in the 1880s - were most evident as compradors and 
Bergere states that until the 1880s the term "Cantonese" and "comprador" were 
synonymous in Shanghai (1989: 145, 38-41).'° Ch’en notes the crucial importance of
8A s  Wasserstrom (1991: 32-3) points out, foreign residents later set up their own native-place  
associations.
9See Jones 1974, Shiba 1977.
l0See Sang (1982 ) on the rivalry between C antonese and N ingbo people in Shanghai from the 
m id-nineteenth century- until the late nineteenth.
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family relations and local affinity to the compradors from Suzhou, Ningbo, and Zhejiang 
in Shanghai (1979: 221-4).11 By the 1920s the comprador system was less important, 
though, the Cantonese by then dominated the field of large modern shops and the cigarette 
industry.
Migrants from Jiangsu were especially involved in the cotton industry and in 
mechanized engineering. Those from southern Jiangsu formed the elite whilst those from 
Subei or Jiangbei (Jiangsu north of the Yangzi River and south of the Huai) were 
predominantly an underclass and engaged in occupations seen as undesirable and inferior 
(Honig 1989b: 245-9). Honig’s research on the history and contemporary situation of 
Subei people in Shanghai provides evidence of the persisting importance of regional 
identifications and stereotypes in Shanghai.12
The proportion of migrants remained high during the first half of the twentieth 
century. Shanghai’s population grew dramatically from 1.3m in 1910 to 2.6m in 1927 of 
whom some 72-83% were bom outside Shanghai (Bergere 1989: 100). In 1987, Davis 
interviewed one hundred Shanghai women born between 1925 and 1935 - 68% of these 
women and 78% of their husbands had been born outside Shanghai (1990: 102). Despite 
the "shallowness" of many families’ residency in Shanghai local people have a strong 
sense of there being a distinctively Shanghainese identity.
Migration to Shanghai continued after 1949 but was gradually halted by various 
measures imposed during the 1950s which were designed as "policing" measures and to 
promote local autarky, control the growth of large cities and to redistribute resources to 
the interior (Parish & Whyte 1984: 16-26). During the "revolutionary period of 
comprehensive residence control" (White 1994: 63), these measures included migration 
restrictions and the rationing of many basic goods and above all, in 1958, the introduction 
o f the household registration system (hukou). Shanghai’s population rose from 3,480,018 
in 1937 to 4,447,015 in 1949 and 6,204,417 in 1953 (Pannell 1981: 99, 103). Between 
May 1956 and January 1957 alone there was an increase of 700,000 people, largely as the 
result of migration (White 1978: 188).13 Under the hukou ("household registration")
"See also B ergere's (1989: 141-52) examination o f  the geographic structure o f  the Shanghai business 
com m unity in the 1920s.
'^Details provided by H onig are closely  paralleled by Wu et a l ( 1985). See also Wu & Lan (1 9 8 5 ) and 
Chu (1985 esp 14-17).
'S h a n g h a i’s population is extrem ely difficult to gauge, not least because the relevant boundaries have 
changed several tim es and officia l figures vary in their reliability. W hite g ives figures for Shanghai’s 
population for every year from 1950 to 1992 (1994: 67-8). These include: 1950 -4 .9 m , 1955 - 6 .4m , 1960
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system introduced in 1959 every person had to be registered at birth and had to apply for 
permission to move elsewhere (Parish & Whyte 1984: 18-19, White 1978: 148-54). An 
extensive rationing system also operated to control the movement of people. Many basic 
commodities such as rice, meat and cooking oil were rationed, and as the ration cards 
were for use solely in one specified city movement to cities from the countryside, or from 
one city to another, was forestalled (Parish & Whyte 1984: 86-90, White 1978: 154-75). 
The effectiveness of these measures and the sending of Shanghainese to other parts of 
China (see below) meant that whilst Shanghai’s central city area population increased by 
1.68 million between 1949-59, between 1959-82 it rose by just 207,600, in 1949 its 
population was 4.19m and in 1982, 6.08m (Yan 1985: 107).
The various "policing" controls effectively sealed Shanghai’s "frontiers" and "an 
invisible wall separated the urban and rural populations" (Chan 1994: 97). As a 
consequence, in rural China, "local populations were more confined to their villages than 
ever before in Chinese history" (Croll 1994: 120). For the few rural residents able to 
come to Shanghai it was, one academic told me, "as though they had got a green card." 
Whilst the rhetoric of the Maoist period professed the goal of reducing the differences 
between urban and rural China most analysts agree that post 1949 changes "actually 
widened the gap substantially" (Whyte 1988: 307).14
The traditional migration pattern was reversed, urban-rural interaction was 
primarily from  urban to rural areas which created "a rigid urban hierarchy of limited 
access" (Parish & Whyte 1984: 17-18). From the 1950s onwards, there were various 
campaigns to relocate people out of Shanghai. Between 1955-1972, there was a net 
outflow of 2.2 million people from Shanghai (White 1994: 66). Between 1968-71 alone,
890,000 Shanghai youth were sent to the countryside, for periods of up to ten years, some 
indefinitely (Yan 1985: 109, White 1978: 53-97).15
With the notable exception of the brief period of "revolutionary tourism" by Red 
Guards in the late 1960s (White 1994: 83, note 48), for most of the Maoist period travel 
within China was heavily restricted with a "de facto internal passport system" (Chan 1994: 
91). For instance, official documents were required to buy travel tickets and special
- 10.4m, 1965 - 10.9m, 1970 - 10.8m, 1975 - 10.7m, 1980 - 11.4m, 1985 - 12.1m, 1990 - 12.8m, 1992 - 
12.8m. H ow e (1968: 78) has rather lower figures for the earlier years. Kirkby g ives the population o f  
Shanghai m unicipality in 1982 as around 12m, with a core population o f  6 .32m  (1985: 62).
MA s Chan argues, policies o f  the Maoist era were often "exploitative o f  the rural sector" (1994: 97).
l5H ow e (1968: 95) considers that the campaign to send down youth to the countryside in 1957 was 
designed, at least in part, to reduce the demand on scarce urban housing.
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bureaucratic permission necessary to obtain ration coupons for areas other than one’s 
official registration.
As Barry Naughton points out, the urban-rural divide gave "hard edges" to cities 
such as Shanghai (1995: 73) - with the countryside adjacent to and surrounding the city 
markedly and visibly different. Alongside the creation of strict urban-rural boundaries, 
the two sectors were organized according to markedly different structural patterns. An 
important consequence of these developments was "to segregate the population into 
clear-cut urban and rural classes and cultures" (Yang 1989a: 31, also Whyte 1988, Watson 
1992). For example, in an examination of funeral rituals Martin Whyte argues that 
"peasants and urbanites, who formerly knew a common ritual vocabulary, are now 
increasingly aliens to each others customs" (1988: 308). In these rituals he sees a "sharp 
urban-rural gap that didn’t exist before 1949" (304). I observed evidence of this urban- 
rural cultural bifurcation through attendance at weddings in the city zone of Shanghai and 
those in suburban counties o f Shanghai. In the former, for instance, the families of the 
bride and groom ate together but in the latter they ate separately. These differences were 
pointed out to me by informants who were, themselves, very clear about the existence of 
a sharp rural-urban disjunction.
James Watson (1992) argues that in pre-socialist China it was orthopraxy (correct 
practice) which made Chinese culture "Chinese" whereas during the Maoist period 
orthodoxy was stressed "through the imposition of a centrally controlled ideology" (79). 
He would take these wedding rituals as evidence of the "disappearance of a unified 
cultural tradition" and locate the cause of this in Maoist policies. However, although 
policies adopted at this time may have hastened cultural divergence there is evidence that 
the cultural bifurcation of urban and rural forms predated the Maoist era. The iconoclastic 
"civilized weddings" (wenming hunli) of 1930s Shanghai which copied Western models 
are an instance of this. The Republican Revolution in 1911 had also ushered in efforts 
to foster simpler and Westernized forms of funerals (Whyte 1988: 291-2). It may be that 
Myron Cohen (1993) is more accurate when he locates the cause of such "radical 
departure from tradition" in urban China as due to Western influence, especially in the 
treaty ports.
2.2 Orientalizing Shanghai: Representing Others. Defining Selves
Beijingers love the country, Cantonese sell (also "betray") the country, Shanghainese leave 
the country (Beijingren aiguo, Guangzhouren niaiguo, Shanghairen chuguo).
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Popular rhyme.16
2.2.1 Notions of Self/Other
I find much o f the literature on ethnicity and "culture" overly deterministic, 
construing them as discrete essences and holding forth the possibility o f grasping and 
defining them. Ethnicity is, at best, an "elusive concept" (Burgess 1978: 266). Even 
when analysts have suggested more fluid notions of ethnicity such as the creole metaphor 
(Drummond 1980) problems still remain. For instance, this notion seems to posit a false 
dichotomy between heterogenous and homogeneous "cultures". Richard Fardon is rightly 
critical o f the "presupposition of a universal class of ethnic difference" (1987: 177). I 
prefer to avoid the term and talk instead of (potential) identities and to examine the ways 
in which "identities crystallize transiently and in terms of different registers of difference" 
(Ibid: 183).
Despite my caution and caveats as an analyst it is important to note that my 
informants usually did essentialize and stereotype identities of both collective selves and 
others. People were willing and able to produce regional (also "class" and gender) 
stereotypes and stereotypes of foreigners.17 For instance, if informants were asked to 
describe a "typical Shanghainese", most responded without equivocation. For my part, I 
was often asked to describe a "typical English person". My failure and inability to 
produce an appropriate answer was generally regarded as evasive. Any consciousness that 
such stereotypes - which showed a remarkable degree of convergence - were problematic 
was generally absent amongst respondents of all educational levels.
Anthropologists such as Barth (1969), Cohen (1985) and Wallman (1979) have 
pointed out that identities often only become discursive at the boundaries where they 
encounter others. A common theme is that "identity is always constructed by reference 
to others" (Cohen 1975: 95) and that "the construction of the collective self...depends on 
its differentiation from the collective other" (Comaroff 1987: 308-9). Morley and Robins 
(1989) adopt a similar view, noting that "difference is constitutive of identity" (14). They 
suggest two lines of investigation: "how we define ourselves, by distinguishing ourselves 
from the Other" and "who the significant Others are against whom (and in relation to 
whom) a given person or group is defined" (10).
,6A popular story contrasts the different behaviour o f  a Beijinger, a Cantonese and a Shanghainese on 
a leaking boat [i.e. China]. The B eijinger w ould try to mend the boat, the Cantonese try to sell it and the 
Shanghainese jum p overboard.
17See G uldin’s (1984) "ethnic map" for Hong Kong.
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From the mid-nineteenth century and into the early decades o f this century there 
was a distinct vogue amongst British writers for collecting instances of "the curious topsy­
turviness of things in China" (Darwent 1904: 66). Cumming found it "really amusing to 
note in how many things Chinese customs are diametrically the reverse o f ours" and 
provides a list o f customs for the reader’s amusement (1886: 125). Over three decades 
later, Hardy provides an even more extensive list after remarking that "[t]he Chinese are 
not only our antipodes with regard to position on the globe, but are also our opposites in 
almost every thought and act" (1907: 90-94). These extracts are, of course, all grist to the 
mill o f notions of Orientalism as delineated by Edward Said (1978). They are clear 
instances of the way in which Western "Selves" take it upon themselves to define non- 
Western "Others". However, it is important to bear in mind the extent to which non- 
Western peoples construct their own Others. For millennia Chinese discourses have 
maintained distinctive world views (see Graham 1983), with their own epistemology, 
which always culminates in "Homo-Sinicus". The perpetuation of the notion of China as 
the Middle Kingdom is, perhaps, symbolized in the way Chinese television news generally 
commences with national events. Elisabeth Croll argues that the perceived threat to 
"Chineseness" through the import of things Western lies at the root of the now almost 
permanent "spiritual pollution" campaign (1994: 220). The Communist Party may well 
fear that if it loses the battle to define what is "Chinese" then it will also lose its ability 
to govern.
An attempt to "read-off notions o f  self identities by examining representations o f 
others seems particularly appropriate in Shanghai since Shanghainese themselves both 
discursively and in quotidian situations often draw sharp distinctions between themselves 
and other categories of Chinese. In the same way as Malcolm Chapman describes 
representations of "the Celt" as providing the definers with "a figure of opposition, a 
mythical alter-ego which they used in pursuit of their own self-definition" (1982: 129) so 
Shanghainese define themselves in contrast to a universe peopled by various categories 
o f non-Shanghainese. It is to Chinese and Shanghainese identities and to "orientalizing" 
Shanghai that I now turn my attention.
2.2.2 "Chinese" Identities Before the Reform Era
[T]hat the Chinese are identical in every province o f the empire, a man needs not travel 
over many parts o f  China to see that this cannot be established by an appeal to reality.
G.T. Lay Chinese Repository (1843 12 (3): 136)
Any attempt to reconstruct ascribed identities prevalent in a previous period to use
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as a basis for comparison to the present is clearly fraught with difficulties. Despite this 
there are enough shreds and patches to piece together a broad outline of Chinese and 
Shanghainese identities in modern Shanghai. People I spoke to in Shanghai invariably had 
a strong sense o f being "Chinese". In daily encounters my being "a foreigner" would 
provoke self-designation by Shanghai- citizens as "Chinese". However, the sense of 
belonging to an imagined community of Chinese people coexists with a strong sense of 
regional identity. In Hong Kong, Barbara Ward (1985: 68-9) describes how Hong Kong 
fisherman may adopt various designations - for example, "we Cantonese", "we Chinese", 
"we water people" - depending upon the context and matter under discussion. She notes 
that Cantonese boat people and Hakka farmers who have very different languages and 
customs both say "we Chinese" in contrasting themselves to "foreigners" (1985: 68-71). 
Similarly, Lawrence Crissman found that amongst overseas Chinese communities ethnicity 
was "relative and situational" (1967: 189). In examining Chinese and Shanghainese 
identities I am, therefore, "freezing" identities which are contingent, over-lapping and in 
flux. I share Helen Siu’s approach that "‘Chineseness’ is not an immutable set of beliefs 
and practices, but a process which captures a wide range of emotions and states o f being" 
(1993: 19). For these reasons I prefer to talk of "being Chinese" and "being 
Shanghainese", emphasizing the potentialities for assertions of these identifications.
Sinologists such as Myron Cohen who have written on "being Chinese" describe 
"the ongoing crisis of identification" in the twentieth century (Cohen 1991: 133). 
However, I found no such crisis over what constituted the basic attributes of 
"Chineseness" - it may be that what Cohen and others are detailing is a crisis o f the role 
of Chinese intellectuals. I found, rather, an exceptional degree of agreement and certainty 
over a "bedrock definition of Chineseness" (Link 1993: 201).18 A fundamental and 
pervasive distinction was drawn between Chinese and foreigners (waiguoren - "outside 
country people").19 This differentiation is made explicit in the phrase: nei-wai you bie - 
there is a difference between the inside and outside.20 In numerous conversations my 
presence spurred an endless stream of comparisons between China and other countries. 
It was evident that "much of what is distinctively Chinese is defined as different from
l8U seful essays on this topic appear in the Spring 1991 edition o f  Daedalus The L iving Tree: The
C hanging M eaning o f  Being C h inese Today  120(2) and Dittmer & Kim (eds) 1993.
igA distinction so embedded that C hinese migrants in the United Kingdom  routinely refer to all residents 
o f  non-C hinese descent as w aiguoren .
:oThis term has a much w ider valency. It can also, for exam ple, refer to the difference betw een Party 
and non-Party members.
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‘outside’" (Croll 1994: 220). A typical list of characteristics of "Chineseness" includes: 
Chinese people are physically distinct (black hair and eyes, yellow skin, small noses)21 - 
they have Chinese culture, that is, they speak Chinese language, eat Chinese food in a 
Chinese way, and have Chinese history (extremely long, with Confucius, dynasties and 
emperors and so forth). These characteristics were felt, clearly, to distinguish Chinese 
from other peoples. For instance, on the basis o f spending several years in China, 
speaking Chinese, consuming local food and knowledge of local customs and affairs I was 
sometimes described as "half Chinese" or "like a Chinese person". However, even if I 
could speak perfect Chinese and been born in China my facial features and skin colour 
would preclude me from being fully "Chinese" in popular perceptions.
Apart from overseas Chinese (whom I discuss later), the foreigners who were felt 
most to resemble Chinese were the Japanese. Although considered "foreign" there was 
a degree of ambiguity since I was often told that "all their culture came from China". I 
heard various racist-type stories which could be described as depicting Japanese people 
as a kind of mutant or deformed Chinese. Most people I spoke with in Shanghai 
expressed a strong dislike and distrust of Japanese (emotions matched only by the desire 
to obtain Japanese consumer products). It was not uncommon to hear them referred to 
as Riben guizi (Japanese devils). This dislike was generally attributed to China’s 
suffering at Japanese hands in the Anti-Japanese War. Many informants expressed disgust 
at the Chinese government’s (perceived) current weakness in its relations with Japan.
The assertions of a common Chineseness were made despite, for instance, manifest 
regional differences in cuisine and dialect. Jenner (1992: 228) describes this as the "myth 
of the oneness of the Han nation" which belies considerable ethnic diversity within China. 
Myth or not, my respondents invariably subscribed to this belief in "Chineseness", a belief 
which can cut across legal citizenships. This can be explained in various ways. Firstly, 
this degree of certainty is a function of the level of abstraction - in interactions solely 
between Chinese people great attention may be paid to regional differences. Secondly, 
the Chinese state has a vested interest in maintaining this "myth". Thirdly, language is 
of key importance. Anderson stresses language’s "capacity for generating imagined 
communities, building in effect particular solidarities" (1983: 122). Even amongst the 
majority Han Chinese there are dialects so diverse - Shanghainese and Beijingese for 
instance - as to be completely mutually unintelligible. Indeed Jenner (1992: 228-9) 
suggests that rather than a single Chinese language there are "creolized languages of the
2,See Frank D ikotter (1992) on the "discourse o f  race in m odem  China."
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Chinese family." However, the notion of Chinese as a single language is underpinned by 
the cultural dominance of the written language. It is still largely the case that "[i]n China 
power does not speak - it writes" (Ibid: 184). It is indicative of the privileging of the 
written word that the term for "Chinese language" is zhongwen - "Chinese writing" - 
whereas "dialect" is fangyan - "the speech of the place/locality".
Mark Elvin (1991) provides a fascinating insight into the "inner world of 1830". 
On the basis of literary evidence he concludes that "the Chinese were already conscious, 
by this time, of being ‘Chinese’" (34). When comparing this sense of Chineseness to the 
present he finds differences but also distinct continuities in "the patterns o f social action, 
of politics, and of social discipline" (61). Older informants portrayed Chinese nationalism 
and a strong sense of being "Chinese" as having reached its apotheosis in 1949. The 
profound appeal of this new "imagined community" was brought home to me by one 
m an's memories of Mao Zedong’s speech at Tiananmen in which he announced the 
creation of the People’s Republic. He had watched this in a Shanghai cinema forty four 
years before and still recalled the great pride he had felt and the "enormous power" of 
Mao’s words "The Chinese people have stood up!"22 I also met or was told about people 
who had returned to China in 1949 out of a sense o f patriotic duty - many of whom 
became victims in the Cultural Revolution. Feelings of Chinese solidarity were described 
to me as enhanced during the Korean War with many Shanghainese volunteering to help 
in this crusade.
During the Maoist period state controls over the media and everyday life precluded 
the dissemination of alternative voices.23 As informants told me, there was only on& 
voice (zhi you yi ge shengyin), only one kind of language (zhi you yi zhong yuyan) - 
China only had one mouth (Zhongguo zhi you yi ge zuiba). The ubiquitous loudspeakers 
may serve as a dominant image of this period.24 Political rhetoric stressed solidarity with 
and support for other third world and socialist countries and was critical o f "bourgeois",
::Mao Tse-Tung 1977: 15-18.
21This did not preclude people retaining personal m em ories o f  contact w ith foreigners or their cultural
artefacts which contrasted with the official line. However, it is important to bear in m ind how powerful 
an effect state propaganda could have. A strong-w illed individual w ho had undergone thought reform  
(s ix iang  ga izao)  in the early 1950s told me that in this process he began to sincerely doubt his ow n  
judgem ent and, in the words o f  a slogan o f  that tim e, "follow the Com m unist Party" (t ing  d a n g  de hua -
literally "listen to the words o f  the C om m unist Party").
24According to Nathan (1986: 163) there were some 141 million loudspeakers in use 
in China in 1974.
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"capitalist", "imperialist" countries and especially of America.25 If identity is asserted 
in contrast to something, then the Maoist state offered relatively few alternative models. 
With the important exception of those dubbed "enemies of the people" there was little 
reason to question what it meant to "be Chinese".
2.2.3 "Shanghainese" Identities Before the Reform Era
Native place identification and persistent regional stereotypes have a long history 
in China.26 There are many historical examples of the role played by native place 
identifications in Shanghai (e.g. Shiba 1977, Jones 1974, Sang 1982) and Emily Honig 
(1989a, 1989b, 1990, 1992) provides evidence of a continuing historical prejudice against 
Subei people (Subeiren) in Shanghai. Ethnic identification can be self-ascription or 
ascription by others. In the case o f subordinate groups "ethnic affiliation may originate 
in an attribution of collective identity to them on the part of others" (Comaroff 1987: 
305).27 Subeiren in Shanghai are an example of the way in which "[t]he boundaries of 
pariah groups are most strongly maintained by the excluding host population" (Barth 1970: 
31). However, where Honig’s key concern is with the stigmatized category mine is with 
the defining population and what these stereotypes "say" about the definers.
Shanghai citizens often identified themselves as Shanghainese. In local media,
:5N ote He D i’s com m ent that Mao Zedong "deliberately shaped a distorted im age o f  the U nited States 
for consum ption by the C hinese people" (1994: 148), even though he h im self "saw the American people  
positively" (155).
26lt is interesting to note the extent to w hich early British travellers and residents in China also engaged  
in a discourse on regional stereotypes. Early visitors to Shanghai often favourably contrasted the "peaceable 
and hospitable community" at Shanghai to the "furious and ignorant mob" o f  Canton (Forbes 1848: 13). 
Sim ilarly, Fortune (w hose com m ents on "northern Chinese" refer to Shanghainese) remarks on the 
friendliness o f  "the northern C hinese, w ho differ w idely  from their haughty and insolent countrym en in the 
south" (1853: I, 108). C onflicts in the city were often attributed to outsiders, especially C antonese and 
Fujianese. For exam ple, an 1848 report m entions that "murderous affrays are very com m on here among 
the people from Fukhien" (CR 17(9): 473). Lt-Colonel Fisher, in Shanghai in the late 1850s, described how  
"the C antonese sw agger about the streets, and g ive them selves great airs as being far superior to the people  
o f  the place. They are generally considered a braver but som ewhat law less race" (1863: 345). The N ingbo  
men are said to be "more numerous, and far more tractable" than these tw o groups (CR 1850 19(2): 107). 
Decades later, Ross wrote that "[i]n the South people are smaller, yellow er, less m anly and less courageous. 
The ugly wrinkled, cat-like w ily  Chinaman o f  dim e-novel fiction came for the South. They are quicker o f  
wit than the Northerners but harder for us to understand or trust. Upon the Canton type is built the 
cherished literary legend o f  the unfathomableness and superhuman craftiness o f  the Oriental" (1911: 29). 
An interesting feature is the degree to w hich W esterners’ com m ents match stereotypes I heard Shanghainese 
express in the 1990s (see also Lin Yutang 1935: 1-23). It is interesting to speculate on the degree to which  
the "Orientalist" stereotypes o f  Westerner writers might have originated in indigenous discourses rather than 
vice-versa.
27In such cases the "identity imputed to a social group from the outside may be quite different from that 
sam e identity as subjectively experienced" (C om aroff 1987: 308). Judith O k ely ’s (1975 ) study o f  outsiders’ 
stereotypes o f  G ypsy wom en and the latter’s se lf  representations is another good instance o f  this.
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Shanghainese identity was frequently asserted with a degree of certainty far greater than 
one generally finds of, say, English identity. On one occasion I asked a market trader if 
he was Shanghainese. He replied simply "wo Shanghai" - literally "1 Shanghai". The 
way in which this self ascription linguistically conflates personal identification and place 
strongly suggests a high degree o f topophilia. A similar instance of this conflation was 
the common reference by older informants to themselves as "lao Shanghai" ("old 
Shanghai") or "women lao Shanghai" ("we old Shanghai").
Evidence of a "Shanghai difference" goes back several centuries. Linda Johnson 
writes that a "dichotomy between locals and outsiders can be seen emerging at Shanghai 
in the Kangxi era" (1993: 163). In the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries the 
territory inside the city walls was "largely reserved for official, religious and educational 
functions, residences, and retail shops... Native-place associations, by contrast, were 
usually located outside the city wall and were distinguished by their large 
compounds...enclosed gardens and courtyards" (Ibid: 167). This spatial differentiation 
between (here Chinese) "outsiders" and city residents is a paralleled by the residence 
restrictions which are still placed upon foreigners and rural migrants (see Solinger 1995: 
126) in Shanghai.
Shanghai’s rapid development from the early nineteenth century onwards and 
especially in the first decades of the twentieth century provided fertile ground for the 
development of notions of Shanghainese sophistication and superiority over rural Chinese. 
Such ideas were well-formed by 1949. Richard Gaulton describes how during the early 
days o f Communist rule in Shanghai "sophisticated Shanghainese...circulated tales o f the 
innocence and naivete of the peasant troops o f the PL A. ‘Yokel stories’ about the
misadventures of soldiers were common" (1981: 43).
Shanghai residents often drew attention to differences between themselves and 
other categories of Chinese people - many of these distinctions predate 1949. Various 
levels of intra-regional comparison were made. At the largest scale was a broad 
distinction between the cultural background and habits of those from north and south 
China.28 Shanghainese included themselves in the category "southerners".29 Typically 
and stereotypically "southerners" were portrayed as good at business, sharp (men ke
28Ram sey points out the north-south language divide in China (1987: 19-26). North o f  the Y angtze  
River p u ton gh u a dom inates and there is "extraordinary linguistic unity". To the South are non-M andarin  
dialects and linguistic heterogeneity.
29Guldin (1984: 149) com m ents that in H ong K ong, "Shanghainese" is a catch-all term for all central and 
som etim es even northern C hinese.
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yzHg/menkanjing) and quick-witted, "northerners" as comparatively slow-witted, honest 
(laoshi) and traditional.
Residents also drew attention to differences between Shanghainese and Chinese 
from different towns or provinces of China. A particularly comprehensive list was 
provided by a Shanghai resident in his late sixties. He outlined six groups about whom 
Shanghainese have particularly strong feelings - those from Shandong, Shaoxing, Ningbo, 
Subei, Beijing and Canton. From further interviews it became evident that the first three 
groups (and for many of my informants Subei too) were primarily o f historical (i.e. pre- 
1949) interest.30 I examine representations of Beijingers and Cantonese in the next 
section since they appear more relevant to the current situation.
It is unnecessary to outline all the historical representations. A few brief comments 
on Subeiren may serve as an example. My informants agreed that Shanghainese had 
looked down on them because they had engaged in the lowest status jobs (zui dideng 
gongzuo) such as street sweepers, night soil collectors, rickshaw pullers and pedlars but, 
above all, because they were perceived of as ignorant, poor, dirty, and rough/crude, 
without culture/education {me ven ho/meiyou wenhua,31 dziong/qiong, o tso/zang, culu). 
From such representations of Subeiren one can "read o f f  the opposite factors as 
indicating what "Shanghainese" are believed to be like. If  Subeiren are despised as 
ignorant, poor, dirty, and rough/crude, then Shanghainese are cultured, wealthy, clean, and 
refined. However, I would argue that in the 1990s the category o f migrant workers 
(mingong) which I discuss later had superseded "Subeiren" as a far more visible and 
frequently discussed category of vilified others.
It is obviously difficult to assess the vitality of "Shanghainese" identities during the 
Maoist period. However, various informants suggested that Shanghai residents’ sense of 
superiority was enhanced during the Maoist period. There are good reasons to posit fertile 
soil for at least the retention and, perhaps, the strengthening of such identities. The 
creation of strict urban-rural boundaries from the 1950s onwards mentioned above played 
a part in this since it entrenched urban privileges such as better educational opportunities, 
job security and welfare benefits.
With no foreign brand labels to compete with, across China products labelled
KT h e status o f  Subeiren  in Shanghai has been w ell docum ented, to reiterate this adds little to my  
argument. I w ould add that there was substantial disagreement am ong m y informants about the 
contemporary persistence o f  this prejudice - som e considered it an historical matter, others regarded it as 
still prevalent and, often, as based upon firm grounds.
31On w enhua see Chapter 1, footnote 42.
123
"Made in Shanghai" were the supreme cachet of quality and sophistication. At the same 
time the strict migration controls and limited possibilities for travel gave the city an allure 
made all the greater by its unavailability. Former rusticated youth were clearly aware of 
Shanghai’s superiority and often spoke resentfully of having been "assigned out of 
Shanghai" (fenpei dao waimian - literally "assigned outside"). A typical Shanghainese 
conception of rural China is abundantly clear in a scene redolent with symbolism in the 
play Yesterday’s Longan Tree.32 A group of "rusticated" Shanghai youth are walking 
through a forest in Yunnan, approaching their destination in the countryside. One of them 
throws aside his case of books with the comment that they would not be needed any 
more.33
Alongside the relatively privileged status of Shanghai residents there were also 
grounds for resentment over the city’s treatment by the central government. After 1949 
the new government was dependent upon Shanghai for funds. Until the reform era, the 
city provided one-fifth to one-fourth of central government revenue (Jacobs & Hong 1994: 
226). Many Shanghainese were resentful of these expropriations. A scientific research 
worker told me that residents were often short-tempered and quarrelsome "because 
Shanghainese cannot accept (xiangbutong) the way that they create so much wealth and 
the state takes 80% of it while conditions in Shanghai deteriorate."34 Lack of change in 
Shanghai’s architecture from the Communist takeover until the early 1980s was a source 
of much complaint. A bitter story I was told several times described how when people 
who fled to Taiwan returned to visit Shanghai for the first time in decades they found 
everything just as they had left it.
An article in Duzhe Wenzhai titled "Great Shanghai, Can You Still Carry 
China?",35 commented that when Shanghainese visit Beijing and see its new, tall 
buildings they will feel "[o]ut of each of these ten buildings, five were built with 
Shanghai’s money!" (43). According to this article "some people calculate" that if since 
1949 the proportion of Shanghai’s wealth handed over to the central government had been 
the same as other places "at the very least it would now have attained the same economic
3:Zuotian  de G uiyuan  Shu by the Shanghai playwright Xu Pinli, w ho was herself sent to Yunnan.
” There are other notions o f  the countryside. For exam ple, a retired man expressed nostalgia for his 
childhood in rural Pudong where it was "very clean" and the air good.
34During 1950-83, Shanghai handed over 86.8%  o f  its funds to the central governm ent, this figure stood
at about 80% in 1993 (Jacobs & Hong 1994: 231-32).
35"Da S h an gh a i, N i H ai B eid eq i Z h on ggu o  Ma?" Readers D igest September 1992: 42 -7 .
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level as Singapore." It adds that in the ten years 1979-88, Shanghai provided enough 
money to the central government to build two cities the size of Shanghai. I often heard 
the complaint that "just one district in Shanghai gives as much to the central government 
as the whole of Guangdong province." Since in the early 1990s Shanghai contributed at 
least twelve times as much to central government revenues as Guangdong this seems a 
reasonable estimate (Jacobs & Hong 1994: 228). Indeed, it seems that in 1992, just one 
Shanghai company - The Shanghai Cigarette Company - paid as much tax as the whole 
o f Guangzhou Municipality (Ibid: 234).
In the early 1990s the sense of a Shanghainese identity fostered through a feeling 
of shared unfairness was very evident to me. However, I am unable to ascertain when this 
sense was formed. I suspect that it was strengthened during the reform era when 
possibilities for comparison became more available. For instance, more people could now 
travel to Beijing and it was only recently that figures of taxes handed over by Shanghai 
Municipality to the central government were in the public domain. It may well be that 
this sense of resentment reached its peak when the very policies which underscored it 
were in the process of being ameliorated as Shanghai began to retain a higher proportion 
of its revenues and there was a greater degree of local autonomy.
2.3 Opening Shanghai’s Boundaries: Identities in the Reform Era
The reform era has been marked by a general relaxation of boundaries and 
increasing fluidity. Zhao and Womack describe a distinct shift from the pre-1980s 
"autarkic localism of cellular decentralization" to "market localism" (1994: 144). A 
significant consequence of "the centrifugal effects of diversification" (Ibid: 132) and an 
increasing "national division of labour" (Goodman 1994: 2) has been the flow o f power 
from the centre to the region. As Segal (1994) points out this includes a decentralization 
of both economic and political power. Present trends are towards "informal variants of 
federalism" (Ibid: 351). Evidence of this is the emergence, since the late 1980s, of 
regional economic protectionism.36 Shanghai’s reintegration into the world economy is 
paralleled by an increase in the power and influence o f the city authorities and business 
enterprises. As one Shanghai resident succinctly remarked "they say that the central 
authorities are in control but in reality each place takes care of itself." Similarly, a retired 
man, a Party member expressed concern that "as gradually local places have money and 
the state has none, in the future each place will only be concerned with its own situation
36See Goodman 1994: 2, Madsen 1990: 253, Prybyla 1989: 12, Sw aine 1990: 25-6 .
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(difang zhi guan ziji de qingkuang)."
An example of increasing local autonomy which may serve as a microcosm of 
wider changes concerns entrance exams for Shanghai university places. Before the 
reforms applicants took a unified, national exam. Entrants now took unified Shanghai or 
Jiangsu province exams. In 1993, Shanghai’s Industry University (Gongye Daxue) began 
to set its own entrance exam. A teacher told me that this was a return to before 1949 
when each university set its own entrance exam.
Shanghai’s boundaries had become far more porous. With the opening up of 
Shanghai’s economy and large scale construction works underway the city was once again 
a powerful magnet for capital, tourists, entrepreneurs and migrant labourers. In 1992, 
utilized foreign investment in Shanghai totalled US $3,357 million, an amount equal to 
the accumulated total of the previous twelve years.37 Migration patterns were becoming 
closer to those of the pre-Maoist period.38 Shanghai residents were no longer compelled 
to leave the city and rural migrants had more opportunities to work and live in Shanghai. 
Over the last few years large numbers of rural residents have come to Shanghai in search 
of employment, attracted, in part, by propaganda about the vast 350 square-mile enterprise 
zone of Pudong New District, established in 1990. This is officially described as "the 
hope of Shanghai" which "is expected to become East China’s most developed and open 
zone, like Shenzhen in South China."39
Shanghai’s "floating population" (liudong renkou), that is people without Shanghai 
household registration, rose from some four percent of the population in 1982 to over one- 
quarter in the mid-1990s (White 1994: 86). Most are from rural areas of Anhui, Jiangsu, 
Zhejiang and Shandong and engage in small scale peddling and trading, construction work 
(mingong), agricultural work on farms in Shanghai’s suburbs,40 work as household 
servants or maids. In many respects, "Chinese exploitation of internal migrants is 
comparable with the treatment of, particularly, foreign migrant labour in other countries" 
0994: 149).
37Jacobs & H ong 1994: 245.
38For a detailed study o f  the categories o f  urban in-migration in post-M ao China see Chan (1994: 114-
41).
3y"Pudong N ew  Zone D evelops at a S izzling Pace" CD 15 January 1993: 4.
40A local econom ics professor w ho conducted a survey in Shanghai’s suburban Baoshan county told  me 
that h a lf its contracted out land was contracted to non-Shanghainese - the original inhabitants engage in 
industrial work or comm ercial activities.
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Apart from maids who lived in residents’ households, migrants were generally 
segregated spatially from the resident population (see Solinger 1995).41 Construction 
gangs mostly lived in wooden huts or under canvas awnings. Their recruitment and 
organization was often dealt with by autonomous labour bosses (baogongtou), an 
occupation well known in pre-1949 China. These figures were demonized as cruel 
exploiters in Communist propaganda literature such as Xia Yan’s (1959) semi-fictional 
account Indentured Labourer (Baoshen Gong). Baogongtou fulfil a similar brokering role 
between urban and rural as compradors between local people and foreigners. Market 
traders and the unemployed tended to congregate around suburban parts of Shanghai at 
the intersection of urban/suburban transport nodes such as Wujiaochang. Less successful 
migrants occupied marginal spaces within the city - they sleep on the streets, beg and may 
scavenge amongst the rubbish in such places as the bank of the pestilent Suzhou Creek.
With the flow of people into Shanghai there is considerable evidence to support 
Lynn White’s assessment that since the 1970s "the state has lost most of its previous 
ability to control where people lived" (1994: 94). However, my own research suggests 
that this conclusion is rather overstated. Although weakened, the hukou system is still 
important. Indeed I heard complaints that only those engaged in low status jobs could 
circumvent the hukou. According to Chan, around two-thirds of urban in-migration is 
"informal" (1994: 120), with formal migration still strictly controlled (144). A city 
danwei could recruit people without a Shanghai hukou but this was very costly. In one 
instance I knew of a danwei which paid 60,000¥ to obtain a hukou also had to arrange 
accommodation for the employee. Non-Shanghainese could obtain a Shanghai hukou if 
they came to care for an elderly relative or to replace a relative who had left Shanghai. 
In one case in my acquaintance, it took three years to circumnavigate the bureaucracy 
involved. Thus the boundaries were differentially "porous".
Since social boundaries are called into being by the exigencies of social interaction 
(Cohen 1985: 12), it is of particular importance to pay attention to Shanghai residents’ 
comments on these people. However, before examining the impact of rural migrants upon 
identities in Shanghai I outline representations of contrasts between Shanghainese and 
Beijingers; a set of oppositions which indicates a redefinition of Shanghainese identities 
in the reform era.
4lA s is clear in Sidsel Larsen’s (1982 ) account o f  Catholic and Protestant residents o f  Kilbroney in 
Northern Ireland, proxim ity o f  residence, in itself, may do little to promote mutual understanding.
2.3.1 Shanghainese/Beijingers
In a conversation with the Shanghainese manager of a stock exchange he compared 
Shanghai to Beijing. He outlined a series of oppositions, the following list is a compilation 
of his views and those of other respondents. It is worth noting that most informants 
expressed morally positive views of Beijingers. Even Beijingers perceived ready resort to 
violence was taken as evidence of their straightforwardness. The only real note of discord 
was the occasional suggestion that they were arrogant, a*characteristic attributed to Beijing 
being the city of government.
Shanghai/Haipai
Financial and commercial centre 
Open (kaifang)
Immigrant population (wai laide), mixed 
race (hunxue)42
Future
Literature
Popular culture (comic plays)
Mental action (dong zuiba, dong naojin),
arguing
Concerned with matters that affect them 
personally (juti de dongxi)
Sharp, clever (jingming, congming, men
ke j ing)
Beijing
Political centre 
Closed (bisi) ’
Indigenous (benshen) in population and 
culture
Past, backward looking 
History
"Serious" culture (Beijing opera) 
Physical response (dong shou), fighting
Concerned with national affairs (xihuan 
guan daguo shi)
Straightforward (shuangkuai), easily 
taken in, simple-minded (laoshi)
To this list I add the comments of two other informants. A Shanghainese professor told 
me:
Shanghainese are open-minded (kaifang) and ‘coastal style’ (haipai) - they can 
accept Western things. But Shanghainese exclude outsiders (paiwai).43 They see 
Beijingers as lao tu  (unrefined - tu also means soil, earth; land; local, native; 
indigenous) who just drink tea whereas Shanghai people drink beer and beverages 
(yinliao). Shanghainese are shrewd (jingming).
A young teacher remarked that Shanghainese have a better relationship with foreigners than
4:Many people I spoke w ith accepted a eugenic v iew  that the children o f  parents from different population  
groups (including different provinces o f  China) are more intelligent. D ikotter (1992) describes how  such ideas 
w ere popularized in China during the late nineteenth century. H e com m ents that som e saw "interracial 
m arriage...as a means o f  strengthening the people o f  the empire" (87).
43Generally paiw ai (anti-foreign; exclusive - literally "exclude the outside") refers to foreigners, but this 
man w as clearly referring to other Chinese.
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do other Chinese because of Shanghai people’s historical interaction with foreigners. He 
felt that:
Northerners have still not lost the Qing dynasty sense of superiority (youyuegan). 
It is Shanghai that most accepts Western culture. Guangzhou is developed but 
unrefined/unenlightened (tu), for example, they don’t eat Western food, they are 
still stuck with the same old way of doing things (lao yi tao). Shanghainese, by 
contrast, visit Western style restaurants and wear Western style suits. So Shanghai 
is the best place to be open to the outside (duiwai kaifang).
The conflation of the terms kaifang and haipai in these comments is particularly
interesting. H aipai - "Shanghai style" or more loosely "coastal style" was a term originally
used to describe the distinctive way in which Beijing opera was sung in Shanghai. It was
subsequently used to describe a school of literature (haipai wenxue) which flourished in
Shanghai in the 1920s and 30s. As a genre it was experimental, Western-influenced and
iconoclastic. The term may also be used of an individual’s style, say, of management. The
term kaifang has various resonances (as outlined in Chapter 1). It denotes the "Open
Door" policy and in everyday use may mean "openness" and "open-mindedness" with a
range of valuations from broad-minded to morally lax. Many Shanghainese considered
Shanghai more kaifang than, say, Beijing because it is a city comprised mainly of
immigrants (yimin chengshi) and because it was a cosmopolitan city in the past.
Moreover, since Shanghainese were already haipai, in a sense they were kaifang before
the kaifang policy.44
It is interesting to recall here the contrast made in the Chinese documentary series
"River Elegy" between the enclosed, stagnant, and insular mentality of "yellow culture"
(China) and the open, dynamic, and exploratory spirit of the "blue ocean" (the West).
These contrasts closely parallel those outlined above of "Beijing" and "Shanghai". It
should, of course, be borne in mind that many of my informants had seen and been
influenced by (some referred to it directly) this series. It had presumably played a part in
the reorientation of Shanghainese identities.
The self-conception of Shanghainese as intelligent and sophisticated urbanites was
also very clear. The notion of Shanghainese as shrewd "maximizers" was evident in
comments people made to me about the demonstrations in Shanghai during Spring 1989.
One middle aged Shanghainese women noted that the voices one heard during the
demonstrations "were all those of waidiren (non-Shanghainese)." Similarly, some
^It is interesting to compare these com m ents to those o f  Lt. Forbes w ho in 1848 w rote that "[t]he English  
merchant at Canton is almost a prisoner in his house" (2). By contrast, he found Shanghai "a city especially  
open to the foreigner" (14).
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informants contrasted the way Shanghai’s laobaixing, unlike those in Beijing, backed down 
from a physical confrontation with the army. They considered this contrast as evidence of 
Shanghai people’s "smartness" and also as indicative of the Beijingers courage and concern 
with national affairs. Other Shanghainese, it should be said, felt no reason to engage in the 
demonstrations considering them to be part of a struggle for power in Beijing and, 
therefore, of no concern to themselves.
Chinese currency  - old style one yuan  note
C S 8 . 4 3 ; I 3 & .
.and new style one yuan  note
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2.3.2 "Outside People1 (waidiren)
Immediately after Spring Festival 1993 large numbers of rural migrants "flowed" 
into Shanghai seeking work spurring complaints by residents and consternation in the local 
media. A Shanghainese friend remarked that it was only at such times that one could see 
Shanghainese identity asserted. During my seventeen months in Shanghai the barrier 
between Shanghainese and waidiren (non-Shanghainese - see below) did indeed seem to 
be at its most tangible at this time. I had the sense that these "outsiders" were regarded 
as a part of a threatening Other, overwhelming in its numbers and poverty. With this 
influx of waidiren I sensed almost a siege mentality. At least one newspaper report 
described these people using terms formerly given to armies from these areas, for 
example, Xiang Jun (Hunan army), Wan Jun (Anhui army), Su Jun (Subei army) and 
Chuan Jun (Sichuan army). If waidiren were perceived of as a threatening army then 
the battle sites were the streets, pavements, shop counters and buses of the city. I recall 
a retired man, a party member, asking rhetorically at this time, "China’s national situation. 
So many peasants, what is to be done?" His tone was one of almost hopeless exasperation 
as though oppressed by the sheer numbers of peasants.
The fear of chaos (luan) has deep cultural roots in China (Watson 1992: 75). 
Shanghainese often prided themselves that their city was well ordered. A young teacher 
described Shanghai to me as run in a very orderly fashion (jingjing you tiao) explaining 
that "it has had one hundred years of modern (xiandaihua) administrative style."45 Rural 
migrants were displaced people who brought disorder and aroused the fear o f chaos. The 
media described the arrivals at this time - many thousands of whom slept outside the train 
station in the freezing cold, wet Shanghai February - as mangliu "blindly moving from 
place to place". Such descriptions seem to deny any sense of rationality on the part of 
these migrants, contributing to a sense of them as an irrational "Other". The image 
portrayed of them is akin to the traditional "hungry ghosts" who roam the land. Sedentary 
residents may fear migrants as they fear ghosts - both may be "angry because they are 
hungry and homeless" (W olf 1974: 170).
Many of these arrivals in Shanghai hoped to become mingong (labourers working 
on public projects) and need to be explored within the wider category o f waidiren of 
which they form a part. The lack of a proper English term for waidiren alerts one to the 
distinctive nature of this indigenous category. Waidi is defined as "parts of the country 
other than where one is" (CED 1988: 705). With the suffix ren - "person", a waidiren
4SN ote that his use o f  the term "modern" is interchangeable with "foreign".
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in Shanghai is somebody from another part of China. However, in everyday use waidiren 
often seemed to be restricted to non-urban people. In this sense it is synonymous with 
the term xiangxiaren (.xiang ho nin) which the dictionary describes as the neutral "country 
folk", "person from the countryside", but which, in Shanghai at least, has distinctly 
negative connotations. Negative perceptions of rural Chinese portrayed them as dirty, 
stupid, ignorant, backward, and poor.46
A term related to xiangxiaren is ah xiang - probably best translated as "bumpkin". 
I often heard Shanghainese complain about "this country bumpkin" (di ge a xianglihigt 
ah xiang), for instance, for blocking crowded buses with bulky bags or obstructing traffic 
when they dragged heavy loads through the city. An older informant recalled a pre-1949 
story about a xiangxiaren called A Tu Sang (Ah Tu Sheng) newly arrived in Shanghai. 
All he saw was new and he understood none of it. Subsequently his name was used to 
describe all people who did not understand new things.
A recent slang term, which not all informants knew, is bazi. This term probably 
derives from the term xiangbalao "country bumpkin". One informant described bazi as 
"those from the countryside who have money but don’t know how to use it" (you qian 
de, danshi bu hui yong de waidi lai de ren) or who "have money but you can see that 
they are outsiders." I also heard this expression used of Taiwanese. On one occasion I 
overheard some workers in a Taiwanese owned company talk about "Taibazi". When I 
asked who this was they became embarrassed and told me that this was how they referred 
to their Taiwanese boss behind his back. Another instance clarifies the usage of this term 
and is an interesting example of "front" and "backstage" impression management. A 
friend introduced me to a former classmate who worked in a real estate company. Several 
times the latter mentioned that some of their customers were "Taiwanese compatriots" 
(Taibao). As we left my friend was much amused by this, suspecting that the old 
classmate would undoubtedly use the term "Taibazi" on other occasions.
Mingong - labourers working on public projects - were the most visible (Chinese) 
"outsiders" in Shanghai. A state danwei employee told me that "non-Shanghainese (waidi 
laide) want to come to Shanghai in the same way as Shanghainese seek to go abroad." 
Most mingong in Shanghai are from rural China. A university lecturer described 
mingong in the following way:
46These characteristics are remarkably similar to representations o f  black people - the m ost "other" o f  
C hina’s others (see Dikotter 1992: 12). H ow ever, in popular perceptions rural C hinese are generally seen, 
unlike black people, as m orally good.
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These are the people who do most of the hard manual labour (kugong) in Shanghai 
such as mending roads and building houses. They are mostly peasants from Anhui 
and Jiangsu province. They are a social problem because they have no houses, live 
together and have no wenhua or self-cultivation (xiuyang). After work they have 
nothing to do so they go out to have a good time (ba xzflrcg/baixiang =  wan). They 
watch films at the cinema, wander the streets, gamble, steal and rape. Many crimes 
in Shanghai are committed by mingong. They have no household registration and 
the police are unable to control them. Without them to build Shanghai’s new roads 
and housing Shanghai’s construction would not happen. But they make Shanghai’s 
society unstable (bu anding).
This is a very typical representation of mingong. I often gained the impression that
mingong were regarded as a necessary evil - essential for Shanghai’s construction but also
the source of public order and social problems. M ingong and waidiren generally were
regarded by many Shanghainese as a considerable threat. They were blamed for making
the city even more crowded and for committing many crimes.47 One informant described
waidiren as "doing the kind of jobs that used to be done by Subei people." It is my
impression that the kind of opprobrium once reserved for Subei people was now
increasingly transferred to waidiren. In a more general sense, all things coming from
"outside" (wai) are regarded as potentially destructive. Within families, for instance,
incoming wives may be regarded as sources of disharmony until thoroughly absorbed by
the "inner" (nei) circle. From the late 1970s the children of "rusticated" Shanghainese who
went to the border regions in the 1950s have been permitted to migrate to Shanghai (White
1994: 74). These newcomers were often described to me as disruptive and as figuring
highly among the ranks of child offenders.48
2 .4  Being Shanghainese
2 .4 .1  Som e Tastes/Flavours o f  Shanghai
Benedict Anderson suggests that it is important to distinguish the style in which 
communities are imagined (1983: 15). Anthony Cohen makes the important point that 
people often "experience their distinctiveness not through the performance of elaborate and 
specialised ceremonial but through the evaluation of everyday practices (1982b: 6). In 
Shanghai, I also found that "the sense of belonging" was evoked in rather mundane
47T his latter perception appears to he hacked up by statistics. In 1983 7% o f  crim e w as com m itted by 
non-registered people, by 1989 this figure had risen to 31 % (W hite 1994: 90 ). A Shanghai radio report (cited  
in FB1S C H I-95-118, 20  June 1995: 62) reported that in the three m onths M arch, April and M ay 1995, there 
had been 2 ,9 5 6  arrests in the city and that 57.85%  o f  these w ere o f  peop le from  other provinces.
48 A woman w ho came to Shanghai from Xinjiang under this p o licy  told m e that she encountered 
difficu lties when she first arrived. This included discrim ination because she spoke Shanghai dialect poorly - 
people thought she was a x ian gx iaren  and so looked down (k an b u q i) on her.
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circumstances such as the use of language and joking, through "processes which occur close 
to the everyday experience of life" (Ibid). With a Shanghai resident in her early forties I 
discussed the ways in which one may tell the regional origin of those who live in Shanghai. 
She said that one could visibly distinguish Cantonese "because their faces are different". 
Subei people were "too obvious" - from their behaviour, dress, and dialect. Other groups, 
she felt, were less visible but could be distinguished by the food they ate.
Building upon these indigenous means of ascribing peopje to different categories, 
the representations outlined above and responses to more direct questions about 
"Shanghainese" identity it is possible to provide some senses of what was considered 
"Shanghainese". It should be noted that the physical characteristics required to be 
"Chinese" apply equally to "being Shanghainese". I concentrate upon dialect, cuisine, 
notions of style and taste, imputed characteristics and behaviour. Each of these are means 
by which lines of demarcation were drawn between Shanghainese and non-Shanghainese and 
evaluative judgements made of different types of people residing within Shanghai. First it 
is important to distinguish contesting representations of where "real Shanghainese" are to 
be found.
Pudong Or Not Pudong: The "Real" Shanghainese?
Many Shanghai citizens are only first or second generation residents of the city. A 
majority of my informants described their family home (laojia) as being elsewhere in 
China. A magazine editor told me that "there are very few real Shanghainese" (zhen zhen 
de Shanghairen). People whose families had deeper roots, whose ancestral line (zuxian) 
was in Shanghai, were generally very proud of this. As a rule of thumb I was told that 
those whose families had been in Shanghai over one hundred years are referred to as 
"people of this place" (bendi ren), others as "coming from outside" (wai laide). In 
practice, however, anyone born in Shanghai described themselves as Shanghainese. A 
university lecturer, himself proud of being Shanghainese, remarked that "Shanghai people 
are crossbreeds (zazhong), only those in Nanshi district are local (dangdi) Shanghainese. 
The rest are from all over China. It is like New York."
Before coming to Shanghai I had expected that Nanshi would be regarded in this 
way. A glance at the modern map of Shanghai reveals that Nanshi is the site of the old 
city. Earlier Western visitors considered this "the real Shanghai" (Gamewell 1916: 140), 
replete with "enough. ..foul-smelling alleys, streets of gay shops, beggars and crowds, to 
satisfy most lovers of the haunting allurements of the Orient" (Ibid: 142). Until 1911, it
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was encircled by a wall and is now the circular route followed by the Number 11 bus. 
This seems straightforward but another resident told me "people from Nanshi are no good, 
they are all immigrants from Subei." If the residents o f Nanshi are not the "real" 
Shanghainese, then perhaps one must look elsewhere. One informant told me that his 
mother was bom in Pudong and described her as a "true (didao) Shanghainese". 
However, there seemed to be considerable ambivalence as to whether Pudong is Shanghai 
or not. Often people spoke of coming from  Shanghai to Pudong, or vice versa.
Even in a single conversation a person may both describe Pudongers as "real 
Shanghainese" and distinguish between "Pudongers" (Pudongren) and "Shanghainese" 
(Shanghairen). The confusion is evident in the comments of a retired man who told me 
that "Pudongren are real (daodi) Shanghainese, they were all engaged in agriculture until 
recently. Shanghainese are not prepared to move to Pudong, it is lower one level (di yi 
ji)." I have no neat solution to this paradox. However, it is important to state that this 
was only a paradox for me as an analyst, it highlights the extent to which an 
anthropologist is dealing with flexible and fluid notions which may, or may not, 
eventually "congeal" or become systematic. My overwhelming impression is that in 
everyday contexts when people spoke about "Shanghai" and the characteristics of
"Shanghainese" they were referring to those who live in the (wholly urban) ten city 
districts of Puxi and not Pudong or the suburban counties of Shanghai. However, there 
was no need for them to specify where Shanghai is when discussing "Shanghainese".
Although evidence that one was born within Shanghai’s political boundaries would
constitute "proof'- of officially being "Shanghainese" in other respects "being
Shanghainese" is a de-territorialized notion, involving a composite of certain ways of 
behaving.
Speaking Properly
R.D. Grillo writes that language is a major element in "the construction of 
"difference" both within and between countries of Europe" (1989: 2). In China, dialect 
is an equally important marker in definitions of Self and Others. It is a key way in which 
distinctions between nei (inside) and wai (outside), inclusion and exclusion, are created. 
It is important to recognise that dialects of Chinese differ as much as Romance languages 
(Ramsey 1987: 4-5). This creates a very real boundary - if Shanghai citizens speak in
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Shanghai dialect other Chinese, who do not speak a Wu dialect, will be excluded.49 The 
central importance of language was made abundantly clear in an informant’s response to 
my question: In Shanghai who are waidiren ("outsiders")? - "People who cannot speak 
Shanghai dialect." Similarly, a teacher in her early twenties who felt that "the Subeiren 
in Shanghai now are second and third generation and have been assimilated (tonghua)" 
explained that "among our generation there is no conception o f Subeiren contrasted to 
Shanghainese, we are all Shanghainese, we all speak Shanghai dialect." Another resident 
remarked that although Shanghainese can understand putonghua if  one speaks to them 
in Shanghai dialect they "immediately feel an intimacy (qinqigan - literally "a feeling of 
belonging to the same family") and a moqi ("tacit understanding") in the relationship. It 
is important from an emotional (ganqing) point of view."
Shanghai dialect is clearly an important focus for a Shanghainese identification. 
However, the confusion over who are "real" Shanghainese spills over into the dialect. I 
was often told that Pudongers speak "true" (zhenzhong) or "standard" (biaozhun) 
Shanghai dialect. However, people may also distinguish between "Shanghai dialect" 
(Shanghaihua) and "Pudong dialect" (Pudonghua). Some respondents, including a 
magazine editor, told me that "the most standard Shanghai dialect is spoken in Nanshi and 
Huangpu districts." A little later he added that "no Shanghai dialect exists." This view 
was based upon a perception that the various waves o f immigrants to Shanghai had 
distorted and submerged an original dialect under the admixture of their own dialects and 
vocabularies. Many respondents described Shanghai dialect as hunhe - a mix or blend 
and heavily influenced by Ningbo and other dialects. English is another encrustation. 
One man remarked that his 82 year old father who used to work in a foreign bank still 
uses some pidgin English (yangjingbang) such as te le fen  (telephone).50 A new rising 
tide was depositing Cantonese terms upon the dialect. Within the city zone itself people 
did not appear to be able to distinguish differences in dialect based upon spatial location. 
Instead, indigenous categorisations tended to stress differences based upon educational 
level with, for example, contrasts between "cultured" (wenya) and "slang" (suyu or 
shijingyu - "city well language") Shanghai dialect. A Shanghai academic described the 
latter as "very poor (cha), obscene (xialiu), lower class (diceng), and hooligan (liumang)
4QShanghai dialect belongs to the Wu dialect fam ily which is spoken in the Y angtze delta and coastal 
region around Shanghai and has som e 80 ,750 ,000  speakers (R am sey 1987: 87-95).
50The term yan gjin g b an g  (Y angjing Creek) originates from a place in Shanghai. It is interesting that 
term for the linguistic encounter o f  English and Chinese uses the name o f  one o f  spatial locations where 
these encounters first took place.
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vocabulary."
Grillo notes that languages and their speakers are usually o f unequal status, power, 
and authority and that "there is commonly a hierarchical ordering of languages, dialects 
and ways of speaking" (1989: 1). Since the May Fourth Movement in 1919 many Chinese 
have regarded a common language as essential to modernising China. Ramsey 
characterises this as the "spread of northern influence" (1987: 27). After 1949, Shanghai 
dialect was gradually excised from official contexts and the media. In 1956, putonghua 
was officially adopted as the national language to be used in government and public life 
and promoted in all educational institutions - it is the "dominant language" (Grillo 1989) 
in the Shanghai diglossia.51 The editor mentioned above told me that in the 1950s there 
were some books in Shanghai dialect. During 1992-4, local newspapers such as Xinmin 
Wanbao occasionally used a few words of Shanghai dialect. However, the editor 
considered that the media "dare not use more because of pressure from above (shangmian 
yali) "
Occasionally people did assert a sense of pride in the dialect. For instance some 
pointed out that it retains much classical Chinese. Others considered the dialect "vivid" 
(shendong), "rich" (fengfu) and "colourful" (secai) since it has "vocabulary from all over 
China" (waidi laide hua). Informants would stress that some dialect vocabulary cannot 
be translated into putonghua and that even when similar to putonghua it has a "different 
flavour" (midao). I suggest that this is a useful metaphor to conceptualize the relationship 
between "Shanghainese" and "Chinese" identities.
Despite such comments I found no evidence of a political - including in the non- 
formal sense - assertion of Shanghainese identity in the form of actively wishing to 
promote or propagate the dialect. For instance, I never heard anybody complain about the 
lack of media in Shanghai dialect. Young people greatly appreciated popular music in 
Cantonese dialect and putonghua but when I ventured the possibility of a pop song in 
Shanghai dialect this was invariably greeted with derision. In addition, if people used 
Shanghai dialect on the radio or television they frequently apologised for this, saying that 
their inadequacy in putonghua (often due to lack of practice) made it easier for them to 
use the dialect. Grillo remarks that in some cases certain ways of speaking have 
considerable prestige - such as upper-class English - but are not always universally 
admired or respected (1989: 171). In Shanghai, by contrast, many Shanghainese told me
5lGrillo defines "dominant language" as "a variety characteristically em ployed by those occupying  
superordinate positions" (1989: 12).
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that they liked the Beijing dialect (to which putonghua is closely related).
Reactions to my own attempts to study the dialect were informative. They 
highlight the perception, and it seems acceptance, that putonghua is the speech of 
education, knowledge and ultimately power, whilst the dialect is only for conversation 
(kouyu). If I tried to use the dialect people were pleased. But if  I suggested that I 
wanted to "study Shanghainese" in an academic context this usually provoked disbelief 
and bemusement. If my wish to study the dialect was taken seriously I would usually be 
told that this was a waste of time "because Shanghainese can all speak putonghua." A 
young worker in a joint venture also remarked "why do you want to study Shanghai 
dialect? Shanghainese now want to study Cantonese." A rare instance when my wish to 
study the dialect was taken seriously indicates the relative status of Shanghai dialect and 
putonghua. On this occasion an academic told me that I would need to use Shanghai 
dialect when talking "to ordinary, uneducated Shanghai people (putong, meiyou wenhua 
de laobaixing)."
I observed that many intellectuals spoke putonghua with their children (also 
Ramsey 1987: 30). They considered facility in putonghua as the child’s route to success 
and seemed to feel at most only a twinge of regret that their children did not (and 
sometimes could not) speak the dialect. It seemed that their identity as parents overrode 
that of being Shanghainese. The status of Shanghai dialect was also made clear in a 
dialect comedy (huajixi) version of the play "OK Stock" shown in November 1993. All 
the characters used various Wu dialects except for a professor who used putonghua. 
Other characters also tended to use putonghua when they spoke with him.
Eating Properly
Food is an important marker of both Chinese and intra-regional identities. The 
comments on Beijingers and Cantonese presented above highlight distinctions of this kind 
- Shanghainese open-mindedness, modernity, Western orientation and sophistication as 
manifested in their consumption of Western meals, beer and other beverages were 
favourably compared to Beijingers tea drinking and the inability of Cantonese to 
appreciate Western food. Instances where the regional origin of Shanghai residents may 
not otherwise be "visible" includes Ningbo people. The female informant mentioned 
above told me that one can only tell Ningbo people from the food they eat - they prefer 
salty, pungent (chou) foods such as strong-smelling preserved bean curd. Similarly, 
Hunanese eat very hot food - "so their neighbours can tell where they are from."
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I encountered the symbolism attached to food in my own activities. One morning, 
with a family, I ate a breakfast of rice porridge (paofan), flat bread (dabing) and fried 
dough sticks (youtiao). This was described to me as "the most typical Shanghainese 
breakfast (dianxing Shanghairen chide zaofan)." On another occasion - as so often as 
an outsider I only become aware of boundaries by transgressing them - I was planning a 
train journey out of Shanghai with some Chinese friends when I suggested that we take 
some steamed bread (mantou) to eat on the train. The response was that this would make 
us like country bumpkins (xiangbalao) and that we had better take something else instead.
Dressing Correctly
Style and sophistication were often regarded as key markers of being Shanghainese.
On this subject my female respondent noted that one could often distinguish the regional
origin of people by their aesthetic taste (shenmeiguan). She remarked that:
Shanghainese are really good at dressing up, they know what is appropriate (deti), 
they like softer colours and have a good sense of colour coordination. Subeiren 
like bright green and bright red - it looks very vulgar (suqi). They also wear 
different colours all jumbled up (luan chuan). It is becoming harder to spot 
waidiren as they dress better now. This is especially true with Cantonese, you 
cannot distinguish them by their clothing, they are integrated (lianxi) with Hong 
Kong and Taiwanese, their clothing is Hong Kong style (Ganghua). However, 
you can tell other waidiren by their clothing.
After being compelled to abandon adornment during the Maoist years fashion had returned
to Shanghai with a vengeance. Shanghainese, the younger generation especially, had
abandoned blue and green "Mao suits" and black canvas shoes. Such apparel marked out
the wearer as a "country person". It was a source of considerable amusement when
foreign women wore such "peasants’ shoes". This new fashion consciousness was alluded
to by the spread of the term xiaosa meaning "stylish" which became popular through a
Taiwanese pop song. A young teacher gleefully told me that the men seen with the brand
label of their suits on the jacket cuffs "are all xiangxiaren, it is a question of quality
(suzhi). They are afraid that others will not be able to see the price of the jacket from its
quality and appearance." In explaining the use of the term xiangxiaren to me, one man
gave an example - if somebody looks at a watch and does not recognize that it is a
famous brand one may say "are you a xiangxiaren?" However, it appeared that dressing
correctly was still not enough. A wealthy young share dealer from Hunan studying in
Shanghai complained to me that Shanghainese are "urban petty bourgeois" (xiao shimin)
who "exclude outsiders" (paiwai). He added that "even if you wear expensive clothes,
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Shanghainese will still look down on you if you are not Shanghainese." Such notions of 
fashion and style, surely profitable to clothing producers, also intersected with emergent 
consumer and generational identities - significant features in 1990s Shanghai.
Behaving Properly
Various characteristics and types of behaviour were routinely ascribed to 
"Shanghainese" both by themselves and others. Extremely common was the notion of 
"cleverness". This was described in various ways ranging from the unambiguously 
positive congming - intelligent or clever - to jingming or men ke jing  (menkanjing) - 
sharp, astute, shrewd - and xiao congming - cleverness in petty things. The dialect term 
men ke jing  is particularly interesting, men ke is the threshold of a door, and jing  - 
shrewd or sharp. With the prevalence of socio-spatial metaphors as outlined in the 
previous chapter I was keen to seek the origins of this term. However, none o f my 
informants could enlarge upon its antecedents, it simply meant what it meant, although 
one young lecturer suggested that it derived from "Monkey King". Often popular 
representations located Shanghainese as mid-way between Beijingers and Cantonese, for 
instance, Beijingers were too honest, the latter too shifty. Both were frequently depicted 
as insular, Beijingers because of a concern with national affairs and Cantonese by virtue 
of their attachment to things Cantonese - as one university lecturer told me, they "exclude 
outsiders (paiwai) and have a strong sense of shared native-place (tongxiang). 
Shanghainese, by contrast, are outward looking."
A retired Shanghainese university lecturer told me:
Shanghainese are very clever (congming), they have a high wenhua level and have 
seen a lot (jianshi guang). When outsiders (waidiren) come to Shanghai, 
Shanghainese look down on them and call them xiangxiaren ("country 
bumpkins"). This is like saying they are unintelligent (bu congming). 
Shanghainese are arrogant (zigao zida). Waidi ("outside") to them includes 
Beijing and Guangdong, not just the countryside. Many people have a bad 
impression of Shanghainese. They say Shanghainese are too clever and call them 
men ke jing  - that is, they seek petty advantages wherever they can (daochu zuan 
xiao pianyi). They are not as honest as waidiren. Shanghainese are clever in 
trivial matters (xiao congming).
This informant considered that "Shanghainese may be like this because they have engaged
in business too much." This is associated with a common perception that business people
are dishonest. By comparison peasants were regarded as laoshi, a term which means
"honest" but includes the notion of being gullible and easily taken in. The sense of
Shanghainese cleverness extended to criminal activities. One man told me that "many
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crimes are committed by "migrant workers from outside" (waidi laide). But they don’t 
have much ability (benshi bu da) unlike Shanghai thieves who are men ke jin g "
Attention to bodily hygiene also played a part in being Shanghainese. A young 
woman commented that Shanghainese, especially women, "pay more attention to hygiene 
(weisheng), they are clean (qingjie). Northern girls may not wash every day even in the 
Summer and in Winter may not wash for weeks on end." One has intimations of notions 
o f purity and danger (cf. Douglas 1966). The common notion in Shanghai that non- 
Shanghainese bring chaos (luan) to the city seems to be paralleled in this depiction of 
non-Shanghainese as disordered in their bodily hygiene - the "soiled" (tu) outsiders are 
blemishes on the "face" (mianmao) of Shanghai. The same speaker also felt that 
waidiren were more generous (dafang) than Shanghainese - "they will use all their money 
to show off. Shanghainese use their money in a way which deploys it most efficiently 
(xiaoyi)." I heard various apocryphal stories in which a waidiren and a Shanghainese 
compare their wealth. In one version they engage in a type of potlatch by burning money 
and throwing away items. Each time the waidiren destroys his property only to find that 
he has been tricked by the Shanghainese who manages to avoid losing his property.
Finally, it is interesting to note an instance of a man who "lost" his 
Shanghaineseness. At a wedding in the city the mother’s brother (niangjiu) was invited. 
He was rusticated during the Cultural Revolution and had not returned to Shanghai. This 
man insisted that the bride and teetotal groom respond to his toasts by drinking down 
glasses of beer and became angry when they refused. The bride explained his 
unreasonable behaviour as related to the fact that he was no longer Shanghainese but 
"completely a country person (wanquan shi xiangxiaren)" - he could no longer speak 
Shanghai dialect and his behaviour - including his style of consumption - was no longer 
that of a Shanghainese.
2.4.2 The Vitality of Contemporary "Shanghainese" Identities
Before carrying out research in Shanghai I had speculated on the degree to which 
a separate and distinctive Shanghainese identity may be asserted. Abner Cohen stresses 
the importance of analyzing ethnicity in terms of the interconnections with economic and 
political relationships (1974). Wallerstein (1979: 184) writes that "ethnic consciousness 
is eternally latent everywhere. But it is only realized when groups feel either threatened 
with a loss of previously acquired privilege or conversely feel that it is an opportune 
moment politically to overcome longstanding denial of privilege." With several decades
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of large-scale expropriations of Shanghai’s profits by the central government, increased 
local autonomy and regional disparities .and an influx of rural migrants during the reform 
era there would seem to be ample grounds for the emergence o f assertive regional 
"voices". I had expected to find an increased assertion of local identity and assumed that 
this would in some ways be oppositional to a Chinese identity. These hypotheses are only 
partially borne out by the evidence. My findings suggest that whilst residents may assert 
a Shanghainese identity and that "people from Shanghai unabashedly proclaim the 
superiority of their native place" (Thurston 1983: 23), nonetheless this was not in any 
sense oppositional to concurrent identification as "Chinese".
I have highlighted the coalescence of Shanghainese identity when faced with an 
influx of migrant workers. This influx may be taken as a message about the relative 
prosperity of city and rural areas - their presence an indication of Shanghai’s economic 
progress and/or the poverty o f rural China. This influx contributed to the common 
perception of an increasing divergence between coastal and interior regions (neidi). This 
may reinforce the sense of Shanghai superiority and provoke a fear that rising regional 
inequalities - alongside those evident between rich and poor within Shanghai - may be a 
potential source of unrest.
The extent to which migrant workers are held to constitute a threat to the 
livelihoods of resident workers is a vital issue. In most instances, like Lynn White, I 
encountered "grudging acceptance of migrants" (1994: 90-1); they are regarded as 
fulfilling valuable functions, for instance, as construction workers and maids and 
supplying fresh food as market traders - many people I spoke with considered that the 
legalization of free markets and the diversity of affordable, good quality food available 
in them was the most important advantage the reforms had brought to them. In most 
instances these are occupations which were too lowly paid or unpleasant to appeal to 
residents, Despite this, residents would express resentment that such people earned more 
than themselves. I also heard some murmurings of discontent that lowly paid non- 
Shanghainese workers were undercutting the wages of Shanghai residents. In chapter 1 
I noted a newspaper description of migrant workers as a "guerilla force...stealthily entering 
[Shanghai’s] factories."52 This article described them as presenting a "threat" and a 
"challenge" to redundant Shanghai female factory workers getting work again.
The owner of a clothing factory in Pudong told me that he employed migrant 
workers from Anhui on a salary o f 200¥ per month - a level that Shanghainese would not
52"‘Y o u jid u i’ Q iaoq iaod e  Jin  C hang" XMWB 22 July 1993: 12.
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accept. In order to circumvent hukou regulations he also provided their accommodation 
and meals. This employer had all the advantages of a workforce which was cheap, 
renewable, dependent, compliant and had limited welfare entitlements. Information on the 
extent of such practices was difficult to obtain (including for government statisticians) but 
anecdotal evidence suggested they were increasingly common. I also heard complaints 
that in seeking contracts with foreign companies non-Shanghainese often undercut (chaitai 
- literally "cut the ground from under somebody’s feet”) Shanghai companies. . One 
resident remarked that "Shanghainese hope to make a good profit, but the money invested 
is cut away by non-Shanghainese (touzi bei waidiren wazou le)."
I have drawn attention to the coalescence of local resentment in the face of 
expropriations by the state. Two instances of this occurred during 1993 - over the East 
Asian Games and Beijing’s bid to host the Olympics in 2000. The East Asian Games 
were held in Shanghai. However, I heard people complain that they were having to pay 
for an event which would bring national prestige, which for many equalled benefits for 
the Party elite in Beijing. This resentment was also apparent as China sought to hold the 
2000 Olympics. Once again, a common complaint was that Shanghai people would have 
to finance this event but that all the benefits would go to Beijing. None of these voices 
appeared in the local press, although some informants gained satisfaction - a definite 
"weapon of the weak" (cf. Scott 1990) - from evading the overlapping collections for this 
event which were carried out by danwei, schools and residents’ committees.
In many countries such a sense of resentment and the problems caused by migrant 
labour are a source for "racist" movements. Despite apparently fertile soil for assertive 
regional "voices" and the clear persistence of senses of Shanghainese identity I found little 
political articulation beyond such "weapons of the weak" as grumbling and complaining 
and occasional diatribes in the local media against rural migrants. An obvious response 
is that the Chinese state would prevent any such assertion. However, I also found little 
commitment to putative "emblems" o f ethnic identity such as the dialect. In the case of 
huju - Shanghai opera - my informants described it as "Shanghai wenhua" but also as 
inferior to Beijing opera and as appealing only to "Shanghai peasants" (nongmin) and 
"those without wenhua". This would appear to support Cohen’s assertion that without 
commitment to "the culture" there will be limited politicization (1982b: 7).
In private conversations people occasionally suggested that Shanghai would be 
more prosperous if it were independent. One academic I spoke with felt that China should 
split up into its provinces. He quoted a traditional saying: tianxia dashi, fenjiu bihe,
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hejiu bifen - "in all great matters under heaven, there is a time to unite and a time to be 
divided." He considered this necessary because "China is ossified/bloated (jianghua). 
With it being so large, the economic and political problems are too hard to deal with." 
However, he added that few acquaintances shared this idea, nor would he dare say this in 
class since students would inform the authorities and get him into trouble. A scientific 
research worker also considered it "a shame that Shanghai is not independent, it could 
overtake Hong Kong if it was." However, she considered such a development out o f the 
question, not least because Shanghai gives so much money to the central government.
I gained the impression that although national expropriations aroused resentment 
and that migrant workers could stimulate a sense of Shanghaineseness the sense o f "all 
being Chinese" was powerful enough to preclude the development o f an assertive 
regionalism in Shanghai. I found no evidence of local ethnicity taking on "the natural 
appearance of an autonomous force, a ‘principle’ capable of determining the course of 
social life" (Comaroff 1987: 313). With a local family I watched the special programme 
broadcast during the Mid-Autumn Festival. The programme included selections o f operas 
from different parts of China. As we watched, one of the family commented that the 
stories acted out in various dramas were the same all over China but that the style in 
which they are acted out differs. I suggest that this is a highly apposite analogy for the 
relationship between Chinese and Shanghainese identities.
2.4.3 Further Consequences of Intra-nation Porosity
If increasing decentralization and the influx of migrants tended to enhance a sense 
of Shanghai distinctiveness there were other consequences of the increasing porosity of 
Shanghai’s boundaries in the reform era which may pull in a different direction. 
Alongside the inflow of migrants was a broader flow of people both into and out of the 
city. For instance, with rising prosperity and reduced travel restrictions Shanghainese 
could now leave the city on business trips, as tourists or honeymooners. Some 
Shanghainese headed for "the south" (nanfang) - the frontier regions of Shenzhen and 
Guangdong, which because of their early economic liberalization had become a preferred 
destination for economic migrants from Shanghai. Two local sociology lecturers remarked 
that in the past Shanghainese were reluctant to leave Shanghai but now several o f their 
students had sought work in Shenzhen and Guangzhou. In many respects, the differences 
between Shanghai and other parts of China - especially other coastal regions - were 
becoming less distinct.
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Although many people I interviewed gave their laojia (home place) as somewhere 
out of Shanghai the degree of interaction people had with their laojia varied considerably. 
Relationships between Shanghai households and provincial relatives occurred along a scale 
from non-existent to occasional reciprocal visits - mainly at Spring Festival - to frequent, 
extensive and intensive relationships. The latter were most likely among first generation 
migrants, especially if  they were influential in some respect. In some instances the 
destruction of tombs in rural areas by Red Guards during the Cultural Revolution served 
to sever vestigial ritual links with the countryside.
With the relaxation of travel restrictions visits were much more frequent. Amongst 
one first generation migrant family in my acquaintance interaction with rural relatives in 
Anhui was intense. Along ties of relatedness flowed information, goods and people, with 
frequent visits by both maternal and paternal relatives. The father had moved to Shanghai 
in the 1950s. He maintains links with Anhuinese friends who came to Shanghai at the 
same time. He also remained embedded in a complex web of personal relationships with 
rural relations. This included frequent reciprocal visits on ritual and festive occasions, 
notably Spring Festival and funerals. Visits, with or without notice, by rural relations - 
sometimes very distantly related - were common. The motives for such visits included 
petitioning for assistance in disputes in the home village, seeking help with medical 
treatment or to gain access to Shanghai educational establishments. It was also a place 
to stay while visiting Shanghai.
The already high degree of permeability in this household across the city\rural 
boundaries had been enhanced by new technology. This family had had a private 
telephone for some years and recently an uncle in the countryside had a phone connected. 
This direct link greatly increased the possibility for contact and involvement in day to day 
family activities and disputes. It is an interesting instance of the way modem technology 
can allow "traditional" ties to be resuscitated and/or enhanced. More generally within 
China, new technologies were overcoming the "friction of distance". For instance, the 
Shanghai share market, already an important forum through which the city has rewritten 
itself into the Chinese map, has an increasingly sophisticated communications network, 
including satellites, which link up many parts of China to the Shanghai market.
The Cultural Revolution policy of sending educated youth to the countryside gave 
almost an entire generation of young Shanghainese direct experience o f rural China. 
Bonds of friendship formed in these unique and often difficult circumstances are 
particularly strong. In the entrepreneurial 1990s, contacts between former rusticated youth
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now returned to their different urban places of origin and those who remained in rural 
areas could be an extremely useful resource. In one instance a factory worker in Shanghai 
had a second job selling bulk orders of leather bags and wallets along the Russian border 
in Heilongjiang. This utilized connections made during his eleven years in Heilongjiang 
from 1967-78. It is worth adding that amongst many of the present young generation of 
Shanghainese I found an extreme degree o f ignorance about rural China. It seemed that 
for them rural China was at least as much of a "foreign country" as was metropolitan 
Shanghai for myself as an urban "outsider".
Although Shanghai is very much an urban environment the daily act of eating 
reminded people o f their link to the countryside. A retired man told me that "in China 
it takes eight peasants to support (yanghuo) two urban dwellers." I was struck by his 
conceptualization of a direct relationship between the food he consumed and the physical 
labour of farmers. This sense is in stark contrast to the overwhelming commodification 
of food buying and consumption in the West. In addition, there was a cultural stress upon 
the freshness of food, many items were b ought daily and fish, for instance, was bought 
whole and alive. People’s diet, therefore, was still largely dependent upon the rhythm of 
the seasons. It is interesting to speculate how far my informant’s lack o f alienation from 
food production is the product of years of Maoist propaganda. In the reform era, 
consumers are perhaps even more aware of the origins of their food since the reemergence 
of private markets involves them in daily interaction with peasant vendors. However, such 
direct links to the countryside and the seasons have begun to weaken in the 1990s with 
the greater availability of prepared, frozen, tinned and imported foods.
Finally, in this section, it is important to note the influence o f Canton upon 
Shanghai. Despite a distinct blurring of Hong Kong/Canton (I examine Hong Kong 
influence later), people may distinguish between Canton and Hong Kong. In the 
nineteenth century many Cantonese were attracted to Shanghai - a stereotype persists of 
the Cantonese comprador. Older informants recalled that before 1949, Cantonese ran 
businesses such as the Hualian and Wingan Stores. In 1992-4, a Cantonese presence was 
again becoming evident in Shanghai. During 1992-3 an average of ten new restaurants 
opened every day in the city. Some were run by Cantonese and many more professed to 
serve "Cantonese style food". Additionally, Cantonese breakfast eating (dianxin/dimsum) 
had become popular along with the recently acquired habit (I did not see this in 1988-90) 
o f tapping one’s fingers on the table in thanks for a drink being poured.
I heard contrasting views about Cantonese people. A young teacher stated that
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until recently Cantonese were looked down on in Shanghai. He felt that money had now 
become the main criterion for judging people’s worth, since Cantonese are rich 
Shanghainese no longer look down on them. However, a more frequently expressed view 
was that, as one university student remarked, "Cantonese are "baofahu" ("nouveaux 
riches"), they have money but no wenhua." A young Shanghai businesswoman concurred 
that Cantonese are baofahu - a term with a distinctly derogatory meaning - and added 
that, by contrast, Shanghai is an "aristocratic (guizu) society1'. Another young respondent 
felt that "Cantonese are crafty (huatou), but they defer (futie) to Shanghainese since they 
can’t rip them off (zei) like they can other people. This is because Shanghainese are sharp 
(menkanjing)."
2.5 Shanghai’s Re-intemationalization
Mao Zedong had a closed-door policy (biguan zhengce). Deng Xiaoping opened the 
window' (dakai chuangzi) and let the wind (feng)53 come in, people could see what the 
West is like.
Informant’s comment
Vigorously develop Shanghai, open up Pudong, serve the whole country, face the world" (Zhenxing Shanghai, kaifa Pudong, fuwu quan guo, mianxiang shijie!)
National Day slogan 1 Oct 199354
Nothing in the policies o f  the Deng years has been more dangerous than the attempt to 
half-open frontiers and minds.
William Jenner (1992: 94)
The increased porosity of Shanghai’s boundaries within China has been paralleled 
by a degree of opening to the outside world. In many respects the "Open Door" policy 
implemented by the Chinese state since the late 1970s is diametrically opposed to policies 
of the "closed door" and autarky pursued under Mao. China is now being integrated into 
the "world of culturally, socially, and economically interconnected and interdependent 
spaces" (Gupta & Ferguson 1992: 14). My own unsupervised visits to people’s homes 
were indicative and expressive of this change; China’s "open door" paralleled by 
households open doors. Many families told me that such visits would have been 
impossible during the Maoist era. Even until the mid-1980s few would have dared invite 
me to their homes.
MOn the diverse range o f  m eanings o f  feng, see Chapter 1 above.
54One o f  the slogans written on long red banners hanging from the old colonial buildings on the Bund 
specially  floodlit for the occasion.
147
In 1984, three hundred years after the lifting of earlier restrictions on coastal trade 
(an unnoticed anniversary), Shanghai was one of 14 coastal cities granted special 
privileges and license to engage in foreign trade. In 1992-4 Shanghai’s re- 
intemationalization gathered apace - a saleswoman commented to me that Shanghai now 
had "an international feel" (guoji de ganjue). A fashionable term frequently used as a 
metaphor for China’s reintegration into a global space was jiegui, jie meaning "to 
connect" or "join" and gui "rail, track" or "course, path". This expression indicates an 
acceptance that the Chinese state is willing, to some- extent at least, to adapt its "socialist 
road" to economic development to one where the agenda is set externally.
As part o f the process of jiegui, China has begun to make significant changes to 
its economic and legal framework. For instance, in 1993 China jieguied the Western 
accounting system and in January 1994 the dual currency system was abolished.55 
Another term used almost daily in news broadcasts was dadao guoji shuiping ("reach 
international levels") - often used of factory production quality. To jiegui in such ways 
was officially described as essential for China’s economic growth and, for instance, to 
enable China to accede to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (now the World 
Trade Organization).
Shanghai’s re-internationalization has proceeded along various fronts and has 
brought significant changes to the social, cultural, economic and physical landscapes of 
the city. Dimensions of global flow are described by Appadurai (1990) as ethnoscapes, 
mediascapes, technoscapes, finanscapes, and ideoscapes. I find this approach interesting 
but problematic. For instance, Appadurai considers that these "people, machinery, money, 
images, and ideas now follow increasingly non-isomorphic paths" (11) and these flows 
"are in fundamental disjuncture with respect to one another" (19-20). By implication, this 
suggests that there was a time when these flows were conjunctive and isomorphic - 
moreover, against what yardstick and by whom would this be judged? It also suggests 
a discrete and essential existence to features which are intrinsically entangled in practice 
and only (if then) analytically separable. The problems of lack of separability have been 
made clear in China where the state has fought hard to adopt foreign technology but avoid 
"spiritual pollution"; a battle which the Marxist ideology it claims to adhere to would
55When foreigners were first allowed to visit China in any numbers a dual currency system  was 
introduced. C hinese citizens used R enm inbi (R M B ) - "people’s money". Foreigners w ere issued with 
F oreign Exchange C ertifica tes  (FEC) w hich they had to use to pay for purchases including imported goods, 
accom m odation and transportation. C onversely, C hinese citizens w ere excluded from m aking certain 
purchases and staying in certain hotels by their lack o f  FEC. This dual currency system  gradually 
dim inished, not least, as the currency black market became ever more extensive.
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suggest is unwinnable. Bearing in mind these caveats I make some brief comments on 
Shanghai’s re-intemationalization and then focus upon two elements of global flow - 
technological and cultural/mediascapes.
2.5.1 Re-internationalizing Shanghai
A key aim of the "Open Door" policy and associated legal changes such as the first 
Joint Venture Law in 1979 has been to "involve global investors, traders and economic 
institutions in modernization" (Zhao & Womack 1994: 147). Since 1978 there have been 
moves to decentralize the economy, in accordance with the general tenet that some should 
be allowed to get rich first. Local danwei and private businesses have been granted 
greater autonomy in dealing with foreign countries. For instance, they can negotiate 
directly with foreign buyers and suppliers. Shanghai enterprises increasingly look towards 
international markets and do their best to escape the rigid, vertical hierarchy which linked 
them to ministries in Beijing. It is likely that China’s (expected) accession to the World 
Trade Organization will further this process since it will be of most advantage to coastal 
regions such as Shanghai.
In 1984 provinces were granted the right to retain 25% of their foreign exchange 
earnings and in 1985 enterprises allowed to retain 12.5% of their foreign earnings. This 
was increased to 70% for key export sectors in 1988 (see World Bank 1990). In the 
1990s state policies have sought to promote Shanghai as an international financial and 
commercial centre. Controls have been relaxed to allow freer access for foreign 
companies especially in the Pudong New District, described by a Chinese government 
spokesman as "a focal point of the country’s opening and reform drive in the 1990s."56 
Daily newspaper and television reports herald the arrival (or return) of foreign companies 
such as IBM , Volkswagen, and Pilkingtons.57 In the first five months of 1993, 1,559 
foreign-funded enterprises settled in Shanghai, making a total o f 4,848.58 An example 
of a sector opened up to foreign companies since the late 1980s is the market for 
international courier services - by late 1993 fifteen companies had opened branches in
''’"Support for Pudong N ot Expected To Waver" C D BW  26 Septem ber-2 October 1993: 4.
57The Volkswagen  joint venture plant in Shanghai was set up in 1985. In 1993 it produced 100 ,000
Santana  cars and planned to produce 150 ,000  in 1995 ("VW Set For W indfall After C hina Ruling" FT 24 
June 1994: 4 ).
Sii"Hot Spot Lures Investors" SS 4 June 1993: 2.
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Shanghai.59 The "Open Door" has allowed foreign consumer items to flood into China 
and few Shanghai households can be without some foreign-made product.
In the last chapter I noted a saleswoman’s comment that "Shanghai now has an 
international feel." Through the "open door" various foreign employees, students and 
teachers along with large numbers of foreign tourists have come to Shanghai. However, 
apart from areas near expensive hotels, foreign consulates, tourist spots such as the Yu 
Gardens and the Bund, the airport and larger university campuses, non-Chinese nationals 
were a rare site.
The living space of non-Chinese nationals was strictly controlled and mainly 
limited to university campuses, expensive hotels or specially designated housing often 
located near the airport on the outskirts of the city. Foreign enclaves such as the 
prestigious Shanghai Center on Nanjing Road can accurately be described as "self- 
contained ‘mini-cities‘" (Gaubatz 1995: 58). Even within university campuses, foreign 
students were housed in accommodation separate from Chinese students. The two types 
of currency also served to segregate Chinese and non-Chinese into different spaces. In 
anthropological terms this segregation could be viewed as a desire to keep polluting matter 
at a safe distance, an approach with many historical parallels in China. Jenner writes that 
"[n]o other state in human history has ever put as much effort into walling itself off 
physically from the outside world as did a number of Chinese dynasties" (1992: 93, also 
88-95).60 Segregation was gradually diminishing, for example, many large hotels and 
the city’s Friendship Store which originally admitted only foreigners had begun to 
welcome wealthy Shanghai citizens.
Foreign companies are now permitted to lease land in Shanghai and this has begun 
to re-internationalize parts of Shanghai’s "face". For instance, Shanghai’s main street, 
Nanjing Road, now has shops such as Benetton and Hong Kong’s Sincere store has 
returned to a site only a few doors from its former nationalized store. Further along 
Nanjing Road the Shanghai Center, designed by an American architect has an 
international style hotel, a theatre, various Hong Kong stores including a Welcome 
supermarket, and a Japanese clothes store. In addition, the foreign companies which 
formerly owned many of the large buildings along the Bund are being encouraged to
59"Time Right for Courier Companies" SS 19 N ovem ber 1993: 3.
60One attempt at containing the "uncontrollable outside world" w as the segregation o f  foreigners to an 
island in pre-Opium War Canton. This segregation even included prohibitions on foreigners learning 
Chinese.
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return.
2.5.2 Technological Flows ■
Alongside geopolitical developments and shifting national policies, technological 
advances have had a significant affect upon Shanghai’s "place" in the world. Until the 
latter part of the twentieth century distances within China and between China and the 
West could only be "bridged at great cost and sustained over time only with great effort" 
(Appadurai 1990: 1). For centuries waterways were the most rapid form of transportation. 
Before the construction o f railways a journey across China could take many months. This 
made a coastal port like Shanghai effectively closer to, say, Hong Kong and Singapore, 
than much of China’s hinterland. Even after the development of railways in the 1950s, 
a journey to Xinjiang from Shanghai still takes four days by train, to Yunnan and the 
border with Vietnam 5-7 days, to Guangzhou 36 hours and 17 hours to Beijing.61 It was 
only with the development and proliferation of aviation and telecommunications 
technologies that the spatial and temporal distances between Shanghai and other parts of 
the world and other parts of China dramatically collapsed. An elderly man reflected on 
this - he first went from Shanghai to England in 1926, a journey of 31 days by boat. In 
1948 he made the same journey by flying boat in five days. In the 1980s he flew to 
England in little over half a day.
Developments in transportation have been beneficial to Shanghainese who have 
taken the opportunity provided by the (half) open door to go abroad to work, study or for 
tourism. Similarly, since the late 1970s many families have renewed relationships with 
relatives abroad, especially in Hong Kong and Taiwan. This new mobility provides for 
knowledge and images of other places to be brought or sent back and for comparisons to 
be made of the recent history and current state of these locations and Shanghai.
Of perhaps greater significance than the physical movement of people is Shanghai’s 
reintegration into the "global space of electronic information flows" (Morley & Robins 
1989: 22). One may include here the increasing availability of international direct dial 
telephones in Shanghai which permit contacts with friends, relatives and business contacts 
abroad. In the contemporary world it is above all the development o f electronic media 
which "have irretrievably shattered the cloissoneed character of cultural barriers" (Abu-
6IA BBC World Service W orld  Business R eport on 15 June 1994, m entioned that Japanese com panies 
are holding talks in China over plans to build a "bullet train" line between B eijing and Shanghai. This 
w ould reduce the journey tim e to seven hours and increase volum e threefold.
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Lughod 1991: 135). A concomitant of this is that M[t]he media have profoundly changed 
both social relationships and perceptions of self' (Fitzgerald 1991: 194) and "that identity 
- in large part, due to media influences - loses its ‘place-defined’ quality" (201).
Short wave radios are cheap and listening to broadcasts by stations such as the 
BBC World Service and the Voice o f  America were no longer described by the Chinese 
state as "secretly listening to the enemy radio station" (touting ditai). Indeed, it was often 
encouraged by teachers as a means to improve students* English. On November 5, 1993 
many Shanghainese tuned into the VOA whilst at work to hear the results of the United 
States presidential elections. Increasing awareness of alternative systems o f government, 
which appealed to many citizens, did little to foster support for the Communist Party’s 
style of government.
With some informants news items from the Voice o f  America were a common topic 
of conversation. One man I spoke with was astonished to hear a VOA report on the arrest 
o f two Chinese dissidents in Shanghai only hours after it had happened, a story not 
reported by the local media at all. This man considered it a big advantage of the "Open 
Door" policy that the Chinese government could no longer block (lanbuzhu) news. 
However, it w'as noticeable that broadcasts from abroad in Chinese were the target of 
jamming more often than those in English. It is as though the authorities considered it 
acceptable for the English-speaking elite to hear messages deemed harmful to "the 
masses".
The intersection of changes in the economic structure and new technologies has 
begun to enable new types of spatial relationship. An instance from a Sino-German joint 
venture demonstrates the way Shanghai’s re-internationalization has loosened the old 
boundaries set by the state and permitted new possibilities for action. A worker in this 
company, which had offices in most o f China’s main cities, described how in 1991 the 
Chinese staff in all its main offices took industrial action by refusing to go on business 
trips until their wages were increased. They could organize this action because staff travel 
often, know each other well, and could readily transmit news in person or by phone.
The "colonization of leisure" (Sahin & Robinson 1981) by new technologies has 
been achieved, above all, by television. There is considerable evidence that "television 
has dramatically influenced the cultural and political consciousness of the people who live 
in urban China" (Lull 1991: 2). I discuss the impact of television and other mediascapes 
more fully below. However, both television and radio - with the important exception of 
recently introduced phone-ins - provide only a one way flow of information. Newer
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technologies such as international direct telephone dialling, fax machines and computer 
link-ups such as E-Mail locate Shanghai residents with access to the appropriate facilities 
(this is an important caveat) within an interactive global network. Electronic media of this 
type, which were unavailable to participants in previous protests, played a crucial part in 
the demonstration of Spring 1989. I was made aware of the potential power of the fax 
machine in Shanghai on the morning of June 4 (also Warner 1991: 217-22). Displayed 
on lampposts and the burnt-out buses barricading Shanghai’s streets were photographs of 
the violent suppression of the Beijing student demonstrations earlier that day which had 
been sent by fax from abroad. Since 1989, information flows have continued to expand. 
For example, in 1993 the Shanghai United Information Network began trial operations.62 
Using this network computer users can access 500,000 Chinese characters of information 
covering fifteen categories including stock market, real estate, trade and international 
affairs.
Shanghai’s integration into global electronic networks seems set to continue not 
least because the rapidly growing telecommunications sector is now Shanghai’s second 
largest industry. A China Daily article described Shanghai as China’s "capital of 
telecoms" with the output value from its telecommunications’ industries - including digital 
phone exchanges, fax machines and fibre optic communications equipment - totalling 
$597.5m in 1992.63 It is relatively easy to control the flow of people and hard copy such 
as books and newspapers but the circulation of electronic products is much harder for 
nation states to control.64
The full implications o f these developing technologies are uncertain even in the 
countries where they were first developed. However, it is clear that they create a dilemma 
for the Chinese party-state, as Tony Saich comments of the CCP elite, "[ijronically, they 
have the un-Marxist view that change in the economic base does not imply change in the 
political superstructure" (1989: 49). The state actively promotes "modernization" - this
“ "Network Wires Econom ic News" SS 19 N ovem ber 1993: 3.
“ "Shanghai is N ow  Capital o f  Telecom s" CD 6 May 1993: 1. A ccording to the local press "[t]he State 
has decided to turn Shanghai into the largest fax machine technology developm ent centre in China" 
("Venture Advances With Fax" SS 10 December 1993: 3). This article describes the recently set-up  
Shanghai R icoh Fax M achine C om pany  - a joint venture between Shanghai, H ong Kong and Japanese 
com panies which is expected to produce 400 ,000  fax machines in 1996.
64In 1992, when I flew  into Shanghai from Hong Kong passengers w ere requested, before touchdown, 
to return the H ong Kong newspapers which had been handed out on the flight. H ow ever, various foreign  
newspapers and m agazines are sold at select outlets - such as expensive hotels - within China. According  
to a Financial Tim es report BBC  journalists in China are currently "subjected to restrictions on their freedom  
o f  movement" and BBC  programmers denied visas ("BBC Feels Chill From China" 23 May 1994: 4).
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includes importing the latest communications technologies, whilst attempting to control 
the information it transmits. Experiences in the West with, for example, transnational 
computer viruses, computer hackers and digitally-transmitted pornography provide an 
indication (and an analogy) for what the Chinese authorities will increasingly face. 
Moreover, it is often the young who can manipulate these machines whilst their elders 
may not even realise their potential. An informant’s comment (itself borrowed from 
another cultural heritage) on the impact of the "Open Door" and the reform policies in 
general seems especially pertinent: "When you remove the cork from the bottle the genie 
flies out. One cannot put him back into the bottle again."
2.5.3 Cultural/Mediascapes
Because there is such a proliferation o f  messages from everywhere in the media, 
postmodern culture is characterized by a multiplicity o f  perspectives and voices. It is a 
thing o f  shreds and patches.
Ulf Hannerz (1992: 34)
There was abundant evidence of Shanghai’s growing cultural re­
internationalization. Most universities had some foreign students and one or more foreign 
teachers. Foreign-funded schools had been set up (for foreign children) and there were 
plans for an American university to establish a campus in Pudong.65 An International 
Cultural Exchange Organization, the first of several which describe themselves as non­
governmental, was set up in 1986. In November 1992, the Shanghai Star, the city’s first 
post-1949 English-language newspaper began publication, at first weekly and since early 
1994 twice weekly. In the theatre too there was a re-engagement with the outside world. 
For instance, I saw a stage version of the Joy Luck Club by the American Chinese writer 
Amy Tan - a co-production with an American theatre company.
Perry Link describes a "post-Mao rush to explore the outside" (1989: 29). Several 
informants recalled, for instance, the excitement with which they had queued to buy and 
devour each newly translated Western book in the early 1980s. Alongside and 
contributing to a general proliferation of popular media and a commercialization o f culture 
since the death of Mao there has been a huge growth in the import o f popular cultural 
items. These items include music, literature, television shows, films, advertisements and 
fashions. Diverse foreign books and magazines have been translated, although many 
controversial works were prohibited and available only to those with "connections". Also 
popular were books and articles by Chinese migrants which describe foreign countries and
“ "Schooling Aimed At Moneyed Classes" CD 18 May 1993: 3.
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their life abroad. Imported music pervaded the now numerous discotheques and karaoke 
in Shanghai.66 On my university campus the loudspeaker system, which would once 
have been devoted to political messages and exhortations, broadcast a daily lunchtime diet 
of music by Western bands such as U2, Pink Floyd and the Beatles. A favourite radio 
programme of many young people was a Sunday morning broadcast o f popular music 
hosted by a disc jockey from Scotland.
Although many popular cultural imports were from the West it was gangtai (Hong 
Kong and Taiwan) popular culture which was especially pervasive. Until recently, all 
over China Shanghainese products were considered the most fashionable goods. This 
preeminence has largely been ceded to gangtai imports and "[fjashions, hairstyles, 
consumer items, interior decorating, lifestyles, cuisine and even language increasingly 
began to emulate the south" (Barme 1992: 13.23). This influx was affecting the Shanghai 
dialect, for instance, the Cantonese terms da paidang (street food stall), da di (call a taxi), 
tso hiu hu (chao you yu) (get the sack - literally "stir fried octopus"), and xiaosa (with 
style, carefree) were coming into common use. Each of these terms could be construed 
as having a synecdochal valency, for example, da paidang indicates the reemergence of 
small-scale private enterprise, da di the rise of a new moneyed class, tso hiu hu the end 
of job security and xiaosa the new importance of fashion and the rise of individualism and 
even hedonism.
Of all the various cultural phenomena, television beamed into the heart o f people’s 
homes, is perhaps the key channel of the cultural re-internationalization of Shanghai.67 
Television is a key medium in the "mediazation of modern culture" (Thompson 1990: 3) 
which enables individuals "to participate in a realm of social experience which is no 
longer restricted by the sharing of a common locale" (17-18). I consider that the rapid 
growth of televisual media in Shanghai and the re-internationalization of its images has 
had a profound effect upon residents’ perceptions of their city and the world around them. 
In significant ways, electronic media and above all television, as the dominant cultural 
medium, re-sites and re-places individuals in new types of relationship to their own 
society.
U lf Hannerz (1992: 223-4) raises the question whether global cultural flow leads
“ Few PRC m usicians appealed to young people. The best known PRC rock musician Cui Jian appears 
to be more popular in the W est than in China itse lf (see Chong 1991 on the them es addressed in Cui Jian’s 
music).
“ Lull has conducted research on television  "audiences" in China (1988 , 1990, 1991).
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to global homogenization or to increasing cultural diversity and the building up of national 
identities. I suggest that the consequences o f proliferating media images are highly 
ambiguous. They can contribute to and construct both national and Shanghainese 
identities, they can also contribute to the deconstruction or renegotiation of these identities 
as well as providing "raw material" for the construction of other forms of identities. It 
is to these overlapping and, at times, conflicting potentialities that I now turn.
Benedict Anderson (1983: 39-40) describes the act of reading newspapers as 
creating a certainty of the existence of an imagined community amongst its readers. 
Drawing upon this approach Hartley argues that television is "one of the prime sites upon 
which a given nation is constructed for its members" (1987: 124). Television penetration 
in Shanghai is almost complete, all the families I visited had at least one television. With 
the lack of alternative leisure pursuits, poor public transport and limited free time it was 
evident that Chinese television "diffuses its messages into the culture in a way that has 
no parallels" (Lull 1990: 145); the most common evening occupation of most of my 
informants was watching television at home.
There was ample evidence of Chinese television’s role in constructing an imagined 
Chinese nation. For instance, there was frequent repetition by television presenters of 
such phrases as "the ancestral land" (zuguo) or "our China" (women Zhongguo). These 
may be regarded as a constant reaffirmation that the speaker and listeners belong to a 
single homogenous community of Chinese people, all are members of the Chinese nation, 
literally the "nation-family" (guojia). Media representations contribute to collective 
knowledges, creating "a cultural resource shared by millions" (Scannell 1988: 22). A 
programme such as the variety show broadcast from Beijing on China Central Television 
Station on Spring Festival eve attracts an audience of hundreds of millions. It is an 
important site - a contemporary ritual of sorts - which provides its viewers with "the 
temporal authentication of their existence as members of a synchronized national 
community" (Morley & Silverstone 1990: 42).68 Both the content of the programme and, 
arguably of more importance, the shared belief that all over China others are watching this 
same programme and participating in this Chinese festival may be regarded as supporting 
the view of television’s role in the construction of the imagined community of the "nation- 
family". The Chinese state actively engages in such a project; festive programmes have 
a lengthy build-up and each year attempts are made to make them more lavish and
b8ln 1986, 566 m illion people watched this show , 96% o f  the possib le number o f  view ers (Li 1991: 
342). Joe Cannon (1991) has a description o f  this programme.
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spectacular.
John Thompson (1990: 16-7, 246-8) argues that for political leaders broadcast 
media have the potential for enormous opportunities and unprecedented risks. Skilful 
politicians who successfully master "the art of managing visibility" can exploit this by, for 
instance, fireside chats and local walkabouts whilst danger lies in emotional outbursts and 
impromptu remarks. As yet no Chinese political leader has tried to use "the artificial 
intimacy of the television or radio" (Jenner 1992: 184). Lucian Pye attributes Deng 
Xiaoping’s limited use of television to the way that in China "omnipotence lies in the 
mystery which invisibility evokes" (1993: 415). The possibilities o f "the most powerful 
technology yet invented for mobilizing popular opinion" were dramatically demonstrated 
by his brief public appearance at Spring Festival 1992, an "act which electrified the whole 
country" (Ibid: 414). In subsequent years his television appearance at Spring Festival 
become an annual ritual - in part, to assure citizens that he was still alive.69 An 
important part of this contemporary iconographic ritual was the physical location of these 
"appearances". In the early 1990s, Deng chose Shanghai and Shenzhen, thereby endorsing 
the reform policies and focusing the national gaze upon events in these places.70
Other political leaders appeared more frequently but rarely in live broadcasts. 
Many were distinctly "media unfriendly" and their appearances could leave them open to 
ridicule. For instance, many Shanghai government officials spoke extremely poor 
putonghua. At least some informants took this as indicative of their lack of education 
(and hence unsuitability for their government roles). Another instance of this occurred 
during the live broadcast of the 1993 East Asian Games opening ceremony. A leading 
Shanghai official made a speech in which he inadvertently and without apparently noticing 
welcomed the "guaibin " (strange guests) instead of "guibin " (honoured guests)! I 
watched this programme with a large family group - many people had been given the day 
off and told to stay indoors - who all burst into laughter at this error.
Television images may re-orientate viewers’ perceptions of their community in 
unexpected ways. In Britain recently I watched a documentary on Mao Zedong with a 
Chinese citizen. My friend had grown up in Shanghai surrounded by images of Mao but 
found it remarkable to see him moving. In China, portrayals of the Great Helmsman had 
always been static, an all-seeing, omnipresent icon. A moving Mao was not only
“ In 1995, D eng failed to appear, fostering speculation over his failing health.
70"Deng Says To ‘Seize The C hance’" C D  25 January 1993: 1.
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unfamiliar but reduced in stature, a human figure with human frailties.
During the 1989 student demonstrations television’s role in constructing a national 
imagined community and the potential dangers in this for the Party were abundantly clear. 
Television images such as the film of hunger strikers on Tiananmen Square and the 
meeting between Li Peng and student representatives made a big impact upon 
Shanghainese and fuelled a sense of involvement in a national event. Furthermore, "mass 
communications allowed localities across China to pattern their protests closely on that 
o f Beijing" (Unger 1991: 3). One may find evidence here for the media’s role in 
constructing a national community. However, the plurality of communities which are 
"imagined" may be quite different from the one the state intends. In the months after June 
4 there was a daily diet of programmes designed to convey the message that the 
demonstrations had been "counter-revolutionary turmoil". Some people I spoke with did 
accept this message, however, many did not.
It is particularly hard for the Chinese state to inculcate its message when many of 
the "audience" are sceptical or indifferent. Recent developments such as the proliferation 
of channels, satellite television and devices such as VCRs, which permit "time shifting" 
of programmes and the possibility to buy or rent materials, all tend to foster a more 
fragmented social world than that o f traditional national broadcast television. Above all, 
in an increasingly competitive cultural market place with many alternative and divergent 
images, it is difficult for the state to "sell" its message. State propaganda officials face 
an uphill task; they are pulled by commercial logic to produce, for instance, comic 
routines which stick to the "official line" and are funny. It is to an exploration of these 
recent developments that I now turn.
An especially ambiguous aspect of electronic media is its ability to "transgress 
national boundaries" (Hartley 1987: 124). In Europe, Hartley argues that this occurs in 
three main ways: the broadcast of programmes such as the Olympics and "aid shows"; 
transnational ownership and control of production and distribution; international sales of 
programmes. In Shanghai the broadcasting of "global events" had certainly begun to 
transgress China’s national boundaries. However, as consideration of Hartley’s example 
of the Olympics suggests the impact of this is ambiguous. Such events may well bolster 
the national imagined community; the Chinese government places great stress upon sports 
events and the achievement of national success in them. Conversely, events such as the 
July 1985 Live Aid concert which was screened to one billion viewers in 150 countries 
including China may appeal to "the ability to feel affinities across national, ethnic and
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cultural divisions, to imagine a community beyond the boundaries of the known" (Hebdige 
1988: 219, also 216-22).
Political controls still prevent transnational ownership within China. However, 
there is considerable screening of foreign-made programmes. A young businesswoman 
described the introduction of such programmes as a clear indication o f the success of the 
kaifang policy.71 Stuart Hall (1991) describes global mass culture as "dominated by the 
image which crosses and recrosses linguistic frontiers" (27). Where Cultural Revolution 
China had a limited range of images the reform era has ushered in a vast increase in the 
range, availability and divergence of images. Several informants told me that when 
images of the West were first shown in Shanghai in the early 1980s they had been 
surprised by China’s low standard of living in comparison to Western countries - a finding 
which supports Chan’s statement that when foreign films and programmes began to be 
shown again in China "most Chinese people were dismayed by the glaring disparities in 
living standards" (1994: 98). For years they had been told that they were much better off 
than workers in the capitalist West. A party member told me that "it came as a shock 
when we suddenly saw that the West was far more advanced (xianjin) than we had ever 
imagined." People noted discrepancies between the style, genre and content of foreign 
and the Chinese media. Images of the West which were clearly at odds with official 
pronouncements contributed to an undermining of the Party’s credibility at the same time 
as providing alternative images of how things were or could be. A middle school teacher 
told me that students had demonstrated in 1989 because of changes brought about by 
gaige kaifang. Above all, she believed, "before the reforms people heard nothing 
(tingbujian) and saw nothing (kanbujian) about the outside world (waimian). Now they 
could compare with the rest of the world and see China’s true state."
The extent to which foreign ideas and genres now influence Chinese programmes 
is also extremely significant. The influential and controversial Heshang series was an 
obvious instance of this. The series format drew heavily upon Western television 
documentary styles. In addition, the script referred to an extensive range of Western ideas 
which could formerly not have been voiced - Marx, of course, had been an exception - 
and used them to analyze China’s current situation. Su Xiaokang, a co-producer of 
Heshang, points out that some of the key theorists referred to in the series are Marx, 
Hegel, Toynbee, Joseph Needham, H.G. Wells and Francis Bacon (1991: 292-3).
’ 'A ccording to Li (1991: 345), China C en tra l Television S tation  first used a live satellite broadcast for 
the 1978 football World Cup. From April 1980, CCTV began to receive daily foreign new s by satellite.
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More generally, global communications systems "lay an abstract space over and 
across territorial configurations" which renders the very idea of boundary, such as the 
frontier of the nation state problematical (Morley & Robins 1989: 23). In Shanghai, for 
instance, the number of television satellite dishes was increasing. These enabled viewers 
to watch, for example, broadcasts of Star Television from Hong Kong. Satellite television 
was common in expensive hotels. I also saw one in a Taiwanese-owned company, a 
newspaper office and a private home, even though it was supposedly illegal for the latter 
to install satellite dishes. Satellite television was subject to other indirect restrictions. For 
instance, Star Television has sought to safeguard its access to the PRC market by reducing 
the sex and violence content of its broadcasts and reducing news coverage. These moves 
included Star dropping BBC World Television from its broadcasts following the Chinese 
government’s criticism of BBC programmes deemed critical of the regime. In a recent 
television documentary an executive of Star commented wryly that in China "no news is 
good news".72
The demonstrations of May-June 1989 provided ample evidence of the way in 
which television "enables individuals to experience events which take place in locales that 
are spatially and temporally remote, and this experience may in turn inform or stimulate 
forms of action or response on the part of recipients" (Thompson 1990: 17). James 
Watson suggests that foreign networks’ satellite broadcasts made an international media 
event out of "small-scale demonstrations" in 1989 and that this created a very serious 
political crisis (1992: 68). Although this may neglect the efficiency of informal networks 
in conveying information it is undoubtedly the case that "[t]he media loop between China 
and the West was unprecedented" (Wark 1993: 140). The demonstrators were often aware 
that their political drama had a global audience and at times played their role 
accordingly.73 The style o f the demonstrations was clearly affected by foreign symbols - 
Shanghai students had their own "Goddess of Liberty", wore headbands with slogans on 
them and banners often had slogans in English (see Watson 1992: 79-80 and Wark 1993 
for Beijing examples). This was clearly an attempt to appeal to an international television 
audience. Theorists such as Joshua Meyrowitz would take this as evidence that electronic 
media have "homogenized places and experiences" (1985: viii). The replication of the
72"The W hole World in His Hands: A Speculative Report on the Future o f  Rupert Murdoch" broadcast 
on BBC 2, 20 February 1995.
73A s Wark points out this "global positive feedback loop" also included the C CPs c lo se  scrutiny o f  
broadcasts show n in the W est during its collection  o f  evidence in the post-June 4 round-up o f  participants 
(1993: 140).
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same images and products in different places may give this appearance, but 1 would argue 
that the way they are appropriated, understood, and the effects they have may vary 
enormously. For instance, I suspect that students calling for "democracy" during 
demonstrations in 1989 did not wish to enfranchise China’s rural population . As Cohen 
points out, to take the apparent homogeneity o f imported symbols at face value ignores 
"the indigenous creativity with which communities work on externally imposed change" 
(1985: 37).
If television images are ambiguous for Chinese identities, then what of 
Shanghainese identities? Is there any evidence of a strengthening of local identities, the 
"recreation, the reconstruction of imaginary, knowable places in the face of the global 
post-modern" (Hall 1991: 35)? Presenters on Shanghai Television Station and the recently 
set up Oriental Television Station frequently spoke of "women Shanghai" - "our 
Shanghai". This constant reference can be regarded as a means of both creating and/or 
reinforcing a sense (or senses) of being Shanghainese.
With the increasing mediazation of Shanghai the local dialect had begun to achieve 
rather more prominence. This was especially apparent with the post-1991 proliferation 
of radio phone-ins and live television programmes. These programmes were 
predominantly devoted to consumer issues and local (non-professional) participants 
frequently used the dialect. Such developments seem to bear out William Jenner’s 
prediction that with a fragmentation of "imperial absolutism" there will be greater cultural 
and local linguistic autonomy within China (1992: 235-6). It may also be, as Jenner 
suggests, that this presages the strengthening of local identities and loyalties.
During 1992-4 popular imported television programmes included an American 
comedy serial Growing Pains, a British comedy serial Some Mothers Do ‘Ave 'Em and 
weekly screening of a British football match. In popular representations "foreigner" 
(waiguoren) was a term used primarily to describe European, American or Australasian 
Caucasians. Television programmes and advertisements often included a foreigner. There 
seemed to be a conflation and concordance of the terms "foreign" (waiguo), "West" 
(xifang) and "modern" (xiandai).74 The presence of foreigners seemed to be 
metonymical for modernity. An informant also suggested that the Chinese authorities 
show' foreigners on Chinese television to demonstrate that China has foreign friends and 
international prestige (guoji weixin).
74This is clearly not a new phenom enon. Bergere writes that in early twentieth century Shanghai 
”[m ]odernism  was equated with Westernism" (1989: 48).
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As with other cultural products gangtai influence was especially pervasive, with 
many imported serials and advertisements. Locally made television programmes 
increasingly copied gangtai formula. Gangtai popular culture "provides a model of a 
modern Chinese life-style and a new language that breaks the hegemonic lock of 
Communist Newspeak" (Gold 1993a: 925).
Some Chinese economists use the term "greater Chinese economic circle" (da 
Zhonghua jingji quan), including the People’s Republic, Taiwan, Macau and Hong 
Kong. In the media, overseas Chinese (huaqiao and huayi) were generally represented 
as "insiders" (nei) but to an extent straddle the "inside/outside" (nei-wai) divide. During 
the reform period the Chinese state has made a particular effort to reconstruct relationships 
between mainland and overseas Chinese in an attempt to attract investment. Investment 
by overseas Chinese has been crucial to construction throughout the coastal region of 
China. From an ideological standpoint the involvement of overseas Chinese is less 
problematic than that of "foreigners"; the state has a vested interest in stressing their 
"Chineseness".
The Chinese media often applauded the positive role of overseas Chinese in 
China’s current reconstruction. On the evening of the Mid-Autumn Festival a special 
China Central Television Station programme was broadcast which had an audience of 
hundreds of millions. The presenters made frequent reference to Taiwan, Singapore and 
Hong Kong "friends". Acts were included from these places and the presenters stressed 
that "we are all children of the dragon" (women doii shi long de erzi); a description 
which emphasises common ancestry and hints at China’s desire to emulate the economic 
success of the "Four Little Dragons" - South Korea, Singapore, Hong Kong and Taiwan. 
It was notable that Shanghai’s recently set up Oriental Television Station had a separate 
section on its news devoted to events in Hong Kong.
Tom Gold argues that the largely one-way flows of cultural imports from 
"peripheral China" are "redefining the essence of what it means to be a "modern" Chinese" 
(1993a: 907). In the case of Shanghai I agree with this to an extent but with certain 
reservations. Firstly, I would add that it also contributes to notions of being a "modern" 
Shanghainese. I gained the strong impression that Shanghai citizens often felt a closer 
cultural affinity to Chinese compatriots in Hong Kong or New York than rural 
mainlanders. When talking about Shanghai, for instance, they often compared it to these 
two cities and never to cities such as Bombay or Jakarta which an outside observer may 
consider more apposite. Secondly, there is a sense in which this is a "recreation of a
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global Chinese culture" which was disrupted in 1949 (Harding 1993b: 673). Watson 
(1992) also argues that this is a new sense of cultural identity which has been created by 
such phenomena as global media. However, it is clear that from the last century treaty 
port cities such as Shanghai, Canton and Hong Kong "shared analogous and specific 
cultures and economies" and had more in common with other overseas Chinese 
communities than rural inland provinces (Bergere 1989: 28, 43). I suggest that the re- 
intemationalization o f Shanghai has reactivated these ties and that electronic media 
actively facilitate this process. As Gold points out, since it was Shanghai refugees who 
pioneered the Taiwan and Hong Kong entertainment industries, "[o]ne could argue that 
the spread of Gangtai popular culture on the mainland now represents a return of Shanghai 
culture" (1993a: 909 note 6).
A third reservation is to suggest that the influence of gangtai culture can be 
exaggerated. Unlike other major growth centres in China, such as Guangdong, Shanghai 
has a wide spread of foreign trading partners and sources of foreign investment (Jacobs 
& Hong 1994: 244-6). In the same way as Shanghai is not tied economically to any 
single region, so I found that its residents would "pick and mix" from the desirable aspects 
of many different places. I often heard rather condescending views expressed towards 
such "upstarts" as Hong Kong, Taiwan and Singapore. In addition, the notion that 
overseas Chinese are "insiders" (nei) was far from universal. I often heard people 
complain that land in Shanghai was being "sold/rented to foreigners" (mai/zugei 
waiguoren).75 In many cases this land was being rented to overseas Chinese from 
Taiwan or Hong Kong. I noted above the appeal of New York, this was not solely for 
the Chinese diaspora there but a more general attraction to New York as an appropriate 
metropolitan model. During 1993, an extremely popular television series was "Beijinger 
in New York",76 the first full-length Chinese-made television drama filmed on location 
in the West. Although featuring Beijingers, the New York setting may have had a special 
resonance in Shanghai, where residents sometimes described their city as similar to New 
York, considering both cities of immigrants. The development o f such programmes also 
indicates the way in which cultural boundaries in coastal cities such as Shanghai 
increasingly "crisscross each other to form interlocking networks in which there is no
75It is interesting to speculate how ordinary people perceived overseas C hinese during the M aoist period  
when political pressure made them outsiders.
7tlThis tw enty episode series was based on the book o f  the same name, B eijingren Zai N iu vu e  (G len  
Cao 1993). The author migrated to the US in 1981.
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single center" (Lee 1991: 225).
Having explored the contribution of mediascapes to the sustenance, creation, 
redefinition and/or deconstruction of an "imagined community" of Chinese and/or of 
Shanghainese, it is important to demonstrate ways in which mediascapes enable many 
other potentialities. It seems necessary to inject a greater degree o f complexity to the 
notion of a single monolithic entity which Anderson’s notion of an imagined community 
seems to posit. Self identification with various, potentially mutually antagonistic, 
imagined communities is possible. These identities can be conceptualized as akin to 
transparencies of varying density, hue and content layered one upon the other. I am 
drawn to the work of Arjun Appadurai (1991) who focuses upon the importance o f the 
imaginary in "imagined communities". It seems a reasonable assumption that "the 
imagination has now acquired a singular new part in social life", above all, as a result of 
mass media images "which present a rich, ever-changing store of possible lives" 
(Appadurai 1991: 197). In image rich Shanghai "ordinary lives today are increasingly 
powered not only by the givenness of things but by the possibilities that the media (either 
directly or indirectly) suggest are available" (200).
The proliferation of media addressed to different audiences at different times and 
places provides the potential for diverse imagined communities. Alongside membership 
o f an imagined community of Chinese people and/or Shanghainese, the same participant 
could also be part of an imagined community, for example, o f film fans (the live Oscars), 
international football fans (watching British football matches) or old people (reading 
Shanghai Old People’s Newspaper - Shanghai Lao Nian Bao). Shanghai radio had 
hourly updates of share prices on the Shanghai exchange and the major markets around 
the world. This could be regarded as contributing to the construction of a community of 
Shanghainese share dealers and/or members of a global share market.
In early 1990s Shanghai the "images, ideas, and opportunities that have come from 
elsewhere" (Appadurai 1991: 199) included those provided via the reintroduction and rapid 
growth of increasingly sophisticated advertising. This played an important role in 
fostering aspirational identities. Many television programmes, especially at peak times, 
were framed an d . interspersed by advertisements for imported products such as 
Marlborough cigarettes, Hitachi video recorders, Colgate toothpaste and Omo washing 
powder - the latter a direct translation of a British advert from the 1960s. In some cases 
the rights to screen highly popular and therefore expensive (usually American) films and 
series were sold cheaply to Shanghai television stations on the condition that adjacent
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advertising slots were filled by advertisements o f their choosing. As advertisers begin to 
target specific audiences this provides material for the construction of imagined 
communities of consumer identities - for instance, of Nike wearers or Marlborough 
smokers - and reinforces differences between groups.
To posit the potentiality for diverse imagined communities does not, of course, tell 
us the extent to which an individual "buys into" any particular community or communities 
- we cannot simply read this from the content. For instance, although the front page of 
Xinmin Wanbao generally replicated that of the main national papers, many people told 
me that they "never read the front page". Additionally, like Andrew Nathan, I found 
many "decipherers and skeptics" who when viewing Chinese media "often reached 
conclusions opposite from those intended for them" (1986: 180).77 Belonging is 
multifaceted and subject to flux. Electronic media’s role in forming, sustaining and 
recreating identities is complex. As Peter Dahlgren found with television news, even this 
single mode of broadcasting "facilitates a plurality of subjectivities which can become 
mobilized in different settings" (297-8). Taking television viewing as an analogy for 
identity, sometimes one is thoroughly captivated by a single programme, at other times 
one is torn between different channels, a remote control can be used to zap from channel 
to channel, one’s attention may drift on and off a programme, people may talk over or 
engage in some other activity whilst it is on. The latter was very much the case when I 
watched the Spring Festival Variety Programme with a Shanghainese family. It was 
evident that the family being together inside their flat sharing a meal was the important 
core of this ritual.
Often the appeal of gangtai culture was its stress upon individual emotion, fun and 
relaxation (Gold 1993a: 913-4). In this way "it helps to carve out a private sphere" and 
"institutionalizes the zone of indifference" (924). For instance, when I asked informants 
about the appeal of karaoke I was invariably told that it gave people an opportunity to 
fahui - to give full rein to their feelings. Shanghai’s numerous bars and discos are 
important sites for re-creation. With the more luxuriant replicating exotic locations 
elsewhere (ancient Egypt at one) they are fine examples of "the unyoking of imagination 
from place" (Appadurai 1991: 202).
China’s largest disco, JJ’s, opened on Shanghai’s Yanan Road in 1992. JJ’s has
771 am not arguing that this dim inishes the notion o f  the im agined com m unity. People may violently  
disagree with official statements because they are incom patible with their ow n conception o f  the relevant 
imagined com m unity.
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room for 1,000 people - in Asia only a disco in Tokyo is larger - and was set up by an 
American overseas Chinese. The lasers, stroboscopes, video displays, music and disc 
jockeys were all imported. One fan commented that JJ’s was an example of something 
good which had come out of the kaifang policy, adding that previously in Shanghai the 
only modern discos were in tourist hotels which required FEC for the entrance fee. By 
contrast, JJ’s was open to "ordinary Shanghai people" because one could also pay in 
Renminbi. However, the entrance fee (27 FEC or 32 RMB) made it the domain of the 
relatively affluent such as joint venture employees or business people. Moreover, like 
many other cultural imports its appeal was almost exclusively to the young. These new 
cultural phenomena (fashion was another) served to create and contribute to a growing 
cultural divide between young and old - the authorities being firmly in the latter camp. 
Visits by popular singers from Taiwan and Hong Kong also attracted the relatively 
affluent young. A new word - fashaoyou (literally "fevered friends") - had been 
introduced from Hong Kong to describe the behaviour of fervent fans. Fans paid touts 
up to 400¥ for tickets originally priced at 100¥, behaviour which provoked 
incomprehension among older generations. By contrast, at performances o f Shanghai 
opera (huju) - where audiences tended to be elderly - tickets priced at 10¥ could often be 
bought for just 2¥.
Significantly, the term daigou - "generation gap" - is a direct translation from 
English. It was clear to me that a new youth culture was emerging and this supports 
evidence of value change among post-Mao youth that Stanley Rosen (1989) found in 
survey data. Dick Hebdige (1988) argues that for British working class youth in the 
1950s and 1960s American and Italian products provided a space in which oppositional 
meanings to the dominant traditions of British culture could be negotiated and expressed. 
For these young people American popular culture "offer[ed] a rich iconography, a set of 
symbols, objects and artefacts which [could] be assembled and re-assembled by different 
groups in a literally limitless number of combinations" (Ibid: 74). Similarly, the emergent 
youth culture of contemporary Shanghai youngsters appropriated commodities especially 
from America and Hong Kong "to mark out aspirational differences in the social domain 
through the invocation of an exotic elsewhere" (Ibid: 9).
It would, however, be overly simplistic to consider venues such as JJ’s and karaoke 
bars as indicating solely a generational cultural divide. Many people considered these 
locations as sites of prostitution. High Party officials were widely believed to make 
money from such entertainment centres. An article in Shanghai’s mass circulation
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Xinm in W anbao hinted at the existence o f high level backing for karaoke bars where 
sexual services and extortion took place.78 The absence of follow-up articles suggests 
that it touched a raw nerve.
2.5.4 Spatial Mobility/Sociological Differentiation
Much more could be said on the impact of Shanghai’s re-intemationalization and 
the intersection of spatial mobility and sociological differentiation. Before concluding this 
chapter it may be helpful to provide a few instances of this.
Joint venture and foreign owned companies offered new employment opportunities 
to (mainly) young, well educated Shanghainese residents. The economic and social 
position of employees in these companies was generally quite different to those for 
employees within state danwei. For example, foreign funded ventures did not usually 
provide housing for employees, nor did they have official Communist party structures 
within them. The need to mediate between foreigners and Chinese has allowed for a 
revival of the old role of comprador. A businesswoman in a trading joint venture 
company described her role to me as a maiban - a comprador. Although this term was 
not generally used, this occupation is returning to Shanghai in practice if not in name.
Often considerable status was attached to those who have studied abroad. To have 
been a "student abroad" (liuxuesheng) is an identification one keeps for life. An 
academic told me that students considered it "glorious" (guangcai) to obtain the gilding 
of having studied abroad (chuguo dujin - literally "the gold plating which comes from 
having been abroad." A dictionary definition says of dujin "get gilded - formerly said of 
students who went abroad to study in order to enhance their social status" CED 1988: 
167). He added that a PhD gained abroad - a yang boshi - is considered more valuable 
(zhiqian) than a Chinese PhD - tu boshi. This is the re-creation o f a social strata familiar 
in pre-1949 China and which was immortalized in Qian Zhongshu’s (1947) satirical novel 
Fortress Besieged which depicts the life of Chinese students who studied abroad in the 
1930s.79
So many people have gone abroad that a term has been coined to describe "left 
behind women" (liushou nushi). In 1991, a play performed in Shanghai used this 
expression as its title "Liushou Nushi". Those who have worked abroad and returned to
7s"Ye C huan KTV" (N ighttim e V isit to KTV) X M W B 9 July 1993: 13.
7yIn 1916 Mary Gam ewell described how "[yjoung men back from years o f  study in A m erica or Europe, 
and there are many o f  them in Shanghai, wear foreign clothes and look w ell in them" (160).
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Shanghai formed a part o f the nouveaux riches in Shanghai. A local stereotype was that 
they can place the savings of two or three years work in Japan in the bank and live off 
the interest (chi lixi - literally "eat the interest"). A fictional account Shanghai’s New 
Aristocrats focuses upon characters of this type.80
Overseas tourism was a possibility for Shanghai’s newly rich and official 
delegations also had greater opportunities to go abroad. In London, for instance, I 
recently met a party o f share dealers from Shanghai. A popular view was that such 
"perks" were one of the ways in which the "open door" provided new scope for corruption 
and official largesse.
Some Shanghainese sought to acquire a foreign passport. A young businesswoman 
I met hoped to become an overseas Chinese in this way, although it was not her intention 
to live abroad. She explained that a foreign passport would improve her status (shenfen) 
within China. For example, it would entitle her to buy soft sleeper train tickets - these 
were officially reserved for those with the rank of section chief (chuzhang) or above and 
foreigners. It would also allow her greater freedom (ziyou) to come and go from China 
and within China - tax evasion was also a part of this freedom.
These instances provide an indication of some of the further consequences of 
Shanghai’s re-internationalization for social differentiation within the city. Brief as they 
are, they highlight the new realms and layers o f complexity which Shanghai’s 
reintegration into the global economy has already begun to produce in the daily lives of 
its citizens.
Concluding Remarks
In this chapter I hope to have given an ethnographic portrayal of the increasing 
porosity of Shanghai’s boundaries both to global and intra-national flows. The 
consequences of the shifts away from the pre-1980s model of autarchy, cellular, 
honeycomb and limited horizontal linkages for identities in Shanghai are extremely 
ambiguous. There is evidence to support those who anticipate "forces within 
modernization that sustain and even encourage ethnicity’s growth" (Burgess 1978: 278-9). 
However, there are also countervailing tendencies which fracture and deterritorialize 
identities. I have demonstrated ways in which these horizontal integrations have helped 
to sustain, redefine and/or deconstruct imagined Chinese and Shanghainese identities. 
Additionally, I have shown that identities in Shanghai are multiple and context-influenced.
80Sh an ghai Xin Guizu Fan Xiangda (1992).
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In the case of senses of "being Shanghainese" I have shown that there is 
considerable vitality to such identifications. The decentralization o f economic and 
political powers, central government expropriations and, above all, the influx of rural 
migrants all provide the potential for distinctive and assertive Shanghainese identities to 
develop. Although this could provide the basis for a more overtly political assertion of 
regional "voices" I found little evidence of this.
I have demonstrated the extent to which Shanghai citizens engage in 
"orientalizing". The delineation of various regional stereotypes expressed by Shanghai 
residents provided a "mirror" for self definitions of "being Shanghainese". My findings 
clearly demonstrate that regional identities contribute to "different meanings of being 
Chinese" (Siu 1993: 19). The senses of "being Shanghainese" are an example of the way 
local experience mediates national identity (Cohen 1982b: 13). However, I also gained 
an overwhelming sense that Shanghainese identities were not oppositional to concurrent 
identification as "Chinese". Indeed, an indispensable component of "being Shanghainese" 
was to "be Chinese". On this part of the China coast, and I suspect elsewhere in China, 
"multiple identities exist which are mutually reinforcing" (White & Cheng 1993: 190). 
To adapt a vogue phrase, "being Shanghainese" is being Chinese with Shanghai 
characteristics. In the following chapter I disaggregate identities further by investigating 
the different types of representations which were made of those who live in different parts 
of Shanghai.
Even in Guangdong, which "has the potential to break away", Helen Siu found "a 
definite commitment towards the larger polity" (1993: 21). My findings endorse Jacobs 
and Hong’s assessment that "[f]ield research in Shanghai does not suggest Shanghai 
people wish to separate from China. Rather, they wish Beijing would show more concern 
for Shanghai’s problems" (1994: 248). Thus people in Shanghai may demand better 
treatment from the central government but as residents o f  Shanghai and not as 
Shanghainese.
There are also "horizontalizing" trends which are reducing Shanghai’s 
distinctiveness within China. In the reform era, Shanghai is less obviously at the vanguard 
in comparisons of wealth and "modernity"; until 1992, at least, many saw it as having 
been overtaken by Shenzhen and Canton. Additionally, greater freedom of movement 
within China has reintegrated Shanghai into flows of tourists, relatives, business people 
and other transients. The growth of national media and communications networks has also
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fostered Shanghai’s key national role.
During the Maoist era China’s international frontiers were relatively tightly sealed, 
flows of information, people and products both into and out o f the country were limited 
and strictly regulated. There was little to challenge views o f what "China" and "being 
Chinese" was or should be. Shanghai’s increasing re-integration into global cultural flows 
has had far reaching consequences. In some respects this is simply a return to the pre- 
1949 situation in which Shanghai was closely linked with other commercial entrepots and 
the Chinese diaspora. There are, however, at least two distinct differences. Firstly, in the 
1990s, Shanghai is no longer a highly productive cultural centre but, rather, is dominated 
by cultural imports, many from the Chinese diaspora in Hong Kong and Taiwan. There 
is an increasing "compradorization" o f the Chinese avant-garde, for instance, in the form 
of contracts between Hong Kong and Taiwan music producers and PRC film makers and 
musicians (Barme 1992: 13.29). However, it remains to be seen whether Shanghai will 
re-emerge "as a great centre of print and electronic culture for the Chinese world" (Jenner 
1992: 236). There is much to support Tu Wei-ming’s view that "the periphery will come 
to set the economic and cultural agenda for the center, thereby undermining its political 
effectiveness" (1991: 12). Secondly, new technologies enable a far more rapid and 
extensive influx of communications and images, although the degree of access to them 
produces new forms o f differentiation.
Undoubtedly "media-derived meanings can contribute to a sense of belonging and 
community" (Dahlgren 1988: 288). Skilful politicians may, for instance, seek to bolster 
the sense of shared national feeling through television programming. However, in place 
of a "captive audience" government propagandists must now vie in the cultural market 
place. The Open Door has contributed to the "undermining of the Party’s totalistic control 
and the rise of more autonomous social life and public opinion" (Whyte 1993c: 533). In 
fracturing the monologic state discourse, transnational cultural flows provide the material 
for diverse non-territorial identities. U lf Hannerz writes of the way the "media gives us 
more contemporaries" (1992: 30). For urban Shanghainese their contemporaries tended 
not to be the rural migrants on their doorstep (at times literally so) but images of 
successful migrants (or their descendants) in the Chinese diaspora and other "modern" 
metropolitans. These models provided positive images of what Shanghai can (and many 
say ought to) be, whilst the influx of indigenous non-Shanghainese migrants heightened 
senses of what Shanghai should not be. The irony is that it is largely these stigmatized 
migrants who are building the "new" Shanghai; a city whose "modernity" and
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"internationality" bolsters senses of Shanghaineseness which excludes those who have 
made it possible.
Global mediascapes facilitated by new technologies and allied with China’s 
burgeoning media provided residents with diverse "landscapes of images" (Appadurai 
1990: 9) and a far greater range of imaginary others. As Tom Gold suggests "Gangtai 
popular culture...provides a model of a modem Chinese life-style and a new language that 
breaks the hegemonic lock o f Communist Newspeak" (1993a: 925). Tu Wei-ming (1991) 
stresses the "transformative potential" of the gangtai periphery. Whilst acknowledging 
the "destructive power o f the center" (15) Tu sees the potential for the periphery to 
participate in "creatively constructing a new vision of Chineseness" (28). Amongst 
Shanghainese residents, who stressed the openness and outward-looking characteristics of 
"being Shanghainese", I found much evidence to suggest a willingness to embrace cultural 
products from elsewhere. However, I conceive of these flows as also having more diffuse, 
diversifying effects. With the proliferation o f trans-national mediascapes there is ample 
evidence of the global trend for "culture" to become less a matter of habitus than "an 
arena for conscious choice, justification and representation" (Appadurai 1990: 18). Global 
cultural flow and rising prosperity provides an increasing repertoire of possible identities 
and communities to belong to. These include a range of "aspirational identities", such as 
consumer and youth sub-cultures.
Finally, it is important to bear in mind that "Chinese culture has never been a static 
structure but a dynamic, constantly changing landscape" (Tu 1991: 4). Those who 
perceive a "problem" of Chinese cultural identity seem to ignore their own observations 
that the Chinese cultural system has always allowed for "the free expression of what 
outsiders may perceive to be chaotic local diversity" (Watson 1992: 74). Shanghai 
citizens are learning to live with the juxtapositions which characterize the post-modern 
world. Those who predict the deconstruction of China, or the demise of the Communist 
Party for that matter, underestimate the ability of people to adopt and adapt. What are 
conflicting identities from an outside analyst’s viewpoint are often non-discursive, not 
reflected upon in people’s daily lives.
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Map 4. Contemporary Shanghai (Chinese map)
Source - Zui Xin Zhongguo Jiaotong Luvou Tuce (Latest China Transport and Travel 
Maps). Wuhan: Dizhi Chubanshe. 1993
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Chapter 3 The Walls Within: Shanghai Inside Out
The previous chapter dealt primarily with the view looking outwards from 
Shanghai. It examined various representations o f those who consider themselves 
"Shanghainese" and of people and places considered as "other", as non-Shanghainese. In 
this chapter the focus moves from flows from outside the city (chengwai) to 
representations of places and people within the city (chengli). I propose to treat Shanghai 
not as a single city but rather as a cityscape which provides a diversity of potential 
environments.
Each visitor and resident will have their own mental map of Shanghai, a map based 
upon memories, gossip, and experiences which is both contingent and subject to 
redrawing. My intention is to pore over some indigenous charts of Shanghai as they were 
represented to me by citizens of the city. Cartographers draw maps of different scales, 
using differing formulae and colours to mark points of interest and importance. Each will 
also differ according to the skill of the artist and his or her perception of the audience for 
his or her work. Some are densely covered with clear, sharply defined features, others 
more opaque, giving only the vaguest outline of what may be found there. This chapter 
provides an excursion around various locations - physical and social boundaries - which 
were described by informants. O f particular interest are ways in which linkages were 
made between place and identity. Special attention is also paid to changing features of 
the work unit and home "styles", and changing modes of transcending space.
During a long, free-wheeling conversation with a young working couple, the wife 
described her life and that of her husband to me as consisting of "two points and a line" 
(liang dian yi xian). They explained that this description (which I have also seen in local 
newspapers) conveys the simplicity, regularity and monotony^of the vast majority of 
Shanghai’s working population (shangban de). Their lives, their time and energy, were 
spent at home, the work place or commuting between these two places. With a six day 
working week still common,1 and many people commuting up to three or four hours per 
day there was little room for alternative activities. My investigation builds upon this 
indigenous model and investigates ways in which its content was changing and new 
alternatives, including new types of "line", emerging.
Each of the two points, the home and the work place, are taken as "enclosures". 
Within Shanghai there was considerable evidence that both physical and social walls are
'In 1994, a five-day w orking w eek was adopted nationally.
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being breached. One informant commented that "before gaige kaifang Shanghai was 
stuck in a frame (kuangjia kazhu), now it has been loosened up (songbing)." I highlight 
a trend for work places to become less enclosed and encompassing and for homes to 
become more enclosed and bounded. I commence, however, by outlining ways in which 
the city environment has begun to alter since the mid-1980s. I then examine a significant 
way in which places within Shanghai and their residents were differentially marked and 
assigned to an "upper" or "lower" status.
3.1 The Changing City Environment
Barry Naughton stresses the way "[t]he lives of urban dwellers are shaped by the 
cities in which they live, and cities themselves are shaped by economic forces that extend 
well beyond urban boundaries" (1995b: 61). Naughton describes how for some fifteen 
years pre-reform China had "followed an explicitly antiurban approach" in which cities 
economic resources were exploited (67, 67-70). A direct consequence of this was a 
[stagnation of the physical form of the core cities (70)." Shanghai citizens often 
complained about the lack of improvement in the city’s infrastructure and physical 
appearance during the Maoist era and until (at least) the mid-1980s. Many informants 
cited this stagnation as indicative of a more general lack of change. A standing joke in 
the city is that when those who left Shanghai in the late 1940s return, they can easily find 
their way around because everything is exactly the same. A typical comment was that 
after thirty years of Communist Party rule the best architecture in the city was still that 
built by foreigners and the tallest building still the 24-floor Park Hotel built in 1934. A 
young businessman remarked that "from 1949 onwards, until the building of the Hilton 
hotel in the 1980s there was no change in Shanghai’s appearance (mianmao)."
Since the latter 1980s new construction began to radically alter the cityscape of 
Shanghai. When I asked Shanghai residents about "change" in recent years many noted 
changes in the physical environment. Residents mentioned in particular the many new 
high-rise luxury hotels, roads being built and old ones renewed, construction of an 
underground line, and the large-scale development project in Pudong - which one 
informant described as Shanghai’s "shop window".2 A resident in her forties remarked 
that this construction work gave one a "feeling of newness" (xin de ganjue).
The building of the luxury high rise Hilton hotel in the early to mid-1980s was
2Another important change is the way Shanghai is becom ing physically bigger, "more unruly" and 
spraw ling (N aughton 1995b: 86).
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widely viewed as the first sign of progress - a literal and a metonymical landmark. 
Although many informants viewed such buildings as indicative of Shanghai’s increasing 
prosperity others were less impressed. For example, a retired man told me that the 
existence of such places was o f supreme indifference to him since people such as himself 
could never hope to stay there. Similarly, a young office worker complained that whilst 
numerous large, expensive hotels were being built many citizens still lived in sub-standard 
accommodation.
After years of neglect, there are also many projects to improve the city’s housing 
and infrastructure. According to the BBC2 documentary "Cities of the Future", in 1995 
Shanghai had 20,000 construction sites.3 In central Shanghai residential housing is being 
demolished to make way for roads and redevelopment, including land leased to foreign 
companies. Key road building projects include completion of the city ring road 
(Zhongshan Road). Informants expected such projects to bring improvements but at 
present they create even greater congestion. Often this inconvenience was described as 
the price Shanghai must bear to repay the debt (huanzhai) of no construction in the past. 
People expressed resentment that this debt had built up because Shanghai had contributed 
so much money to Beijing.4
The commercialization of the economy has begun to alter the cityscape directly. 
Advertisements proliferate and ever more neon signs light the main commercial areas. 
Walking along Nanjing Road opposite the Peace Hotel with a local businessman in his late 
thirties I commented to him on the profusion of bright lights. Concurring he added, with 
great approval, "Shanghai is returning to how it was in the 1930s." He paused before 
continuing, "now China is the Communist Party’s, and they have to make Nanjing Road 
brighter and the life of the laobaixing (common people) better than it was then, or it will 
be seen as a failure." He was clearly full of optimism. Unfortunately I had no chance to 
ask him if returning to how things were sixty years ago could be construed as the 
measure, of success.
3.2 Uptown, Downtown Shanghai
Within Shanghai, local residents drew a distinction between the shangzhijiao (zang
3Broadcast 29  N ovem ber 1995. I suspect that this figure o f  20 ,000  may be an exaggeration. During 
1993, various informants quoted a figure o f  5,000.
4People spoke o f  m oney being given to B eijing or zhongyang - the Central C om m ittee o f  the Party or, 
more loosely , the central authorities. The terms appeared to be interchangeable.
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tsa ko) - "upper comer" - and the xiazhijiao (o tsa ko) - "lower comer". The Chinese 
terms shang (upper, higher) and xia (low, under) are used in much the same ways as these 
socio-spatial metaphors are in English (see Lakoff & Johnson 1980: 14-21). Thus shang 
includes notions of political superiority as in shangji - higher authorities - and being 
morally or qualitatively superior as in shangdeng - high, superior quality. By contrast, xia 
includes things both physically and morally base as in xialiu - low-down, obscene.
Although, as one informant remarked, it is not possible to draw a precise line (juti 
de jiexian) on the map of Shanghai (see Maps 4 and 5) to divide shang and xia, amongst 
people I encountered I found a broad consensus on how different parts of the city should 
be assigned. The shangzhijiao included especially Jingan, the northern part o f Xuhui, 
Luwan, Huangpu - especially the northern part, Nanjing West Road, Beijing West Road, 
Huaihai Road, and Yanan West Road. The xiazhijiao included especially Zhabei, also 
Putao, Yangpu (especially in the south west), the southern most part of Xujia Hui, 
Chongning and parts of Hongkou, Luwan south of Jianguo Road (especially Dapujiao 
Road).
Several informants noted that within shang areas there are xia parts and vice versa. 
For instance, whilst Yangpu overall is xia it also has places such as Fudan and Tongji 
Universities which are shang. Hongkou was generally regarded as neutral - as possessing 
both shang and xia. Most divergence from this "map" of Shanghai involved the "border” 
areas between shang and xia. One of the few sites over which there were contesting views 
was Nanshi - the district containing the old city. Some placed it firmly in the xiazhijiao, 
others considered it neither shang nor xia. One suggestion was that "Nanshi used to be xia 
but is now middling (zhongdeng)." To describe it as xia accords with an imperial 
discourse which found numerous contrasts between the "model settlement" and the "Chinese 
native city" - the former invariably positive and latter negative.5 I speculate below on why 
the status of Nanshi may be rising.
I also asked how Pudong should be considered. A doctor responded that "Pudong
5I discuss this topic at length in Gam ble (1991). The fo llow ing  contrasts are drawn from a typical text 
o f  the imperial era (W ilson 1887):
C hinese N ative City 
past/m iddle ages 
isolation/arrested developm ent 
fever and filth
struggling and sordid multitude 
sordid struggle o f  life , sloth 
decrepitude and decay, squalor
Foreign Settlement 
present/future 
progressive ideas/hope  
w ell paved
w ell-selected  population  
industry, thrift, enterprise 
luxury and com fort
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was/is really poor [cha - this can be "poor" in the sense of poverty and/or quality], even 
lower than the xiazhijiao." Equally typical was the response o f a young man who replied 
that "Pudong is completely different - this is a difference between Shanghainese and 
country bumpkins (xiang o Hw/xiangxiaren)." He laughed and continued "once you cross 
the Huangpu River it is considered the countryside (xiangxia)." Similarly, an editor 
described the xiazhijiao as "like the second world" and Pudong as "like the third world".
On 18 April 1990, China’s Premier Li Peng announced that a 350 kilometre site, 
Pudong New District, was to be made a national development zone. Large-scale 
construction has begun in Pudong. Additionally, Pudong has been physically integrated 
into the rest of the city by the construction of the Nanpu and Yangpu bridges and an 
under-river tunnel. It will be interesting to examine how representations of Pudong 
change in coming years. Intimations of Pudong’s changing status were already apparent. 
Until recently a popular saying commented: "It’s better to have a bed in Puxi, than a
whole house in Pudong" (bu yao Pudong yi zhuang lou, zhi yao Puxi yi zhang chuang). 
This assessment had begun to change - a young architectural worker told me that she had 
recently chosen to work in a company in Pudong. She added that her mother, who was 
born in Pudong, had been very keen to leave Pudong to study and work in Shanghai. She 
commented that "it’s very different now, Pudong was seen as the countryside. In the past 
Pudongers had to cross to Puxi to buy many things they needed, now Puxi shops are 
opening branches in Pudong."
3.2.1 The Basis of the Distinction
When I asked people what they considered the origin and content of the distinction 
between the shang and xiazhijiao five main types of factor were mentioned - historical, 
housing and environmental, social and cultural differences, occupational and economic 
status, regional origin of inhabitants. In this section I examine each of these facets. 
Although different informants may stress one factor more than another there was a broad 
degree of consensus. In addition, the factors were invariably regarded as linked and 
mutually reinforcing.
It was often remarked that the shangzhijiao accorded with the former foreign 
concessions. These were described as having been the most prosperous (fanhua) with the 
best housing. It was "where foreigners lived" or, as a young teacher remarked, "where 
people with status (shenfen) lived." The editor mentioned above observed that "Huangpu
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district is in-between shang and xia, inclining towards shang. It was where businessmen, 
compradors and those who worked for foreign banks lived. Therefore, they could not be 
without w enhua (culture/education)." Informants considered the current positive 
evaluation of the shangzhijiao area as a continuation of its historical preeminence. The 
former French zone was the most highly rated shang area, the Japanese zone the lowest 
and the International Settlement area in-between these two. By contrast, a Communist 
Party member in his sixties described the xiazhijiao as being the pre-1949 Chinese run 
part o f Shanghai (huajie). A resident o f Yangpu observed that "the level is lower (cengci 
di) in Yangpu. No foreigners lived in Yangpu." The term cengci was often used to refer 
to moral, educational or price levels. As noted in previous chapters, the notion of 
"foreign" and "modem" are closely associated.
The terms shang and xiazhijiao do not appear to have emerged until long after 
1949. The editor mentioned above believed these terms had only emerged during the 
reform era. However, a Huaihai Road resident in her fifties had first heard the terms used 
during the early 1970s. She believed that they would not have been used any earlier in 
the Cultural Revolution as "then everyone was supposed to be equal." A teacher felt that 
"before the Cultural Revolution the shang/xia difference did not matter so much. Then 
people from these areas did not meet so there was no conflict (chongtu). But when Mao 
Zedong carried out the Cultural Revolution and, for example, people from Zhabei were 
moved to the shangzhijiao contradictions arose."
Housing, architecture, and general appearance (mianmao) were described as key 
components of being shang. It was noted, for example, that many houses in the 
shangzhijiao are Western style and have gardens. One woman, a resident of Yangpu, 
observed that before 1949 places such as Jingan were where the rich lived and that it still 
has many villas. She asked rhetorically "how many villas are there in Yangpu district?". 
These architectural differences seemed to be important even though many of the foreign- 
designed dwellings intended for single households were now divided among several 
families.
Shang areas were said to have a lower population density and be cleaner and 
quieter. One man compared the area around Fudan University - considered a shang area 
within a xia area - to Zhabei. "In Fudan’s space (kongjian) people do not disturb or 
influence each other. But in Zhabei people are mixed-up (hunhe) together, for example, 
three generations live together. There is no quiet environment in which to study and 
improve one’s wenhua level." It is notable that traditionally several generations living
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together was regarded as the ideal family and accorded high prestige (Baker 1979: 1). In 
early 1990s Shanghai, the concept of "five generations under one roof' was more likely 
to be associated with over-crowding and families condemned by inadequate housing space 
and poverty to reside together. Space is undoubtedly of particular concern to 
Shanghainese because o f its scarcity - in downtown areas the population density can reach
80,000 per square kilometre (Xu 1993: 2).6
Inferior housing with poor, often communal, washing and cooking facilities was 
said to characterise the xiazhijiao. A former resident of Huaihai Road commented that 
xiazhijiao areas are "rubbishy places" (laxi p i se ge difangllaxi biesan de difang). This 
informant recalled that before 1949 Zhabei, Nanshi and Putuo had dwellings called 
gendilong ("rolling along the ground dragons") which were simply bamboo frames 
covered with matting. He added that "this is where what we now call mingong (migrant 
workers) lived. Like contemporary mingong they did all the hardest manual work and 
Shanghainese, as now, had nothing to do with them." A doctor reckoned that even though 
the old slums had gone the population density was still much higher and incomes lower 
in these districts.
Architectural differences were closely associated with notions that there were 
differences of "cultural/educational level" (wenhua cengci) or "quality" (suzhi) between 
residents of the shang and xiazhijiao. It appears that educational level and indicators of 
material well-being were correlated, as though the former legitimated, implicitly, the latter. 
Huaihai Road and areas adjacent to it were considered especially shang. A woman in her 
early forties who was born and brought up on Huaihai Road felt that "there were more 
codes of conduct (yi tao guiju) there. There was a distinct demarcation line (mingxian 
jiexian) between us and those brought up elsewhere. We dressed more smartly than those 
in other areas, had better manners, were more civilized (wenming) and had more etiquette 
(liyi)." It is interesting to bear in mind that this woman is describing a childhood in the 
1960s, including the early Cultural Revolution, when the rhetoric o f egalitarianism and 
equality were at their height.
The editor mentioned above told me that in the shangzhijiao far more students 
pass university entrance exams than in the xiazhijiao. He added that those who go abroad 
from Shanghai are mostly from the shangzhijiao. This view was shared by a young 
woman from Yangpu district who told me "in my imagination I have the idea that the 
^  zhijiao has a connection to overseas (he haiwai you guanxi). For example, people
6Pellow  cites a density o f  40 ,000  people per km 2 for the m unicipality o f  Shanghai (1993: 397).
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there have relatives abroad or have studied abroad." People in the shangzhijiao were also 
said to pay attention to "outward appearance" (jiangjiu waim ian) - to dress and make-up. 
The editor remarked "as soon as you look at somebody, you can tell if they’re from shang 
or xiazhijiao. The latter are uncouth (tuli tuqi - "the air or manner of soil"). One 
sometimes sees girls in the xiazhijiao who wear rings on every finger like they’re opening 
a jewellery exhibition, it’s unbearably vulgar (su bu ke nai)." More generally, the 
"atmosphere" (fengqi) of the xiazhijiao may be described as bad and these areas as dirty 
and chaotic. A doctor told me that in the shang areas one may say of a neighbour "this 
person has come from the xiazhijiao" (di ge nin si ho tsa ko lei ge/zhige ren shi 
xiazhijiao laide). He explained that this could be said "to curse somebody who behaves 
like this."7
The pre-1949 occupational and economic differences between the shang and 
xiazhijiao appeared to have persisted in contemporary Shanghai. The doctor remarked 
that before 1949 in the shangzhijiao "people’s quality (suzhi) and education were high 
and they had good white collar jobs. Refugees went to the xiazhijiao, they were lower 
strata (xiaceng) people. Since 1949 there has been a continuation of this distinction." 
The shangzhijiao were considered to have more professional workers and places such as 
Xuhui district were where "old cadres" (lao ganbu) and officials (dangguan de) lived.
A high proportion of industrial workers and other low status (dixia) occupations
was described as characterising xia areas. A young architectural worker told me
"xiazhijiao are where industrial workers live, they are rough/crude (culu), comparatively
poor and people have more children."8 An academic’s view was that:
In Yangpu district there are many industrial workers and this is xiazhijiao. People 
who want face do all they can to move to the shangzhijiao, even though the 
housing there may be worse than where they moved out from. Some girls want 
to marry somebody who lives in the shangzhijiao, (he adds, half jokingly) so if 
you live there it’s easier to get a wife.
It was striking that none of my informants used the term jieji (class) in the 
discourse on shang/xia. My older informants especially would have been well trained in 
the use of the language of class; It may well be that the ideological overtones of jieji are
7"Subeiren" (Subei person) may be used in a similar fashion to describe som ebody as being o f  low  
status. A bundle o f  notions seem ed to overlap - poverty, chaos, bad taste, low  status, xia zh i jia o , Subei 
people.
8In Shanghai, I often heard people describe having many children as an indication o f  lack o f  
culture/education (w enhua).
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just too overwhelming. The nearest informants came to this terminology was to use the 
terms (translated from English) of "white" and "blue" collar (bai/lanling).
A resident o f Yangpu described this district as xiazhijiao "because many poor 
people live here." A scientific research worker remarked that in the xiazhijiao people’s 
incomes and social status were lower. He contrasted this to a shang area such as Xuhui 
and especially Kanping Road: "If you say you live there others will know that your status 
(shenfen) is high. Government people with special power (tequan) can live there." He 
continued "in my danwei the leaders live in comparatively bustling (renao) places but the 
workers mostly live in the countryside (xiangxia). If  somebody from Zhabei gets rich 
they will want to move to the shangzhijiao."9
Regional origin was often mentioned in descriptions of the xiazhijiao. 
Specifically, a high proportion of Subei people was closely associated with an area being 
xia. A scientific researcher told me "there are many Jiangbei people in Zhabei and they 
form a small society (xiao shehui) - it is dirty, chaotic and poor (zang, luan, cha)." 
There was often a coalescence between regional origin and occupation. The comments 
of a young teacher were typical, "areas were xia because they were industrial districts with 
many industrial workers and especially non-Shanghainese (wai laide) workers. It is the 
same as the way people now look down on migrant workers (mingong). They were 
especially Subei people. Putuo is still a complete mess (yita hutu), they’re all Subei 
people." Similarly, a long term resident of Huaihai Road remarked that residents of the 
shangzhijiao area of Xujiahui described another part of Xujiahui as being
xiazhijiao "because many Subei people lived there." It was notable that in describing the 
shangzhijiao regional origin was not mentioned. One young man considered that Nanshi 
was not usually called xiazhijiao even though its housing was very dilapidated because 
"it is where ‘old Shanghainese’ (lao Shanghai) live." It appears that the dominant social 
group acquires a degree of "invisibility" (cf. WASPS in America).
3.2.2 Changing Views of the Shang/Xiazhiiiao
A man in his sixties felt that the difference between the shang and xiazhijiao was 
at its greatest during the Maoist period "because no new houses were built at that time, 
it was like two worlds (liang ge shijie)." Most of my informants felt that the
9In an interview with the share dealer "M illions Yang" the interview er found it strange that Yang had 
not m oved from his native Zhabei to Xuhui, Jingan or H ongqiao districts. Y ang agreed that these areas 
were "extremely good" but remarked that "it w ould not feel right for an emancipated ‘p ° or peasant’ like 
m y se lf to m ove there* "Jinri Y ang Baiw an" (Y ang Baiwan T oday) SW Y B  4 -10  June 1993: 4.
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shang/xiazhijiao distinction had weakened (danbo/danhua) during the reform era. The 
two main reasons cited for this were improvements to the housing stock and changes 
related to the reform policies themselves.
The demolition o f poor quality housing and the construction of much new public 
housing (gongfang) since the late 1980s was considered to have weakened the shang/xia 
distinction.10 The new opportunities for wealth making which the reforms had provided 
also played a part in reducing the distinction. A  young architect felt that until recent years 
there had been a clear difference in wealth between the shang and xiazhijiao. Now, 
however, one could not say clearly where the rich lived since people, for example, in 
Yangpu may become wealthy through business. In addition, if they became rich and 
wished to buy property most commercially available housing was not in the shangzhijiao 
but in suburban areas such as Hongqiao.
A young businessman felt that the concept of shang and xiazhijiao had also 
weakened because of a "change in people’s way of thinking (gainian bianhua)." He 
observed that:
Money is now used to judge a person’s worth (jiazhi). Previously wenhua was 
the most important thing in China. It didn’t matter if you were poor. Manual 
work and service jobs were regarded as xiazhijiao occupations with low status 
(didang). But now this is not the case. For example, a hairdresser or a bar 
worker may be regarded as high status (gaodang) and have style (qipai). 
Previously these occupations were seen as low status (didang), now they are 
popular (chixiang). If they have money this gives them status.
An interesting aspect of these comments is that the "previously" time period referred to
is the pre-reform era when state rhetoric stressed minimizing differences between mental
and manual labour. It was clear to me that many service occupations were still regarded
as inferior but this does not, of course, affect this informant’s perception of a shift.
This businessman felt that Nanshi district was no longer considered xiazhijiao
because many residents engaged in business and may be quite well off.11 However, a
former resident of Huaihai Road considered that Nanshi was still xiazhijiao. She agreed
that "many people in Nanshi are richer now" but added:
This doesn’t matter, these people are getihu whose wenhua is insufficient. People 
may praise them to their face, but in their hearts they still despise them and don’t 
want their children to marry them. They feel that in the past they were really
"’Residents were often rehoused in suburban areas. Huangpu district, for instance, was being  
depopulated at the rate o f  10 ,000-30 ,000  people per year.
" P hysically  Nanshi had changed very little. The narrow streets, densely packed low -level housing and 
extrem ely high population density present enormous problem s for redevelopm ent.
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poor, their home didn’t even have a single decent chair, now they’re rich, they’re 
really rubbish (bi jia  h  xz/feichang cha). In Huaihai Road many people have 
mahogany furniture.
This woman appears still to be using the "traditional" criterion which clearly allies 
wenhua (culture/education) with wealth in contrast to the previous informant’s stress 
solely upon wealth as a key signifier o f status. It is also relevant that my female 
informant retained a strong sense of moral superiority on the basis o f her upbringing in 
Huaihai Road, a commitment not shared by the young businessman. A mutual friend 
described the latter as having been brought up in the xiazhijiao, in a home with "three 
generations living together." As noted above, the prestige accorded several generations 
living together is clearly reversed, for in Shanghai it now served as a synonym for 
poverty.
The persistence of the notions of shang and xiazhijiao demonstrates the failure of 
the Maoist rhetoric which sought to reduce differences between mental and manual labour 
and produce an egalitarian society. In practice, the relative status of different types of 
labour appears to have been unchanged - white collar occupations were still highly 
regarded and manual work and service jobs looked down upon.12 An interesting aspect 
of the shang/xia discourse is that people used a geographical idiom to describe what an 
outside observer may consider as largely class distinctions.
In the previous chapter attention was drawn to the way in which Maoist rhetoric 
sought to overcome urban-rural distinctions. Evidence suggests a sharp disjuncture 
between this rhetoric and the actual consequences of socio-economic policies which appear 
to have reinforced this divide. In a similar way, Emily Honig (1989a, 1990) argues that 
prejudice against Subei people persisted after 1949 as a consequence of state policies. 
Similarly, I would argue that post-1949 socio-economic policies also contributed to 
entrenching the shang/xia distinction. Lack of capital investment in the city enabled pre­
existing inequalities to persist: for instance, most of the better housing and the main
entertainment centres were still in the shangzhijiao. The limited degree of social 
mobility, including inability to change jobs or move residence, o f the pre-reform era also 
helped entrench these inequalities.
The case of the woman in her early forties who had been brought up on Huaihai 
Road illustrates the persistence of distinctions. She described schooling in the Cultural 
Revolution as haphazard and limited. Her (well-educated) parents often kept her at home
12The w ay in which "bad elements" w ere given such work as a punishment w ould have reinforced these 
view s.
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and educated her themselves. In a long discussion on this topic the impression I gained 
was that educational provision generally deteriorated but that families such as hers could 
ameliorate the consequences of this. In other words, policies designed to bring about 
equality tended to have the opposite effect.
A further irony is that the shang/xia distinctions only appear to have been 
declining in importance during the reform era, when little attention is paid to egalitarian 
ideological imperatives. For instance, the status o f some service workers had risen and 
the previous correlation between shangzhijiao and wealth and xiazhijiao and poverty was 
beginning to alter. Architectural changes were also reducing the shang/xia distinction. 
Until recently it appeared that new, better quality public housing was mainly allocated to 
those with (politically) higher status jobs. A local government official said that this had 
begun to change and that now "poor people" may be moved into public housing.
There were, however, also ways in which new boundaries were being (re)created. 
For instance, in 1993 Huaihai Road was extensively refurbished and many of its stores 
now sold expensive, imported goods. A retired resident of Luwan district recalled that 
when he was young Huaihai Road was "very refined" (gaoya), with relatively few people, 
many jewellery shops and Western style restaurants. It was of "superior quality" 
(gaodang). He noted that the city government intends to make Huaihai Road more 
gaodang, "we can already feel that this has happened, the laobaixing are afraid to enter 
the shops on Huaihai Road, they cannot afford the prices."
3.3 Two Points - Work Place/Home
In this section and the next I focus upon the "two points" referred to in the 
introductory comment. It seems reasonable to depict them as "enclosed" spaces. 
Although Shanghai’s sixteenth century city wall was demolished in 1911, regarded as a 
"relic of medievalism, out o f keeping with modern China" (Pott 1928: 192), many walls 
remain in contemporary Shanghai.13 Work units (danwei) are often surrounded by a 
physical wall and many houses are clustered in compounds with a surrounding wall. 
Shanghai has many "new villages" (xincun) which were built in the early 1950s (see Fung 
1981: 281-2). One "new village" I visited was bounded by a wall, it had a nursery and 
a primary school, various shops and repair centres. Until their teens a young person could 
easily live enclosed within this small circle. As in many residential areas, the people to
13Chang writes that "[w]alls have been so central to the C hinese idea o f  a city that the traditional words 
for city and w all are identical" (1977: 75).
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whom the flats had originally been assigned were all employed in the same danwei. It 
was socio-spatial organization of this type which produced a form of urban life that was 
"unusually sheltered" (Naughton 1995a: 25).
The spatial metaphors people used when talking about danwei appear to support 
the notion of them as bounded, discrete entities. This was expressed in the way a person 
who left a state danwei and moved, for example, to a joint venture would talk about this 
as having chulai - "come out" or "emerged". In a similar way, the unemployed may be 
described as liu zai shehui - "remaining in society" as opposed to being "in" a danwei. 
The polite way to see off a guest (songren) also supports the notion o f bounded 
enclosures. A host displays concern for guests by physically accompanying them across 
the boundaries from the inner space to the outside (waimian).
The incorporation of a new, adult female family member through marriage involves 
a number of rituals which highlight the sense of a journey from one bounded unit to 
another. I watched a wedding video of a couple’s spatial and ritual journey. As the bride 
left her natal home (niangjia) just before she stepped into the car she removed her shoes 
and puts on a new pair. The bride later explained to me that this was because she should 
not take any of the n iangjia’s soil (tu) with her - it is said to represent either the 
n iangjia’s wealth (caiqi) or bad luck (huiqi). The bride must also cross flames (huo) 
upon arrival at her new home with the family of the groom.
Although the bride’s marital journey involves elements o f separation and transfer 
of rights and obligations it also provides the basis for an ongoing relationship between the 
two families. This was symbolized in a ritual I witnessed in a wedding at Shanghai’s 
Songjiang county. Upon his arrival at the bride’s home to collect her a "custom of the 
place" (bendi de xiguan) included the groom’s presentation of six gifts including a fish. 
When the groom left with the bride, the bride gave him eight gifts including the fish. The 
fish was especially important I was told because it "swims back and forth" (you lai you 
qu) a homonym of which means "to come and go". A participant explained that this 
signifies the hope that there would be a good relationship between the two families with 
many reciprocal visits (liang jia laiwang miqie)."
3.3.1 Boundaries and Enclosures
Both at my university accommodation and when visiting people in the city I often 
felt that the various entrances and boundaries were like Russian dolls - each one opened 
revealed another doll in a seemingly endless succession. At my accommodation the main
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gate of the university had gatekeepers. The entrance to the foreign students building had 
permanent doormen to keep out all Chinese except for students o f the university. Each 
floor had a worker employed to clean the corridors and communal areas. It seemed like 
a series o f ever finer filters to exclude outsiders and prevent contacts deemed 
"undesirable" for our studies.14
On a visit to an ordinary flat I noted the following: there is a wall around the 
compound with a gate through which a car could pass but often only a small gate just 
large enough for a bicycle and rider to pass through is kept open; usually there are people 
observing who enters or leaves; beside the entrance to the building (one o f several in the 
compound) is an office usually manned by several elderly people. In addition, a group 
of 3-4 people invariably sit in this area talking and/or knitting; the lift has an operator; 
each of the four quarters o f each floor has a door which can be locked; the flat itself has 
a barred metal outer door and an inner wooden door.
William Jenner in The Tyranny of History (1992: 83-102) has written convincingly 
about the persistence o f walls, boundaries, enclosures and compounds o f various types 
throughout Chinese history. He writes, for instance, of the way walls have been erected 
to keep foreigners out. As I have shown in earlier chapters it was evident to me that 
many Shanghainese conceived of national "walls" in a similar way to those described by 
Jenner. At another level Jenner describes the way "[ojffices, factories, schools and 
housing projects are walled or fenced off and gatekeepers put in place to monitor the 
movements of all who come or go" (86). Deborah Davis describes how, in the Maoist 
era, many "citizens spent their lives living and working behind gated walls" (Davis 1995: 
2). In these instances, my informants did not necessarily share Jenner’s approach that 
these walls were detrimental and oppressive. I suggest that the cultural significance o f  
walls may vary. The potential for surveillance in the residences described above was 
clearly very great. However, informants I spoke with did not consider this a problem. 
Indeed people were more inclined to complain when these gatekeepers were absent, 
feeling that they enhanced security. In China the degree of enclosedness appears to bear 
a relationship to status. In imperial times Emperors bodies were enclosed within myriad 
enclosures inside the Forbidden City, this "architectural design symbolically displayed and 
reinforced Imperial power" (Rofel 1992: 102). This practice continues with the current
l4Foreign students were still privileged in their degree o f  freedom when compared to C hinese students. 
At Fudan University, for exam ple, male students were banned from visiting fem ale students’ dormitories. 
In addition, fem ale students had recently all been rehoused in dormitories inside a sm aller, adjacent 
com pound outside the main campus walls.
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political leaders who live within a modern equivalent of the Imperial Palace at 
Zhongnanhai. The homes of poor people, by contrast, are far less enclosed and daily 
activities such as cooking and washing hair become public events.
Jenner notes the fear of luan ("chaos") in China. However, he appears to overlook 
the extent to which many Chinese people consider walls, boundaries and surveillance as 
valuable and essential means to prevent chaos. It may well be that attitudes towards 
control have varied over time in Britain. For instance, Forbes describes, with admiration, 
the degree of orderliness he found in Shanghai in the 1840s. He describes how most by­
streets had a small gate at each end which was locked at nine o’clock and that 
"[s]ometimes each house, but invariably each street, has its watchman, who patrols all 
night beating a small drum" (1848: 21).
Many informants complained to me that crime in the city was increasing, although 
they considered Shanghai relatively secure and well-ordered in comparison to other parts 
o f China. A young Shanghainese woman told me that she felt safe in Shanghai at night. 
She felt that Shanghai people "keep within bounds (yueshu)." In this sense it seems that 
"walls" provided a haven, a retreat, a non-porous private sphere. The blame for rising 
crime was laid on migrant workers. It was those coming from beyond the bounds of 
Shanghai who brought such disorder.
3.3.2 The Work Place
Chinese state work units (danwei) represent the epitome of a socialist planned 
economy. Mayfair Yang’s (1989a: 31-2) description of danwei as "total institutions" 
since they "oversee functions of production and reproduction, social welfare, indoctrination 
and surveillance" captures effectively and succinctly the nature o f the danw ei’s impact.15 
Under this (Maoist) model the danwei is the place where the dangan (individual dossier) 
is kept and is responsible for the supply of housing, social security, medical care, income 
and social status. Associated with the danwei system is a high level of both job security 
and worker dependency upon the enterprise (Walder 1988).
A particularly high degree of inclusivity (and exclusivity) is found in large state 
enterprises such as Jinshan Oil and Chemical Plant and Baoshan Steel Plant, both
'T o r  the purposes o f  analysis in this section I regard these units as an "ideal type" m odel. It is 
important to note that even during the peak o f  collectivization many work places never achieved the ideal 
m odel. The full range o f  benefits and security applied only to permanent workers in larger state enterprises, 
about 42%  o f  the industrial workforce in 1981 (W alder 1987: 59). A dditionally, to an extent, the use o f  
the gift econom y challenged and subverted principles o f  state distribution and "represents an oppositional 
force to the paternalistic norm alizing and disciplinary' power in China" (Y ang 1986: 9).
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founded in the 1970s. The Jinshan plant is like a small-scale city.16 It provides 
everything from nursery and primary schools to shops, recreational and leisure facilities 
to a university, old people’s home, television station, hospital and crematorium. Workers 
may be encapsulated in the danwei at all stages and in all points of their lives. A 
company executive described Jinshan as the "mother and father" (funm) - it considers 
itself responsible, for example, to help introduce potential marriage partners.
William Jenner (1992) describes a mental and often physical walling off of work 
places into discrete units.17 To an extent my own research confirms this perception. For 
instance, a teacher told me that "anything beyond our danwei is distant and we take little 
interest in it". I had the sense of her danwei as not only a literally but also a socially 
enclosed space. A younger state danwei employee told me that "when you enter a 
danwei your self (ziji) becomes the danw ei’s, all aspects of your life are contained (bao) 
by it. It has no connection to society." A Shanghai sociologist told me that there is a 
lack of links between units in a local area, for example, between local factories and local 
Residents’ Committees. In many instances, people resorted to guanxi - particularistic 
relationships - in order to negotiate the vertical hierarchies of such cellularized units (Yang 
1994: 75-108).
During the Maoist era spatial controls over people were generally very strict.18 
Work units were "multi-functional compounds" and the "work-unit compound became a 
miniature city within its walls...entered through a guarded gate" (Gaubatz 1995: 30). A 
former "counter-revolutionary" recalled how during the Cultural Revolution he had not 
been allowed to use the main gate of his danwei. Instead he and other "cow demon and 
snake spirits" (niugui sheshen - "forces of evil; class enemies of all descriptions" CED 
1988: 499) were compelled to enter and exit via a hole in the wall designed for rubbish 
collection. Such people often felt that they were denied the right to be human (zuoren 
de quanli). This was here symbolised by denying them the right to use the entrances and
l6Jinshan is a county o f  Shanghai seventy kilom etres from the city centre. The plant is one o f  C hina’s 
six largest enterprises. It has som e 60 ,000  thousand em ployees, around 30 ,000  o f  w hom  com m ute from  
urban Shanghai. It contributes about 10% o f  Shanghai’s tax to the central government.
l7Rofel describes how  Hangzhou silk w eaving factories w ere also internally spatially differentiated with 
the "main offices o f  the party secretary and factory director...set in a separate building w ell apart from the 
w orkshops...com pletely w alled o f f  from the shop floor...[by] thick concrete walls" (1992: 101).
l8This statement requires som e qualification. For certain sections o f  the population the Cultural 
R evolution provided significant spatial (and social) m obility. Rofel (1992 ) describes instances o f  this in 
Hangzhou silk w eaving factories. Som e workers there physically  w alked away from their work position  
to engage in politics and others "mix[ed] the space o f  the factory with ‘dom estic’ space by doing their 
laundry, shopping, and w ashing b icycles at the factory or during work hours" (97).
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exits o f humans. This man had little choice but to be associated with a state danwei, 
access to which was controlled by political "gatekeepers". Ultimately suicide was the only 
"route" he felt remained open to him.
During the reform era the "total institution" model of Chinese danwei has been 
undermined by changes in the overall economic structure and within danwei themselves. 
Changes implemented in the 1980s meant that in large state danwei "subtle yet important 
changes have taken place within the old frameworks" (1992: 110). In 1992-4 danwei 
were becoming increasingly permeable and porous entities - vertical linkages were eroding 
and wide-ranging horizontal networks becoming more important. Both the proportion of 
workers in such danwei and the degree of inclusivity of danwei was decreasing. There 
was a distinct trend for functions formerly dominated by danwei to become disentangled. 
Danwei were losing their "normative power" (Yang 1989a: 31). Important changes 
included the extensive sale of housing in the 1990s, the erosion of welfare benefits and 
moves towards the introduction of insurance schemes to replace danwei-based welfare 
benefits, and the cessation of political study sessions in most danwei. The adoption of 
1-5 year labour contracts, first introduced for new employees in 1986, had also reduced 
job security (see Wilson 1990: 49-50). In the most extreme cases danwei became "empty 
shells". A redundant factory worker, for instance, described her danwei as a kong jiazi 
(bare outline, mere skeleton) where city employees were made redundant and production 
transferred to the countryside.
The new "socialist market economy" offered workers alternative sources of income 
and status. As labour increasingly becomes regarded as a commodity it is "tradeable" and 
transferable. Workers were freer to move from one state unit to another and between state 
and collective enterprises. There were also opportunities for workers to move to private 
companies, joint or wholly foreign-funded ventures or to establish themselves as private 
entrepreneurs. Additionally, as many as five million Shanghai workers remained in their 
danwei but engaged in some form of sideline occupation.19
Danwei retention of individual dossiers still gave them an important degree of 
control over employees. For instance, permission to get married or for a passport was 
given via this dossier. However, it was increasingly possible for those with sufficient 
money to buy their way around danwei attempts at control, for example, employees who 
had signed contracts could break them by paying "compensation". Some of my 
informants had an extremely complex bureaucratic existence. In several cases, their
l9CD 8 March 1993: 4.
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dossier was not at their current place of work but at a danwei they had previously worked 
at. Sometimes retaining the dossier at the former work place was a strategy - good 
personal connections there would make it easier to obtain bureaucratic permissions. In 
other cases, workers had left danwei without permission and would deal later with the 
consequences o f this invisible "cord".
3.3.3 Tearing Down the Walls
Many official institutions, including schools and local government offices, had 
poqiang kaidian (break down the walls and open a shop) in an effort to increase revenues 
(see also Davis 1995: 3). The breaking down of school walls (poqiang) to set up shops 
is both a literal instance of changing boundaries and a microcosm of wider architectural 
and social trends in the city.20 In particular, it demonstrates the blurring of what used 
to be quite segregated spaces or spheres.
Since 1988 schools have been allowed to set up shops (kaidian), factories and 
courses to make money. One of the first schools to poqiang kaidian is located in a busy 
part of Hongkou district. After unsuccessful attempts at producing and selling radios the 
school poqiang kaidian.21 This development may be taken as indicative o f a wider shift 
from a stress upon production to one upon consumption. One wall of the school was 
converted into shop fronts - regulations stipulated that they must be closed off at the rear 
where they back onto the school - and sixty were rented out. This school was successful 
in its commercial ventures because of its location on a "city mouth" (shikou), a "hot and 
noisy" (renao) place. In the first year, 1988-89, the school made 1,000,000¥. In 1992-93, 
it made 4,700,000¥, vastly more than the 800,000¥ provided by the city Education Bureau 
to this key school.
As a result of the school’s poqiang kaidian many other businesses were 
encouraged to move to this area. This commercial success brought a danger to the school. 
The covetous local authorities wanted to relocate the school, knock down the current 
single storey shops and replace them with high rise buildings which it could rent out at 
high rents. However, one teacher felt that this danger has receded because "now everyone 
is going into business, there is more independence (dulixing bijiao qiang) arid the state
20T his includes an increasing differentiation o f  the cityscape. The M aoist ideal was for each district o f  
the city to be self-su fficient. R ecently, in cities such as Shanghai, there is the developm ent o f  specialized  
districts. These changes are discussed more extensively  by Piper Gaubatz (1995).
2IA teacher pointed out that originally schoolchildren had engaged in labour as a part o f  their "thought 
education" (six ian g  jiaoyu ). O nly later did profit (Iiyi) becom e the main m otive for such activities.
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can no longer simply confiscate property in this way." Once again, these comments are 
indicative o f wider changes, most particularly the greater degree of individual "space", a 
widening of the margins at the expense of state power. In Summer 1994, I was told that 
the school had set up a joint venture with a Hong Kong company to develop this zone.
Commercial success brought big changes to the school. The premises had been 
refurbished, teachers received higher salaries and many fringe benefits - newly appointed 
teachers received a higher salary than headmasters of many Shanghai schools, the library 
was being computerised and could buy "as many books as it likes". The school had 
bought large colour televisions, video machines and a satellite television. In addition, 
600,000¥ had been spent on setting up a school television station.
In 1992 the school embarked upon another money-making venture. It bought a
5,000 square metre plot of land in the Zhoushan Islands and formed a joint venture with 
a Hong Kong company to develop the land as a tourist resort and conference centre. I 
was told that an important reason the school had entered into this project was because it 
had "too much money and people were jealous" (yanhong). By using the money in this 
way "people could not see it" (ren yanjing kanbujian).
This school is a remarkable instance of persistent privilege. It was built in 1913 
as a private boys’ school for foreign children. After 1949, as one of Shanghai’s 26 key 
(zhongdian) middle schools (out of a city total of 800) it was still marked out as a 
privileged place. An educational bureau cadre told me that parents tried hard to get their 
children into a key middle school. He admitted that "if children attend a key school they 
have a good chance of going to university. Otherwise they have almost no chance." In 
1992, at this school, all its final year students won university places. It provides excellent 
facilities and can attract high quality teachers. Whereas many university graduates did 
their best to avoid becoming school teachers, graduates of Shanghai’s top universities were 
competing to be appointed as teachers at this school.
This case study provides a microcosm of many trends in contemporary Shanghai. 
In a literal sense by "breaking down its wall" the school had affected the appearance of 
the city. The school’s vertical links to the Shanghai Education Bureau (and through it to 
the State Education Commission in Beijing) had diminished in importance now that they 
provided less than 20% of the school’s funding. In their place, the school was embroiled 
in a much more complex network of relationships - both personal and contractual - with 
former pupils, commercial organizations and local government departments. Although all 
the staff and pupils were affected in some way by the poqiang kaidian, the school tried
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to contain and control these activities by appointing two teachers as "gatekeepers" to act 
on behalf of the school in its commercial transactions.
Another significant aspect of this case, is that it highlights the growing inequalities 
within the city. As a key school it already received state funding in excess of ordinary 
middle schools. Its commercial success, largely based upon its prime down-town location, 
now placed it in a "super-league" with few peers - its income in 1993 was nearly six times 
its state subsidy. Entrance to this school was still open to children in its catchment area. 
However, as with other key schools, parents may attempt to use the "backdoor" - 
including the use of "connections" and bribery - to enrol their children. Others may use 
"hukou strategies", for instance, one mother I knew moved her daughter’s household 
registration to her grandmother’s house so as to be in this school’s catchment area. 
Shanghai already had several private schools and there was clearly an incentive to make 
this a fee paying school.22
I noted above the reduced degree of enclosure of work units in the 1990s. 
However, in the case of this school a rather different scenario had developed. This school 
was now materially able to offer a much more comprehensive array of socialist-type 
benefits to its employees. Thus, whilst its employees were now free to leave this danwei, 
they may also be reluctant to leave since they would lose these benefits - they remained 
tightly "bound" to the danwei, although though the nature of this link had altered.
3.3.4 Beyond the Danwei
Workers who left state danwei separated themselves to varying degrees from the 
surveillance and control of the state. Joint ventures and foreign-funded enterprises were 
less intertwined with the state. However, it would be mistaken to conceptualize them as 
necessarily "freer" environments. Amongst informants considering working in joint 
ventures, I found that higher salaries, better promotion prospects and more interesting 
work were often weighed against the loss of personal freedom. It was widely believed 
that foreign-funded ventures applied much stricter attendance regulations and expected 
more intensive work than state danwei. In addition, since many of these ventures did not 
provide accommodation, employment in them often meant that employees must continue
221 visited a private primary' school w hich required a o n e-o ff paym ent o f  10 ,000¥ and charged annual 
fees. From the sch o o l’s register o f  p upils’ parents it was clear that many w ere senior executives in joint 
ventures, involved in the m edia or worked abroad. Local newspaper reports have already questioned the 
establishm ent o f  such "aristocrats’ schools" (guizu  xuexiao), for exam ple, "‘G u izu ’ X ian x ian g  M anyi" (A  
D iscussion on the Phenomenon o f  "Aristocrats") X M W B 18 January 1993: 10.
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to live in the parental home. Thus increased freedom in the sphere of employment may 
well be offset by (even) less choice in where one lived.
Other possibilities for workers may offer a less constrained existence. An 
archetype of mobility are the private motorcycle "taxis" which proliferated in Shanghai 
during the early 1990s. More generally, private entrepreneurs (getihu) often inhabited 
lateral or liminal niches between units. Small-scale enterprises within the city were 
spatially dispersed and differentiated and provided new locales to earn a livelihood. 
Zhapu Road, for example, a narrow street in central Shanghai, with a high concentration 
of private restaurants and neon lights was described by some as "little Hong Kong".23 
The re-legalization of private enterprise had also allowed a recolonization o f public spaces 
by private traders and hawkers.
Wujiaochang, on the outskirts of the city, also had many getihu. In many respects 
it was a liminal zone, a place of rural-urban interaction. As Naughton (1995a: 26) 
remarks it is in such spatial margins, as with social margins, that change is particularly 
rapid. Informants told me that until recently this area had been rural (xiangxia). 
Wujiaochang now had many street stalls - often run by moonlighters. Informants 
sometimes described this area as luanqi bazao - chaotic and disorganized. As such it can 
be contrasted with, say, the Hongqiao district around Shanghai airport. This was another 
marginal zone - it was where most early foreign investment and residence was allowed 
(and contained). A young man described, with great approval, Hongqiao development 
zone as "completely foreign style" (wanquan waiguohua). From this and other 
conversations, it was evident that his view of "foreign" included notions of modernity, 
progress, order and organization.
Those who had succeeded in the share market also inhabited very different socio- 
spatial environments. Wealthy share dealers (dahu) sometimes resigned from their 
danwei. They could choose to be based at any of the city’s three hundred plus dealing 
centres. These centres are a striking instance of a new type of place.24 Share dealing 
centres had rooms divided into various categories, with separate dealing rooms for large, 
medium and small scale dealers. This spatial hierarchy matched a wider process whereby 
wealth, rather than primarily political status, provided access to more space, comfort and 
access to information. Access to the separate dealing rooms (dahushi) for the use of
23Som e o f  the capital for this developm ent has com e from w ealthy overseas Chinese.
24It is noticeable that these centres attract clusters o f  shops and restaurants around their v icin ity.
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wealthier dealers was generally restricted to those with capital in excess of 500,000¥. It 
was also becoming possible for wealthy dealers to operate from home. A share exchange 
manager estimated that some one hundred people had a computer and analysis software 
at home and did deals via the telephone.
The different type of work place which the dahushi constitutes was evident in 
conversations with dahu. I asked two dahu - one a retired engineer the other a former 
factory worker - relaxing in the black vinyl chairs o f their special dealing room how they 
would characterise relationships between fellow dahu. They both felt they were quite 
good and believed that this was because, unlike in a danwei, there was no relationship of 
profit and loss (li-hai guanxi) between them. Thus, for example, if  one person made 
money it was not at the expense of somebody else in the same room. It was va ta ga - 
a dialect expression meaning "has no relationship" (literally "no bridge is built'Vbu da 
qiao). In a danwei, by contrast, there was such a zero-sum relationship, and there was 
often competition over housing and other entitlements. In addition, the lack of mobility 
in Chinese danwei meant that workers were often colleagues for many decades. This may 
foster strong bonds of friendship, but it could also mean that resentments and rivalries 
smoulder for years. In some instances workers must still work alongside those who had 
denounced them or were on opposing sides in previous factional disputes.
I gained useful insights on small-scale share buyers (xiao hu) in an interview in 
November 1993 with Zhao Huanan, author of the play "OK Stock". Before writing this 
play. Zhao conducted research among xiao hu. He described the crowded dealing room 
and the space around its doorway as an "environment" (huanjing) with a "small society 
(xiao shehui) since it is comprised of people of every w enhua (cultural/educational) and 
occupational level. These people have only one objective, to buy and sell shares." As a 
place to interview people he felt that this small society possessed a great advantage, "the 
interviewee is in a place distant from their home and danwei. He is a complete individual 
(wanzheng de geren) in this market place." Zhao considered that under these 
circumstances people expressed themselves very honestly. There was a "high degree of 
transparency (toum ingdu) because there is no relationship of loss and gain (li-hai guanxi) 
between share dealers. At home or in the danwei they would all have something they 
wished to conceal (yinbi) and would not fully reveal themselves (biaoxian ziji)."
Finally, in this section, the demonstrations o f Spring 1989 present an interesting 
instance of social and spatial boundaries being transgressed. For several weeks 
demonstrators colonized many of the city’s streets including the key road area along the
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Bund. At the same as this carnival like atmosphere prevailed some o f the boundaries 
between Shanghai’s vertically discrete units were weakened. Even though students 
demonstrated under their unit’s banners there were many instances where barriers between 
them and Shanghai’s "common people" were visibly transcended - this was apparent in 
the way bystanders supplied the demonstrators with food and drink. In the view o f local 
people I subsequently discussed this topic with, there was a distinct belief that the 
demonstrations were a product of the reforms and the changes brought about by the "Open 
Door" policy.
3.4 The Inner Circle: Home Spaces
They don’t put in much effort at work, (laughs) but once they get home they’re really 
busy" (sltangban dao bu zenme yang, huijia dou hen neige...)
Middle-aged woman talking about Shanghainese men
For many foreign visitors Shanghai induces a sense of claustrophobia. The slow 
moving crowds on the streets, and the density o f humanity jammed into buses and shops 
confront even the most transitory visitor. Local residents also frequently lamented "there 
are too many people!". With space at such a premium it was, perhaps, hardly surprising 
that my informants could invariably tell me the precise dimensions and volume o f their 
accommodation.
Inadequate housing was regularly cited by Shanghainese as the main problem in 
the city. In 1949, average living space was 3.9 square metres.25 During the early years 
of Communist Party rule considerable attention was paid to rehousing slum dwellers. 
However, after the early 1950s, there was little new housing built or renovation to the 
existing housing stock. In addition, an inflow of people contributed to a per capita decline 
in living space. Between 1949 and 1965 per capita living space in Shanghai declined 
from 3.7m2 to 2.15m2 (Howe 1968: 79).26 However, the rent burden was quite low - 
about 8% of average income. In the late 1970s, in a city without high rise housing, the 
population density of Shanghai was five times that o f London. The population density in 
the downtown area was 80,000 per square kilometre (Xu 1993: 2), with up to 170,000 
people per square kilometre in some parts (Yan 1985: 121).
Scarcity of housing affected the lives of all residents. To varying degrees, it 
constrained people’s lives and forced them to adopt various strategies. In university
^T hese and fo llow in g  figures are from Pellow  1993: 398-9 .
2bWalder notes a general per capita urban housing space decline o f  c.20%  between 1952-1977  (1987:
65).
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dormitories, for example, seven or eight students shared a single room. The amount of 
personal space for each student consisted of their bunk bed and a small cupboard, they 
had to use great ingenuity to minimize conflicts and retain any degree of privacy. 
Deborah Davis argues that the system of household registration (hukou) "determines job 
and marriage strategies" (1989: 97). My impression was that, if  this were true, it is no 
longer the case. However, residents may resort to an array of strategies designed to 
circumvent hukou regulations (see Pellow 1993: 415-8).
Access to housing played a part in decisions to marry. Most unmarried young 
adults lived in their parents’ homes. Since danwei did not allocate accommodation to 
unmarried employees non-marriage was rarely an option. Even after marriage a 
substantial proportion of couples still had to live with the bride or groom’s parents while 
they waited for a danwei allocation of housing. It was my impression that many couples 
would prefer to have a flat of their own. Housing could, therefore, be an important 
criterion in mate selection. I visited a young couple who lived in a large flat (over 
seventy square metres) inside a compound of buildings belonging to the military. The flat 
was given to the husband by his father, a retired (lixiu) senior army officer. The wife told 
me that her husband’s ability to provide this flat was an important factor in deciding to 
marry him.
The family and home - which are conflated in the Chinese jia  - were clearly of 
central importance to many of my informants. The importance of the home and its 
members is symbolised during Spring Festival, the main annual holiday. It is a time when 
scattered family members should return home and be together (tuanyuan). The 
commensal meal on New Year’s Eve is for family members and not "outside visitors" 
(waike).27 The family group remains separate until at least after the mid-day meal of 
the following day, only then does visiting begin.
In a city the size of Shanghai there 1$ inevitably a diverse array of living 
environments. Moreover, the experience and perception of these environments will differ 
in accordance with a range of sociological factors such as age, gender and occupation. 
For instance, the spatial world of the elderly was often especially restricted. Shanghai’s 
densely packed main streets and pavements were a hazardous environment for the elderly. 
Many informants spoke of a generation gap (daigou) emerging in Shanghai. A young
27It is notable that from the day before N ew  Year’s Eve until the fifth day o f  the new lunar month 
people reverted to the traditional lunar calendar. In a sense one may say that for these few  days people are 
both physically  and tem porally in a different place to the state.
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export salesman considered that this gap had widened because of the rapid pace o f change 
and because older people "have a smaller circle (quanzi) and less contact with society."
Often the elderly are spatially marginalized within households. After their children 
marry, many parents move into a smaller room and the new couple take over the largest 
room. The best accommodation is accorded those who are the most (re)productive. I 
watched a documentary programme in which an elderly woman slept on the balcony of 
her flat while her married children occupied the main flat. A retired man also told me that 
some parents may have to spend part of the day outside in order to give the young couple 
some privacy.
Despite such experiential differences it is possible to outline larger trends which 
were underway. In particular, as work places are becoming less inclusive and less 
bounded, I suggest that there is a general tendency in the reform era for the home to 
become an increasingly bounded, separate and privatized sphere. A combination of 
political, economic and socio-cultural factors are involved in this trend. It is to the inner 
circle of the home and an examination of these factors that I now turn my attention.
3.4.1 Privatizing the Home
The increased discreteness of the home was particularly evident for those who were 
persecuted in the past and whose homes could be subject to outside encroachment. 
Several informants described the "reach of the state" (Shue 1988) as having been much 
closer to their everyday lives in the past. A number described how their homes had been 
searched by Red Guards. The fear of such searches must have spread well beyond those 
who were actual victims. The control of outsiders over private space could extend to the 
absurd. One family I visited had been searched three times by Red Guards. Three people 
lived in their two room flat. This was considered too much space for a family with their 
"bad" class background, but the extra room was too small to be given to anybody else. 
The solution was to seal up the room with a strip of red paper - with the name of the 
revolutionary group giving the order and the date - glued across the door forbidding 
entrance. In the same household I admired a large mahogany dresser (an obvious sign of 
pre-1949 wealth). Unable to move this large, heavy piece o f furniture the Red Guards 
again resorted to the red tape, prohibiting the cupboard being opened!
Even when not physically entered the home space could be subject to incursion. 
A member of a family which had been "under the supervision of the masses" during the
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Cultural Revolution recalled how the head of the local Residents’ Committee would 
deliberately do his exercises outside their window.28 He would rest his leg on the fence 
outside their ground floor flat ostensibly carrying out his exercises but in practice 
watching their activities. More generally, extending Shue’s metaphor, Residents’ 
Committees were described to me as constituting the fingertips o f the state. These 
Committees, set up in the early 1950s, tended to be dominated by elderly women, often 
cadres’ wives, and they acted as a low-level surveillance organization.29 They were the 
people best placed to maintain surveillance over purchases made by families, their daily 
activities and any suspicious visitors. Families told me that even in the early 1980s a 
"suspicious" visitor would soon be followed by a visit from the police who would question 
them to discover who it was and what they had wanted. In addition, it was also a popular 
myth - with at least some foundation in truth - that husbands and wives dared not speak 
openly during the Cultural Revolution. Once again, the reach of the state could transcend 
the physical boundaries of the home.
The post-Mao depoliticization of everyday life included a reduction in the number 
of communal activities. In addition, Residents’ Committees have lost much o f their 
overtly political role. However, some informants pointed out that their present benign role 
could change if the government directed them. There was some evidence o f this after 
June 4, 1989 when families and neighbours were encouraged to turn-in "counter­
revolutionary elements". More generally, in place of fear I found disinterest in their 
activities, especially amongst young people. Rather than complaints about their 
surveillance activities elderly residents, in particular, complained that their local Residents’ 
Committees paid insufficient attention to security and local welfare. Many Committees 
now ran small scale enterprises such as noodle stalls and hairdressers and older residents 
considered that these commercial ventures conflicted with the Committees' "proper" 
activities such as organizing evening security patrols or helping the elderly.
3.4.2 Furnishing Desire: The Urge To Decorate
It was apparent that many Shanghai people invested much of their energy and
^N eighbourhood R esidents’ C om m ittees are the low est level o f  organization, each includes 500 to 1,300  
households. Their main functions are mediation in quarrels between neighbours, to organize participation 
in elections for P eople’s R epresentatives, the maintenance o f  cleanliness and sanitation, d issem ination o f  
propaganda and information, liaison with local police station (see Parish & W hyte 1984: 22-5).
29W hite (1981b: 51) notes that in 1946 the KM T set up a public security system  through the grouping  
o f  households and streets. This was, itself, a revived version o f  the traditional baojia system .
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financial resources in their homes. A Shanghai resident explained that "people place great 
importance upon their homes because the wider society has many things which oppress 
people (yapo ren de dongxi). The home is a small heaven (xiao tiandi). Everything 
outside their home is not their world (jiali yiwai de bu shi tam en de shijie)." This 
informant considered the historical context important in this retreat to the home, remarking 
that "previously outside the home people could not speak the truth and had no real friends 
with whom they could speak openly (tanxin). Outside one was fearful and without a 
sense of security." In these circumstances, the home offered at least a relatively greater 
degree of safety and security.
The stress upon the home as a "symbolic investment" was apparent in the craze for 
decorating and home furnishing. The resident noted above described an historical 
progression in this. He recalled that in the late Cultural Revolution many people began 
to engage in hobbies such as making small gasoline stoves. This was followed by a craze 
for making radios and sofas and then by home decoration. At first people made their own 
furniture. Recently higher incomes and a greater variety of consumer goods - fabrics, 
furniture and fittings - meant that items could be bought. He considered the emphasis 
upon the home as a kind of passive (xiaoji) opposition to society (dui shehui de 
fankang). However, he stressed that the individuals concerned would not explain it in 
this way. He associated this with Shanghai people’s general lack of concern about things 
that do not directly concern them; some feel they cannot control (guanbuliao) things 
beyond the home, others are afraid of trouble (po mo ve/pa m afan) if they do. He 
concluded that "apart from their homes, people take no interest in anything else. The 
circle in which Chinese people live is smaller and smaller."
My own observations support this view. For most Shanghainese there were few 
avenues for fulfilment outside the home. The high population density and paucity of 
cultural facilities - from sports facilities to clubs and more engaged civil society - meant 
that for the most people "home [was] the main site of leisure and recreation" (Wang 1995: 
168). bite Deborah Davis I found that this "inward gaze" was apparent in the way 
household interiors were generally "devoid of all connection to the state, the party, or the 
workplace" (1989: 95). Davis describes this as an explicit rejection of state intervention 
in private space and a popular resistance to state power. Although I accept that resistance 
to state intervention may be an outcome of these individual choices, I suggest - as the 
remarks of the informant above indicate - that this formulation exaggerates the degree of 
conscious agency involved.
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I also consider that both outside observers who are looking for resistance to the 
state and my own informant overlook other features of the urge to decorate. Many home 
decorators expressed great pride in their achievements. Only a fully-fledged ethnography 
of home furnishing could do this topic justice but I make a few comments.30 Geremie 
Barme contrasts the home to the outside world and the danwei which are' largely 
"unmalleable" and observes that "people with economic means are increasingly anxious 
to change their immediate environment, translating their visions o f individual comfort and 
bourgeois life into their own apartments" (1992: 13.22). Even those with slender means 
sought to creatively inscribe their personality on their living space. One man, a true 
bricoleur, showed me the dining room, just large enough for a small table and chairs, he 
had constructed at the back of his flat. He proudly explained that all the items employed 
in its construction had been salvaged or obtained via "connections" and could discourse 
at length on the origin of each.
New technology was also facilitating the privatization of the home. Television 
watching alongside the core family group was the dominant leisure activity. In addition, 
in the summer of 1994 air-conditioning was installed in many households. In the old style 
housing high temperatures had a centrifugal effect forcing people out of their crowded 
stifling housing and onto the streets where they mingled with neighbours. Air- 
conditioning has precisely the reverse effect, it only functions when doors and windows 
are kept shut.
A significant policy shift which was promoting the privatization of the home and 
underpins the desire to furnish was the marketization of housing. Until the early 1990s 
most residents rented housing from their danwei.31 Danwei generally allocated housing 
on the basis of a points system based upon various criteria such as number of people in 
the household, age, length of employment and rank. Rents had increased since the mid- 
1980s but were still low. A standard flat would be about 20¥ per month. However, since 
1992-3 a city-wide policy began to marketize housing by encouraging occupants to buy 
their homes. In one "new village" in Yangpu district some 70% of residents had bought
30Studies by D avis (1989 ) on household interiors in Shanghai and Laing (1989 ) on furniture arrangement 
and decoration indicate the potential for such an ethnography.
3lA ccom m odation may be acquired in five basic w ays - danw ei allocation; city housing authority 
allocation; purchase; private rental; inheritance. H ow e found that even after the 1956 socialization  
campaign som e 40% o f  the c ity ’s housing stock was still privately ow ned (1968: 82). See D avis (1989: 
96-8) on the allocation o f  housing in Shanghai.
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their properties for just 250¥ per square metre.32 Even when new housing was allocated, 
occupants now usually had to contribute a percentage of the cost (jizi jianfang).
A commercial housing market was also developing. Real estate agencies 
reemerged in the 1980s but only flourished after 1991. By 1993, there were as many as 
one thousand real estate agencies. A worker in a real estate agency remarked to me that 
"those who rely on salaries cannot buy the housing we sell." Their properties were sold 
mainly to those with overseas connections or who had earned money abroad, overseas 
Chinese, or wealthy businessmen such as the bosses of private enterprises. Housing had 
to be paid for in advance. Mortgages were still not available in late 1993. However, with 
the sale of public and danwei housing, a far more vigorous local housing market is likely 
to develop. As tenants became property owners they were more likely to invest resources 
- both financial and emotional - in their homes.
3.4.3 Changing Home Styles
During the reform era housing policy is again on the agenda, with a substantial 
increase in state investment in housing (see Chan 1994: 101-3). Figures cited in Davis 
(1989: 99) show that more new housing was built in Shanghai between 1980-86 (25.16 
million m2) than between 1950-80 (23.13 million m2). Pellow (1993: 399) states that 40 
million m2 of dwelling space were constructed between 1979-89 and that by the early 
1990s average living space in the city was 6.3 square metres.33 A recent policy was to 
rehouse 31,808 families with less than 2.5 square metres living space per person 
(tekunhu) by the end of 1992.34 A new goal for the end of 1994 was to rehouse all 
those with less than four square metres per person. A longer term goal is to double the 
amount of average living space in Shanghai by 2010 (Zhao 1993: 19).
The regeneration of large tracts of the city in the 1990s is rapidly changing the 
type of accommodation of many residents. Although the majority of Shanghai citizens 
still live in low-level housing such as the shi kumen - two storey houses built on a grid 
of lanes (see Pellow 1993: 401-9) - high-rise living is becoming much more prevalent. 
To highlight the significance of this shift it is necessary to compare the two types of living
32This price did not convey full freehold rights. Occupants were "encouraged" to buy their properties 
by being told that their rents w ould increase dramatically i f  they refused.
33I am uncertain i f  these figures indicating a doubling o f  liv ing space take account o f  the enlarging o f
Shanghai’s administrative boundaries to include areas w hich have a low er population density.
34"Housing Plan Ahead o f  Schedule" SS 18 December 1992: 2.
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"style" involved.
Parts of Shanghai with low-level high density housing, such as Nanshi, with its tiny 
houses and crowded alleyways are visibly very different to the new high-rise housing 
compounds. In shi kumen up to eight families may share one building, in which, 
generally, washing, toilet facilities and kitchen areas are communal. The cramped living 
conditions, along with strict controls over migration, facilitated a residential stability 
which Parish & Whyte argue allowed "rather traditional relations - gemeinschaft" to 
reappear in Chinese cities (355). Informants commented that although living conditions 
in Nanshi were poor, relationships between neighbours were good - they all knew each 
other and would help each other, for example, to look after children. On one occasion I 
visited Nanshi accompanied by a former resident who now lived in a high-rise flat. He 
said he felt nostalgic for life in Nanshi and missed the closeness of relationships between 
neighbours and the frequent visits they made with each other (chuanmen). He contrasted 
this situation with his new accommodation where there was little or no contact with 
neighbours.
In Hongkou district I visited the home of factory worker, his wife and eight year 
old son. The couple both worked in a large state glass factory. They lived in a high 
density residential area, just ten minutes walk from the factory, in pre-1949 housing built 
by the factory for its workers. Their house was in a small compound comprised of four 
households which shared toilet facilities and a common entrance onto the street. Most 
neighbours worked in the same factory and, like my host, had spent 10-11 years in 
Heilongjiang from 1967-78. The proximity of the work place, shared occupation and the 
experience in Heilongjiang gave this area a very special character with neighbours lives 
interwoven in diverse and complex ways.
I was invited to join the family for a meal. This was cooked at their home and on 
the coOker of the family next door. The large round dining table was borrowed from 
another neighbour. Their home consisted of two floors, a bedroom upstairs and a 
downstairs living room. The kitchen was outside the front door jutting out from the front 
of the house. It had two gas rings and a sink and was only big enough for one person. 
It had no space to prepare food, which was done on the plain cement floor of the 
downstairs room. In this compound interaction with neighbours was frequent and 
unavoidable. Privacy was limited, the exits and entrances of residents and visitors were 
all visible. Apart from the shared toilet facilities, front doors were almost side by side and 
since cooking areas were outside this provided many opportunities to engage in
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conversation with neighbours (and to observe what they are eating).
Some six-storey buildings, often with shared washing and cooking areas, were built 
in the early 1950s. During the reform period true high-rise dwellings have been 
constructed. According to Pellow (1993: 410-1), China’s indigenous elevator technology 
was too poorly developed to allow the building of high-rise blocks. The appropriate 
technology could not be imported until the reform era - an interesting spatial outcome of 
the "Open Door" policy. High-rise living is becoming the experience for an increasing 
number of Shanghai residents. It was apparent that this type o f accommodation leads to 
a marked privatisation of experience.
Many informants told me that people preferred the new high-rise housing because 
it was yi jia yi hu - "one flat, one household", that is, each household had its own kitchen 
and toilet. I was told that this separation reduced the number of arguments between 
neighbours since "they may not even recognise each other and have no relationship to 
each other" (va ta ga/bu da qiao - literally "not build a bridge"). Families which were 
rehoused often moved to suburban areas of the city away from old friends, relatives and 
neighbours. One informant suggested that living in such accommodation decreased the 
prejudice against Subei people "since people will not even know if their neighbours are 
‘Gang bu nin (Subei people/Jiangbeiren)." However, informants also noted a negative 
side to high-rise dwelling. A retired man told me that house breaking has become more 
common. He considered a combination of high-rise accommodation and women going 
out to work - thereby leaving homes unoccupied during the day - as the key factors behind 
this increase. In the old, low-level housing neighbours all knew each other and would 
notice any strangers.
Differences between the two types of housing were very apparent. Residents of 
high-rise blocks live in far more privatized spaces. A fear of crime, allied with a decline 
of mutual neighbourhood surveillance furthers this process. The physical openness of 
many low-level homes contrasted with the multiple doors in high-rise dwellings. With the 
home an increasingly encloistered space it is interesting to note some of the "outside" 
objects which were incorporated into homes. Almost every home I visited had a glass- 
fronted cabinet which displayed items considered "attractive" (haokan) by the residents. 
These often included wedding gifts - sometimes in unopened boxes - and mementoes from 
places visited by the household or the gifts of friends. Most cabinets contained at least 
one foreign item, for example, a jar of Nescafe coffee, a bottle o f "foreign" alcohol such 
French XO Brandy, even dried milk and in one case an unopened packet of PG Tips tea.
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The presence of these foreign objects indicates both the "breach" in the Chinese wall and 
the extent to which such objects were considered prestigious.
In the evidence presented above there are aspects to both support and undermine 
David Harvey’s thesis of the "urbanization of consciousness" (1989: 229-55). In Harvey’s 
view with capitalism and urbanization the family "provides a haven to which individuals 
can withdraw from the complexities and dangers of urban life or from which they can 
selectively sample its pleasures and opportunities." My findings suggest that individuals 
were often forced to withdraw from the wider society when the Chinese state was at its 
most virulently anti-capitalist. Of the factors promoting this withdrawal in the (capitalist- 
orientated) reform era only new technologies such as television and air-conditioning, taken 
as products of a consumer economy, play the type of role Harvey suggests. However, set 
against this, communications technologies pull in the other direction and the 
commercializing economy presents new motives to extend contacts beyond the family (see 
following chapter). In the final section I will indicate the role o f electronic media in both 
linking and severing the home from the "outside".
3.4.4 Alternative Places
During the reform era there has been a proliferation of locations which are neither 
work nor home places (see Wang 1995: 149-72). These include a variety of locations for 
conspicuous consumption which have emerged or re-emerged including karaoke bars, 
discotheques, night clubs, leisure centres and restaurants - during 1992 an average of ten 
new restaurants opened each day. The polarization of incomes has been matched by a 
polarization of leisure sites (Ibid: 167), many of the new places just mentioned are far 
beyond the price range of ordinary Shanghainese. In 1993, many health and social clubs 
opened, often charging extremely high prices. Private karaoke rooms, with rental prices 
often in excess of 500¥ for an evening, were also particularly exclusive locations. These 
places are indicative of rising inequalities and of the way money can now buy exclusivity. 
Many informants also considered such places as constitutive o f the trend for money to 
exert a stronger influence than morality - it was widely believed that these places were the 
location for corruption and prostitution.
Privacy was a luxury in short supply for most Shanghainese. Before the late 
1980s. for example, courting couples had few' places to go. They would congregate on 
the Bund after dark or head for the parks where they faced competition from elderly men 
playing chess or taking their pet birds for a stroll. Unsurveyed spaces, dark corners, were
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at a premium. With the commercialization of leisure there were now more possibilities 
for young people to find (relatively) secluded places. For instance, a trend in many 
Shanghai cinemas was to provide only double seats. In 1990, many cinemas tickets were 
under one yuan. The new double seats were 10-20¥, to which cost must be added the 
price of expensive drinks and snacks brought round by a waitress service. This seating 
facilitated a privatisation o f experience in a semi-public space. The proliferation o f dimly 
lit coffee houses with highly priced snacks and cover charges was another example o f this 
trend.
Reopened Christian churches offered a quite different type o f place. An elderly 
churchgoer described the church to me as "very different to the rest of society." He 
commented that, for instance, "when people leave the church it is quiet and orderly, 
completely different from the way people try to grab a seat on the buses (qiang weizi), 
not caring if there is an elderly person or a woman with a baby.
These few examples of new, alternative places highlights the increasing diversity 
and fragmentation of social life in contemporary Shanghai. In the case of the church, my 
informant stressed that it was an "orderly" place in contrast to the disorder "outside". 
Karaoke and nightclubs, by contrast, were more morally ambiguous places, which some 
described as "chaotic". Other important sites included restaurants and shops, the types of 
consumption these were believed to involve are examined in chapter five.
3.5 Connecting Lines
In this section I focus upon connecting "lines". I commence with some 
observations on the commuting lines mentioned in the quote "two points and a line". I 
then investigate more abstract types of "line" including electronic connections. I highlight 
conjunctions between access to different types of line and social status. I also indicate the 
way in which electronic media can both create, fragment and/or transgress boundaries.
3.5.1 Commuting Lines
Residents who commuted to work often told me that this journey - it could take 
three and a half hours to cross the city - took up far more energy than they ever expended 
at work. Most citizens travelled by bus or bicycle - there were some four million bicycles 
and 40,000 motored bicycles in 1993.35 City buses were frequently so tightly packed 
with passengers that the doors could not be closed. It was notable that this degree of
35Figures from Xu 1993: 6-18.
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crowdedness was constitutive of some informants’ notions o f Shanghaineseness. For 
instance, a young library worker told me that she felt a moqi ("tacit agreement") when 
travelling by bus, a shared feeling that she and her fellow passengers were all in this 
together. Notions of Shanghainese identity extended to "correct" ways o f standing on 
cramped buses. I was often assured that Shanghainese ingenuity had designed the most 
efficient way to stand on these - those who did not know these unwritten rules were 
xiangxiaren, rural outsiders.
The number o f motor vehicles was rising rapidly. In 1993, there were 300,000 
motor vehicles in the urban district - including some 25,000 taxis. In 1993, it cost 40-50¥ 
to cross the city by taxi. There were still few private cars, during seventeen months in 
Shanghai I never met anybody, apart from taxi drivers, who owned a car. Congested 
roads and minimal parking spaces undoubtedly deterred the minority who were wealthy 
enough from buying cars. Despite this there was a marked increase in the number of 
expensive foreign cars on Shanghai’s streets. The largest proportion o f these cars were 
said to belong to foreign businessmen and companies, with others owned by "Party and 
government organizations, State-owned enterprises and institutes, and even some private 
businessmen."36 Access to a private car was widely conceived of as a mark o f elite 
social status.
3.5.2 Electronic "Lines"
At an exhibition o f  pictures by children in the Shanghai Art Exhibition Centre fo r  
Children’s Day on June 1, 1993 a picture by a nine year old caught my attention. It 
shows a child with a mobile phone and above him a representation o f  a goddess in the 
heavens also with a mobile phone. A caption shows the message the boy is giving the 
goddess: "Goddess o f  Rain, on May 9,3 please don’t let it rain.
No matter which means of transport one uses, physically moving from one place 
to another consumes both time and energy. Electronic media, as the young artist clearly 
realized, "make possible new forms of social interaction, modify or undermine old forms 
of interaction, create new foci and new venues for action and interaction" (Thompson 
1990: 225). Various theorists have written on the way electronic media separates social 
interaction from physical locale (e.g. Meyrowitz 1985, Thompson 1990, Fitzgerald 1991). 
In this section I outline the role and impact of three types o f machine - the telephone,
3t’"Luxury Car Market R evs Up" SS 14 M ay 1993: 10.
37The day o f  the opening cerem ony for the East Asian Games.
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pager, and mobile phone before concluding with mention of the impact of television and 
boundaries in Shanghai.
In Shanghai the type of communications device a person had access to was often 
a reasonable indication of their social status. At the lowest level were those who must 
rely upon public phones. These phones (chuanhu dianhua) usually serve several dozen 
households. Calls are taken and made from small booths staffed by elderly local residents. 
Incoming callers leave their name and number and one of the booth’s staff emerge from 
the hut and summon the person sought with the aid of a megaphone.
Installation of a home phone ensured a much greater degree of privacy, although 
the size of many dwellings meant that family members may be able to overhear calls. The 
use of a private phone and the privatization of experience it brings has only become 
possible during the reform era. At first, only those with "connections" and/or status could 
have phones installed. A teacher told me that her phone was installed in the early 1980s 
"soon after phones were opened (kaifang)." An ex-student employed as a telephone 
engineer had installed a phone for her - an instance of a personal connection - a type of 
"line" in itself (see following chapter), providing a telephone "line". By the early 1990s 
phone installation was available to those who could afford the expense. In 1992, it cost 
about 3,500¥ to install a phone - a local newspaper pointed out that this was the 
equivalent of a year’s salary for many people.38 A bimonthly charge of 30-40¥ allowed 
up to sixty free calls within Shanghai.
Telephones make the use of connections (guanxi) much more convenient. A 
retired teacher who retained an extensive network with former students and colleagues told 
me that his bimonthly phone bill was between 200-300¥. In using guanxi the actual 
connection one requires is often reached indirectly via another or several other people. 
Negotiating such a chain by physically going from place to place would be extremely time 
and energy consuming. In my own research the telephone was a key research tool and 
I used it to pass along the links of sometimes very elaborate chains.
In the previous chapter I described an instance where the installation of private 
phones had reinvigorated what may be construed as "traditional links" between urban and 
rural relatives. The telephone can also "reinvent" traditional rituals. For example, at 
Spring Festival people should visit relatives and the streets are thronged with people 
carrying large round cakes and bottles of alcohol. Flowever, one can only visit so many 
people and the telephone enables these ritual "calls" (baifang) to be made from home.
38"Chinese Pay Dearly To Have Phones Installed in Homes" CD 13 March 1993: 3.
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An element of competition appears to creep into this - it was considered best to phone 
others before they phone you. This competitive reciprocity may follow over to the 
following year.
Since the early 1990s pagers had become common. A young woman who 
described herself as a "broker" (dzi ka - qianke) told me that for her the pager is "an 
opportunity (jihui)", "a line (xian)" and "a route (lu)".39 She had a danwei but rarely 
went there. Moreover, colleagues there would not pass on any messages for her. A 
young saleswoman, who had been issued with a pager by her boss, felt differently about 
her pager. The description of her new pager’s effect upon her life seemed to liken it to 
a kind of electronic tagging device. Soon after she had been issued with it I asked her 
what difference it had made. She replied that she felt "caught" (zhuahao) and "lacking 
freedom" (bu ziyou). She added that in contemporary Shanghai communication (lianxi) 
links of this type had become very important, before it had not mattered. She explained 
that this change was due to increasing commercialization in Shanghai and a new sense that 
"time is money". These two contrasting views on pagers show the ambiguity o f this 
device. For one informant it was a source of opportunities, for the other an infringement 
upon her personal space, an invisible line which bound her. These examples demonstrate 
the way in which the global phenomenon of "time-space compression has not been 
experienced by all in the same way, whilst some initiate its operation others are 
constrained by it" (Carter et al\ viii).
Informants recognized that information had become much more important in the 
reform era. In pre-reform rural China, Elisabeth Croll (1994) describes a situation where 
local cadres acted as "gatekeepers" for information, a resource which under-pinned their 
own power. In urban China I doubt that the state ever achieved the same degree of 
"revolutionary enclosure" (1994: 116-34). However, information was limited and access 
to it strictly controlled - there was primarily a vertical flow of information within units 
controlled by the state. As I showed in chapters one and two, during the reform era the 
state’s near monopoly over the control of information has been fundamentally undermined. 
The new stress upon communication devices is both indicative of and contributes to the 
proliferation and dissemination of information. In Shanghai, there was clear evidence of 
the way in which when people are connected electronically rather than by geographical 
space, horizontal rather than vertical communities are created (Morley & Robins 1989: 25- 
6 ).
3gThis term inology, with its interesting contiguity o f  terms, is d iscussed in the next chapter.
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An advanced form of pager - a xinxiji ("information machine") - could store 
simple messages and provide information such as the latest share prices. However, the 
most prestigious means of communication was the mobile phone. In local discourse a 
new stereotype had emerged of the businessman wearing a stylish suit, mobile phone 
clutched in his hand - a symbol of his power and ability to make things happen. The 
mobile phone market in Shanghai was opened-up to competing companies in 1988. At 
that time there were just over two hundred mobile phones in Shanghai. The 10,000th 
mobile phone was issued in December 1992.40 The official name for mobile phones is 
a direct translation from English - yidong dianhua - but in everyday speech they were 
dageda - "big brother big". Informants suggested that this term originated in Hong Kong 
as a title of triad gang leaders. This genealogy, whether real or imagined, is indicative 
of the power and prestige which was associated with possession o f a dageda. A company 
boss may issue an employee with a pager - in 1993 they cost around 2,000¥. However, 
a mobile phone cost 20-30,000¥. As one informant commented, "if somebody has a 
dageda you know he’s rich, because the most a boss (laoban) would give somebody is 
a pager."
Newspaper reports wrote about a "mobile phone stratum" (dageda jieceng). A 
young office worker described the increasing disparity between rich and poor as 
Shanghai’s most serious problem. He portrayed this as a difference "between those who 
lead very hard (ku) lives in poor accommodation and the few who have mobile phones." 
These new technologies enabled their possessors to cross boundaries. At the same time 
they also created new boundaries both in the sense of the wealth they embodied and the 
access to opportunities they provided which were denied to those who lacked them. A 
rich share dealer I met had both a pager and mobile phone. When I asked him why he 
had both he explained simply that information (xinxi) was very important to him. Mobile 
phones and pagers were both indicative of, and made possible, a quite different lifestyle 
from the "two points and a line" of ordinary workers (shangban de). Following this 
indigenous description it could be said that these new devices merged the two points into 
one with multiple lines radiating to and from it. The user is at the centre of his or her 
own network and incorporated into the networks of others rather than being daily 
conveyor-belted from home to work and back.
^Figures in "Hushang ‘D a g ed a ’ Jiazu K ew ang Zisun Mantang" X M W B  16 January 1993: 2, and 
"M ilestone for M obile Phones" SS 18 December 1993: 2.
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3.5.3 Home Boundaries in the Electronic Age
The electronic media of radio and television had entered the homes o f most 
Shanghainese. Since the 1980s, watching television had become the dominant leisure 
activity in the city. I take it as axiomatic that "television, and video, (along with the 
computer), are major agents in our understanding of time and space, and they contribute 
to the trans-formation o f these categories in everyday life" (Brunsdon 1989: 123). As I 
showed in chapter two, the material conveyed via these media has the capacity to facilitate 
both the construction and disassembling of identities at diverse levels. For instance, they 
sever traditional links between physical and social place; instead of, or alongside, place- 
related identities new types of identities can develop (cf. Fitzgerald 1991).
The effects o f electronic media on the boundaries o f the home are ambiguous. At 
one level television, radio and home telephones fragment society into households by 
furthering a process "in which leisure time has increasingly been located within the home, 
as opposed to within the public sphere" (Morley & Silverstone 1990: 38). In China, the 
development of the home as a cloistered environment may be even more attenuated in 
view of the impact of past political campaigns, the spread of high-rise dwelling and 
growing fear of crime which I have outlined. However, at another level these media 
collapse time and space and purvey global images and locate Shanghainese within a global 
and national media world. In this way broadcasting spans the private and public spheres 
through, for example, the domestication of standard national time (Scannell 1988). 
Additionally, the sitting room becomes the place where "the global meets the local" 
(Morley 1991); once public events now "occur" in the living room. Paradoxically, as 
these media promoted a separation from neighbours, they joined viewers with (or, at least, 
enabled them to gaze upon) people, places and events they would otherwise never 
encounter - distance and intimacy becoming increasingly disjoined.
Concluding Remarks
In the first part of this chapter I outlined significant changes which were taking 
place in the city scape of Shanghai. Important points in this section include the widespread 
belief that Shanghai’s physical environment had changed little in the decades from 1949 
until, at least, the mid-1980s. In the 1990s, profound physical ruptures and dislocations 
are re-constructing the "face" of the city. A theme of this thesis is to show ways in which 
identities are contingent and contextual with a wide range of cross-cutting, possible 
identifications. In the second section I continued this theme with an examination of ways
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in which places and people in Shanghai were assigned to an "upper" or a "lower" status. 
The attribution of qualities and identities to people in (or from) different parts o f the city 
provides further strands of complexity. The persistence and apparent reinforcing of these 
identifications during the Maoist era demonstrates the way in which socio-economic 
policies of that time often operated to produce consequences in direct opposition to the 
ideals rhetorically espoused.
In the third and fourth sections, I outlined ways in which work and home places 
are changing in the reform era. I argue that there appears to be a trend for danwei to 
become less enclosed and bounded and for the home to become an increasingly privatized, 
cloissoneed sphere. A combination of factors reinforced the home as a place of refuge 
including the impact of past political campaigns, technological and architectural changes, 
and the sense that rising crime is making Shanghai a less ordered and a less safe place. 
On this point it is worth noting that Western approaches which tend to depict China as 
authoritarian, in need of greater democracy and political freedom often overlook the quite 
different cultural background in China. The dominant view amongst my informants was 
that Communist Party rhetoric on, for example, controlling crime and corruption was 
correct. However, they believed either that the Party was too entangled in these activities 
to control them or that it was too weak, too lacking in authority to control them.
In the final section I highlighted ways in which differential means of transcending 
space not only located people within different spatial habitats but was also often indicative 
of social status. When analyzing social differentiation in contemporary Shanghai, rather 
than use the terminology of "class", it may be more appropriate to refer as local people 
do, for example, to a car-using "stratum" or a mobile phone-using "stratum". These are 
clear instances of the way in which, in contemporary society, consumption of products can 
be used to ascribe identities. I have shown too some of the ambiguous effects of 
electronic media, as they serve to make "connections" easier and new types of links 
possible but at the same time create new boundaries and new types of exclusion.
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Chapter 4 Trust in an Uncivil Society - Personal Relations in 
Contemporary Shanghai
In the 1950s people helped each other. In the 1960s people struggled against each other. 
In the 1970s people cheated each other.
Western theorists of modernization such as Anthony Giddens have often suggested 
that one consequence of modernization and urbanization is that a reliance upon face-to- 
face, particularistic relationships will be replaced by a stress upon universalistic, 
credentialized relationships. Indigenous discourses in Shanghai and my own experience 
as a researcher in that city sharply contradict such an assertion. An overwhelming 
impression was that particularistic ties (guanxi) were considered an essential requirement 
to creating opportunities and attaining positive outcomes in diverse aspects of everyday 
life. Indeed, Shanghainese often described this as an increasingly prominent feature o f life 
in Shanghai. In this chapter I outline indigenous "histories" which described changes in 
human relations over the last five decades. Key themes of these commentaries were a 
decline in shared values of morality and an increasing lack of trust in human relationships 
beyond key significant others. These developments were described predominantly as a 
consequence of past political campaigns or as the outcome of current social and economic 
reforms or a combination of these factors. In a society where people believed they can 
rely only upon those they "know" I examine the bases of trust which individuals depended 
upon.
There are compelling reasons for studying personal relations in contemporary 
Shanghai.1 It is a topic which both indigenous and outside observers remark upon as 
important. Chinese people frequently assert that human relations are o f key importance 
in their society whilst Mayfair Yang writes that "the art of guanxi strikes the outside 
observer as a central feature of Chinese society" (1986: 24). In addition, the state has 
actively sought to mould human relations and behaviour through social and economic 
policies, education, political campaigns, laws and coercion. From the mid-1950s 
significant socio-economic changes included the development o f the planned economy 
based upon the socialization of labour and the work unit (danwei) system which 
encapsulated workers to a considerable degree in discrete, vertically structured 
organizations. According to Parish and Whyte state policies had produced "some dramatic
‘M y study builds upon the approaches o f  researchers such as V ogel (1965), Jacobs (1982 ), G old (1985), 
Y ang (1986 , 1989, 1994), and King (1991 ) w ho have exam ined human relations in C hinese societies.
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changes in relations with neighbours, friends, workmates, and kin since 1949" (1984: 333). 
Since the late 1970s, and especially during the 1990s, far reaching socio-economic changes 
have been implemented in Shanghai. These range from the promotion of private enterprise 
to the establishment of money, share and commodity markets. The relatively clear-cut, 
vertical structures have been undermined and residents face both new opportunities and 
risks in an overall environment where the future drift of national political and economic 
policy remain uncertain. All of these factors make it particularly interesting to investigate 
some of the ways in which the urban residents I encountered discussed interpersonal 
relations.
In the first instance I hope to provide a nuanced and evocative ethnographic account 
of personal relations and bases of trust in Shanghai. This study also provides the 
opportunity to relate my findings to theories proposed by Western social scientists such as 
Anthony Giddens and Georg Simmel. The opening section of this chapter examines some 
of the theories on modern, urban society proposed by Giddens and Simmel. The next 
section highlights the way local people described human relationships as both a central 
feature of their lives and of being Chinese. Attention is drawn to the widespread belief 
that particularistic relationships (guanxi) had become an increasingly vital factor in 
determining one’s life chances since the late Cultural Revolution (1966-76). In a third 
section I outline indigenous "histories" which described changes in human relationships 
over the past five decades in Shanghai. In particular, in Shanghai I used a well known 
local rhyme - which depicted interpersonal relationships and morality as having 
deteriorated since the 1950s - as a sounding board to instigate and provoke discussion on 
this topic. My exploration in this chapter includes comments on the way the current 
marketization of the economy was often described as having a deleterious impact upon 
human relationships and morality. In a fourth section I explore discourses on various bases 
of trust which underpinned the efficacy of particularistic relationships. I conclude with a 
re-examination of Giddens and Simmel’s theories in the light of ethnographic datc\ from
Shanghai. Included in this are ways in which trust in the old abstract systems of
comradeship and the Communist Party has been replaced by trust in one’s self and new 
abstract systems such as "economic laws".
4.1 Western Theories of Human Relations in "Modern". Urban Society
Anthony Giddens (1990, 1991) has paid attention to trust in the context of 
contrasting "pre-modern" and "modern" societies. His arguments are complex and I distil
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elements which are cognate to my own concerns. Giddens describes trust in pre-modern 
societies as vested in localized contexts such as kinship and "the local community as a 
place" (1990: 102). By contrast, trust in modern societies is vested in disembedded 
abstract systems and, through a "transformation of intimacy" (1991: 6), personal 
relationships - especially those of friendship and sexual intimacy. Abstract systems 
include: i) symbolic tokens - "media of exchange that have standard value" (1991: 244) - 
such as money and ii) expert systems - "systems of expert knowledge, o f any type, 
depending on rules of procedure transferable from individual to individual (243) - such as 
medicine and law. Personal relationships are "pure relationships" created voluntarily. 
Important aspects of such relationships are that they are "not anchored in external 
conditions of social or economic life" but focused on intimacy, dependent upon mutual 
disclosure and "sought only for what the relationship can bring to the partners involved" 
(1991: 88-98).
In this chapter I use the English term "trust" rather than the Chinese xinren since
both terms share a similar range of meanings. "Trust" like xinren, has connotations of
confidence, dependability and faith and Giddens formulation that trust "always carries the
connotation of reliability in the face o f contingent outcomes, whether these concern the
actions of individuals or the operation of systems" (1990: 33) applies equally to xinren.
A key function of trust is to reduce or minimize risk and danger and to maximize
ontological security. Ontological security "refers to the confidence that most human beings
have in the continuity of their self-identity and in the constancy of the surrounding social
and material environments of action. A sense of the reliability of persons and things, so
central to the notion of trust, is basic to feelings of ontological security" (1990: 92).
wki\e
I will suggest thafGiddens1 notions on trust provide useful insights the fact that they 
are grounded in various ethnocentric assumptions undermines their utility. This conclusion 
is partly bound up with the term used in the title "uncivil society". In part, I use this term 
as a reaction to the burgeoning Sinological literature during the 1990s on "civil society" 
in China. Although in Shanghai, as elsewhere in China there are clearly what Gordon 
White (1993) describes as "tendencies" towards the emergence of a civil society I will not 
directly address this topic. However, given that trust plays a key role in associations my 
study focuses on factors which may inhibit or promote, and also affect the contours of, 
such civil society as may develop. In this respect "uncivil society" refers to frequent 
indigenous comments on the lack of trust, unity, and politeness between strangers and also 
the lack of universally accepted moral values. Taken together these constitute a distinct
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lack of civic sense.
Georg Simmel (1990) contrasts the difference in personal relations between a 
traditional and a monetized economy. He argues that in a traditional economy a subject 
is involved in personalized relationships with a limited number of people. Above all, the 
subject is bound to a particular master, a relationship Simmel describes as "the real 
antipode of freedom" (299). In a monetized economy two main developments occur. 
Firstly, there is a "plurality of economic dependencies" (297). Secondly, these relations 
are increasingly depersonalized and devoid of "all the imponderables of more emotional 
relations" (288). Simmel perceives both positive and negative aspects of a monetized 
economy. On the positive side, "the money economy... affords room for a maximum of 
liberty" (295). Money makes the individual more independent, s/he can sell his/her labour 
to whom s/he pleases, buy the achievements of others’ labour and choose which other 
forms of association to enter into. This freedom also has a negative side. There is a 
danger that there is "freedom from  something, not liberty to do something" (402). 
Moreover, Simmel considers that objects have a "direction-giving significance" (404). 
Once objects (and presumably personal relations too) are detached by money they lose this 
significance. In its wake this may bring the danger of instability, disorder and 
dissatisfaction.
I consider that contemporary Shanghai offers a useful field site for investigating 
some of Simmel’s ideas. In certain senses the pre-reform economy could be depicted as 
possessing many of the features of a non-monetized economy. In particular, workers had 
little choice over where they could be employed and many of their benefits such as 
housing, medical services and pensions were all bound up with the place of employment. 
In addition, from my own research and that of others (e.g. Walder 1986) it seems that 
workers were often tied into personalized relationships with specific bureaucratic 
gatekeepers. In recent years Shanghai’s economy has become increasingly "monetized": 
there are now possibilities for workers to choose and change their own place of 
employment; the scale and scope of services offered by work units has tended to decrease; 
wages have risen and with the legalization of private enterprise far more services are now 
available for money.
4.2 Shanghainese Representations of Human Relations
Shanghai citizens contrasted social life in China with that in "the West" claiming 
that China was a "human feelings nation" (renqing guojia) in which interpersonal
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relationships (ren yu ren zhi jian de guanxi) and the "flavour of human feelings" 
(renqingwei) were of especial importance. In the West, I would be told, human 
relationships are comparatively distant and cold. More positively, it is widely believed that 
in the West treatment of others is dependent upon universal values, fairness and 
impartiality whereas in China the stress upon renqingwei means that connections (guanxi), 
background (beijing), backstage support (houtai) and backing (kaoshan) are paramount. 
A common complaint was that in China, ranging from control o f the state to individual 
work units, there was rule by men (renzhi) and not by law (fazhi). This perception was 
encapsulated in the saying: don’t bother about the official head of the county, worry about 
who is actually in charge (bu pa xianguan, jiu pa xian guan). The reliance upon face-to- 
face relationships was evident in Shanghainese use of the term renshi - "to know 
somebody" - to describe a connection. Renshi also means "understand" and "recognise" - 
criteria which must be fulfilled to enable a basis of trust.
Traditional Confucian philosophy stressed the correct ordering of human 
relationships emphasizing the existence and maintenance of distance between distinct, 
predominantly hierarchically ordered, moral categories of people.2 Although there were, 
for instance, injunctions to place righteousness above family loyalty (dayi mie qin) in 
practice filiality (xiao) was considered to have been more important than observance of 
laws. In his pre-1949 study of Chinese society, Fei Xiaotong wrote that "the Chinese 
pattern of social organization embraces no ethical concepts that transcend specific types 
of human relationships" (1992: 72). When the Communist Party took power in 1949, it 
sought to promote universalistic values such as comradeship and "serving the people" 
which would supplant and supersede particularistic moral values such as nepotism which 
were denounced as "feudal".3 The attempt to spread the use of "comrade" (tongzhi - 
"common will") which derives from zhitong daohe meaning "cherish the same ideals and 
follow the same path" (CEP 1988: 903) may be construed as emblematic o f this project. 
It is notable that terms of address have now completed a full circle and reverted to those 
used before 1949. The terms "Mr" (xiansheng), "Mrs" (taitai), and "Miss" (xiaojie) are 
being revived whilst use of tongzhi is mainly limited to political contexts and older 
intellectuals.
:Hugh Baker (1979: 15-16) outlines the corollaries o f  this for the ideal fam ily structure in "traditional" 
China.
’Madsen (1984) provides a com prehensive account o f  the introduction and ultimate disintegration o f  
the "new governm ent-sponsored paradigms o f  morality" in a Cantonese village.
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4.2.1 "Connections" (guanxi)
In previous chapters I stressed the preponderance of walls and boundaries in 
Shanghai, a factor which is closely related to the cellular or "honeycomb pattern" (Shue 
1988: 50) of social organization. It was widely believed that going through the back door 
(zou houmen) by using personal connections (guanxi) was the only effective way to 
surmount or negotiate these boundaries (see Walder 1986: 181-5). A local sociologist 
remarked to me that it is very difficult for both Chinese and foreigners to conduct research 
in China because "there are many walls and curtains." The ways in which I was able to 
meet people and the kinds of networks I used to negotiate these boundaries are indicative 
of the nature of guanxi in Chinese society.4 It is important to bear in mind that apart 
from the party-state bureaucracy and work units there are few organizations in urban 
China. During 1992-4 Shanghai lacked most o f the myriad advisory and information 
services and voluntary associations which are found in Western cities, there was little even 
in the way of organized leisure activities. In addition, banks were only at the preliminary 
stages of offering credit facilities to individual customers. In many senses this resembles 
Sun Yat Sen’s description of China as "a plate of loose sand". Recourse to guanxi was 
considered important or essential in diverse spheres including finding work, gaining 
promotion, obtaining housing, medical treatment or a place on popular university courses 
and in any interaction with bureaucracy. A man in his sixties remarked to me that 
"without knowing somebody, you cannot do anything" (ya ning ge nin, sa si ti be va ho!bu 
renshi ren, shenme shiqing banbudao). The reverse also held: "If you have connections, 
there is nothing you cannot do." The overriding ethos can be summed up remarkably well 
by the English expression: "It’s not what you know, it’s who you know." Another
informant considered the recourse to guanxi a case of bi shang Liangshan - be compelled 
to do something wrong through force of circumstances. Without "knowing" somebody not 
only would people’s attitude be poor but any requests for assistance would be unsuccessful. 
More generally, he felt unable to trust people he did not "know" remarking that "one 
cannot believe what Chinese people say" (Zong ku nin gang e wu, va su sw/Zhongguoren 
shuohua, bu suanshu). The efficacy of using guanxi rather than relying upon appeals to 
public morality or universal values was made clear to me in the comments o f a worker in 
a neighbourhood cultural centre. He remarked, "it’s easy for me to get things done as my 
Toads’ are open (luzi hen tong). I rely upon personal connections (pin siren guanxi) to 
get things done. By contrast, the neighbourhood committee leaders just issue orders and
4I expand on this topic in the Introduction to my thesis.
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people take aversion to this. I have friendly relations (jiaoqing) with various people and 
this is important."
At this point it is important to provide some explanation of the term guanxi. Gold 
restricts guanxi to instrumentalism and describes it as a "power relationship" (1985: 660). 
However, my understanding is that whilst guanxi may be used by people for instrumental 
aims and may contain relations of this kind - the patron-client relationship is a type of 
guanxi - nonetheless the term has a wider range o f referants than this. Guanxi may be 
translated as relationships, particularistic ties, connections or connectedness. The meaning 
of guanxi is context related. It may have negative, neutral or positive connotations; it 
may involve a power relationship or describe one o f equality. Since no single English term 
encompasses the range of meanings of guanxi I follow Gold (1985), Jacobs (1982) and 
Yang (1986) and leave this term untranslated.
A rich vocabulary is associated with the use of guanxi. Some terms build upon it 
such as "pull connections" (la guanxi) and "network of connections" (guanxi wang). 
Other terms alluded to the basis which underlies the use of connections such as tuo 
renqing - to gain one’s ends through pull (literally "rely upon human feeling/sentiment"), 
song renqing - to give somebody a gift ("give human feelings") and qian renqing - to be 
indebted to someone ("owe human feelings") (see Yang 1957 on reciprocity in social 
relations in China). The use of connections was often described using a transport metaphor 
of "roads " (lu or luzi). A lu is a road or route via which some aim may be attained. A 
person whose roads are "wide" (cu) and "clear" (tong) stands a good chance of attaining 
their goal. If one meets with some obstacle (zhangai) it may be necessary to take a less 
direct route and use the backdoor (zou houmen). The backdoor may be opened (kai 
houmen) by a connection (guanxi). If this connection is reliable (ying - hard) this may 
be easy, if not it may be necessary to "surface the road" (pulu) using gifts or money.5 In 
contemporary Shanghai, those made redundant are told to "find their own way out" of 
unemployment (ziji zhao chulu). Guanxi is the key to such roads. If one lacks guanxi 
one must "walk the roads" (zou zou luzi), that is, try to find some. Social connections are 
also called menlu - literally "the entrance to roads" and one can "search for" (zhao) such 
connections. Significantly, one informant described her mobile phone as a lu and an 
"opportunity". Theatrical metaphors are also common in the discourse on connections.
5In Shanghai, the term sh aox ian g  (bum incense) is also used. In the same w ay as incense is burned 
before heavenly gatekeepers, the bodhissatva (pusa), to secure their aid and support so g ifts are laid before 
more earthly "pusa" to achieve this end.
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For instance, it is important to have beijing - background/backdrop - and houtai - 
backstage or backstage supporters whilst those with power (and, therefore, much guanxi) 
can beihou caozong - manipulate from behind the scenes. Guanxi is also implicated with 
notions of face (mianzi) (on face see Hu 1944). Face involves notions of prestige and may 
be described as a type of "social capital" (Smart 1993: 402). A person with many 
connections is said to have "a large face" (mianzi hen da). More specifically to Shanghai, 
the term pa dii (paitou) "style" may be used in this context. A person with many 
connections has pa dii. If  one relies upon such a person’s connections one may say "I’m 
relying on your ‘style’" (nu zao nong ge pa dii/wo kao nide paitou).
4.2.2 The Flourishing of Guanxi
Official statements decry guanxi as a "hangover from feudalism". Another, more 
convincing, explanation for the recourse to guanxi is scarcity of goods in a system with 
bureaucratic allocation of resources. However, this explanation does not explain why the 
use of guanxi appears to have proliferated since the late 1960s nor its current epidemic 
proportions. My findings suggest that unanticipated consequences of actions by the state 
have been instrumental in undermining the universalistic bases of trust which their rhetoric 
promoted and have thereby fostered an environment in which guanxi can flourish. Before 
turning to local "histories" on this development it is worth noting that not all citizens were 
included within the rhetoric or abstract system of comradeship. Although the notion of 
comradeship exhorted equality of treatment among comrades some categories of person, 
such as "landlords", "rightists" and "capitalist roaders" were excluded from this circle. 
Even amongst "comrades" some were more equal than others. This non-universal view of 
human nature remains enshrined in the current (standard) Chinese-English Dictionary 
which states "different classes have different feelings" (1988: 572) and "in class society 
there is no human nature above classes" (573).
People I spoke with suggested various reasons for the increased resort to guanxi. 
A man in his sixties observed that during the Maoist era "although cadres may be evil, 
leftist, inflexible and stubborn they were comparatively honest (lianjie). Before the 
Cultural Revolution things were very rigid and everything was done according to political 
criteria such as class status." He felt that since 1976 "there are no set criteria, no dogma 
(jiaotiao). This flexibility (linghuoxing) along with a limited legal framework has 
permitted guanxi use to flourish." Another informant, a man in his fifties, told me that 
during the early Cultural Revolution "people dared not use the backdoor." Extensive resort
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to the use o f guanxi appears to have reappeared especially during the latter part of the 
Cultural Revolution (see also Hertz 1994: 83-90).6 Like Hertz, I also found that the most 
significant motive for resort to guanxi at that time had been by parents attempting to have 
their "sent-down" children transferred back to Shanghai (85, note 42). This desperate wish 
on the part of tens of thousands of Shanghai households coincided with (and, perhaps, 
contributed to) a weakening of the structures of social control and surveillance.
The flourishing of recourse to guanxi may also be related to changes in the 
economy since the death of Mao. Ezra Vogel reports how in Canton from the late 1970s 
"guanxi blossomed to play a new instrumental role for entrepreneurs taking advantage of 
market opportunities" (1989: 405-9). In the 1990s especially the cellular, vertical socio­
economic structures have been considerably weakened both by an internal inability to meet 
workers’ demands and the emergence of alternative sources to meet these demands. A 
university professor commented to me that "the commodity economy by its very nature 
requires guanxi." In a society where bases o f trust between strangers are extremely 
limited, it is inevitable that people turn to those they "recognize". Many residents 
considered that Shanghai’s commercializing economy was creating new opportunities. 
However, a common belief was that access to these opportunities was limited to those with 
power and the ability to pull guanxi (to have power is also to have guanxi), especially if 
they also had ability (nengli). At the highest levels were those who operate within the 
guanxi-power nexus provided by military backing. A man in his fifties remarked, "in the 
West people say that time is money, in China guanxi is money." In Shanghai there were 
popular stereotypes of government officials with "two-sided name cards" who utilized 
contacts made in their official capacity for personal enrichment - one side has their official 
status, the other their company affiliation. Retired high-ranking cadres (gaogan) were 
often involved in trading companies or as ubiquitous "advisors". Such activities could 
easily blur into the type of official sleaze and corruption (guandao) which, in Shanghai 
at least, was the prime target of demonstrators in 1989.
An arena where the potential for guanxi had proliferated was in job selection and 
career opportunities. Career mobility, especially for the young and well-educated, had 
expanded greatly since Deborah Davis’s description of Shanghai’s workforce in the 1980s 
as "highly immobile" (1990: 86). Since the mid-1980s graduates from Shanghai 
educational establishments had been allowed to find their own jobs instead of being
6My findings are remarkably sim ilar to those o f  M ayfair Yang (1994: 154-9) w ho conducted research 
in Beijing in the early 1980s.
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assigned to a danwei. Graduating students used guanxi to learn about opportunities and 
liaise with danwei. Although there were now job advertisements in the local press and 
various job markets students believed that the best jobs went to those with connections. 
Under the old system party officials were responsible for making this choice which reduced 
the potential loci for guanxi. By 1992-4, students told me that only those who lacked 
ability and were without guanxi were still assigned jobs by the state. Alan Smart (1993) 
discusses the notion o f guanxi as social capital and in Shanghai a correlation was made 
between the amount of guanxi somebody had and their opportunities (jihui). For students 
engaged in finding employment an important criterion in selecting a particular job was the 
potential opportunities it would provide to make new and further guanxi.
Allowing graduates to find their own jobs contributed to the declining influence of 
the party by reducing the power of its members as bureaucratic gatekeepers. Two bright 
students I knew were advised by their teachers to join the Communist Party because "it 
would help in their job assignments." Both ignored this advice and found their own jobs. 
The devolution of power to enterprise heads also gave them greater freedom to engage in 
(or be ensnared by) nepotism, especially in state enterprises where, as one informant 
pointed out, "it’s all the state’s money." Mitigating against such nepotism was increased 
enterprise responsibility for profits and losses. In some instances economic liberalization 
provided equality of opportunity beyond guanxi. A newly appointed worker in a Beijing 
state trading company was one of 20 chosen from over 600 applicants for a job in its new 
Shanghai branch. She observed that usually jobs were given to those with guanxi who 
"open the backdoor" rather than simply those with ability. However, in this case the 
company had no established organization in Shanghai and, therefore, no people with 
guanxi.
Personal connections were considered essential to business operations. In one 
instance I was acquainted with two young men rented a shop counter and set up a small 
business selling m en's trousers. Every step o f this procedure involved personal 
connections: for example, locating a suitable site, obtaining supplies of merchandise and 
finding two shop assistants. One of the partners took long term sick leave from his work 
unit. He explained that he "recognised" a doctor who would sign the relevant sick note. 
Clearly one role of guanxi in this enterprise was to provide information about commercial 
opportunities. During the Maoist era information sources were strictly controlled. In the 
emerging socialist market economy, information has become increasingly valuable and 
sources of it elaborated far beyond the vertically organized state structure. As Elisabeth
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Croll (1994: 116-34) argues, there is a close association between information and agency. 
Amongst share dealers, for instance, information was frequently cited as the key to success 
and the main source of information were contacts. There was a strong incentive to build 
up extensive networks of persons whose knowledge could be trusted. A striking contrast 
I noted was the successful share dealers’ reliance upon numerous phone calls as opposed 
to the crowds which gathered on the pavements outside various dealing halls from the time 
the market closes at 4pm often until midnight.
In recent years public relations had emerged as a new course of study and rapidly 
become very popular. This development indicates that new types o f relationships were 
coming into existence. Shanghai’s commercializing economy also provided scope for 
many types of brokers and middlemen. Alan Smart (1993), for instance, found that many 
Hong Kong entrepreneurs utilize or construct social ties with individuals to facilitate the 
process of investment in the PRC and act as brokers. These people fulfil the same type 
o f role as compradors in pre-1949 China. Before the reform era danwei had a vertical, 
hierarchical structure and relations between lower levels in two danwei went up vertical 
ladders to the leaders, then across and down. Exceptions to this were lianluoyuan, (liaison 
personnel) who operated on behalf of state danwei as middlemen between wholesale and 
retail units. Individuals could also use personal connections, although the scope for this 
was limited. In the early 1990s there was now a much greater opportunity for connections 
to be made horizontally. Indeed, one informant suggested that danwei leaders, and by 
extension the Communist Party itself, were increasingly just "signboards" (zhaopai).
Recently dzi ka (qianke) a pre-1949 term for broker had been revived although it 
remained a rather derogatory term. One woman I spoke with who said that she could be 
called a dzi ka described one aspect of her work as being a "cultural" or "propaganda" 
broker (wenhua/xuanchuan jingjiren). These activities involved publicizing products 
through placing articles and creating opportunities in the media. She drew a distinction 
between "hard advertising" and the type of "soft advertising" she facilitated. The former 
is direct advertising and the latter advertising in the guise of news items or other features 
such as interviews. She used a guanxi "net" comprised of "familiar people" (shuren) 
including former classmates, and "friends of friends". In addition, she added, money is a 
pass/permit (tongxingzheng). In discussing her work she observed that she "earns money 
through sentiment" (zhuan you qing de qian). Referring to me she remarked that since 
I had been introduced to her by an old schoolmate that in our interview I was "earning her 
thoughts through sentiment" (zhuan you qing de siwei). In explanation she added that she
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had only agreed to being interviewed because of the sentiment between herself and this 
school friend. I was dependent upon her friend’s face (kao lao pengyou de mianshang) 
and using the sentiment of the friendship between them to obtain her thoughts.
Resort to particularistic contacts appears to play a major part in all Chinese societies 
and in China before 1949. For instance, Gordon Redding writes that "trust and 
dependability based on social obligations rather than contractual relations are central to the 
understanding of Overseas Chinese business" (1993: 99) Similarly in Mazu, Taiwan 
"people believe they can only rely on those with whom they have an emotional attachment, 
ganqing, to protect them in times of difficulties and to help them reach their goals in better 
times" (Jacobs 1982: 229-30). Indeed, the remarkable feature of the PRC may not be the 
apparent re-emergence of their importance but their reported lack of importance during the 
early years of Communist rule. To investigate this it is necessary to locate the proliferation 
of the resort to particularistic ties within wider discourses on human relationships. In 
tandem with the perceived need for guanxi, informants frequently lamented a lack of unity 
amongst Chinese people. One informant remarked that she often felt that there was hatred 
(chouhen) between strangers - a case not so much of the "polite estrangement" described 
by Giddens (1990: 81) but rather an absolute estrangement. A local writer told me 
"Chinese people do not unite (tuanjie) but they are extremely good at protecting 
themselves" (feichang hui baohu ziji). This individualism (geren) and lack of unity of 
Chinese people was frequently contrasted to a perceived solidarity on the part of 
Japanese.7 This perception was conveyed in a short rhyme of which I heard various 
versions: one Chinese is a dragon, but ten Chinese are ten insects; one Japanese is an 
insect, but ten Japanese a great dragon. The lack of unity and cooperation was matched 
by a sense that everyone was out for themselves and also jealous of the success of others. 
A typical comment was that made by a worker at Shanghai’s Baoshan steel works who 
told me "in China, people are jealous (duji) of others who have more than them. In the 
West people would strive to surpass this person, but in China they seek a way to pull them 
down."
Various indigenous explanations were given for the prevalence of jealousy and lack 
of unity. Some cited the crowded living environment of Shanghai. This was described as 
creating a calculating (jinjin jijiao) and petty (xiaoxinyan) personality. Others blamed 
"China's history" or "culture", often as agents which act upon people - an underlying thesis
7It is interesting that Nakane contrasts the Japanese fam ily system  as one based upon mem bership o f  a 
collective group and the C hinese system as based on relationships between particular individuals (1970: 14).
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of the Heshang documentary series (see Su & Wang 1991). One man cited a traditional 
phrase: each person sweeps the snow from their own doorstep, no one bothers about the 
snow on another’s roof (geren zi sao men qian xue, mo guan ta ren wa shang shuang). 
In Shanghai this same sentiment of lack of concern for others was encapsulated in a 
phrase: ignore (even) the affairs of the dead (xi nin va hue - si ren bu guan). More 
frequently political/conspiratorial and economic explanations were given. These 
explanations for the lack of unity mirrored those given for the increased resort to guanxi - 
the obverse of trust in abstract systems such as comradeship is placing trust only in those 
one knows.
Political/ conspiratorial explanations blamed deterioration in interpersonal 
relationships firmly on the policies and campaigns of the Communist Party especially 
during the Maoist period. One informant remarked that the Communist Party had "harmed 
the thinking, personality and emotions of people." In place of the "former honesty of 
Chinese people" he now saw only jiahua - lies, dahua - boasting, konghua - empty 
words. A view often expressed was that Mao had deliberately orchestrated a policy of 
keeping the people in ignorance (yumin zhengce) - for instance, by denying access to 
foreign news - and sowing discord (tiaobo) through his notion o f class struggle in order 
to divide and rule (fen er zhizhi). As one informant expressed it, "Mao Zedong made it 
a society in which people attacked (literally "ate") each other (ren chi ren) in order to 
maintain control." Turning a current party slogan on its head, one academic remarked 
acidly, "Deng Xiaoping calls for ‘stability and unity’ (anding tuanjie). But that is the last 
thing the Communist Party really wants. If the Iaobaixing unite, it will be unstable for the 
Communist Party." Economic explanations stressed the impact of the reform era in which, 
for example, wealth differentials had expanded greatly and money become a key criterion 
of success.
4.3 Indigenous "Histories" of Personal Relations
A popular rhyme characterised the change in interpersonal relationships over three 
decades: In the 1950s people helped each other. In the 1960s they struggled against each 
other. In the 1970s they cheated each other. (Wu shi niandai, ren bang ren. Liu shi 
niandai. ren dou ren. Qi shi niandai, ren pian ren). This short rhyme proved a useful 
sounding board to discuss dimensions of change in human relations. Many respondents 
spontaneously told me this rhyme whilst others, when asked for their opinion on its 
veracity, considered it an accurate portrayal of how things were. The depiction of the
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1950s, in particular, was accepted by almost all informants, of all ages, as axiomatic. The 
early years of Communist rule were often described as a "golden period" in which 
standards of morality, politeness and interpersonal relationships were particularly good.8 
Many felt nostalgia (huaijiu) for the comradely friendship (tongzhi youyi) of this time. 
One man recalled that in 1949 neighbours who had not spoken for years would speak to 
each other and that "during 1949-52\3 people were like brothers (xiongdi) but soon the 
class struggle began." Another contrast was that "in the early years after 1949, people 
queued for buses, now everyone tries to grab a seat." Occasional dissenting voices 
included that of a former KMT official who commented that "superficially interpersonal 
relations were very good with everyone saying ‘comrade’. But this was only on the 
surface (biaomian), people dared not do otherwise. People were lying from dawn till 
dusk." A journalist in his early forties suggested that positive views on the past may be 
based upon nostalgia, a notion expressed in the proverb: renxin bu gu - people’s hearts 
are not what they were in the old times.
4.3.1 The 1960s - People Struggle Against Each Other
It is a source o f  endless jo y  to struggle with heaven, earth and man.
Mao Zedong
Of all the political campaigns after 1949 the Cultural Revolution (1966-76) was 
described as having had the most deleterious effect upon interpersonal relationships, 
although, as I show later, others formed strong friendships at this time. One man described 
the Cultural Revolution to me as an "interpersonal hell" (ren yu ren diyu) and I heard 
many examples of the way human relations were affected at this time. At its most extreme 
form individuals were physically and/or socially isolated (guli). One victim of social 
isolation described himself as having been a "political orphan (zhengzhi de guer)" because 
neighbours, friends, work colleagues and relatives all ignored him. Tu Wei-ming describes 
many people in this position as having "immediately imposed a moratorium on their 
guanxi (human relations), fearing that their ‘social disease’ was potently contagious" (1992: 
267). Similarly my informant told me "when I saw people I knew (shuren), I deliberately 
ignored them to protect them as anyone seen talking to me would have problems." Such 
people experienced profound "existential anxiety" which, as Giddens remarks, is the most 
extreme opposite of trust (1990: 99-100). Giddens describes this state of mind as one of
8Mayfair Yang, w ho conducted research in Beijing, found that "[i]n the years between 1949 and 1956-7, 
human relations are remembered as being very sim ple and straightforward. Spirits were high and people  
genuinely em bodied the socialist ethic o f  working hard and helping each other" (1986: 56, 55-9).
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dread, and it is striking that both this informant and others used the term kongju, "dread", 
to describe this period. This sense of dread may persist until the present day. One 
interviewee told me that nearly thirty years later occasional nightmares - including on the 
day of our interview - caused him to wake at dawn with the same feeling that "it was the 
start o f another day as a victim." This anxiety was neither a consequence of "urbanization" 
or "modernization" per se in the sense Giddens anticipates but rather of policies instigated 
by the state.
There was great pressure on individuals to conform and considerable fear that 
unorthodox views or behaviour would be reported. Some reported others because they 
believed in the Communist Party others for more partisan motives (see Shirk 1982). Trust 
in others "is psychologically consequential for the individual who trusts: a moral hostage 
to fortune is given" (Giddens 1990: 33). Faced with such risks it was necessary to take 
precautions (yufang) and exercise caution in all interactions. One informant told me that 
he took this to the point of not speaking at all. Treatment of the elderly is often said to 
have deteriorated during the Cultural Revolution and the universal moral basis of 
professions such as medicine and teachers undermined since "class enemies" - "cow 
demons and snake spirits" (niugui sheshen) - and their offspring were expected to be 
treated with less consideration than "the people". A former teacher remarked that the 
legacy of class conflict is that people are now callous (lengku), aloof and indifferent 
(wudong yuzhong) and will not deal warmiy^each other. Often both activists and victims 
described themselves as having been used (liyong) and tricked (shangdang) by political 
leaders (especially Mao and/or the Gang of Four) during the Cultural Revolution. Against 
this dominant view other "histories" stressed that the social atmosphere (shehui fengqi) 
was much better during Mao’s time and that people then were more honest (laoshi).
4.3.2 1970s Onwards
The final verse of the rhyme proclaims that in the 1970s "people cheated each 
other". This verse was less well known than the preceding two and more controversial.
I asked the first person to tell me this rhyme, a worker in a joint venture, to add his own 
supplementary verses for the 1980s and 1990s. He first added an extra line for the 1970s 
of "people concealed things from each other" (ren yinman). For the 1980s he suggested 
"each person looked after their own affairs" (ge ren guan ge ren). For the 1990s he 
speculated that it may be "people trample on each other" (ren cai ren). A common 
reaction to the statement that in 1970s people cheated each other was that this was far
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more appropriate for the 1980s and 1990s. A female factory worker had only heard the first 
line of this rhyme. She was uncertain how the intervening years should be judged but 
suggested "people ‘consume’ each other" (ren chi ren) for the 1990s.
Most people considered that standards of living had risen in the post Mao years and 
that there were fewer constraints on everyday life. However, these improvements were 
often described as having been accompanied by deterioration in standards o f public and 
private morality. Such views were expressed even by those highly supportive of the Open 
Door policy and reform. A not uncommon view was that current trends compounded 
damage done during past political campaigns. A woman in her late thirties remarked that 
"the Cultural Revolution severely damaged interpersonal relations (her father committed 
suicide at this time), there was no link up (goutong). Now relationships between people are 
via money. People will only have contact (laiwang) with others if it is profitable to them." 
A 38 year old clerk described personal relations in the 1990s as lacking human feeling 
(renqing) and emotion (ganqing) and as cold (lengmo), selfish and dominated by money. 
It was widely believed that professionals such as doctors and teachers require gifts and "red 
packets" (containing money) in order to ensure their attention. An intellectual expressed his 
concern that "morality cannot be imported, but China has none of its own." He added that 
"Deng Xiaoping’s ‘black and white cats’ have now found their way into interpersonal 
relationships. If is advantageous to themselves people make friends with others regardless 
of whether they are ‘black’ or ‘white cats’."9 These statements accord closely with 
Simmel’s thesis that a monetized economy provides greater individual freedom but also the 
danger of "a selling and uprooting of personal values" (1990: 404).
In the reform era the state has paid less attention to communal activities. Moreover, 
since active involvement in public or social affairs laid one open to considerable potential 
dangers a pervasive spirit of "the more you do, the more mistakes you make" (duo zuo, duo 
cuo) seems to have taken hold. I found that people often ought solace in home life and 
disregarded all matters that did not directly concern them (bu guan xianshi). When asked 
about the ills of their society a common response was that "nothing can be done" (meiyou 
banfa). One worker outlined his philosophy of life: "When asked to do something, I do 
my best to avoid agreeing to do it. If pressed I agree but then don’t do it. If I really have
^This is an ironic play upon D eny X iaoping's famous aphorism o f  the early 1980s: It does not matter if  
the cat is black or w hite so lony as it catches m ice. This statement w as understood as im plying that ideology  
is less important than econom ic developm ent. D eny has recently reiterated this pragmatic paradigm in a more 
direct fashion observing: It does not matter if  som ething is called socialism  or capitalism  so  long as it
im proves the life o f  the ordinary people.
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no choice, I just do the minimum possible."
The main public events in recent years which contrast with such expressions o f  
cynicism  were the dem onstrations o f  1989. Tu W ei-m ing describes how "[f]or 
approxim ately fifty days, the city o f  Beijing exhibited a civ ic  spirit, a sense o f  civ ility , 
thought to have been destroyed by the Cultural R evolution . There was a pervasive feeling  
o f  interconnectedness, mutual bonding, and co llective  responsibility in public places" (1992: 
227). In Shanghai this sense o f  shared feeling was replicated to an extent, particularly 
am ongst the young people w ho constituted most o f  the dem onstrators. H ow ever, many 
residents took no part in these events; on the evening o f  June 4 I visited a getihu 
restaurant, only to find the manager and a group o f  his friends enjoying a spontaneous party, 
apparently unconcerned by events in Beijing. M any Shanghainese, believed , like the worker 
informant noted in the previous paragraph, that young people w ere being tricked and duped 
by political manipulators in just the same way as his generation had been in the Cultural 
Revolution. Since the early 1990s the pervasive apathy which fo llow ed  June 4 had 
increasingly been replaced by a belief that making m oney w as o n e ’s primary concern.
C artoon  10 Caption "The Mouse Has M oney"
(XMWB 29 July 1993)
The change in personal relations was reflected in the way people described changes 
in the morality and behaviour of officials. An academ ic couple in their early fifties both o f  
whom experienced persecution during the M aoist era still expressed nostalgia for som e  
aspects of that time. Both felt that then "leaders and cadres shared the hardships
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(tongganku) o f the laobaixing. People’s morality (daode) was good and they would help 
each other, cadres would ‘serve the people’." A dominant impression in 1990s Shanghai 
was that officials were primarily concerned with personal enrichment.10 In the view of 
a retired mechanic, "now party members do what they want for themselves, their sons and 
grandsons, only then may they consider other people." A recent addition to the phrase 
rudang zuoguan - join the party to become an official - was zuoguan facai - get rich by 
becoming an official. In the words of one informant securing an official position was now 
simply a strategy to become rich (facai de shouduan). With the blurring borderline 
between state bureaucrat and private merchant (see Solinger 1992), it was widely believed 
that offspring and relatives of high officials were making vast profits from business 
activities (see also Rocca 1992: 415).
Despite common perceptions that this decline in morality was due to factors such 
as the political campaigns of the Maoist era and the marketization of the economy it can 
also be viewed as a return to a more traditional pattern. The perceived link between 
officials and personal enrichment is made abundantly clear in traditional phrases such as: 
only the prospect of wealth will make someone travel a thousand miles to become an 
official, if it were not for gold who would go? (qian li zuoguan zhi wei cai, bu wei 
huangjin shei ken lai?). Another traditional phrase comments: after just three years even 
an honest official will become rich (san nian qingguan zhifu, shi wan xuehua yin). The 
stress upon particularistic relationships and the perception that officials showed favouritism 
is evident in the saying: when a man attains the Dao, even his chickens and dogs ascend 
to heaven - when a man gets to the top, all his friends and relations get there with him (yi 
ren dedao. ji quan sheng tian).
4.4 Bases of trust
In the preceding section I outlined "histories" of the changing nature of 
interpersonal relationships. In a society where "knowing" people and having connections 
is considered so crucial it is important to understand the types of relationship involved. 
In this section I examine the key bases of trust which people relied upon and try to
l0This new ethos is by no means limited to Shanghai. Madsen writes o f  the new  generation o f  leaders 
in a Cantonese v illage in the 1970s that "a common term used to characterize their private lives was 
selfishness; these people did not care about anything outside the circle o f  their own sm all fam ilies" (1984: 
218).
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produce a nuanced view of each.11 This involves drawing attention, where appropriate, 
to changes over time and where feasible and applicable to generational, gender and 
occupational differences. Thus, an unmarried young woman living at home noted how the 
degree of importance placed upon different relationships varies with the life cycle. For the 
time being she considered friends - with whom she had a common language (gongtong 
yuyan) - more important than family. However, she expected that when married with her 
own child that her own family would be the most important to her. A young wife 
remarked on a gender difference in this respect. She rarely contacted friends but her 
husband frequently spent time with friends. Following the birth o f her child her 
relationship with her mother-in-law, with whom she lived, took on much greater 
significance. The legacy of political campaigns and more rigid conformism of the past was 
often evident in the interactive style of different age groups. Since the death of Mao the 
presence o f the state was no longer felt to be so omnipresent or all encompassing. Young 
people more readily spoke their minds, for instance on political matters, whilst older people 
tended to discuss such topics only in hushed voices.
When I asked a man in his forties with whom he had the best relationships he 
described these as circles (quanzi). The inner circle consisted o f his household (jiating) 
and relatives (qinqi). Radiating outwards were university classmates (tongxue); friends 
(pengyou) and then work colleagues (tongshi). I follow this order and add the following: 
student-teacher; same native place; relationships of mutual benefit. I examine trust in 
abstract systems in the concluding section.
4.4.1 Qualities of Human Relations
Before examining these bases of trust it is important to outline some of the qualities 
which are considered an integral part of human relations. The first term is yiqi (code of 
brotherhood, personal loyalty) which has associations with the xia - chivalrous - tradition 
of the Mohists, a school of thought in the Spring and Autumn and Warring States Periods 
(770-221 BC) and with jianghu yiqi - code of brotherhood or the personal loyalty between 
those who engage in wandering trades (Yang 1986: 108-12). This idea was alluded to in 
the contemporary saying: at home depend upon relatives, outside rely on the help of
friends (zai jiali kao qinqi, zai waimian kao pengyou bangmang). According to the xia 
tradition one should sacrifice one’s own life (liang lei cha dao - cut out one’s own ribs)
"In his study o f  local politics and guanxi Jacobs (1982 ) outlines seven bases o f  g u an x i - locality, 
kinship, co-worker, classmate, sworn brotherhood, surname and teacher-student.
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for the sake of a friend and have absolute sincerity (chicheng). With yiqi there is an 
injunction to provide help when asked. Indeed it is complex layers of mutual indebtedness 
for favours and help received and given which create, promote and strengthen yiqi. As 
Mayfair Yang remarks, "a debt keeps a relationship open" (1986: 91). Commenting on the 
importance of "continuing reciprocation", Fei Xiaotong points out that to suanzhang - 
settle accounts - also has the implication o f breaking of relationships (1992: 124-5). A 
Chinese academic considered that in contemporary Shanghai, yiqi was confined to young 
people and especially manual workers. He expressed admiration for yiqi but remarked that 
most intellectuals looked down upon yiqi as uncivilized. Both men and women could have 
yiqi. although it was generally used of men. A man in his nineties observed that if friends 
have yiqi their relationship can'^stronger than that between brothers. Discourses on yiqi 
also invoked regional stereotypes, this man added that "northerners and Japanese stress 
yiqi. southern Chinese are devious (huatou)."
The term qing (feeling, sentiment, emotion) combines with other characters to form, 
for example, ganqing (emotion, affection), aiqing (love between man and woman) and 
qingyi (friendly feelings). Qing refers especially to male-female relationships but may 
also exist between friends, for instance, an act of kindness may evoke qing. Yiqi is felt 
to be rather "coarse" (cu) and qingyi comparatively "fine" (xi) and "gentle and soft" 
(wenrou). A third term xin (confidence, trust, faith) combines to form the expressions 
xinyi (good faith) and xinyong (trustworthiness, credit) which are generally used in 
business (see De Glopper 1972: 304-11). It does not involve emotion but an injunction 
that one's words can be trusted (jianghua suanshu). Ultimately it is backed up by law.
Ambrose King writes of the importance of "guanxi avoidance" as essential to create 
the level of instrumental rationality necessary to engage in business transactions (1991: 75- 
8). He observes that actors engage in a "compartmentalization" strategy to keep separate 
specifically economic exchanges from diffuse social exchanges.12 I find this notion of 
compartmentalization helpful in 1990s Shanghai. In one small business I knew of, failure 
to compartmentalize in this way was a major contributory factor behind the failure o f the 
enterprise itself. In this case the type of generalized reciprocal relations demanded by 
codes of yiqi became implicated in business transactions. By contrast, a highly successful
12K ing’s notion o f  compartmentalization builds upon Fei X iaotong’s insight on the w ay C hinese villagers 
w ould walk m iles to a market where they could exchange goods and act "without human feelings" (1992: 
126-7).
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businesswoman explained her philosophy on human relations in business very succinctly: 
business is business, friends are friends.13 The import of this was clear, the former 
involves a degree of calculation and detachment wholly inappropriate in the latter 
relationship which is built upon yiqi.
The comments of a young saleswomen clearly reveal the tension she felt in this 
compartmentalization. She observed that "businessmen only pay attention to profit (liyi). 
If there is no profit they will not have contact with you. In only discussing profit, never 
affection (ganqing) I feel that my self is lost (shiqu ziji)." When this 
compartmentalization breaks down awkward dilemmas can emerge. A secretary told me 
how her boss had become aware that she has a friend who can obtain airline tickets. 
However, the secretary was reluctant to use this contact since the "human feeling would 
be too heavy" (renqing tai zhong) - in other words she would feel too indebted to this 
contact. The demands of commercial organizations and "human feelings" clashed since 
the boss expected her to use this "route" (lu) every time whilst the secretary considered 
that these two spheres should remain separate. One young man told me that to avoid such 
dilemmas in applying for jobs he deliberately relied upon newspaper advertisements rather 
than guanxi. He explained that if a job is given via a personal connection that one’s own 
conduct and behaviour is then embroiled with and will affect this person’s "face." It was 
a debt and responsibility he did not wish to shoulder.
Compartmentalization can also operate at a different level. During the reform years 
name cards have become a vital accessory to many professionals and business people in 
Shanghai. Often one person has multiple name cards. In the course of a single interview 
an interviewee would first hand me a name card relating to their main profession. As the 
conversation touched upon differing aspects of their life so other cards may appear relating 
to sideline activities. In addition, a name card with the home address may be proffered - 
the hand-written addition (or omission) of home phone, pager and/or mobile phone 
numbers adds another degree of finesse. The presentation of different name cards could 
be construed as proffering differing versions of their self, the decision of which cards to 
give dependent upon considerations including the degree of trust developed.
4.4 .2  Relatives
Permeating Chinese society from the national to the familial level is the conception
l3De Glopper reports a sim ilar situation in Taiwan where with business, kinship and neighbourly relations 
"each has its own principle and purposes, its ow n satisfactions and problems" (1972: 312).
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that there is a fundamental distinction between the inside and the outside (nei-wai you 
bie). China is "inside country" (guonei), foreign places "outside country" (guowai) and 
foreigners "outside country people" (waiguoren). This perception is so deeply ingrained 
that long-term Chinese residents in England continue to describe non-Chinese inhabitants 
as "foreigners". At the micro level this inside-outside boundary is evident in the dialect 
term a la zi ga nin (women zijia ren) - "our own people/one of us." In its most strict 
application only close family members who share the same surname (tongxing) are 
included. However, as King (1991: 67) points out, this boundary of "our own people" 
possesses considerable elasticity. It may, for instance, include a close friend who is 
regarded as if they were a family member. To be "one of us" is to be bound by rights and 
duties of reciprocity, mutual aid and support. Traditionally, those related or friendly with 
an offender could be punished (lianzuo) and this ethos persisted through the class labelling 
of families during the Maoist period.
In Shanghai various relationships invoked kinship terms.14 For instance, one may 
call a boy younger than oneself xiao didi (little brother) and a man over fifty lao baba 
(old father). Female friends may call each other ah jie (sister). A sarcastic term for the 
police was (lao) niangjiu (mother’s brother). Traditionally, the niangjiu plays a crucial 
role in family disputes, for example, at the time a family breaks up (fenjia). The 
traditional term for a matchmaker (meiren) appeared to have fallen into disuse. It had 
been replaced by jieshaoren (literally - a person who introduces) which, unlike meiren, 
could also be used for somebody who introduces business contacts. A particularly 
interesting fictive kinship term was xiao xiongdi (little brothers). These were people, male 
or female, of roughly the same age who help each other. They may be fellow students, 
neighbours, people who went to the countryside or were Red Guards together, students of 
one master, friends, friends of friends, from the same native place, or the head of a 
university and department heads. A similar term to xiao xiongdi which suggests a closer 
relationship was tse ku (chu ke) xiongdi - little brothers who have emerged from the same 
nest. The use of such terms can often be regarded as an attempt by metaphorical extension 
to make non-familial relationships become as dependable as (the ideal of) close kin ties. 
The manager of a stock exchange who told me that his aim was to make the company like 
a "warm home" (wennuan de jiating) clearly had in mind the harmony and reliability of 
the ideal family. The ultimate imaginary family is the nation - the "state family" (guojia).
'“Shanghai’s status within China was often described using a kinship term. A rticles called the city "elder 
brother" (lao  da) in recognition o f  its vital econom ic contribution to the "nation-family" (gu o jia ).
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When asked about the impact of the Cultural Revolution on interpersonal relations 
the starkest portrayal was that even husbands and wives and parents and children could be 
pitted against each other. I was told of various instances of conflict between relations. For 
instance, a man is his early thirties told me how as a fifteen year old he had denounced his 
father for his pre-1949 association with the KMT. Another man told me how his family 
avoided contact with a grandfather who had been a comprador. Other families cut off links 
with relatives abroad. However, whilst husbands and wives could fall out over political 
disagreements and/or personal quarrels could become politicized my impression is that this 
was not common. More frequently, husbands and wives dared not speak openly for fear 
that their spouse may reveal incriminating details to a third party. Parents had to be 
especially careful when speaking in front of their children in case they innocently spread 
damaging information. In densely crowded Shanghai, there was also a fear that neighbours 
would overhear and report comments made. Even when spouses were called upon to 
publicly denounce partners it seems that many would agree beforehand the limits of such 
denunciations. One informant who knew of several cases o f suicide by persecuted 
individuals told me that withdrawal of support by a spouse was often the final straw behind 
such action. Such evidence suggests the crucial role of close kin in maintaining 
ontological security. The fact remained that if one could trust anybody it was most likely 
to be close family members. In these circumstances the core family group could be 
strengthened as people retreated to the household as the only safe haven in a society full 
of risk and uncertainty.
In 1992-4 I found that relatives (qinqi) and especially husbands and wives and 
parents and offspring were generally considered the most reliable guanxi. For many 
Shanghainese various logistical factors tended to inhibit the maintenance of extensive 
interpersonal relations (see also Parish & Whyte 1984: 334-6) and fostered reliance upon
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close kin. These included a five and half or six day working week which reduced the 
amount of time and energy available for visiting people. Shanghai’s extremely crowded, 
slow public transport also contributed to a spatial reduction in human interactions although 
set against this was the increased availability in recent years of telephones and pagers.
As noted in chapter two the number of relatives families had in Shanghai and the 
degree of interaction with them varied considerably. Folk wisdom acknowledges that yuan 
qin bu ru jin lin - a relative at a distance is not as good as near neighbours. Helping and 
the reciprocal exchange of gifts (song renqing - literally "give human feelings") such as
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mooncakes at Mid-autumn Festival all helped sustain feelings. Families with extensive kin 
networks in Shanghai tended to maintain frequent contact and were rather more inclined 
to ask for and offer help than in the British context. However, it is useful to note the 
comments of a married man of about forty who responded instantly to my question "who 
are the most reliable guanxi?" with the answer "relatives". When asked about his own 
family it transpired that following a disagreement over sharing property after the death of 
his mother the previous year that of his six siblings he had fallen out with all but one 
sister. When asked about this apparent anomaly - a clear instance of the anthropological 
insight that what people do and what they say they do often diverges - he cited the 
following two contrasting adages: renqing da guo wangfa - human feeling is stronger 
than the law of the land, renqing shi zhi zhang de bao - human feeling is as thin as 
paper. In subsequent conversations it became clear that this man’s closest relationships, 
apart from his wife and child, were with friends and especially those he had been sent 
down to Yunnan with during the Cultural Revolution. Since the most crucial family 
relationships were usually those between husbands and wives and parents and offspring 
these are the ones to which I pay attention next.
4.4.3 Husbands and Wives
Romantic love and individualism, almost unknown in old China, have taken possession o f  
modem Chinese youth.
Olga Lang (1946: 120)
When conceptualizing this relationship it is important to bear in mind the high 
degree of conformity when compared to a West European city. The vast majority of 
people in Shanghai married and had a single child. Most alternatives to this pattern were 
either illegal - such as having more than one child or living together without marriage - 
socially unacceptable or an indication of social failure. An instance of the latter would be 
a childless marriage although some recent press coverage of a new phenomenon DINKS - 
"double income no kids" - suggested a modification of this traditional view. Divorce rates 
were rising but still low and considerable stigma was still often attached especially to 
female divorcees. People often voiced Confucian notions that being able to handle family 
relationships was an important part of being human (zuoren) and that the stability (anding) 
of society depends upon the unity (tuanjie) o f families. Material considerations conjoined 
with cultural imperatives to stress the importance of marriage. Above all, danwei 
generally only allocated housing to married couples. It was of considerable importance, 
therefore, that the marital relationship be built upon trust.
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Since the early 1980s romantic love had become a topic of considerable moment. 
This included numerous articles, books and radio programmes on topics such as sexual 
fulfilment and the "ideal partner" (cf. Evans 1994). Sexual mores and morals were felt by 
many people to have declined with a growth in divorce, pre-marital pregnancy, sexually 
transmitted diseases, extra-marital love affairs and prostitution. Despite burgeoning media 
attention to romance and love it was my impression that young couples considering 
marriage in Shanghai paid greater attention to practical considerations than their English 
counterparts. Whilst the affective component of marriage may be growing in importance 
romantic attachment alone was generally considered too weak a basis for a lifetime 
together. There appeared to be a gender distinction in this with young men more interested 
in the physical appearance and affective qualities of a potential spouse and young women 
more concerned with practical considerations. An unmarried girl in her mid-twenties 
suggested that "girls consider practical aspects more because they do not have much chance 
to become rich on their own but must rely upon their husbands." A rhyme depicted 
changing ideals of prospective marriage partners for women - it implicitly accepts the 
notion that a woman’s status is dependent upon her husband: in the 1960s marry a soldier 
(dabing), in the 1970s marry an intellectual (lao jiu), in the 1980s marry the "navy, army 
and air force" (hai, lu, kong) - homonyms of overseas connections (haiwai guanxi), 
compensation for confiscated property (luoshi zhengci), accommodation available (kong 
fangzi), in the 1990s rich men (dahu) are popular. A highly significant factor was that 
danwei seemed more inclined to allocate housing to men. A recently married woman who 
lived in a large flat over 70 m2 with her husband told me that her husband’s access to 
housing was a key determinant in deciding to marry him. In addition, a study in Shanghai 
found that married sons were more than twice as likely as daughters to be joint resident 
with parents, with an increase in this figure during the 1980s (Davis 1993: 62-7). In 
important senses young men could afford to take the advice of a popular song and "follow 
their feelings" more than their female counterparts.
Accommodation was a prime consideration since many young couples had to 
continue living with their parents for at least some time after marriage. In addition, during 
the reform era costs o f marriage had increased and parents generally had to contribute to 
this. These factors inevitably gave parents at least some influence over their children’s 
selection o f marriage partner. Parents most important sanctions were denial of 
accommodation and financial support and withdrawal of affection. Martin Whyte (1993a: 
216) stresses the importance of kinship as a basis for social ties. These ties tend to involve
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reliable primordial loyalties which provide "a natural basis for mutually advantageous 
exchanges" and be geographically and occupationally dispersed (Ibid). Whyte seems to 
infer from this that families engage in marriage strategies to extend and enhance their kin 
networks. However, my findings suggests that although families could influence mate 
selection tke, choice of partner was primarily taken by the young couple themselves. 
Moreover, parental influence was most likely to be negative, acting to prevent a match they 
considered unsuitable. Strategic thinking may be involved but the locus o f this was the 
young couple themselves.
Western writers on China have generally stressed the patriarchal nature of 
traditional Chinese society. This is a view that informants in Shanghai readily accepted. 
Family relationships in the past were portrayed as the father being distant and serious and 
the mother providing kindness (yan fu en mu) within male dominated households and 
society (da nanzizhuyi). Children were said to respect (jing) both parents but to fear 
(wei) the father and love (ai) the mother. In Shanghai in 1992-4 family relationships often 
differed markedly from this pattern. Many younger men especially engaged in child- 
rearing and household chores. Popular stereotypes often satirized local men as qiguanyan 
- hen-pecked husbands. The fact that most women worked and contributed financially to 
the household was a key factor in increasing women’s status. The importance of this 
economic factor is made clear in the saying that "the drawer (i.e. where the household 
income is kept) is the head of the family" (chouti dangjia). The relationship between 
status within the household and income was particularly evident with one young couple 
I visited. The wife engaged in diverse entrepreneurial activities often staying out late or 
travelling on business. When I asked her husband’s opinion of this she remarked simply 
"he can’t complain, I make a lot of money. He only earns 400¥ (about £40) pcm, that is 
not even enough to take me out for one meal." This example illustrates Simmel’s notion 
that a monetized economy increases individual freedom.
A harmonious household (jiating rongqia) was often described as intimately bound 
up with its economic situation. Women usually controlled household finances {dang 
/:a/dangjia) especially for day to day expenditure. A common pattern was for both salaries 
to be placed in a drawer and taken out as needed. The ideal in financial matters between 
husband and wife was to have transparency (toumingdu). Families who did not pool their 
income or discuss financial matters may be described as lacking in emotion (ganqing). 
One explanation I heard for women’s control over household finances was that men were 
more likely to (in their wives view) squander money on friends. This perception was
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associated with men’s greater involvement in relationships o f yiqi which required them to 
be generous (dafang) and hospitable.
Informants considered that the changing status of women in marriage and increased 
individualism was reflected in rising divorce statistics. The traditional view of marriage 
(for women especially) was: If you marry a chicken you are stuck with a chicken, if  you 
marry a dog you are stuck with a dog (jia ji sui ji, jia gou sui gou). A married woman 
in her late twenties remarked that the way people now paid closer attention to themselves 
(guanzhu ziji) was a major change in contemporary Shanghai. She considered the 
increasing divorce rate as evidence of this new stress upon the self (kaolu ziji), taking it 
as an indication that people were searching for personal satisfaction in a relationship. The 
incorporation of alienation o f affection as a grounds for divorce into the 1980 Marriage 
Law also hints at a greater stress upon individual feelings. There is evidence here of the 
transformation of intimacy described by Giddens. However, this transformation was to a 
degree gender specific. In addition, important material conditions impinged upon the 
emergence of the type of "pure relationship" he describes.
4.4.4 Trust Between the Generations
When considering inter-generational relationships in Shanghai the following factors 
are particularly salient: the city has a rapidly increasing proportion of elderly residents; 
living accommodation in Shanghai is severely limited; many households contain, for at 
least some time, three generations living under one roof; different generations have been 
socialised in sometimes markedly different social, economic and political environments. 
Each of these factors created its own configuration of responses, problems and potential 
contradictions.
Traditional conceptions of the place and role of the individual in Chinese society 
are encapsulated in various "traditional" sayings which were still widely known. "Above 
are elders, below are the young" (shang you lao, xia you xiao) makes clear the relational 
nature of the person and their embeddedness within the family.15 The phrase "a son 
should look after the elderly and the young" (zuo erzi yao yang lao, yang xiao) describes 
a bounden duty (tianzhi) which stresses obligation and interdependence. The nature of 
parents' expectations and offsprings’ duties are also enshrined in the saying: men rear sons
,sThe opposite o f  this expression is: when one person is full, nobody in the fam ily is hungry (y i ge ren 
bao, yi jia  bu e). The informant w ho pointed out this phrase observed that such people (i.e. those with no 
fam ily ties) were the most likely to be hooligans. By inference, only being embedded in fam ily relations 
is considered to g ive a person a stake in society.
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to provide for old age, they plant trees because they want the shade (yang er fang lao, 
zhong shu tu ying liang). Reciprocity is an important component of inter-generational 
relationships. This reciprocity rests upon a basis o f trust that the succour given to 
offspring will, when one is elderly, be reciprocated. Since 1949, whilst introducing 
pensions for many urban workers the Communist Party has stressed care of the aged as 
primarily a family responsibility (see Ikels 1993, Davis-Friedmann 1991). Although some 
older people I spoke with felt that respect for the elderly had been diminished during the 
Cultural Revolution most informants contrasted the perceived neglect and cruel treatment 
of elderly people in "the West" with that in China. This stereotype is, however, an overly 
simplistic representation of the actual position of the elderly in Chinese society.
A common belief was that in the West once children reach the age o f eighteen they 
leave the parental home and are financially independent of their parents. In China most 
young adults remained bound (kun) to the parental home. The crucial factors which bound 
them were lack of alternative accommodation and low income - salary structures being 
based upon age-related increases. It was not uncommon for adult offspring to have no 
separate room of their own. A grandfather described three generations living together as 
"troublesome" and "complicated" and expected that nuclear households (xiao jiating) 
would become more common. Another grandfather remarked that inter-generational 
conflicts over expenses and different lifestyles could only be tackled by the older 
generation "keeping their mouths shut tight and their pockets loose" (zuiba yao jin, koudai 
yao song). In his estimation both generations now wished to live separately and he 
expressed his strong approval for this "foreign method" (na ku be ^a/waiguo banfa). 
During the reform era young people’s salaries - especially those of the well-educated - may 
exceed those of their parents. In addition, there has been much new housing construction. 
These developments are likely to promote this trend. There was, however, also evidence 
that with the influx of consumer goods and increasingly expensive weddings that 
youngsters were becoming more dependent on their parents creating what Martin Whyte 
calls "revived inter-generational dependency" (1993a: 200).16 The ideal was for the two 
generations to live separately but close at hand. Typically there was a "multifaceted 
interdependency between the household of parents and married children" (Unger 1993: 40). 
One young wife noted that ideally childless young couples preferred to live independently
16In a study in Chengdu, W hyte found that in the reform era young married couples are less likely  to live 
separately after marriage than previously (1993a: 200). Unfortunately I lack the statistical data to compare 
the situation in Shanghai.
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of parents but to live with them once they have a child so that the grandparents can help 
in child-rearing.
The tyrannical mother-in-law and the subservient, exploited daughter-in-law are 
persistent figures in "traditional" Chinese families. However, my findings support those 
of other researchers who observe a significant shift in the balance of power between the 
elderly and the young. Indeed, there is evidence that in Shanghai this shift began before 
1949. Olga Lang wrote of mothers-in-law in Shanghai that "[t]he fate of these old women 
with modern daughters-in-law is tragic indeed" (1946: 237). The balance has shifted to 
such an extent that the Chinese media considers it necessary to publicize examples of 
"model" daughters-in-law. A worker at a large state danwei told me how the state seeks 
to educate the populace on the correct conduct of such relationships under the rubric of 
"spiritual civilization". This education included watching videos on how to manage 
relationships such as with neighbours and the mother-in-law/daughter-in-law relationship. 
Workers had a short examination and the results of this along with marks subtracted for 
any "uncivilised behaviour" (bu wenming xingwei) such as fighting comprised "spiritual 
civilization marks" (jingshen wenming fen) which affected the level of bonus. A women 
in her early seventies told me that problems were greatly reduced if the mother-in-law 
works or has some other funds and "does not need to eat the food of her son (bu yao chi 
erzi de). But if she eats his food, she will certainly suffer from their anger."
Many elderly people complained that as young working adults they had handed over 
all their income to their parents whereas young adults now are helped financially by their 
parents. One retired man in his early sixties speculated that this state of affairs may not 
last and that in future, neither generation would aid the other (shei ye bu guan shei). He 
added that his own granddaughter - like all families in the era of the one child policy - 
would find her burden especially onerous as she would have to look after four people when 
she grew up. Another retired man also remarked on the changed relationship between the 
old and young. He told me that he calls his son laoye - master or grandfather! In his 
estimation the retired should be leisurely (xiangshouxing) but instead many are now 
"work-natured" (laowuxing de) who "madasaodaiban", that is, buy food, do washing and 
cleaning, look after grandchildren and carry out tasks for the children. Elderly parents who 
still supported their children were called lao huangniu - old oxen. Many parents Spoke 
of being fleeced (gua) by their children - this may be said with affection or real bitterness. 
It was not uncommon for married offspring in their early thirties to still gua their parents. 
This gua included financial aid and labour including contributions to the costs of raising
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grandchildren. The grandfather who was "work-natured" added that by serving the second 
and third generation in this way it allowed them to do well in their careers. He noted that 
in the past people raised sons to keep them in their old age (yang er fang lao). He felt 
that now "one should make savings to keep one in old age (chuxu fanglao). If parents 
have money their children respect them." Such a notion appears to represent a shift away 
from trust in one’s close kin towards reliance upon personal savings and social insurance. 
In addition, women, especially, may prefer to have daughters, a marked divergence from 
the (apparent) pattern found in rural China. One young mother observed that when sons 
marry they look after their wives but that girls show greater concern for their parents. 
Trends such as increasing life spans, greater job mobility, more housing construction - 
which allows a greater possibility for nuclear households, and the one child policy are all 
likely to effect inter-generational relationships. I agree with Ikels’ assessment that in the 
absence of "community care" there will be a growing need to develop support services for 
families to provide care for the elderly (1993: 332), especially if both marital partners 
continue to engage in wage labour. It seems that the elderly will have to become 
increasingly reliant upon systems. However, this represents not simply a consequence of 
modernity per se, as Giddens suggests, but rather is dependent largely upon state policies.
4.4.5 Classmates(tongxue)
Friendships created during the formative years of education were a particularly 
important basis of tong - "sameness" or co-identification. Classmates often formed bonds 
which lasted a lifetime. At university, for instance, six or seven fellow students share the 
same small room for four years providing the opportunity for mutual understanding and 
trust to be built. My oldest informant, a man of 92, described the way that he and fellow 
university classmates had maintained contact - including regular monthly meals (jucan) - 
for seven decades. University tongxue were in different danwei therefore there was no 
competition between them and relationships were good. A young teacher considered 
middle school colleagues her closest friends. She believed that at university students 
established contacts with others on an instrumental basis. For instance, there had been 
competition to curry favour with the political instructor (zhidaoyuan) who was responsible 
for job assignments. At middle school, by contrast, relationships between schoolmates 
were "purer", with friendships based upon affection. This is one of the rare instances of 
the type of "pure relationship" described by Giddens. At university students were not
241
"true-hearted" (zhenxin), and it was even worse "outside" in society where one should 
"always protect oneself' (baohu ziji). Despite the importance of tongxue I found some 
evidence that the diversification of the economy may undermine such friendships. A 
former library student who had entered the world of business felt that she now lacked a 
common language (gongtong yuyan) with old classmates. A distance (gehe) had emerged 
between them.
Strictly speaking tongxue are those who have studied together. However, the 
elasticity of such concepts meant that I could be introduced as their "tongxue" by people 
of a similar age who had attended the same university as myself although we had never 
studied together. Alumni of the same educational institute are more accurately described 
as xiaoyou. I encountered an interesting instance of the role xiaoyou may play in a school 
which engaged in commercial activities. A teacher observed that guanxi was essential in 
commerce and that an educational institute has a distinct advantage in this respect since 
it has many guanxi in the form of parents and xiaoyou in every kind of occupation. The 
teacher continued, "if we need to solve a problem, we simply flick through the school’s 
files, there is bound to be somebody we can turn to for help." The school’s entry into 
commercial affairs was highly controversial and it had mobilized various xiaoyou, for 
instance, now employed in the media to publish articles on its behalf. Subsequently, the 
school became engaged in a court case with a client and once again it sought the aid of 
xiaoyou to campaign on its behalf. This involved not only a publicity campaign but also 
backstage connection pulling, gift-giving and meal invitations. One teacher commented 
that society was dirty (angzang) and that by engaging in commerce various school 
personnel now tonglju hewu (wallow in the mire with somebody, associate with an evil 
person). The school was also involved in a joint venture and the foreign businessman was 
a xiaoyou in Hong Kong. A teacher noted that the school would fear to lose out (chikui) 
if it dealt with a stranger.
4 .4 .6  Friends
A popular piece of doggerel expresses the view: at home depend on relatives, 
outside depend upon friends (zai jiali kao qinqi, zai waimian kao pengyou). In Shanghai 
I found that friendship played an important part in many people’s lives. Of the five 
relationships outlined by Confucius, only that between friends was one of equality with the 
ideal that all friends should be treated equally without partiality (zhou er bu bi). In 
practice, I found that there were different categories of "friend". The most unbreakable
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were zhixin pengyou - intimate friends, literally "friendships in which one knows the 
heart." These relations involved all the values of yiqi and qing set out above. These 
friendships can be contrasted with jiurou pengyou - wine and meat friends. Amongst such 
fair weather friends the values of yiqi and qing may be invoked by the parties concerned 
but were probably absent in practice. There also tended to be a gender distinction in 
friendship. Women generally engaged less in guanxi, an observation also made by 
Mayfair Yang (1986: 32-4), and women with many social contacts (shehui guanxi) may 
be regarded with ambivalence. At best they may be considered "strong women" 
(nuqiangren) - in a society where the dominant view is that women should be soft and 
gentle (wenrou) - and at worst "loose women." People with many social contacts were 
likely to have jiu rou  pengyou and it is salient that wine and meat are "strong" foods with 
masculine connotations. An important defining feature of a qiguanyan (hen-pecked 
husband) is where the wife controls her husband’s drinking and smoking (thereby 
curtailing his social activities) through tight control of his personal spending money (si 
fang ^z'/sifangqian).
Ezra Vogel (1965) described personal relations in the PRC from 1949 to 1965 as 
characterized by a shift from friendship to comradeship. Vogel described fear as the main 
motive behind this shift. I heard of many instances were people felt they had been 
betrayed by friends during political campaigns. The need to exercise caution in all 
interactions also mitigated against friendships. An informant pointed out that if one did 
not see a friend for some time one may avoid them because their circumstances would not 
be known. This man recalled various instances where previously good friends had 
informed against him. He felt that political campaigns had deformed (bianxing) people’s 
souls (linghun) and damaged their moral quality (suzhi). In his view those who were 
honest and loyal towards friends suffered whilst those without yiqi, who were cold 
(lengdan) and secretive (baomi)fwere least likely to encounter problems. This experience 
led him to regard the highest practicable moral standard in contemporary China as: do not 
have a heart which harms others, but do not lack a heart which defends oneself against 
others (hai ren zhi xin bu ke you, fang ren zhi xin bu ke wu). Political campaigns 
undoubtedly made people more cautious about human relations. My understanding is that 
fear mitigated against "fair weather friends" but that "true friendships" could be 
strengthened. Amongst those who were persecuted friendships which survived were 
especially highly valued. A former "counter revolutionary" described them as "life and 
death friendships" (sheng-si zhi jiao) which could continue into the second generation.
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In the more politically relaxed atmosphere of the 1980s and early 1990s it became 
safer to have a wider network of friends. Moreover, the commercializing economy greatly 
increased ttaneed  to have guanxi friendships of a more instrumental type. Greater 
possibilities o f association emerged including opportunities for a greater range of achieved 
as opposed to ascribed relationships. In Confucian social theory, which still permeates 
contemporary China, man is a relational being. Seen from one view a person is locked 
within a web o f human relations, from another perspective he or she is at the centre of an 
ego-centred network (King 1991, Fei Xiaotong 1992). Apart from preordained relations, 
such as father-son, "Chinese guanxi building can be characterized as an ego-centred social 
engineering of relations building" (King 1991: 73). This brings the potential to act as "the 
architect in relation construction" (Ibid: 67). In Shanghai, people inevitably took the 
cultivation o f guanxi to differing lengths. For some people the effort, energy and cost 
involved in making friendly contacts (lianluo ganqing) was not worthwhile. Without 
some degree of "emotional investment" (ganqing touzi) in the form of visits and so forth 
guanxi weakens - an outcome conveyed in the saying: when a person has gone, the tea 
grows cold (ren zuo le, cha liang le). The term "emotional investment" is clearly a highly 
instrumental conception of human relations. The use of touzi (investment) accords well 
with Smart’s (1993) description of guanxi as "social capital of trust".17 Such investment 
was especially vital to business people and those who acted as brokers in the 
commercializing economy.
The potentially instrumental nature of friendship is stressed in a common rhyme: 
one more friend is one more ‘road’ (duo yi ge pengyou, duo yi tiao lu). This notion of 
pengyou (friend) was very prevalent in Shanghai although intellectuals tended to regard 
this use of pengyou as confined to the "lower reaches of society" (xialiu shehui). This 
type of "friend" may be especially important to Shanghai’s new entrepreneurs who readily 
seize every opportunity to widen their guanxi network. There was marked concordance 
with the businessmen in Lukang, Taiwan studied by De Glopper where "[t]he aim seems 
to be a lot o f amiable, matey, but not too intimate ties with as many people as possible" 
(1972: 320). People I met for the first time and, for instance, market traders would often 
intersperse their conversation with the assertion "we are all friends". In the former case 
this seemed designed to create a basis of fraternity and equality, whilst in the latter traders 
appeared to imply that they would treat customers as though they were friends - with 'the 
implication that I could trust them not to cheat me. A similar commonly heard expression
17N ote that during 1992-4, the term "investment" (tou zi) was heard daily on m edia reports.
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people used when asking strangers for a favour was pengyou bangbangm ang - "friend, 
help me". The friend of a getihu restaurant owner.told me that he liked the owner because 
he was a businessman "not just to make money but because he liked to make friends" (jiao 
pengyou). On another occasion, in a small private restaurant a group o f drunken builders 
engaged me in conversation. They told me they were "brothers" (xiongdi) - the party 
included two women - out for a good time. They stressed that "we", that is their group 
and myself, "were all friends". In a society where notions of universal values seem limited 
it may be particularly important to fabricate a basis of commonality, o f inclusiveness.
Inevitably most friendships draw upon some shared experience. This is made clear 
in the use of the character you - "friend" or "friendly" - as a suffix for various types of 
friendship where the first character defines the context o f the friendship. Examples o f this 
include zhanyou ("war friend") comrade-in-arms and xiaoyou ("school friend") alumni. 
People may also create their own expressions, for example, in the Summer of 1994 when 
the Shanghai share market had been falling for over one year many share buyers held 
shares bought at well above their current market price - in the new slang they were taozhu 
- stuck fast. Built on this term were taoyou, fellow holders of shares "stuck fast" in this 
way. Although I was told this term in some jest it is conceivable that it could form the 
basis of an interest group based upon mutual engagement in an abstract system. Another 
expression I heard, with more limited range, was mayou - mahjong friends!
Spatial proximity also provides the opportunity for friendships to be built. 
According to Parish and Whyte one of the distinctive features of interpersonal relations in 
Chinese cities since 1949 are closer ties between neighbours (1984: 349-53). These ties 
were especially important to the elderly and those tied to the home. As noted in the 
previous chapter I also found a sharp distinction between those who lived in older low- 
level, high density housing and residents of newer, high-rise apartments. Other 
developments noted in chapter three, such as improvements in living accommodation, new 
technologies such as television and air-conditioning and a growing fear of crime, all tended 
to promote the atomization of Shanghai into individual households and reduce contacts 
between neighbours.
Most friendships were between those of similar ages and the same sex - the main 
exception to the latter being in higher education. Generational differences were particularly 
interesting in a state where there has been dramatic changes in social policy and politics - 
each age cohort had grown up in a distinctive phenomenological environment. Informants
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felt that there were clear generational differences in attitudes and values.18 Different age 
cohorts shared if  not always trust, then at least a potential shared basis of understanding. 
Those of the same age group stressed that they had a common language (gongtong yuyan) 
- this included both literal language and the language o f shared experiences.
A basis o f friendship specific to larger urban areas o f the China are those between 
former sent-down youth (chaxiong). Chaxiong is an abbreviation of the term chadui 
luohu xiongdi - "brothers who went to settle in the countryside." A term chamei is used 
for women - literally sisters. For roughly a decade a majority of young people who 
graduated from high school were sent to the countryside for up to ten years. Spending 
these formative years together often in conditions of considerable hardship is a basis for 
many friendships. Even when people of this generation were not together the shared 
experience of having "gone down to the countryside", knowledge of the distinctive 
language of this period, shared difficulties of returning to Shanghai and similar age formed 
a basis for mutual understanding (goutong). Those socialized during the Cultural 
Revolution and especially those sent down to the countryside often claimed an inability to 
convey their experiences to younger people (let alone a foreign researcher). Unlike 
Beijing. Shanghai lacked a restaurant devoted to former sent down youth where they could 
reminisce (I suspect that this is only a matter o f time). Despite this informal gatherings 
were common. I vividly recall an afternoon spent with a group of former sent down youth 
as they sang along to karaoke versions of revolutionary songs from this period (in multiple 
senses an alien language to younger Shanghainese) and expressed a piquant mixture of 
bitterness, betrayal and nostalgia for their younger days.
In the entrepreneurial 1990s, chaxiong may be an extremely valuable type of 
guanxi since they are now engaged in widely differing occupations including in other parts 
of China. A successful writer who lived in a high rise flat - where interaction between 
neighbours was usually very limited - told me that both she and her neighbour were former 
sent down youth, the former went to Yunnan and the latter to Heilongjiang. The writer 
felt a "special feeling" for her and made up her redundancy money in return for 
housekeeping work. In addition, the writer intended to set up a company which would 
employ this woman as a secretary. Another chaxiong who spent ten years in Heilongjiang 
now utilized contacts made at that time in entrepreneurial activities including smuggling 
leather goods across the Russian border. There were chaxiong at all levels of Shanghai
l8lt is interesting to bear in mind that many o f  the generation now  in their tw enties received much o f  
their early socialization from grandparents w ho reached maturity before 1949.
246
society including amongst the local party elite which contained at least two unofficial 
groups of people - one which went to Heilongjiang and another to Chongming Island. A 
local journalist told me that the Heixiong ("Heilongjiang brothers") who were now high 
officials regularly met up, had meals together, and helped each other. Such groups of 
people who had spent time in the same place bear a resemblance to pre-1949 native place 
associations (tongxianghui), although in the case of these two groups o f high cadres it 
appears that they only provided support for those already in positions of power.
4.4.7 Colleagues ftongshi)
Parish and Whyte found evidence of "considerable mutual aid" and "comradely 
concern" in Chinese factories" (1984: 337-8). This is in marked contrast to my findings 
on relations between co-workers. I was often told that interpersonal relations within work 
units (danwei) were "complicated" (fuza), a term with a distinctly pejorative implication. 
A common view was that relations between co-workers may be "superficially polite" but 
that undercurrents of jealousy and latent hostility may emerge when, for instance, one 
worker received a higher bonus or is favoured by the boss. An office worker confided that 
whilst the ideal is for co-workers to help each other (bangm ang) that generally they are 
on their guard (fangbei).
It is interesting to speculate on why my findings should differ so markedly from 
those of Parish and Whyte. One difference was that my informants included a higher 
proportion of intellectuals and office workers rather than manual workers. Various 
informants felt that relations between intellectuals - in Shanghai this refers to university 
graduates and above - are poorer than those between other sections of society. A worker 
in one danwei observed that relations between workers (gongren) in her unit were much 
better than those between intellectual employees - although she felt that this was less 
apparent amongst younger intellectuals. A possible explanation is the residual impact of 
past political campaigns. This may account for the (perceived) generational difference 
within this danwei. A worker in an advertising joint venture told me that relations 
between co-workers were very good since they were "all young Shanghainese." Parish and 
Whyte found that "the Cultural Revolution was a time of retreat from friendship and fellow 
worker contacts" (1984: 345). These campaigns had the greatest impact upon intellectuals. 
An older informant described the destructive impact of the Cultural Revolution in his office 
which "overnight" reduced friendliness (youqing) to hate (hen). Those who suffered in 
the Cultural Revolution were often the victims of personal rivalries. Amongst many work
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colleagues were informants who would report unorthodox views or behaviour of 
workmates to Communist Party officials. Such an environment demanded extreme caution 
and mitigated against friendships with work colleagues. In addition, there was a stress 
upon "completeness". For instance, in an office o f ten people where one person was 
accused of being a counter-revolutionary all the other nine would have to denounce them. 
Non-participation was not an option, all must express an opinion (biaotai). It is notable 
that a "traditional" saying states that scholars tend to scorn each other (wenren xiangqing). 
By contrast, notions of yiqi tended to be most closely associated with manual workers.
Lack of friendliness between co-workers appeared to be founded upon the existence 
of a li-hai guanxi - a zero-sum relationship - between them. Amongst work colleagues 
matters involving bonuses or promotion were often cited as creating friction. In Tianjin 
danwei in 1986, Danching Ruan (1993) found evidence of "relational dependency". The 
relations involved are described as "quite instrumental". Ruan remarks that this 
dependency was due to workers lack of alternatives but to rely on the workplace to provide 
what they need. The patterns of guanxi use adopted by different categories of workers 
would be expected to differ. Different types of danwei have always varied in the degree 
of benefits they can bestow. In the reform era there are also increasing opportunities to 
attain these ends, including changing jobs, and sources beyond the danwei in which a 
person works. Some elements of these changes indicate the type o f increased freedom 
Simmel posited in a monetized economy. The (expressed) lack of a li-hai relationship 
between share dealers mentioned in the previous chapter (see also chapter 6) provides an 
instance of this. Within danwei there was also evidence of greater freedom. A worker 
in a large state danwei contrasted the lack of freedom in his parents’ youth to his own 
situation. In the past workers dared not question the authority of danwei leaders, now 
workers "say what they like about them, so long as they are out of earshot." This worker 
added that when leaders gave instructions "people such as myself now consider, is this 
advantageous to me (dui wo you li)? Only if the answer is yes do I carry out the task."
4.4.8 Teacher-Student
A traditional Chinese saying states: If somebody is your teacher for a day, they are 
your father for the rest of your life (yi ri wei shi, zhong sheng wei fu). A retired teacher 
considered that:
This father-son (fu-zi) relationship has declined since 1949 and especially as a
result of the Cultural Revolution when teachers were criticized and sometimes
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beaten by students. Politics distorted this relationship - teachers dared not praise 
the work o f students from ‘bad’ class backgrounds nor criticise the work o f those 
from ‘good’ class families. Teachers deliberately distanced themselves from their 
students. Teachers did not want to know what students thought in case the higher 
authorities (shangm ian) asked about them, and especially about their political 
standpoint. It was best if  one could honestly say ‘I don’t know’. He felt that now 
there is no emotion (ganqing) between teachers and students, teachers take their 
money and leave the classroom as soon as they can.
It was now widely believed that parents must give teachers gifts to encourage them to
provide special attention to children. However, I also found that relations between teachers
and favoured students could contain elements of the traditional pattern. For instance,
former pupils may visit teachers on festive occasions and amongst past and present pupils
of one teacher there may be bonds of sentiment.
4.4.9 Same Native Place (tongxiang)
Amongst the resident population of Shanghai, same-native place identification 
appeared to be of limited importance. Shared Shanghainese identity had significance only 
when ranged against some alternative identification. As a basis o f trust it had little vitality 
in the city itself although in other places it may serve as basis of shared understanding - 
which may be a route towards trust. At a minimum, common dialect may evoke emotion 
(qing). For households with origins out of Shanghai same native place could be an 
important basis of mutual trust and support. Although I did not investigate this further, 
this may be especially true for those from the north of Jiangsu province - Subei people - 
who faced prejudice in Shanghai.
With the relaxation of migration controls in the reform era, same-native place 
relationships were, however, becoming of renewed importance. The vast majority of 
Shanghai’s current frenetic construction work was being carried out by migrant labourers. 
Shanghai factories, especially in the Pudong new development zone, which had relatively 
lax legal controls, often employed non-Shanghainese labour. Companies sent out labour 
recruiters to distant provinces and arranged for workers to come to Shanghai. They were 
employed on low wage rates and must be housed and fed by the companies. Non- 
Shanghainese enterprises are being attracted to the city. For instance, some Sichuanese 
restaurants employed only staff recruited from Sichuan. At one o f these restaurants a 
waitress explained that she had first worked in a Pudong factory and then moved to this 
current job. Anxiety over coming to Shanghai alone was reduced since the employers were 
lao xiang (people of one’s native place). Giddens describes "the local community as a 
place" as one of the components of trust in pre-modern cultures which will be transformed
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by modernity (1990: 102). It is, therefore, ironic that this basis of trust showed signs of 
becoming more important in a society in which the avowed aims of the state are "economic 
development" and "modernization".
4.4.10 Relationships O f Mutual Benefit - (li-hai guanxi)
In a situation where those in positions of power - described in local slang as 
"heads" (toutou) or "mothers-in-law" (popo) - were often described as being unfair and 
partial (bu gongzheng) and favouring friends and relatives those who possessed no special 
guanxi may seek to create some other basis o f common interest (li-hai).- This type of li- 
hai guanxi differs from that noted earlier of a zero sum relationship. In this context it 
refers to a relationship where the two parties interests (li) or losses (hai) are in some sense 
mutually intertwined. As noted earlier reciprocity plays a vital role in interpersonal 
relations. With li-hai guanxi in particular, when gifts are given or favours carried out it 
is said that one xin zhong you shu - one know’s how things stand (literally "the numbers 
are in one’s heart). Smart points out that repeated exchanges of gifts and favours creates 
not just obligation but also a "social capital of trust" (1993: 403). Li-hai guanxi operate 
in diverse spheres. In politics a bangpai (faction) acts to promote mutual interests. 
Within a danwei a group of workers may align its fortunes with a particular boss as his 
"little brothers". Individuals may engage those with power to allocate resources in a li-hai 
guanxi, thereby forming a patron-client relationship.
A common view was that leaders like those who flatter (pai mapi, taohao, bajie, 
fengcheng) them and workers may attempt to ingratiate themselves in this way. This 
ranged from laudatory comments on leaders’ abilities to carrying out favours for them and 
giving gifts. One clerk told me that decorating work on his flat was carried out by 
peasants employed at his factory who were keen to stay in Shanghai. He had the power 
to make appointments, they sought to get on his right side (pai m api - literally "pat the 
horse’s backside") so that he would enable them to stay in Shanghai. A Shanghai proverb 
notes: food is not ruined by too much salt, the giver of many gifts incurs no blame (yan 
duo cai bu huai, li duo ren bu guai). Those who allocate housing were a focus of 
attention. A factory worker told me that in his danwei whether one is given 
accommodation depended upon one’s guanxi with the factory boss. The relationship with 
him could be improved by flattery, including secretly taking gifts to his home. However, 
he added that if other workers saw that somebody had a good relationship with the boss 
they would be jealous and try to destroy this, for example, by telling the boss that one had
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made mistakes at work. Many factory workers were being made redundant (xiagang) in 
Shanghai. A common belief was that selection of those chosen for redundancy was not 
based upon rational criteria but rather the personal relationship of the employee and the 
employer. A xiagang factory worker told me that although older and female workers were 
most likely to be made redundant she considered that the most crucial factor was one’s 
guanxi with the factory boss remarking that "if you toady to the boss, you can stay."
It was widely believed that one must now create a li-hai guanxi with various types 
of professionals such as teachers and doctors. For instance, parents believed that they must 
give presents to teachers to ensure they gave their children extra care. Similarly, doctors 
were considered to require hongbao - red envelopes with money in them - to give patients 
good treatment. All those in positions of power and control over resources were the focus 
for gift-giving. Increasingly, these were not only bureaucratic gatekeepers but also 
entrepreneurs - although at times this distinction was blurred. A local expression sums this 
up as: who has milk is the mother (you nai jiushi niang). In business circles, inviting 
people to eat (qingke) and giving gifts could help create a lihai guanxi. Via eating and 
drinking one can pull connections (tongguo chifan hejiu la guanxi).19
In some circumstances there was direct resort to bribery (huilu) (see Rocca 1992). 
In popular usage bribery was often referred to using the indirect and less wholly derogatory 
metaphors shaoxiang (burn incense) or pulu (surface the road). Sometimes the "backdoor" 
may already have been opened but may still be blocked in some way (bu kaitong) so one 
must pulu. Pulu was used in similar circumstances to the English colloquial expression 
"grease somebody’s palm".20 A redundant (xiagang) worker told me that it was difficult 
for someone such as her to set up a stall as "whatever you do, you have to ‘spread the 
path’, for example, to obtain a trader’s license. Everything requires money. If you don’t 
‘surface the road’, the road is impassable (ni bu pulu, lu bu hao zou)." This example 
illustrates extremely well the negative aspects of a monetized economy remarked upon by 
Simmel. For those with financial resources contemporary Shanghai offered much 
individual freedom. But in the case of such impoverished workers this emancipation may 
well be chimeric, it is "freedom from  something, not liberty to do something" (Simmel 
1990: 402). As the preceding section of this chapter indicates moral values were felt to
'‘'Rocca notes the extent o f  "collective embezzlement" (1992: 412).  In 1988, work units allegedly spent
25-30 m illion yuan  on banquets, a figure equal to the national budget for education. On banqueting and
other techniques o f  the "art o f  guanxi" see Yang (1986: 60-100).
20One definition I was given o f  pulu was "to put m oney on the road like a carpet".
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have declined and venality and corruption increased since 1949 and especially since the 
late Cultural Revolution. Once again it is salutary to note a traditional proverb: the yamen 
gate is open wide; with right but no money, don’t go inside (yamen bazi kai, you li wu 
qian mo jin  lai). In traditional, as in contemporary China, it seems that money and 
guanxi talks.
4.5 Trust in Systems - Trust in Self
I have paid most attention to trust in other persons. I now focus attention on 
notions of trust in self and abstract systems and reflect on Giddens1 notions on trust in the 
context of Shanghai. Giddens outlines a shift from trust relations vested in localized 
contexts such as kinship to those vested in the personal relationships of friendship and 
sexual intimacy and in abstract systems. I examine each of these aspects in turn. Initially, 
I note that Giddens theories are underpinned by various ethnocentric assumptions. He 
underestimates or ignores entirely the impact of divergent political, cultural and other 
socio-economic factors on trust. He appears to suggest that these transformations are 
inevitable concomitants o f industrialization. As a writer in a liberal, democratic state he 
underestimates the extent to which a state can deeply affect human interactions. Examples 
from the Cultural Revolution especially show the extent to which actions instigated by the 
state can impact upon personal relations. In extreme cases these could create in individuals 
the existential isolation of "a separation from the moral resources to live a full and 
satisfying life" (Giddens 1991: 9). During the more politically relaxed reform era the state 
still has a profound impact upon households. A potent example of this is the one-child 
policy which in Shanghai, unlike many rural areas, is enforced with great effect.
In the case of kinship, for instance, it appears that political pressures, economic 
imperatives and cultural preferences conjoined to maintain dependence and trust in kinship 
ties. Although a contrast between kinship in urban and rural China may well demonstrate 
support for Giddens on this point. There is considerable evidence that kinship networks 
are generally far more extensive in rural areas of China where the household is the key 
unit of production. In urban China, where the household usually does not have this 
function, kinship ties are less elaborated but trust in close kin is clearly vital. Despite this, 
current trends, especially an increasingly elderly population and the one child policy, will 
make individuals more reliant upon abstract systems in the form of pensions and social 
insurance.
I also found some evidence for the "transformation of intimacy" Giddens posits.
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There was clearly an increasing emphasis upon romance and sexual intimacy as indicated 
by numerous magazine articles, books and even radio phone-ins on this topic. However, 
my findings suggests that mate selection tends towards a "pure relationship" for men more 
than for women. This highlights the interaction of cultural and material imperatives on 
"emotional" factors. For example, marriage was viewed by most as a cultural and 
economic imperative and women especially were likely to consider that they were 
dependent upon their husbands for accommodation and social status. Within marriage 
itself, Giddens stresses the importance of "mutual disclosure". However, I agree with the 
Potters (1990: 192-5) depiction of the marital relationship in China as affirmed primarily 
through work and mutual aid rather than through the idiom of love. It is notable that the 
main area where couples stressed a need for transparency was in financial matters.
Friendship is the other personalized relationship of trust which Giddens considers 
will increase in importance in conditions of modernity. I have shown that in the context 
of Shanghai the term "friend" covers a range of different types of relationship from the 
highly instrumental to those resembling "pure relationships". Beyond deconstructing a 
simplistic notion o f "friendship" as a single category it is also highly problematic to gauge 
the degree of "purity" o f any particular friendship. In addition, shifting state policies have 
affected friendship. During political campaigns especially, the risk o f betrayal was high 
and its potential consequences devastating. In such an environment people were extremely 
wary of creating too many "moral hostages to fortune". With the greatly reduced political 
pressures of the reform era and with the need, particularly for those engaged in commercial 
activities to extend their contacts, there is a strong incentive to increase "friendships" of 
the more instrumental kind.
Giddens1 key focus is upon the increased importance of abstract systems as loci for 
trust. Once again his theories appear to be partially bounded in ethnocentric assumptions 
since he appears to conjoin trust in the knowledge of expert systems with trust in those 
who operate them. In the instance of experts such as doctors, patients appeared to have 
faith in both Western and Chinese medical systems. Unless proven otherwise they trusted 
the skill o f any given practitioner. However, a patient was likely to believe that a 
particular practitioner would only treat them to the maximum level of his or her abilities 
if they had a personal relationship. The individual must have both trust in the expert 
system and trust in the "access points" of this system.
The project to propagate comradeship can be construed as an attempt to popularize 
an abstract system. As Vogel (1965) points out, this project was associated with a degree
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of fear which demanded caution in friendships and intimate relations. In Giddens scenario 
trust in personalized relations and in abstract systems both increase. In this example one 
seems to have been promoted at the expense of the latter. Various "histories" portrayed 
the way comradeship was undermined, a decline paralleled by and implicated in a decline 
in trust o f the abstract systems of the Communist Party and socialism. It is important to 
bear in mind the extent to which socialism and the Communist Party were considered 
synonymous. In addition, the Party was often personalized in the form of Mao Zedong 
and/or the Gang of Four. For instance, when people discussed events such as the Cultural 
Revolution they often made comments such as "we were fooled by Mao Zedong (or the 
Gang of Four)." In this merging of individual/s, ideology and policy there are clear 
grounds for arguing that the Communist Party and socialism are, in a sense, not abstract 
systems at all, but extended forms of personal relationship. The fall from grace of the 
Party has been accompanied by the ideals it espoused. It is notable that during seventeen 
months research I never encountered a single person who actively argued in favour of 
socialist ideals.
The destruction of trust in the Communist Party and the loss o f the sense of 
ontological security this appears to have provided in the early 1950s can be charted in 
political campaigns such as the Cultural Revolution, with June 4, 1989 finally eroding "any 
vestigial notions that the party was a moral force in Chinese society" (Saich 1992: 50). 
Much earlier campaigns such as the "reform" (gaizao) of intellectuals also had an impact 
in alienating some citizens. One intellectual explained that in gaizao intellectuals were 
made to question their motives and to feel that they had original sin (yuanzei) for 
harbouring capitalist or feudal ideas from the old society. During his own gaizao he came 
to truly suspect his own professional motives and to feel a sense of self disgust (zibei) and 
to look down upon himself (ziji kanbuqi ziji). However, he noted that once gaizao 
changed from being voluntary to coerced people realised that its sole aim was that one 
should "do what the Communist Party said and follow Mao Zedong" (ting dang de hua, 
gen Mao Zedong zou - a slogan of the time). As another informant told me, "at first we 
believed that to have gaizao was a loss of face (diulian). Later we realized it was nothing 
of the kind."
An important shift which Giddens seems to overlook is an increasing trust in the 
self. Informants felt that there are clear generational differences in attitudes and values. 
Many young people asserted an increasing trust in the self. This was paralleled by what 
a young university lecturer described as a shift since the late 1970s from collective (jiti)
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toward individualistic (gerenhua) activities. He added that people "now recognize 
themselves (renshi dao ziji) and then deal with relations with others. Before danwei and 
the state handled interactions with others." During the Maoist period the state promoted 
"revolutionary heros" such as Lei Feng who were "characterized by selfless dedication to 
the cause o f building a collective utopia under the leadership of the Chinese Communist 
Party" (Chu 1985: 268). In the early 1990s attempts were made to revive the "Lei Feng 
spirit". Some informants expressed nostalgia for the ideal of selfless comradeship he 
embodied, more expressed cynicism suggesting, for instance, that China’s altruistic hero 
had gone abroad, perhaps to make money {bu yc«/pafen). The increased emphasis upon 
the self was evident, for example, in the promotion of fashion and cosmetics. In post- 
Cultural Revolution films, for instance, Pickowicz found that many are "exploring the 
complexities o f ‘private’ and ‘individual’ life in the urban sphere" (1995: 197). The rising 
divorce rate was further evidence of a stress upon individual desires. The age cohort sent 
down to the countryside appear to have been pivotal in this shift. Nearly two decades later 
many still felt a sense of betrayal but also that this experience, far from their families, 
dependent upon their own resources and often in harsh conditions, was a tempering 
(duanlian) through which they had learnt to rely upon their own abilities. I asked a couple 
in their late thirties who had taken part in political activities in the 1960s how they had 
then considered their actions. The husband replied, "at that time people did not think at 
all. They had no mind (tounao). There was just one mind, that of Mao Zedong. People 
had no self (ziwo)." His wife added, "in the past people had too little self, now they have 
too much." A young woman in her mid-twenties considered her age cohort very different 
from her parent’s. She felt that whilst the latter had "solemnly followed the Communist 
Party. We are for ourselves (weile ziji). We have more personality (you gexing yidian), 
previously everybody had a single point of view allocated (zhipei) by the state, now we 
have our own."21
Belief in one’s own self was often associated with a profound pragmatism and "this- 
worldliness". Most of my informants expressed neither faith nor interest in metaphysical 
beliefs or explanations. However, during the reform era the loss of trust in the Communist 
Party and socialism as expert systems has been replaced by a tendency toward trust in 
economic laws (jingji guilu) and the market. Indeed, if as I suggest, trust in the former 
was primarily a personalised relationship, this constitutes the type o f qualitative shift
2lThis is an ironic use o f  the verb zh ipei w hich is generally used for the allocation o f  materials and 
labour.
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Giddens posits. A popular attitude was that deficiencies in the political system will be 
confronted by the inexorable development of the economy - a Marxian type view the 
Communist Party itself appears not to share. A similar argument was that the economy 
remained dependent upon guanxi because it was immature (bu shu) and that talent 
(rencai) would become more important in the future. It is notable that in this transition 
belief in progress remains, the mantle being passed from one set o f expert systems to 
another.
I find Simmel’s notions on the impact of the monetized economy a useful means 
of understanding events in contemporary Shanghai. Many of my informants appeared to 
feel a greater degree o f personal freedom in the monetizing economy (lessened political 
control was also highly significant). The increasing significance o f money payment for 
labour allowed (some) workers to engage in a wider range of more contractual, less 
embedded, associations than before. The power of money did indeed "lend to the 
individual a new independence from group interests" (Simmel 1990: 342). However, 
increased monetization could also produce new forms of dependency, for instance, the 
increased cost of wedding arrangements made young couples more reliant upon parents 
than during the Maoist era. Simmel also ignores the dangers of inflation and the sense of 
injustice created by rising wealth inequalities. Despite this, the sense of alienation which 
monetization may bring in Shanghai should be offset against the degree of alienation which 
existed before. It is notable that the self presentation of Shanghai’s notoriously surly 
service workers was transforming with the incentive of material rewards (and increasingly 
the threat of redundancy). Moreover, there was a remarkable concordance with Simmel’s 
notions on the liberating effects of a money economy in the way many informants 
described the reform process - with its attendant monetization o f the economy - as China’s 
second "liberation" (jiefang).22
As in the 1950s when Shanghai’s citizens began to learn the language of class 
struggle and Marxism-Leninism Mao Zedong Thought so in the early 1990s a new 
vocabulary of "markets", "opportunities", "competition", "redundancy" and "bankruptcy" 
began to infiltrate into daily life. Shanghai’s commercializing economy is loosening and 
remaking the fabric of the society. This is creating new reasons to be fearful and 
mistrustful, new sources of risk, uncertainty and danger to replace the old. At the same 
time it offers novel opportunities, possibilities and reasons to maintain and create bases of
22The com ponent characters o f  the term jie fa n g  (liberation) o ffic ia lly  used o f  the Com m unist Party’s take 
over o f  power in 1949 are worth noting: jie  - undo, untie; fang - let go, set free, release.
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trust. I hope this study has been able to evoke a sense o f  the flux, tensions and parameters 
o f  human relations in Shanghai and to increase the understanding o f  trust in C hina's major
city.
Old style five m ao  note
New style five m ao  note
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Chapter 5 Consuming Shanghai - Hairy Crabs, Ghosts, and Christmas 
Trees
Shanghai was in the midst of a consumer revolution. A distinct shift appeared to 
be underway, from a "puritanical notion of deferred gratification" (Parkin 1993: 87) to a 
stress upon material well-being in the present (cf. Croll 1994). Evidence of this was 
readily apparent in the well-stocked stores packed with shoppers, the proliferation of 
advertising billboards, neon signs, lavishly furnished new restaurants, expensive nightclubs, 
karaoke bars, jewellery shops and fancy bakeries. The once drab clothing o f its inhabitants 
was being replaced, especially that of the young, by the latest fashions and accessories. 
On the television, glamorous and alluring images designed to entice the "audience" seeped 
into almost every living room, deliberately, or unwittingly, creating new desires and new 
"needs". The consumer "tide", the "flood" of consuming, was there for all to see.
My focus in this chapter is to examine notions and patterns of consumption in 
contemporary Shanghai. As a basic starting point I consider that "consumption is a 
socially constructed, historically changing process" (Bocock 1993: 45). It is a process 
through which social values and senses of identity may be expressed, maintained, created 
and disputed. A key concern is to investigate the social values and senses of identity 
which may be implicated in differential modes of consumption. I pay particular attention 
to newly emergent types of consumption.
I am interested in consumption from a broad perspective and take it to include 
diverse aspects of consuming, whether it be food, clothes or leisure activities. As such my 
study addresses a theme which involves a cluster of Chinese (and English) terms. In 
Chinese the terms xiaofei (consume) and xiaofeizhe (consumer) are becoming popular. 
Both derive from English and are used in increasingly similar ways to their English 
equivalents. Thus one may speak of gao/di xiaofei (high/low consumption) and xiaofei 
shuiping (consumption levels). However, to speak of dianshi xiaofei would, I suspect, 
puzzle Chinese listeners just as much as "television consumption" would many non­
sociologists in Britain. If the Chinese xiaofei is rather more restricted in its use than the 
English term, then the reverse case is true for the Chinese chi. Chi means "to eat" and 
"ate" but also includes "live on"; "annihilate"; "exhaust" and "suffer, incur" (CED 1988: 
89).
The two initial sections of this chapter locate consumption in contemporary 
Shanghai within an historical context: the first examines the factors which restricted the 
development of popular consumerism during the Maoist period; the second outlines the
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structural and ideological changes which have made possible the emergence of popular 
consumerism in contemporary Shanghai. The third section locates the rise of popular 
consumerism within a general commodification and commercialization of many aspects of 
life. I note the indigenous notion of rising consumption levels as an indicator of "progress" 
(jinbu) followed by oppositional voices which denied this link or expressed a feeling of 
exclusion from this consumption. I then outline the new importance o f money and the rise 
o f consumption in courtship and marriage rituals. The fourth section focuses upon 
foodstuffs and the semantic field of "eating". In particular, I examine ways in which food- 
based analogies and metaphors permeated the language local residents used to depict many 
aspects of life in Shanghai from individual behaviour to conceiving of the relation between 
Shanghai and the central government. In the fifth section I investigate instances o f newly 
emergent forms of lifestyle consumption. In particular, I highlight the way small-scale 
entrepreneurs (getihu) and young people were often described as having distinctive 
consumption patterns. I then highlight the recent craze for famous brand name consumer 
goods and the re-emergence of Christmas, in part at least, as a new festival of 
consumerism.
5.1 Historical Background To The New Consumerism
In the 1920s and 1930s Shanghai achieved world renown and sometimes notoriety 
as a "modern", cosmopolitan, semi-colonial city administered on a basis o f laissez-faire 
mercantilism. Photographs and written accounts of the period highlight the way fashion, 
advertising, dance halls, nightclubs and other forms of conspicuous consumption were 
highly developed features of Shanghai life. In the view of the Communist Party, Shanghai 
was a parasitic, consumer city (xiaofei chengshi) (see Gaulton 1981: 46). When the troops 
of the People’s Liberation Army walked into Shanghai many citizens were struck by their 
simple, frugal and unadorned (jianpu) appearance. This was the ethos which was to 
dominate China, in rhetorical terms if not always in practice, with varying degrees of 
intensity for the next three decades. In Shanghai, of all places in China, this constituted 
a significant break from the past.
An interrelated set of political, economic, ideological, moral and social factors 
precluded the emergence of consumerism in Maoist China. All persons were assigned a 
class label and, in many respects, these defined the opportunities available to people. 
Expressions of allegiance to and compliance with the prevailing ideology were frequently 
demanded o f citizens. Economic policies stressed heavy industry and capital investment,
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and there was a "two-decade-long policy of sacrificing consumption (including consumer 
goods, housing, and services)" (Chan 1994: 97).1 A common refrain was that "during the 
Cultural Revolution shops remained open, but there was nothing to buy." In addition to 
a severely limited range of consumer goods, wage levels were relatively egalitarian and 
generally low - a situation summed up in a satirical expression of that time "long live 
36¥!" (san shi liu kuai wansui). Advertising was severely curtailed from the 1950s until 
the late 1970s and "castigated...as the apotheosis of the capitalist religion of consumption" 
(Stross 1990: 485). Moreover, the ethos of the period discouraged conspicuous 
consumption and "bourgeois" habits and lifestyles - drinking coffee and raising goldfish 
were two examples I was told about. At least some informants believed that Mao Zedong 
used poverty and the "closed door policy" as part of a deliberate strategy of keeping the 
people in ignorance (yumin zhengce), all the better to maintain his own position of power.
At its most intense the prevailing ideology had much in common with that of the 
Puritans in seventeenth century England. Clothing was functional and personal adornment 
discouraged. It has been remarked that fluctuations in the stress on conformity were most 
readily apparent in the number of women with permed hair (Honig & Hershatter 1988: 42). 
In Life And Death In Shanghai. Nien Cheng writes that during the Cultural Revolution 
"[o]ne could no longer assess a man’s station in life by his clothes in China because 
everybody tried to dress like a proletarian" (1986: l l ) .2 Revolutionary operas were 
encouraged over dancing and love songs, sexual behaviour was subject to highly 
conservative control.3 At times coercion was used to ensure conformity. A female 
informant, for instance, recalled seeing young women being publicly humiliated in the late 
1960s by having the legs of trousers considered too fashionable cut open.4
'See Penelope Prime (1989) on the relationship between "curtailed consum ption and leisure" and the 
M aoist p olicies o f  se lf  reliance and a stress upon heavy industrial growth.
2This com m ent provides evidence o f  the flux in M aoist China - the im plication here is that one cou ld  
assess "a m an’s station in life by his clothes" before the Cultural R evolution . It w as, after all, during the 
Cultural R evolution that "the virtue o f  austerity reached its pinnacle" (Prim e 1989: 146). In addition, it is 
important to note that distinctions in dress still persisted, but becam e much m ore subtle. For instance, the 
number o f  pens in a person’s pocket could display their status. 1 have also noticed that informants could  
often pick out C hinese offic ia ls by recognizable physical mannerisms such as bod ily  posture and gestures.
3From the mem oirs o f  M ao’s physician these restrictions appear not to have applied to M ao h im self (Li 
1994).
4Nien C heng also recalls seeing this and w om en having permed hair cut o f f  (1986: 65-6 ). H ow ever, I 
w ould add that both these incidents have becom e "myth-stories" in Shanghai - everybody seem ed to know  
o f  them, but few  could state categorically that they had w itnessed them.
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Highly developed organisational and surveillance structures reaching into every 
work place and residential area, facilitated by the high population density, and a cultural 
stress against individual expression all acted to ensure a high level o f conformity. Since 
wage levels were relatively similar and alternative sources of income extremely limited 
people could readily assess the income level of neighbours and would be suspicious if they 
bought expensive items. A family who bought a colour television set in the 1970s before 
most of their neighbours told me that they did their best to keep this acquisition a secret.
David Parkin has written o f "peoples’ propensity continually to make themselves 
different through objects" (1993: 79). During the Cultural Revolution, in particular, it 
appears that the reverse situation generally applied - Chinese people had to make 
themselves (appear) the same - and, of course, markedly different from foreigners and 
"capitalist" consumers - through objects. Since the death of Mao, people once again may 
assert distinctive identities through consumption.
5.2 Revolutionary Slogans To Advertising Jingles - The Re-emergence o f Consumerism
During the reform era most of the factors which prevented the emergence of a 
popular consumer society have been either radically changed or, at least, undermined. 
There has been a profound shift from "deferred gratification" (Croll 1994: 11) to a stress 
upon consumption and material rewards in the present. Compared to the Maoist period 
there is a far greater range of consumer products available, extensive promotion of these 
products through media images and increasing numbers of people can afford these items. 
Some informants noted modest improvements in their standard of living as early as 1972 
but most located significant changes as beginning in the 1980s and especially after 1991.
My impression and that of various informants is that by the late Cultural Revolution 
the Communist Party had lost much of its moral authority (see also Madsen 1984). 
Wholehearted, or at least grudging, expressions of support by the populace for Party 
slogans had gradually given way to ritual observance, feigned compliance, even irony, 
ridicule, contempt and sheer boredom. The demonstrations of Spring 1989 across China, 
the collapse of regimes in Eastern Europe and the break-up o f the Soviet Union 
concentrated the minds of China’s leaders. After three decades o f shifting ideological 
campaigns the Party had lost the ability to use revolutionary rhetoric and political 
campaigns to spur the masses. Instead the Party elite perceives the best hope for its own
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survival as lying in increasing the economic prosperity of the populace - to adapt Marx, 
the hope is that material prosperity will act as the opium of the masses. As Geremie 
Barme writes, "under the regime of the reforms and the awesome spectre o f the dwindling 
communist world, economic viability and constant images o f prosperity - in the streets and 
shops as well as on television - are also crucial to the Party’s legitimacy" (1992: 13.19).
In this new scenario economic life is increasingly depoliticized. In Deng 
Xiaoping’s most famous aphorism: "It doesn’t matter if the cat is black or white so long 
as it catches mice." In the early 1990s, Deng reiterated this view, now not even bothering 
to use metaphor, in his widely publicised remark that: "It doesn’t matter if  something is 
called ‘socialism’ or ‘capitalism’ (buguan xing ‘she’, xing ‘z i’) so long as it increases the 
prosperity of the common people." The changed emphasis is symbolically manifested in 
China’s bank notes. Gone are depictions of happy workers engaged in production - a 
nickname for the former ten yuan note was the "great unity" (da tuanjie) so called because 
it had a portrait of a worker, a peasant and a solider. In their place are romanticized 
portraits of ethnic minorities and, rather ironically in view of the "Open Door" policy, the 
Great Wall.
One informant remarked that pre-reform China had a political economy (zhengzhi 
jingji), but now the economy is omnipotent (jingji wanneng). With the increased 
marketization of the economy - officially described as a "socialist market economy" - there 
is much greater stress upon the production of consumer goods (see Robinson 1985) and 
increased competition between both producers and retailers.5 The Communist Party’s 
former stress upon egalitarianism has been jettisoned and is now criticized. An article in 
China Daily observed, "the idea of equal shares for all has been shattered."6 Instead, some 
may "get rich first" and income differentials diverge.7
Income levels generally have risen in Shanghai and there is an increasingly large
5ln 1952, the tertiary sector accounted for 41.7%  o f  Shanghai’s industrial product but after 1956 this 
proportion declined to just 18.2% in 1970 (Jacobs & Hong 1994: 226). From the early 1980s this trend has 
been reversed and the stated aim is for the tertiary' sector to account for 45%  o f  Shanghai’s GNP by 2000 . 
By 1988 the individual sector had 17.8% o f  retail sales compared to just 0.1%  in 1978 and 2.9%  in 1982 
(Y oung 1991: 120).
6"Money Fever B ecom es Epidemic in China" CD 15 July 1993: 4.
7Bonus payments (j iangjin) are subject to a much greater degree o f  variation and are often much higher 
than basic salaries (gongzi). For exam ple, in one university, 1993 Spring Festival bonuses varied from 300¥  
to 3 ,000¥  in different departments.
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number of wealthy individuals.8 The Kleinwort Benson Investment Bank estimated that 
5-15% of Shanghai households have an income between 5,220-10,730¥ and constitute a 
"consumer market".9 In addition, ration coupons are no longer necessary to buy products. 
Chinese newspapers described a "consuming passion"10 and "shopping craze"11 in places 
such as Shanghai. In the year to October 1993 retail sales were up 25.1% over the 
previous year.12 During the early 1990s numerous jewellery shops opened in Shanghai - 
China recently became the world’s largest gold consumer.13 Despite this, for most 
households buying items such as a colour television involved a lengthy period of saving. 
The money used may be described as saved from "the mouth not eating it" (zuili bu chi) 
or the "gaps between the teeth" (yachi feng).
Before the reform era consumer goods purchased in China were invariably home 
produced and the highest cachet accorded those marked "Made in Shanghai". However, 
by the mid-1980s [f]oreign consumer goods [had] replaced Shanghai products at the top 
of the status list" (Hooper 1985: 143). The two largest stores in China are both on 
Shanghai’s Nanjing Road - the No 1 Department Store and the Hualian Commercial 
Building. ,4 Since the early 1980s the re-internationalization o f Shanghai has allowed an 
increasing influx o f foreign consumer items from everyday commodities such as soap and 
toothbrushes to Pierre Cardin suits and Rolex watches.15 Foreign retailers have been
8A tax inspector told me that the average salary in Shanghai was 7 -800¥  pcm. In 1993, personal tax 
(geren shu i) began at a rate o f  5% on amounts above 620¥  pcm. O nly basic salary and bonuses are taxable, 
incom e from second job s was tax free. A household’s incom e is much influenced by the life  stage cycle o f  
the fam ily. For exam ple, a fam ily with working adult offspring w ill be far better o f f  than one with a 
dependent child.
“Figures cited in Ho & Leigh (1994: 28). K leinw ort’s estimate that the number o f  households in this 
incom e range is grow ing at a rate o f  25%  each year.
'“"Consuming Passion Hits The Populous" C D BW  14-20 February 1993: 8.
"For exam ple, "Big C ities G o Shopping Mad" CD 22 February 1993: 6.
12"Locals earn more and spend more" SS 26 N ovem ber 1993. This article states that the average local 
citizen earned 370¥  pcm.
""Gold King" C D B W  16-22 May 1993: 8.
Hln 1992, the N o 1 D epartm en t S tore  had a turnover o f  l,350¥m  and H ualian  l,0 3 5 ¥ m  (H o & Leigh  
1994: 26).
"In the first four m onths o f  1993 "huge dom estic market demand for foreign products" led to a 24.7%  
increase in imports compared w ith the same period in 1992 ("Imports Up" C D B W  16-22 May 1993: 8).
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keen to exploit and promote the "virtual explosion of consumer spending" in the city.16 
Since June 1992 foreign companies have been allowed to participate in the retail sector 
(see Ho & Leigh 1994). As a result companies such as the Hong Kong retailer Sincere 
opened a new department store on Nanjing Road and Japan’s Yaohan Department Store 
signed a US $100 million joint venture agreement to build a 120,000m2 shopping centre 
in Pudong (Ibid). Chinese shoppers eagerly flock to these "new cathedrals" of 
consumerism (Tomlinson 1990b: 70) where "the increasingly sophisticated display of 
goods...encourages voyeuristic consumption" (Featherstone 1991: 173). A Xinmin 
W anbao article titled "Without Leaving The National Gate One Can Buy Many Famous 
Foreign Commodities" quotes the approval expressed by "customers who wear famous 
brand name clothing and pay attention to rank (jiang dangci)."17
Alongside rising incomes and the increased availability o f consumer products was 
a recognition that one of the new demands of the "socialist market economy" was to learn 
how to become a consumer. An article in Xinmin W anbao. for example, discussed 
various opinions on children’s yasuiqian, the money given to children at Spring Festival. 
One parent suggested ending the practice, another disagreed arguing that "consumption is 
a branch of learning...which requires studying in the environment of the commodity and 
market economy."18
The resurgent advertising industry (see Stross 1990) is eager to take up this 
"educative" role.19 In late twentieth century consumerism, media derived images play a 
vital role in valuations and notions surrounding products. Advertising is "one of the 
central purveyors o f the new consumer culture values" (Featherstone 1991: 173). Mike 
Featherstone’s description of developments in advertising in 1920s America is remarkably 
appropriate to post-Mao China. He writes that through the new mass media "[wjorkers 
who had become used to the rhetoric of thrift, hard work and sobriety, had to become 
‘educated’ to appreciate a new discourse centred around the hedonistic lifestyle entailing 
new needs and desires" (1991: 172). Clearly, astute marketing by Western and other
"Q uote from Ron Crom ie, general manager o f  Hong Kong-based advertising firm J. W alter Thompson  
China, cited in "Building For A B illion: C hina’s R ising Consumers Lure D evelopers" FEER 16-7-1992: 41-2.
,7"Bu C hu G uom en Y e N eng M aidao Bu Shao W aigu o  M ingpin" X M W B  23 February 1993: 8.
,8"Y asuiqian D e Sikao" (C onsiderations On M oney Given To Children For N ew  Y ear’s Gifts') XM W B
3 March 1993: 13.
'“A ccording to Stross (1990: 486), advertising made its first major reappearance in China on the first day
o f  C hinese N ew  Year in 1979, when Shanghai’s J iefan 2  R ibao (Liberation D aily ) carried a series o f
advertisements for consum er products.
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advertisers explicitly seeks to fuel the "aspirations, dreams, and fantasies" o f consumers 
(Tomlinson 1990a: 10).
On the basis of frequent comments made to me by Chinese television viewers, I can 
attest to the accuracy of Catherine Meek’s suggestion that "[t]he popularity of Western 
goods as communicators of both material success and of style may be due in no small part 
to the sophistication of Western, as compared with Chinese advertising" (1993: 20). 
However, I would locate advertising within a much broader increase in the range and 
diversity o f images purveyed through mass media in the reform era including magazines, 
films and television programmes. These images often implicity promote the lifestyles of 
wealthy Americans and overseas Chinese and the consumerism associated with them. In 
these programmes the "furniture, house decoration, cars, clothing, eating and drinking 
habits, the Took’ of the characters... creates images of life-styles which are perceived as 
being desirable in the eyes of the viewers" (Bocock 1993: 93). The subtlety of these 
influences makes them at least as powerful as advertisements in promoting consumerist 
lifestyles. In a complex interplay media images stimulate, form and articulate consumer 
desires. At the same time they create, fuel, and define standards o f success and provide 
patterns of ways of life (ways of consuming) that many Shanghainese aspire to and seek 
to emulate.
It would be tempting to consider the predominance of Western and Japanese 
products as symbols of success as an example of "cultural imperialism". In chapter two 
I noted the frequent congruence in everyday discourse between "the West" (xifang) and 
economic modernization/modernity (xiandaihua).20 I would argue that the Chinese state 
actively engages in sustaining (and, perhaps, creating) this conception by utilizing the 
success of Western products in China as propaganda tools to advertise its own success. 
State rhetoric now emphasises, above all, economic development and popular perceptions 
are that "the West" has already achieved this goal. It is, therefore, hardly surprising that 
Chinese people adopt as their own the symbols of success in the West. A China Daily 
article on fashion in China demonstrates this point.21 In 1978, Pierre Cardin was the first 
overseas designer to visit China and "[h]is name is now known to many ordinary Chinese." 
Cardin’s success is taken as evidence that "China enjoys rapid economic growth", events 
such as Cardin’s first fashion show in China "proved that China had gained international
20Stross remarks that C hinese advocates o f  reintroducing advertising stressed that "China needed
advertising to be scientific and modem" (1990: 489).
2l"China Vogue For Fashion" CD 20 May 1993: 5.
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recognition in fashion." In this article as in many others, the Western gaze is invoked. 
Foreign visitors are described as "amazed" that the "the daily attire worn by people is so 
colourful and diversified." The significance of "the West" may be particularly important 
in Shanghai. Many Shanghainese compare their city to Hong Kong or New York - an 
article in a local newspaper approvingly described Shanghainese as "China’s Americans" 
(Zhongguo de M eiguoren).22
The rise of popular consumerism was inescapable on Shanghai Oriental radio 
station which devoted abundant airtime to consumer programmes. These included advice 
on consumer issues, product care and availability. A particularly interesting development 
was the proliferation of live phone-ins devoted to these issues - these substantially 
increased the presence of the Shanghai dialect on local media. These programmes 
constitute not only cheap programming and publicity for stores but also education on being 
"consumers". Experiences in the "West" were often inveigled. For instance, much 
mention was made of the "Western" saying that "the customer is God". This was 
contrasted to the experience of Shanghai shoppers who have become used to sullen and 
off-hand treatment by sales staff.
5.3 Commercialism. Commodification and Consumerism
The rise of popular consumerism during the reform era is part of a general increase 
in commercialism and commodification. These trends affected many aspects of life in 
Shanghai from education, leisure, housing, journalism and medical services to weddings 
and funerals. In the case of the latter one elderly man, reflecting upon the increasing cost 
of funerals, told me that he "could not afford to die" (sibuqi). Commercialism was 
apparent in the increasing number of private enterprises and trading activities by units as 
diverse as schools, local government departments, research academies such as the Shanghai 
Social Science Academy, the police and the military.
In education parents were expected to make much higher contributions to their 
children’s schooling. In 1993, two Shanghai universities (Foreign Languages School and 
the Business School) raised their fees to 2,000¥ per term. A teacher estimated that it costs 
a parent 10,000-30,000¥ to support a child for a four year university degree course. 
Recently established private schools and universities were often even more expensive. 
There was also a common belief that teachers now needed to be given gifts in order to take 
greater interest in pupils.
22"Dushi L iu x ing  Da Z hanwang" (Forecasting Metropolitan Fashions) SWYB 5 March 1993: 2.
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Leisure was being commoditized. Until the last decade cinemas were the main 
location for paid leisure activities. Since the mid-1980s numerous dance halls and over 
1,000 karaoke had opened in Shanghai. Attempts were also being made to foster a housing 
market.23 The rent o f one typical flat I visited had increased from 3¥ to 27¥ pcm over 
one year from 1992. In the media, the acceptance by journalists o f gifts to promote 
commercial products had become so widespread that in 1993 a highly publicized campaign 
was launched against this practice. There were also "brokers" who, for a fee, used their 
connections to place advertisements disguised as news items in the media.
With the commodification and commercialization o f the economy old types of 
behaviour may take on new meanings. Many danwei have periodically issued employees 
with items which were unavailable or which required ration cards, for instance, "patriotic 
fish" (aiguo yu) and other foodstuffs at Spring Festival. During 1992-4 this practice 
persisted and had become even more widespread. For example, in the space o f a few 
months a young architectural worker’s danwei issued cases of Qingdao beer, Yantai 
apples, Rejoice shampoo, a 200¥ box of foreign biscuits, mattresses, frying pans and Oil 
o f Ulan (sic) moisturizing cream. In some instances, these are gifts from other danwei - 
this unit had projects in both Qingdao and Yantai. Another important objective in the 
1990s is tax avoidance. At a school which was making substantial profits from subsidiary 
enterprises great ingenuity was employed in distributing profits to the staff in kind rather 
than in taxable salary payments. A teacher detailed for me a myriad of free products, 
meals, holidays and "bonuses" for every conceivable festive occasion.
5.3.1 Consumption As The Measure Of Progress
For most people I spoke with the meaning of gaige kaifang was higher incomes, 
the emergence of numerous free markets with abundant and good quality produce and the 
possibility of acquiring consumer durables. A retired teacher told me that "gaige kaifang. 
is better than previous policies. In the 1970s and early 1980s the laobaixing never 
imagined that their homes could have a fridge, television and video. After a few years of 
gaige kaifang every family bought electrical goods.24 The ordinary laobaixing are 
relatively satisfied. We eat more dishes (cai) and less rice. Now sea food is common,
23For example, see "Increase Rents To Sell Hom es Says Newspaper" C D  10 Septem ber 1993: 4. This 
article suggested that rents should be raised at least sixfold  to promote the sale o f  residential housing.
24By 1989, more than 80% o f  Shanghai fam ilies owned a refrigerator, 93%  o f  these had been bought in 
the previous five years and over 18% were imported (CD Shanghai Focus "Facts And Figures" 19 March 
1989: 2).
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before there was only pork." Official rhetoric that the aim of these policies is to increase 
the standard o f living o f the common people is clearly an extremely potent and powerful 
force.
Standards of living were described in the press and by people I spoke with 
according to four different levels.25 One informant described them in ascending order as 
follows: chichuan - one has clothing and can eat until 70-80% full; wenbao - dress 
warmly and eat one’s fill; xiaokang - have a cash surplus, an annual income of US 
$1,000, one is "more free" (gengjia ziyou);26 fuyou - can afford to buy a house and car, 
"like developed (fada) countries such as Australia and the United Kingdom." He 
considered that if  only around 20% of a family’s income went on food it was "wealthy" 
and if 40-50% went on food it was rather badly off."27 The objective for 1995 is that the 
average annual salary in Shanghai will be 10,000¥, more than double the 1993 average.
A Shanghainese economics professor considered that until the late 1980s the main 
concern in Shanghai was still wenbao, now many households were approaching the 
comfortable state. He estimated that 5-10% of households were now rich (fuyou), 20% 
comfortably off and 5% had a declining standard of living. An indication of the move 
away from a subsistence economy was the declining use of the traditional greeting "have 
you eaten?" (nong ve tci ku le va/n\ chiguo fan ma). In the Chinese countryside this 
expression is still widely used, but in Shanghai tended to be used only by older people. 
Most Shanghainese used the term nong ho!ni hao? (literally "you good") as a greeting.28
Older people generally expressed their relative contentment. As a retired man told 
me, the "ordinary laobaixing are relatively satisfied now, their demands are low because 
they are accustomed to poverty (qiongguan)." However, younger people often did not 
share this sense of contentment. The demand for consumer products has rapidly increased 
during the reform era and, as this speaker remarked himself, young people who had grown
2<T h e criteria for these categorizations are reminiscent o f  those used by advertisers in their targeting o f  
potential customers.
26The equation o f  "freedom" (z iyou ) with econom ic prosperity is interesting. M y understanding is that 
freedom from worry about food and clothing is im plied.
27An "ordinary" fam ily o f  three told me that they spent about 3 -400¥  pcm on basic necessities. Rent for 
their 27m 2 flat was 20¥  pcm - one twentieth o f  the husband’s salary. Water cost a few  yu a n  per month, 
electricity 10-20¥, gas c20¥  - a total o f  50-60¥  pcm. The telephone cost 18¥ pcm . About 6 ¥  per day w as 
spent on food. Food com prised 60% o f  total expenditure.
28Am ongst the young it becam e fashionable from the m id -1980s to use the English "bye, bye" when  
leaving.
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up in the relatively affluent 1980s and 90s had much higher consumer demands. An article 
in Wenhui Film Times commented that in the 1950s and 60s the consumer items people 
sought cost in the region of 100¥ - a watch, bicycle and a sewing machine and in the 
1970s and 80s in the region of 1,000¥ - a colour television, fridge and washing 
machine.29 This article considered that there were no comparable "big three items" (san 
da jian) in the 1990s, although housing, cars, home decoration, air-conditioners and travel 
were mentioned.30 It suggested that this is partly because some o f these items were far 
too expensive for most households and also because people no longer "follow the crowd 
(pailang)" but, rather, "choose an individualistic lifestyle" (gexinghua de shenghuo 
fangshi). This article added that there was also the "magical and colourful world" (shenqi 
secai de shijie) o f the dakuan, dawan and dahu [all meaning "rich person"] names which 
"signify mobile phones, high class clothing, famous brand cars, villas with a garden and 
enough money to spend it freely." Similarly, an article in Xinmin W anbao expressed the 
view that the "new wealthy strata" (xin fu jieceng) now had a strong interest in buying 
cars.31 Even amongst those on more average incomes house ownership was becoming 
an aspiration. A man who had worked as a tax inspector for 30 years told me that 
although people like himself could not yet afford to buy a house that he now had this wish 
(yuanwang). His 30m2 flat would cost about 4-50,000¥.
Although many people I spoke with considered the rise of consumerism indicative 
of progress there were oppositional voices. A common complaint was that those who 
relied upon salaries (kao gongzi chifan) could not afford many of the items in the shops 
or enjoy the proliferation of entertainments such as karaoke. Still less could they afford 
the "flood of consuming famous brand names" which are "gushing" into Shanghai.32 One 
informant noted that he saw consumption levels increase whilst he collected his pension 
and his income decreased. Some informants described the vast increase in restaurant 
consumption as "abnormal" (bu zhengchang) and beyond the pockets o f ordinary salaried
29"Jiushi N iandai X iaofe ich ao  Toushi" (Perspectives On The Consum er F lood In The N ineties) 
W H D Y SB 5 June 1993: 7.
30In interviews, frequently mentioned candidates as xin san  jia n  w ere air-conditioner, computer, stereo 
system and m icrowave.
3l"Quan G uo Yi You ‘S ijia ch e’ 37 ,000  Liang" (The Entire Country Already Has 37 ,000  ‘Private Cars’) 
XM W B 11 January 1993: 2.
32"M ingpai X iaofe ich ao  N engfou  Chijiu?" (Can the Flood o f  C onsum ing Famous Brand Nam es 
Endure?) W HB 13 May 1993: 7.
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people.33 Lavish restaurant eating was associated primarily with private entrepreneurs, 
the (mis)use o f public funds or, more generally, "abnormal income" (bu zhengchang 
shouru).
The reappearance of inflation in the reform era was a source o f concern, especially 
for those on fixed incomes and the elderly in particular.34 It was suggested to me that 
the reappearance of inflation lay behind the dialect slang term which called a 10¥ note one 
fen iyi zang fen/yi zhang fen) - there are one hundred fen to the yuan. A concomitant of 
the "market economy" was that food prices now varied daily and store prices were no 
longer fixed but differed from store to store. Memories of stable incomes and prices and 
the general perception of limited corruption during the Maoist era often constituted a 
source for comparison. Discontent over official corruption and inflation was a significant 
factor behind the 1989 demonstrations. Fear of inflation was also cited as a spur to 
consumption by creating a desire to spend Renminbi before it depreciated in value.
The commercialization, increased levels of consumption and availability of 
consumer products associated with gaige kaifang brought an "economic pressure" (jingji 
yali). Media and advertising images spurred new wants and there was increased social 
pressure to keep up with one’s peers. A university professor reflected on the way the 
media "continually promotes high class products." He commented that his own income 
was above average but that these goods were way beyond his price range. He wondered, 
"if such products are affordable by only a very small group of people in Shanghai, why 
is there so much promotion of them?"
Those who "relied on a salary to eat" often had to find a second job or source of 
income in order to acquire the consumer durables now considered essential for happiness 
and well-being. For instance, a worker in a state danwei told me that "now without 
outside income (waikuai) in Shanghai one is very poor." This pressure to make money 
was associated with what a deputy restaurant manageress described as an increasing 
pressure of material goods (wuzhi de yali). Formerly a university lecturer, this woman 
had changed careers because of this pressure. As a lecturer her salary had been just 300¥ 
a month but she wanted to enjoy expensive entertainments such as karaoke and buy 
expensive consumer goods. She mentioned also a "clothing pressure" (fuzhuang yali) with
33There were, o f  course, many different types and style o f  restaurant and eating place from sim ple stalls 
by the side o f  the road with just a single bucket to wash the dishes to the m ost luxuriant o f  restaurants.
34Although pensions are raised each April they tend not to keep pace w ith inflation. In 1993, when  
inflation w as around 20%  they rose by 10%.
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a desire to wear famous brand (mingpai) clothing such as Nike shoes which cost 600¥. 
These comments provide evidence of the double-edged quality of a monetized economy 
(cf. Miller 1987, Simmel 1990). Money brings both the social advantages o f freedom but 
also new stresses and constraints. It is to the re-monetizing of Shanghai that I now turn.
5.3.2 The God O f Wealth Returns To Shanghai
An important feature associated with the rise of consumerism, commercialism and 
commodification was the new significance of money. Before the reform era, low wages, 
a reliance upon payment in kind (such as housing), a limited choice o f consumer goods and 
rationing made China if not a demonetized economy then at least reduced the importance 
of money. Daniel Miller writes of the way that "[i]n a non-monetized society, the 
individual is likely to be tied to activities which are far more tightly constrained by 
necessities of everyday life" (1987: 74). Although Miller is describing "traditional" 
societies, I consider that this is a helpful insight into the lack of freedom people described 
to me in pre-reform Shanghai.
By 1992-4 money was receiving far greater prominence. I asked a young worker 
in a joint venture what he considered the meaning of "gaige" (reform). He replied simply, 
"make money". I then asked what he understood by "kaifang" (the "Open Door" policy). 
The answer, once again, was "make money". For this young man it would seem that "the 
substitution of money payment for payment in kind secures the liberation of the individual" 
(Simmel 1990: 288). There were, however, many critical assessments of this new 
prominence of money. An article in China Daily commented that the socio-economic 
changes had "revolutionized attitudes toward wealth" and that Chinese people had no 
choice but to become "money conscious".35 In certain cases this was said to have given 
rise to "worshipping money", "idolatry of money" and "moral degeneration" (Ibid). My 
informants could all cite instances of this and felt that China had become a far more 
materialistic society, one in which "everybody grabs" (da jia na).36
Official pronouncements condemning such worship of money and stressing the need 
for "spiritual civilization" (jingshen wenming) were, in my experience, either ignored 
entirely, regarded as empty words (konghua) or as hypocritical. In the television series
35"Money Fever B ecom es Epidem ic in China" CD 15 July 1993: 4.
36This term is a re-ordering o f  the C hinese name for Canada - J ianad a.
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Heshang, it was said o f Chinese rulers that "while some people exert their full strength to 
criticize western life-styles and values, yet they themselves would never refuse to enjoy 
those super-deluxe limousines and high-class consumer goods" (Su & Wang 1991: 151). 
These criticisms were frequently echoed in the comments of my informants.
It seemed to me that intellectuals in particular often still retained at least a rhetorical 
disdain for money. For instance, a university graduate who was now a successful 
businesswoman described to me her dislike of businessmen. She described them as having 
tongchouwei - literally the "stink of money". This would seem to be an example of the 
way notions of cultural distinction (cf. Bourdieu 1984) are invoked - this women stressed 
her affinity to "cultured people" (wenren). In this instance, cultural taste was contrasted 
with the actual taste of money - one may have money but should not "smell" of it.
A pun was often made on the Communist Party’s call for people to look toward the 
future - xiang qian kan, a homonym of this is "look toward money". The suggestion is 
that people are more concerned to make money in the present than to place their faith in 
an uncertain future. An illuminating event occurred when I visited the home of a retired 
car mechanic. I was met near the block by a young cousin who led the way. I was told 
that before carrying out this errand the young boy had asked for a one mao "labour fee" 
(laowufei). The family considered this an indication of the changes wrought by the 
reforms. The retired worker noted that in the past there were only "spiritual" (jingshen) 
rewards, but now material (wuzhi) rewards were essential. His wife added that during the 
reform era there is less feeling (ganqing) among Shanghainese because "everyone is going 
into business" (jingshang)."
Money in Shanghai had various "Chinese characteristics". There were few credit 
facilities and banks generally did not lend money to individuals. Instead funds were 
borrowed from family, friends and sometimes danwei. This situation was described to me 
by a Shanghai economics professor as an instance of the way that China, in contrast to the 
West, is a "human feeling" (renqing) country.
The power of money was frequently mentioned. A state danwei salesman noted 
a traditional saying: If you have money you can make ghosts turn the millstone (you qian 
neng shi gui tui mo) whilst a 1990s version people may even say: If you have money you 
can make the millstone turn the ghost (you qian neng shi mo tui gui). The increasingly 
vital role of money was evident in the revival of expressions such as pulu - literally "to 
spread the path/road)" (see chapter 4). A school teacher who had played a part in setting 
up a commercial restaurant which had been opened by the school told me that much
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"spreading o f the path" had been necessary. In opening the restaurant people from various 
authorities had to be invited to eat in order to obtain their permission or cooperation. Each 
set of diners had to be invited separately so that they did not meet. It was also necessary 
to invite these people for meals at regular intervals to ensure their continuing cooperation. 
Two teachers had taken on the role of organizing these activities. My informant noted that 
at first these teachers had been rather naive. For instance, they had not known how
to eat certain types o f food. He commented "now they really know how to eat."
Another pre-1949 term which was regaining popularity was shaoxiang - "bum 
incense". An informant noted that one bums incense to bodhisattva (pusa). In this case 
pusa are officials and to shaoxiang is to give them gifts. Spring Festival appeared to be 
a time for much "incense burning". At this time in 1993, an informant assured me, 
restaurant owners in Zhapu Road each had to buy 1,000¥ worth of firecrackers from the 
local police - alongside regular free meals - in order to secure their protection. The 
tradition of giving money to children wrapped inside a red packet (hongbao) at Spring 
Festival also served as a cover for shaoxiang. In 1993, a sum between 10¥ and 100¥ was 
usual. If the amount enclosed was very large the parent of the child to whom the hongbao 
was given "would know what this meant" (xinli you shu - literally "have the numbers in 
their heart"). One informant considered that during the 1990s there had been a change in 
shaoxiang. Until the early 1970s officials were afraid to accept bribes and people afraid 
to offer them. Then bribes in the form of gifts such as Maotai alcohol became acceptable. 
Most recently cash payments had become common and increasingly officials would state 
how much they wanted before helping somebody. A commonly heard term in business 
negotiations was yanjiu - "investigate". A popular pun was a homonym of this term 
"cigarettes and alcohol", people spoke of the need for this type of "investigation" in order 
to conclude a deal or solve a problem. The government’s anti-corruption campaigns were 
widely regarded as futile, corruption was considered as endemic and to spread from the 
highest echelons of society downwards.
Westerners who visit China have often been surprised by the close questioning they 
receive from local people over their incomes. As income differentials within China 
diverged and sources of income proliferated a distinct shift was detectable in this sphere. 
The former transparency and openness over incomes was being replaced by secrecy and 
conjecture. What was once public knowledge was now entering an increasingly privatized 
zone. Bonuses and especially the hongbao which were handed out at various festival 
occasions were popularly termed mohu gongzi - indistinct or blurred salary. The giving
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o f hongbao, the contents of which were secret, engendered complaints about unfairness 
because, as one man told me, "they may have human feeling inside them" (renqing zai 
lim ian). That is, the money is given for personal motives and not based upon ability or 
performance at work.
The new striving for wealth was symbolized in the return of a pre-1949 custom on 
the fourth day of the lunar New Year to welcome (jie) Caishen - the God of Wealth. 
Traders set off firecrackers and bought large carp (liyu). The carp is considered the lucky 
(jixiang) since its name "li" is a homonym of the li in lixi (interest). This tradition was 
dormant until recent years both because it was frowned upon and since there were few 
private stores. The main display of firecrackers on this occasion was on Zhapu Road a 
street now almost entirely occupied by getihu restaurants.
5.3.3 Points of Consumption
Conspicuous consumption by most people is concentrated during a particular part 
o f the life cycle, namely unmarried young adults and couples on the point o f marriage.37 
In each of these stages consumption had considerably inflated in recent years. Expenditure 
on leisure and clothing were especially associated with unmarried youth and often related 
to courtship. Some cynics suggested that the whole enterprise of dating (tan lianai - 
"talking love") had become commercialized and was now "talking business" (tan shengyi). 
A retired woman in her late fifties divided courtship (tan lianai) into three phases and 
noted that each phase is marked by a different pattern of consumption. In the first phase 
(chulian) "consumption is especially high." In the past couples used to visit parks or 
cinemas. Now they were likely to eat at restaurants or visit karaoke. Such expenditure 
gradually declined through the middle phase (zhonglian). As the relationship entered its 
final phase (wanlian) the couple prepare to marry and set up a home (chengjia). A young 
man’s suggestion to his girlfriend that they buy furniture is tantamount to a proposal of 
marriage.
The boyfriend who spends lavishly trying to impress his girlfriend was a popular 
stereotype. Some joked that he is "under the order of the soup" (tang si ling). This 
expression is a pun upon the name of a character - General Tang (i.e. Tang siling) - who 
featured in a film shown early in the reform era. The homonym expresses the idea that 
the young man eats only soup so as to save money to lavish on his girlfriend. A
37See, for instance, "Shoppers Busy Stocking Up On Electrical Goods" C D B W  16-22 M ay 1993: 8. On 
courtship generally see H onig & Hershatter (1988: 81-136).
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prospective son-in-law, called a maojiao nuxu - "hairy-legged son-in-law" - in Shanghai, 
is expected to gue pa diilguai paitou - display style/show off his wealth - by providing 
gifts for his prospective parents-in-law. Some parents were considered especially greedy 
(tanxin) and to decide if their daughter could marry the young man depending upon the 
quantity of gifts he brings on his visits.
From the late 1950s and especially during the Cultural Revolution families were 
discouraged from holding lavish wedding feasts (Parish & Whyte 1984: 139). Instead, the 
Communist Party tried to popularize simple and frugal "wedding tea parties". Wedding 
feasts continued on a reduced scale but by the 1970s had "retreated back into the home" 
(Ibid). In the mid-1970s Parish and Whyte found that expenditure by the male side totalled 
three to five months income for the average family (1984: 136-7, note 34). Although the 
government still warned against extravagance (see Honig & Hershatter 1988: 147-55), in 
the early 1990s most of the former socio-political restraints had been removed and there 
was considerable social pressure to hold a wedding feast and acquire the requisite array of 
consumer durables for the new marital home. It would, for instance, "lose face" (te del shi 
mianzi) if the couple did not have a new colour television set with at least a 21" screen. 
On wedding days a new home is packed with goods from the traditional eight quilts piled 
up on the bed to video players and television sets, the larger the better.
A typical wedding meal I attended cost 9,000¥ and a further 30,000¥ was spent on 
consumer items. In 1988, an average of 13,186¥ was spent on wedding ceremonies, almost 
double that of 1987.38 Parents paid half of this figure. The annual average wage was 
then 2,181¥ per year. The cost of the wedding feast itself may be offset by the gifts of 
money brought by the diners. Guests generally gave a sum of money enclosed in a red 
envelope (hongbao). In 1993, an average gift was 100¥ per person.39 It was often 
remarked that the hosts "made a profit" on the wedding meal. It was widely believed that 
extra guests were invited to make money.
The rise of popular consumerism can be charted in the requirements of young 
couples who set up home (chengjia). In the early 1970s the items they bought comprised 
the "thirty six legs" - a table, four chairs, bed, sofa, chest of draws, wardrobe. 
Subsequently it was the "four machines" - television, tape recorder, camera and sewing
38CD Shanghai Focus "Facts And Figures" 19 March 1989: 2.
39This may constitute over one-third o f  a person’s m onthly salary. W edding attendance could be a great 
Financial burden especially  i f  several friends married at around the same tim e. In 1993, the average salary 
was about 4 ,500¥  per year ("Family Finances Show Electrifying Changes" SS 16 July 1993: 11).
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machine. Currently it is an air conditioner, video and television. In one flat I visited a 
large cardboard box graced the front room. It contained a huge, 29" Phillips colour 
television which had cost over 10,000¥. This had been bought by the fiance of the 
family’s son - the couple planned to marry within the next two years. It had been decided 
that the girl should buy one "large item" (da jian) for her dowry. The son was 
expected to buy most of the other items which would cost a minimum of 3-40,000¥.4° 
His parents would have to pay most of this and for costs such as a video of the wedding 
and decorating the new marital home. Although informants suggested that there was a 
tendency for a more equal level of contributions from the bride and groom’s families than 
in the past, the male’s side generally contributed more. Terminology drawn from 
computing was popularly used to describe the division o f costs - the groom’s side was 
responsible for the "hard ware" (yingjian) such as the television and video and the bride’s 
for the "traditional" items of "soft ware" (ruanjian) such as bedding items.
Older informants suggested that the inflated requirements of weddings meant that 
children must now rely more upon their parents in order to get married. It was considered 
a moral imperative for parents to contribute even if they lacked these items themselves. 
Popular stereotypes depicted parents as having to eat frugally, wear old clothes and make 
do with a black and white television so as to raise the amount o f money. The burden was 
especially great if a family had more than one son. In one instance in my acquaintance 
a man with two sons paid out 10,000¥ for the marriage of his first son in 1982 and 
20,000¥ for the marriage of the second in 1992. Using a dialect term he commented that 
his "wealth (literally his "fat") has all gone" (hiu si ma /a/youshui meiyou le). He did not 
envisage paying off the debts incurred until the child of the marriage was seven or eight 
years old. The high level of costs involved was suggested to me as one cause o f later 
marriages in Shanghai. In this respect, it would seem that rising consumerism was 
increasing the dependency of young people on their parents.
5.4 Eating Culture
The tables were now covered with a profusion o f small dishes, which contained all the 
finest fruits and vegetables o f  the season, besides many o f  the most expensive kinds o f  
soups, such as the celebrated bird’s nest and others, many o f  which were excellent even 
to the palate o f  an Englishman.
Robert Fortune (1853: Vol. I, 113)
4UIn the m id-1970s, Parish and W hyte found that the items bought by the groom ’s side averaged 500- 
800¥ (1984: 136-7, note 3).
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An occasional dish in Shanghai is "drunken shrimps". When faced with a steaming 
bowl of live shrimps, crustaceal arms and legs flailing in a salty, sable, alcoholic liquid and 
enjoined "eat quickly, while they are still alive!" one is reminded that notions of 
consumption are culturally constructed. This section explores indigenous notions 
connected literally, semantically or metaphorically with food and eating. This topic seems 
particularly important for a number of reasons. Firstly, foodstuffs are the most obvious 
items of consumption and in all human societies food consumption (and non-consumption) 
is imbued with cultural meanings. Secondly, in China, people frequently assert that food 
plays a central part in Chinese cultural life and speak, for instance, of an "eating culture" 
(chi wenhua). It is indicative that the Chinese measure word for people, kou, also means 
"mouth". A family, for instance, may be described as consisting of wu kou - five mouths. 
In everyday discourse notions connected with "eating" constitute a leitmotif through which 
people talk about, conceive and evaluate many aspects of the world around them. It may 
well be that "few other cultures are as food-orientated as the Chinese" (Chang 1977: 11). 
Thirdly, the provision of foodstuffs for the "family basket" has been a central concern of 
the Chinese state’s project of "alimentary perestroika". Foods have been at the leading 
edge of the consumer revolution in Shanghai.
With the indigenous perception of the centrality of eating and the abundance of 
notions associated with it this subject provides a useful avenue through which to examine 
perceptions of the socio-economic changes now taking place in the city. I note the 
implication of foodstuffs and notions of "eating" in relationship to conceptions of the body 
and health, regional and national identities, the household, calendric events, and 
interpersonal relationships and behaviour. I then explore more extensively the relationship 
between Shanghai and the state and between individuals and the state.
5.4.1 Our Daily Rice
It is misleading to talk about Chinese "food". Instead, in everyday usage people 
speak of "Chinese rice" (Zhongguo fan). The Chinese term chi ("to eat") is embedded in 
an extensive semantic field with many more figurative and metaphorical senses than the 
English equivalent. Traditionally, foodstuffs have been located within an extensive range 
of ingested items in which medicines and ultimately cosmological notions are intertwined 
(e.g. see Anderson 1988, Anderson & Anderson 1975, Wolf 1974). It is notable that in 
the Shanghai dialect the range of "eaten" items is even more extensive than in putonghua. 
In the latter one "eats " (chi) rice and medicine, in the dialect chi also serves for beer,
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coffee and cigarettes. In Chinese chess opponents’ pieces are "eaten". In October 1993 
I was in a share dealing centre when Shenzhen’s Baoan Company tried to takeover 
Shanghai’s Yanzhong Company. This first attempted takeover by one listed company of 
another was described to me as an attempt by one company to "eat" the other.
Food is a key marker through which Chinese and regional identities are expressed. 
Any researcher in China soon becomes aware o f the seemingly endless discourse on food 
and eating. It does seem that "[f]or the Chinese... food is a central feature of ethnicity, a 
basic statement about what one is" (Anderson 1988: 211). Eating "Chinese food" in the 
correct way is a key component of "being Chinese". It is a prime instance of the way 
"consumption habits, deemed natural as skin, are criteria for membership and become 
weapons of exclusion" (Douglas & Isherwood 1978: 85). For instance, chopsticks are 
considered so "Chinese" that it is believed foreigners can scarcely learn to use them. Even 
people who knew I had been in China for over three years expressed surprise that I was 
able to manipulate chopsticks. During the peak of the Cultural Revolution when fierce 
campaigns sought to distinguish "enemies o f the people" even such habits as drinking 
coffee and eating foreign foods could be used against someone as "weapons of 
exclusion".41
Cuisine plays a part in the construction of regional distinctions.42 "Being 
Shanghainese" requires, for instance, wanting to eat the species of hairy crab caught in 
October and November. Anderson writes that during the colonial era Shanghai "developed 
the most eclectic of all China’s cuisines, incorporating dishes and ingredients not only from 
every part of China but also from the West" (1988: 161). The taste of the West from 
before 1949 may still linger in people’s memories. A woman who had lived in the vicinity 
o f the American run St John’s University still recalled with great fondness the taste of 
American chocolate from that time. As I noted in chapter two, informants compared the 
sophistication and Western orientation of Shanghai with its many Western restaurants such 
as the French-style Red House when compared, for instance, to tea-drinking Beijingers.
For its part, the state has used food to emphasize the poverty of many in pre-1949 
China. A ritual was created using food as an instrument o f propaganda to highlight the 
Communist Party’s takeover of power as constituting a qualitative break with the past.
4lSuch accusations were levelled against N ien Cheng (1986: 83).
42For exam ple, see James W atson’s (1987) description o f  Cantonese ritual banquets o f  eating from the 
"common pot" (sihk puhn) as a means o f  establishing an ethnic boundary from other, com peting ethnic 
groups. See also Anderson & Anderson (1972).
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Many informants recalled having eaten y ikufan .43 Yiku means to "recall one’s suffering 
in the old society" and yikufan was a poor meal specially prepared to remind its 
consumers how people had suffered (chiku - "eat bitterness") before 1949. This ritual was 
intended to promote a common purpose and a sense of belonging to the Chinese nation, 
the "nation-family" (guojia). In contemporary Shanghai, some fashionable restaurants now 
serve such dishes - a clear instance of the way in which in "postmodern culture" [t]he past 
is raided...for commoditizable nostalgias" (Hannerz 1992: 35).
An important ingredient of being "a family" is the regular eating together of food 
cooked on the same stove, "the stove is the symbol of the living family" (W olf 1968: 28). 
The core kin group are, above all, those who eat together on key ritual and festive 
occasions.44 At Sunday lunchtime families may wrap dumplings together (cf. Watson 
1987: 398). The roundness of the dumplings and the process of wrapping and consuming 
them which involves the whole family may be taken (by the consumers themselves as well 
as anthropologists) as symbolizing and reinforcing the unity o f the family. At certain times 
of the year this commensality may extend to deceased family members. Several families 
told me that on particular festive days they lay a place at the table for deceased relatives 
(generally grandparents). Food is set out and windows left open so that their ghosts may 
come and join the meal.
Anthropologists have noted the structuring capacity of food (and other goods). For 
instance, it can be used to discriminate different times of the day, one day from another, 
annual events and life cycle rituals (Douglas & Isherwood 1978: 115-6). The role of food 
in life cycle, religious rituals and festive occasions in China has been well rehearsed (e.g. 
see Ahern 1973, Parish & Whyte 1978: 273-297, Thompson 1988, 1994, W olf 1974). I 
therefore mention just a few instances of the specific place of food in Shanghai.
Shanghainese had a strong awareness of the importance of food in ritual and other 
occasions. As one informant commented, "it seems that in China, whatever the occasion, 
it always involves eating." Lunar New Year’s Eve was described as a time when families
43Presumably this is the same as the "class congee" made up o f  tw igs, grass, soil and so on w hich Lynn 
W hite describes as being given to Shanghainese youth in order to show  them how  hard life  had been "before 
Liberation" (1978: 80).
44See Elisabeth C roll’s description o f  attempts made during the Great Leap Forward to socialise  
consum ption by introducing com m unity dining halls (1982: 341-363). One may, perhaps, consider this as 
an attempt to engender the kind o f  solidarity associated with the sihk  puhn banquets described by Watson 
(1987).
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should unite (tuanyuan) and waike - "outside guests" - should not visit.45 The family 
eat and remain cloistered together until after the mid-day meal on New Year’s Day. From 
then and for the next two days Shanghai is full of people carrying gifts especially bottles 
of alcohol bound together in pairs - even numbers indicate good luck - and large round 
Western-style cakes. Many people joked that the cakes, which cost around 35¥, are passed 
on from one household to another in a chain of reciprocity and rarely consumed since they 
ultimately go bad. As living standards have improved so the value placed upon Spring 
Festival appears to have changed. A young woman expressed the view that this festival 
was more important in the past. She recalled it as a time when people had better food to 
eat - danwei gave out special foods and extra ration coupons. However, people in 
Shanghai now eat well throughout the year. She considered the New Year’s Eve television 
variety programme the most important aspect of the festival.
Each festive day has its special foods.46 At Mid-Autumn Festival (Zhongqiujie), 
for instance, moon cakes, taro, lotus, water chestnuts and duck are eaten. Such foods 
invariably have stories and myths associated with them. As a person consumes such foods, 
ideally alongside other family members, these stories may be recalled or told to youngsters 
thereby incorporating them into the imagined Chinese community. In a sense they eat 
themselves into being "Chinese". One example is a festival one or two days before Qing 
Ming called hanshi (cold food). On this day one should eat only cold food. This derives 
from an event in the Spring and Autumn period when an upright scholar who had gone 
into hiding rather than compromise his principles was burnt in a fire. To commemorate 
him the emperor forbade people to burn fires for one day. In this instance, alongside the 
food the eater ingests the social and cultural values of "being Chinese".
4<T h e solar calendar is generally used in China. But for the six day duration o f  Spring Festival and other 
specific festive days people revert to the traditional lunar calendar.
4bParticular flow ers and clothing are associated with festivals. For exam ple, children should have a
tiger’s head embroidered on their shoes (h u tou x ie) for the Dragon Boat Festival (d u an w u jie), at Spring
Festival they should have a new  set o f  clothes. Flowers are involved in m ost festivals, for exam ple,
narcissus (sh u ix ian ) and wintersweet (lam ei) are bought for Spring Festival and m ugwort (a i) is associated  
with the Dragon Boat Festival.
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Cartoon 11 Caption "The Last Big Dish"
The television screen shows that it is the start 
of the New Year's Eve Variety programme.
(XMWB 22 January 1993)
In life cycle rituals commensality expresses and maintains relationships. Particular 
foods eaten have symbolic importance, for instance, peaches given to the elderly and noodles 
eaten on birthdays symbolize long life. Wedding foods include zaozi (dates) - expressing 
the hope that the couple will zao sheng rizi (give birth to a son soon) and lianxin (lotus 
seeds) the wish that the couple will be xin lian xin - hearts joined together.
When visiting relatives it is considered bad manners to arrive empty handed 
(kongshou) and gifts, often of food, facilitate, follow and create lines of communication. 
In the dialect to give somebody a present is song ninqing (song renqing), renqing has the 
meaning of both human feelings and a gift. For instance, if preparing to attend a wedding, 
one may ask "so n g jid i  n inqing?/song duoshao renqing?" - how much human feeling should 
be given? In a typical instance, a young married couple took two expensive boxes of moon 
cakes (costing 84Y) when visiting the wife's parental home. This represented a sizeable 
portion from the couple's combined monthly income of under 500X. A traditional saying 
comments: human feeling is more important than debt (renqing da yu zhai).
Banqueting and gift giving plays an important role not only in maintaining ties of 
affect but also in the creation and maintenance of more directly instrumental relationships 
in the "art of guanxi" (Yang 1994: 127-39). In Shanghai foods such as turtle, shark's fin 
soup and crab were considered especially prestigious for banquets. Similarly, particular 
foods acted as "social lubricants" (Anderson 1988: 200) in gift-giving such as crabs and 
M aoiai  alcohol. A piece of doggerel acknowledged this widespread practice: m a gc va tci,
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tci ge va ma/maide bu chi, chide bu mai - the people who buy them don’t eat them, the 
people who eat them don’t buy them.
Acceptance of gifts or a meal may constitute "repayment" for a debt of gratitude or 
create a duty of reciprocation at some point in the future. Eating the food of relatives also 
involves reciprocity. A recently married woman, for instance, told me that she often ate at 
her nearby mother-in-law’s home. However, she had begun to cut down these visits, feeling 
that it increased the pressure on her to produce a grandchild as soon as possible. At times, 
refusing a gift can resemble a fierce struggle, with pushing and shoving by gift giver and 
refuser. One household head told me that he particularly disliked the inflation o f this 
practice during the reform era. He did his best to refuse all gifts to avoid embroilment in 
the round of reciprocity it creates. In explaining this attitude he remarked that his household 
was "kaifang". This is the expression for the "Open Door" policy (see chapter 1). In this 
instance it conveyed a sense of "modernity", an oppositional stance to social mores.
Various phrases incorporating the verb chi were used to describe types of behaviour, 
states of mind and personality. A philanderer, for instance, was said to chi doufu ("eat 
bean curd"). Whiteness, purity and "softness" were ideal attributes commonly associated 
with both women and bean curd. In Shanghai dialect a man who lived off a woman was 
said to chi ruanfan  - eat soft rice. The verb chi was also often used in the dialect in place 
of the putonghua ‘d a ’ (to hit or beat) as in the expression tci sang hu!chi shenghuo ("to 
eat life") - to get a beating. To have suffered was to have "eaten bitterness" (chiku). 
Jealousy was described as "eating vinegar" (chicu) and when things did not meet with one’s 
expectations this was evocatively described as "eating a stuffed rice dumpling with no 
filling" (chi kongxin tangyuan).
Many foods in Shanghai were still seasonal. For instance, the arrival of convoys of 
trucks bringing in water melons was congruent with the arrival of Summer. As I noted in 
chapter two, the seasonality of foods and the cultural stress upon buying fresh unprepared 
foods daily contributed to city dwellers’ sense of being linked to the countryside. Indeed, 
this link may well have been reinforced during the reform era. Before the re-introduction 
of free markets, foods were bought from state stores. Now, many fresh foods were bought 
directly from the peasant producers in free markets.
There were, however, new trends which pulled in a different direction. During the 
reform era new types of foods have become available. An early arrival was Nescafe, jars 
of which graced many a display cabinet and were often given as gifts. Coffee drinking is 
a good instance of the way that consumption can express and establish differences between
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social groups (Bocock 1993: 64). The consumption of coffee was considered prestigious and 
"modem” and young people especially drank coffee.47 A different import to Shanghai in 
1992-4 was the spread of the Cantonese habit of eating zaoclia (breakfast tea and snacks), 
culinary recognition of this region’s growing economic importance. Shanghai’s restaurant 
scene was also being re-internationalized with Korean and Japanese restaurants and fast food 
chains such as Kentucky Fried Chicken. Nanjing Road now boasted a fine example of 
cultural miscegenation, a Japanese Hamburger Bar! The rapid rise in the number of non­
local, processed and packaged foods will increase alienation from the producers of foods and 
the seasons.
A young employee at a television station described a generation gap in levels and 
types of consumption. She felt that her generation’s way of eating was a result of kaifang 
and that it was more "modern" (xianjin). As an example, she told me that when her 
contemporaries at a restaurant they only order what they can eat. This was more 
"modem" than her parent’s generation who would deliberately order more than could be 
consumed. Another result of gaige kaifang she remarked upon was the recent proliferation 
of fast food restaurants (kuaican). These were a consequence of the faster "rhythm"" 
(jiezou) of society. She noted that her parents had more time to shop and prepare meals. 
By contrast, she worked longer hours, under greater pressure and rarely ate at home. Her 
parents regarded her regular meals out as a waste of money. She saw this different view 
as symptomatic of a general generational difference in values and priorities. Her parents 
stressed the importance of saving for "the future" (weilai), in particular, for her marriage.
Metaphors of eating could be used to express the new inequalities which were 
emerging. For instance, in the view of a factory worker big share dealers "eat big meat" 
(chi da rou) whilst small scale share buyers, such as herself, "eat small meat" (chi xiao 
rou). In another instance, a neighbourhood cultural centre worker expressed the view that 
"top officials eat big ‘rice’ (daguan chi da fan), middle ranking officials eat medium sized 
‘rice’ and minor officials eat small ‘rice’." Notions of expropriation and corruption could 
also be expressed through gastronomical metaphors. The "appetite" (weikou) of officials 
who accepted bribes was said to depend upon how "greedy" (tanxin) they were - the higher 
the official the greater his "appetite".
It was considered axiomatic that top officials ate foods unavailable to the common
47On one occasion I visited a household where I w as given co ffee  to drink. Each tim e my glass was half 
empty more coffee and water were added. 1 realized that my hosts w ere treating coffee  in the sam e w ay as 
green tea.
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people. Informants would assure me that, for example, Deng Xiaoping ate croissants flown 
in specially from France and that top Shanghai officials drank tea which cost 10,000¥ per 
jin. More visible differences in consumption were also taken as evidence o f inequalities. 
For instance, one informant commented on Zhapu Road restaurants that "ordinary people 
cannot afford to eat there, you can tell the kind o f people who eat there from the fact they 
arrive by car."
I noted earlier the importance of the hairy crabs (<du za W dazhaxie) eaten each 
Autumn. Since this prized food had increased dramatically in price in recent years, this 
could make comparisons with the past very unfavourable. For instance, one informant 
remarked that in the Cultural Revolution crabs had cost just 2¥ per jin , they now cost 80- 
100¥ per jin. He remarked that "my family used to eat them five or six times a year, now 
not at all." The ability to consume or exclusion from consumption o f these crabs could 
mark out different status groups. When I asked one informant who could afford to eat 
crabs, he suggested that they were mostly "the class with special power (tequan jieji) and 
getihu...who should be classed as ‘citizen strata’ (shimin jieceng), but who economically 
are very different from ordinary city folk." A front page article in Xinmin W anbao which 
caught many people’s attention described a couple who paid over 1,000¥ for two large 
crabs.48 They refused to tell the journalist their names or occupation but would only 
comment that "we are also ordinary salaried stratum." The journalist and those I spoke 
with clearly did not believe this. Instances of such conspicuous consumption often 
provoked the anger of those who "relied on their salaries to eat" (kao gongzi chifan de).
From the comments above one can distinguish the discursive creation of the 
"laobaixing" as a discrete category of persons. The laobaixing, as I note in the 
introduction to this thesis were a shifting category. However, there were distinct contours. 
The laobaixing were routinely described as "everybody except high officials". The 
wealthy and intellectuals were ambiguous members of this category - both sought to be 
incorporated as laobaixing but others may deny their inclusion. If  asked whether they 
were laobaixing, intellectuals affirmed this. However, in their conversations, my 
impression was that they defined "laobaixing" as a category separate, separated by 
education, from themselves. They depicted laobaixing. as it were, as those who had not 
"consumed" sufficient wenhua (culture/education). Although Chinese people did not speak 
of education as something consumed, my interpretation does not seem too far fetched. It
48"Xunmi Xie Wang" (Searching For The King o f  the Crabs) XMWB 17 January 1993: 1.
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is notable that in Chinese knowledge is described as being in the "stomach" (duzi). The
category laobaixing generally concorded with those who "relied on their salaries to eat."
The laobaixing were portrayed as morally good, honest and hard-working. By definition
they were not conspicuous consumers or consumers of expensive goods and services.
Workers who had been laid-off (xiagang) and lacked an alternative source of
income formed a largely hidden underclass unable to participate in popular consumption.
A factory worker in her late forties who had been laid-off told me that half the nine
hundred workers at her danwei were in the same situation. She believed that the factory
originally had considerable potential and blamed its decline on the factory manager
appointed in the late 1980s. She described the behaviour of this "hooligan manager"
(lium ang changzhang) in the following manner:
He eats from day until night. Every lunchtime he eats at restaurants - often in 
Zhapu Road - until 2pm. He has a car bought by the danwei. (A television game 
show is on as we speak, she points to it). Recently 20,000-40,000¥ was spent on 
the factory taking part in a television game show! Many places have our 
advertisements and our manager often appears on the television. He wants to 
become famous (churning) but there is no production. The boss just wants to use 
connections (la guanxi), eat, drink and have a good time (chihe wanle).
The diverse examples provided above demonstrate the pervasive role that food and 
"food talk" played in the lives of Shanghainese citizens. In the early days of my research, 
when I could understand little of the Shanghai dialect, an informant attempted to console 
me. He told me that I was not missing much, for people were either talking about food 
or money. From these more quotidian and ritual uses o f food I now turn to ways in which 
metaphors and analogies of food and eating were used to portray the relationship between 
Shanghai and its people and the state.
5.4.2 The State As Conspicuous Consumer/Consuming The State
In chapter two I noted the conviction of many Shanghainese that the Chinese state 
was a voracious consumer of Shanghai’s wealth. This was clear in the comment of a 
women in her early forties who said that in the thirty years after 1949 Shanghai had not 
changed. It had just "lived off its past capital" - chi laoban ("eaten its old capital") whilst 
the whole country had "lived off Shanghai" - quan guo chi Shanghai ("the whole country 
ate Shanghai"). In a similar vein, a young man adapted a current slang term for a rich man 
(dahu) in describing Shanghai’s relationship to the state, calling the city the "biggest tax 
paying dahu of all." This perception of many Shanghainese was the inverse of the 
Communist Party’s rhetoric (before 1949 at least) that Shanghai was a parasitic "consumer
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city" (xiaofei chengshi). However, this was only one aspect of a relationship of symbiotic 
commensality for many were described as being fed by the state. This applied in particular 
to those in larger state enterprises who had an "iron rice bowl" (tie fanwan) who "ate the 
food of the state" (chi guojia de).
An elderly man graphically summed up the situation in China for me in the following 
way: "China only has one Party, if you don’t eat this Party’s food, you will starve"
(Zhongguo zhi you yi ge dang, ni bu chi tade fan, ni jiu  esi le).49 It is interesting to 
compare this comment to those of a rich share dealer in his mid-thirties who complained that 
at his work unit people simply sat around and drank tea all day. He said that he rarely went 
to the danwei, and added, "I don’t drink the Communist Party’s tea, I can drink my own 
tea at home." I suggest that these two comments are highly indicative of the changes in 
Shanghai society. The elderly man describes especially the Maoist era when the "iron rice 
bowl" (tie fanwan) dominated. The share dealer depicts the contemporary situation in 
which the "unbreakable" rice bowl" had been either broken (dapo) or, at least, begun to 
leak (lou). That the younger man did not have to drink the Communist Party’s tea may 
serve as a metaphor for and is indicative of the newly emergent possibilities for alternative 
lifestyles and means of livelihood.
The share dealer had chosen his new career, for many others there was little choice. 
A worker in a state danwei told me that from 1994 she and her colleagues would no longer 
"eat food from the big national pot" (chi daguo fan), a term which often served as a 
synonym for socialism. Instead each department of the danwei would have to earn its own 
salary and bonus. This was occurring in many danwei and created particular problems in 
those which did not produce saleable items. Changing jobs was increasingly common. A 
slang expression for this was huan yi wan fan chi chi - change to a different rice bowl to 
eat. Another expression which had recently become popular to describe changing jobs was 
tiaocao - to jump to another trough. As one informant commented, "previously one could 
not tiaocao, but only be a ‘revolutionary screw’ (geming luosiding)." An expression which 
demonstrated a new possibility was chi waihui de ren - "people who eat outside money" - 
a term used of Shanghainese who lived off money sent them by relatives abroad.
The term chi daguo fan could have a rather derogatory meaning in Shanghai - it 
was, as Rofel found in Hangzhou, a synonym for a "lazy work ethic" (1989: 238). 
However, a more distinctly parasitic type of relationship had flourished in the reform era.
49On another occasion he substituted the term laoh an  - boss - for "Party". T he meaning is the same.
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The city’s countless expensive new and refurbished restaurants were often filled with 
diners. This proliferation was ascribed by some informants to the commercialization of 
the economy and the association between commercial transactions and banqueting. More 
negatively, many Shanghainese described it as "eating public funds" (chi gongkuan), also 
referred to as chi laogong (eating the Communist Party). A former accountant told me that 
this was very corrupt (fubai) and that it made people very angry (qi ren).50 He continued 
that this "chi laogong is actually eating the blood of the laobaixing. This was why in the 
1989 demonstrations the main protest was against official corruption (guandao), the 
laobaixing supported this." During these protests several dozen Shanghai students 
emulated those in Beijing and embarked upon a hunger strike outside the city government 
headquarters. The television pictures and descriptions of the hunger strikers - the "nation- 
family’s children" - provoked a very strong emotional response among many people. The 
moral power of this refusal to consume - conspicuous non-consumption - contrasted 
sharply with the (perceived) avaricious consumption by high officials.51
A woman who had been employed in a karaoke bar and a Zhapu Road restaurant 
confirmed the impression of many Shanghainese that customers were often "eating public 
funds". She remarked that many customers asked to have a receipt, for which they would 
be reimbursed later by their danwei. On one instance I was shown around a newly opened 
restaurant by the manager. I subsequently described this visit to some Chinese friends.
I told them that several hundred thousand yuan had been spent on furnishings including 
mahogany tables and chairs and, for example, flying in Taiwanese chefs and ingredients 
for its opening night. The immediate reaction of my friends was that it must be owned by 
the state. One of them explained that "if money is being spent in this way it must be a 
state restaurant because the state’s money can never be used up (yongbuwan). If  it runs 
out they just dig out (wachulai) more from the pockets of the laobaixing."
A local slang expression which was indicative of individuals’ changed relationship 
to society and changing social values was hun ve tci/hun fan chi (to get a meal just by 
muddling through) which could be translated as "putting the minimum effort required into 
one’s job." A former teacher in his sixties remarked that hun ve tci could be contrasted 
to the term gongxian (contribute). He recalled that:
In the early 1950s people worked very hard, this was to ‘serve the people’ (wei
,0Business trips by offic ia ls w ere also often regarded as extensive opportunities to consum e public funds.
5lThe Party tried to discredit the B eijing hunger strike by show ing film  o f  a prominent student leader and 
hunger striker, W e’er K aixi, apparently enjoying a luxurious meal at this time.
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renm in fuwu) it was gongxian.52 Then people would have despised somebody 
who said that he was hun ve tci and regard them as petty bourgeois (xiao shim in). 
It was like this until about 1958. Now it is the other way round, even doctors may 
say they are hun ve tci. People would consider somebody who said he was 
‘serving the people’ as an idiot (shi san dian).
5.5 Emergent Contours of Lifestyle Consumption
Georg Simmel (1990: 342-4) considered that the rise o f the money economy allows 
individuals to engage in new forms of association. Presciently, he also noted that 
dislocation from fixed structures and the uprooting of values which this new freedom 
involves would lead people to search for significance in arts, new styles and so forth. 
Contemporary analysts have built upon Simmel’s insights. It has been noted that "[p]eople 
in contemporary society come together in ‘taste cultures’, ‘life-style groupings’, or ‘market 
segments’, which represent distinctive consumption patterns" (Leiss et al 1986: 3). 
Similarly, Bocock writes on the way that consumption can express and establish
differences between social groups (1993: 64).
By the term "lifestyle consumers" I indicate people’s use of products to assert 
particular identities. These identities overlap and may cross-cut those more territorially 
based identifications outlined in chapter two. In Shanghai during 1992-4 there was ample 
evidence of the way "the person in the big city consumes in order to articulate a sense of 
identity, of who they wish to be taken to be" (Ibid: 17). An informant provided me with 
a striking instance of the way the "consumer is engaged in a continual task of grading 
goods and occasions and matching them appropriately" (Douglas 1992: 153). He told me 
of a danwei colleague who regularly carried three brands of cigarettes - imported, good 
quality Chinese cigarettes and poor quality local cigarettes. The type of cigarette offered 
depends upon the man’s assessment of the interactee’s social status and/or potential
instrumental value to himself. A distinct case of wanting to be taken as what one presents 
to others, what may be termed a literal presentation of self (cf. Goffman 1959).
5.5.1 Lifestyle Consumers
In Shanghai it was possible to discern at least two sections of society which 
conformed closely to "status groups". These are defined by Bocock as having "a 
distinctive pattern of living, of eating, drinking, dressing, entertaining, in short of
” Nien Cheng writes that, "‘To Serve the P eople’ was perhaps the most publicized slogan o f  the Chinese 
Communist Party" (1986: 498).
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consuming" (1993: 6). The first of these are getihu. Tom Gold writes of getihu that "the 
young ones in particular, have developed a distinctive life style...characterised above all 
by conspicuous consumption" with the emergence of many coffee shops, restaurants, bars, 
and hair salons to cater to their tastes (1990: 176). In popular discourse getihu were 
considered the exemplars of conspicuous consumption, spending lavishly on karaoke, 
clothing, women and food.53 They were said to do this to gue pa  rftf/guai paitou - 
display their wealth/show of their style or to tse fong  dii/chu fengtou - seek to be in the 
limelight. Such perceptions bear a close parallel to the way getihu were often described 
as baofahu - upstarts, people who had got rich quick. Like Ann Anagnost I found that 
baofahu often had connotations that this wealth derived from "dark economic forces" such 
as speculation or fraud (1989: 219). The root of the term bao in baofahu is "sudden and 
violent" (also "savage, cruel; hot-tempered; stand out" CED 1988: 24) - it may be used 
to describe the violence of a thunderstorm. Their pattern of consumption was popularly 
perceived of in just this way, with their money portrayed as spent wildly, freely, 
aggressively, with no concern for taste or finesse.
A second "status group" is outlined in an article in Xinmin W anbao which stated 
that "yuppies (yapishi) had now emerged in Shanghai."54 The term yapishi was a newly 
coined term, a transliteration from English. This article described them as being "foreign 
style" (yangqi) and mostly graduates from Shanghai’s top universities who worked for 
foreign companies. Distinctive aspects of these young professionals included the way they 
were "immaculately dressed", speak foreign languages fluently, go to big hotels and travel 
by taxi.
A young deputy restaurant manageress who closely fitted this description told me 
that she wished to become a successful person (chenggongzhe). Her notion of success 
included distinctly "Chinese characteristics". For instance, her definition of success 
included, not unexpectedly, the ability to enjoy high class consumption (gaoji xiaofei) 
items. However, she added that she already frequently participated in many of these 
activities, such as eating in expensive restaurants and going to karaoke bars. A vital 
ingredient of her definition of success was the ability to invite other people to engage in 
these activities and to be able to pay the bill. Additionally, success, in her view, would
53Susan Y oung (1991: 128-32) m entions the w idespread perception o f  conspicuous consum ption by getih u  
and hints that there is som e truth behind this. She w rites that many getih u  (in the late 1980s) "fully expect
the policy o f  encouraging private business to change, and do business w ith  this in mind" (131).
54"Shanghaitan Chuxian ‘Y apishi’" ( ‘Yuppies’ Appear In Shanghai) XMWB 26 October 1992: 2.
2 8 9
include the ability to financially support her parents.
5.5.2 Famous Brand Name Clothing: The Uncooked Consumer?
Whilst in prison during the Cultural Revolution, Nien Cheng was faced by one 
interrogator who had hair greased down, clothing of good quality and a gold watch, "the 
habitual attire of the capitalist class" (1986: 257-8). She was surprised to see somebody 
dressed in this way and writes that only later did she find out that this attire marked him 
out as "a typical son of a senior army commander." This instance clearly indicates how 
styles of consumption may divide and the way "[c]lothing is a vocabulary, complete with 
evocative subtext" (Finkelstein 1991: 108). In this case differential styles of dressing are 
expressive of power relationships. In contemporary China, power grows less obviously 
from the barrel o f a gun than from the wallet.55 Clothing styles are now more diverse 
and their "meanings" more ambiguous - they may indicate relations o f power (dressed in 
a new' guise) but may also be indicative or expressive of aspirations, commodification and 
commercialism as well as involving indigenous notions of face.
Fashion in contemporary Shanghai provides many examples of the way 
"consumption involves the incorporation of the consumed item into the personal and social 
identity of the consumer" (Gell 1986: 112). In this section I interrogate the desire to 
acquire famous brand name (mingpai) clothing to see what it communicates about 
Shanghai in the 1990s.56 I begin with an indigenous explanation for this phenomena 
taken from an article in Shanghai’s W enhui Bao.57 This article suggested that in cities 
such as Shanghai people are "compelled" to join the trend to buy mingpai. Two main 
reasons are suggested to explain this. Firstly, the "desire to consume" had been suppressed 
until the reform era and this type of high consumption is a form of "compensation" for this 
"psychological suppression" Secondly, it suggests that Chinese consumers are influenced 
by an "abnormal emotionalism" (qingxuhua). It gives as an example, men who even 
refrain from eating meat to save money to buy foreign cigarettes. They may not even
55This is partly a question o f  visib ility , as the military is deeply em broiled in com m ercial affairs.
56In a more extended investigation o f  fashion, gender w ould play a particularly important part. An 
examination o f  m id -1980s fem ale fashions is presented in Honig & Hershatter (1988: 42 -51). Marilyn 
Y oung (1989: 263), for instance, writes o f  the way that "[t]he sexually undifferentiated style o f  dress and 
manner urged on w om en during the Cultural R evolution has been overw helm ingly rejected." Instead many 
m agazines and other m edia "educate" w om en in how  to be "feminine", including advice on posture, make-up, 
fashion and bodily shape.
57"M ingpai X iao fe ich ao  N engfou  C hijiu?" (Can The Flood O f Famous Brand N am e Consumption  
Endure?) WHB 13 M ay 1993: 7.
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enjoy smoking these cigarettes but just holding them gives them "a sense of self
confidence." The writer suggests that buying mingpai is comparable to the way people
in poor rural areas are extremely frugal except for key ritual events when they may spend
several years savings at once. In both these cases, these items become necessities, rather
than luxuries, in the serous game of maintaining status at an appropriate level.
The article states that people buy mingpai not for their use value but rather for their
symbolic meaning (xiangzheng yiyi). It adds:
Every commercial product has the symbolic function of displaying the owner’s 
social and economic status, personality, accomplishment, character/quality, and so 
forth. Commercial products possess this symbolic function because in society they 
are always associated with a particular type of person, for example, high class cars 
are invariably associated with high ranking cadres, wealthy people and film stars, 
pianos are associated with dignified (timian) families, ‘dageda’ (mobile phones) 
with managers, bosses, and high level company employees and so on. Commercial 
products have become an important sign (biaozhi) of displaying a person’s social 
status.
The article suggests that often people without sufficient money seek to buy these 
products and that this will change only when consumers become more mature (chengshu - 
ripe). The article sees the craze for high levels of consumption as led by the propaganda 
of Western high consumption and the "gushing in" of foreign famous brand products.
The mingpai clothing and accessories which people bought or aspired to buy were 
predominantly American and European products such as Nike and Roebuck training shoes 
and, for the most wealthy, Swiss wratches and Pierre Cardin suits. During the early 1990s 
it became much easier to buy such products in Shanghai including from shops devoted to 
selling single name brands of imported clothes. These products were far more expensive 
than locally made goods, for instance, Nike trainers at around 600¥ were some ten times 
the cost of locally made sports shoes. This accords closely with both the indigenous 
explanation in this article (although the writer could well have referred to translated 
Western sources and/or been abroad) and Alan Tomlinson’s definition of consumerism as 
"the difference between buying an object mainly for its function, and acquiring an item for 
its style" (1990a: 9).
I noted earlier the common conflation of notions of "the West" (xifang) and 
"modernity" (xiandaihua), the purchase of Western and Japanese goods as symbols of 
success, and the stress upon wealth as a key component in the judgement o f a person’s 
worth. Clothing fits into this framework and wearing expensive foreign clothing could 
instil a sense of national or local pride. This "purchasing pride" was evident in the 
comments of a businesswomen who had bought such clothing and told me that it gave her
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a "sense of pride that as a Chinese and a Shanghainese I can afford to buy such items." 
I also felt that her comments accorded closely with Simmel’s insight that "the very act of 
buying is experienced as such a satisfaction, because the objects are absolutely obedient 
to money...money provides a unique extension of personality" (1990: 326).
The desire and pressure to buy these products was most apparent among the young, 
especially university students and those engaged in commerce. In many ways these were 
the two sections of society most affected by the increasingly marketized economy and for 
whom style had become "a powerful medium of encounter" (Ewen 1990: 46). The popular 
use in the 1990s of the term baozhuang ("packaging") is indicative of this "aestheticization 
of social relations" (Ibid: 49). The Chinese term baozhuang - pack or package - had 
recently acquired, imported from English, the more abstract meaning of the term 
"packaging" as used in advertising. Mike Featherstone stresses "the importance of 
appearance and the Took’" in consumer culture (1991: 170). He suggests that with 
consumer culture a "new conception of self has emerged" (1991: 187). He calls this a 
"performing self' which "places greater emphasis upon appearance, display and the 
management of impressions" (Ibid). Featherstone writes that in consumerist society 
"individuals are required to be ‘on stage’ all the time" (Ibid: 190, cf. Goffman 1959).
Although this is a useful approach I consider that it has a rather ethnocentric bias. 
From my interviews and conversations with Shanghainese it appears that the need for 
individuals to be "on stage" was particularly strong in China’s most virulently anti- 
consumerist phase, during the Cultural Revolution. Many informants likened the Cultural 
Revolution period to a dramatic stage (wutai) in which individuals had to act out certain 
roles (juese). Indigenous notions of "face" also indicated a conception of public behaviour 
as involving role-playing, for instance, the dialect term for "lose face" (te de/ta tai) means 
literally a "collapsing stage". The key change in contemporary China is the much greater 
range, diversity and origin of acceptable "looks". I would argue that in the reform era 
presentation of self and the management of impressions is concerned less with verbal or 
written expression - such as self-criticisms - than with visible images. Whereas people in 
the Cultural Revolution appear to have dressed largely not to be noticed, not to attract the 
surveillant gaze, they may now dress to attract an appreciative gaze. Moreover, it is no 
longer politically inspired notions of style that dominate but images purveyed by 
advertisers and the mass media which increasingly contribute to and are imbricated with 
the construction of socially acceptable "looks" and perceptions of the body.
On Shanghai Television Station and Shanghai’s Oriental Television Station there
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were many advertisements which promoted "looks" and "lifestyles". Amongst the myriad 
of advertisements for products which promised to improve viewers’ hair, teeth, skin and 
health were those for Cussons soap - "for the future world" (weilai de shijie), GilletiZrazor 
blades - to make the user "gengjia xiaosa" (even more carefree/fashionable), and Lux 
Shower Cream to "make the (female) you that loves beauty even more attractive". Food 
adverts included Tuc biscuits promise of the "taste o f France" (Faguo fengwei), Sunkist 
canned drinks film of beaches in America and backing music in English "California 
dreaming...", and Kentucky Fried Chicken's call to chihe wanle (eat, drink and be merry). 
"Traditional" gender stereotypes dominated - men were doctors, businessmen, "experts"; 
women were pretty, mothers, dancers, air-hostesses. Locations were often of modem 
kitchens, shopping malls, "exotic" places.
The new stress upon "packaging" and the associated desire for m ingpai intersects 
with "traditional" notions of face (mianzi). When I asked people of differing ages and 
occupations why people liked to buy mingpai I received very similar answers. Typically, 
I was told that people wear mingpai as a means to display (biaoshi) or increase (tigao) 
their social status - shenfen or shenjia (literally "the value o f their body"). Informants 
linked this to the way Shanghainese "want face" (ai mianzi) and/or, more critically to their 
vanity (xurongxin). Only those with "thick-skinned faces" (lianpi hou) did not want face. 
A library worker added that "Shanghainese judge people by their clothing (tongguo yifu 
kan ren). They pay great attention to this packaging (baozhuang)." Now that economic 
success was often perceived to be the main determinant o f a person’s worth it was 
increasingly important for the packaging of the individual - clothing, make-up, and other 
adornments - to conform to media derived images of success.
The examples just given indicate how "consumer goods are part of the way in 
which people construct a sense of who they are" (Bocock 1993: 52). Bocock describes this 
as "a ceaseless striving for the distinctive" (18). In the context of Shanghai this approach 
can be examined from differing perspectives. Within the commercializing and marketizing 
environment and emergent popular consumerism of contemporary Shanghai one might talk 
about a rise of individualism. As I noted in chapter four there is an emergent discourse 
on individualism, there are also undoubtedly many new ways to present one’s face/facade 
to the world. From a different perspective, one may consider this as an "invention" (cf. 
Hobsbawm & Ranger 1983) of individualism, which may be construed as a 
commodification of the individual. The particular products that people desire to consume, 
and the lifestyles they hope to achieve, are often closely related to the category systems
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of consumers constructed by advertisers. Consumers may, for instance, seek to emulate 
patterns o f consumption depicted in "lifestyle format" advertising (Leiss et al 1986: 
210-15). However, this is also a reflexive, interactive process. Producers, for instance, 
engage in extensive market research, they are responding to, as well as in/forming, 
"consumer demands".
Young people were especially attracted to buy mingpai. This contributed to the 
view of many parents who felt that with gaige kaifang some positive values have been lost 
such as the ability of young people to keep expenditure within the limits o f income (liang 
ru weichu) and the value of thrift (jieyue). Older informants expressed incomprehension 
at the way youngsters may spend 300¥ on tickets for the concerts of Taiwanese and Hong 
Kong pop singers and their desire to buy mingpai clothing and accessories. Older people 
wanted durable (jieshi) clothes. Their modes of dressing were often distinctive. For 
instance, an elderly man I interviewed at his home in the Summer wore an old, threadbare 
vest, with holes and patches and ancient, striped pyjama bottoms. Chinese viewers of 
Western soaps would remark on the way that Western middle-aged woman "dress-up" and 
wear make-up. They would contrast this to the lack of such adornments among Chinese 
women of this age group. However, this was beginning to change.
Many informants volunteered examples of young people who spent all their income 
on clothing, even to the extent of stinting on food. This is clearly not only a post-reform 
phenomenon since a pre-1949 expression - yang zhuang biesan, ziji shaofan ("Western- 
suited trash, cooks his own food") - describes behaviour of a similar kind. I learnt this 
expression from a man in his late sixties who was explaining to me notions o f face in 
Shanghai. He used this expression of the way people may "show o ff' (gue pa  dw/guai 
paitou) or "want face" (yao mianzi) His explanation of this phrase was that it describes 
a man who wears a Western style suit but has no money, that is, when he returns home, 
he must cook for himself since he does not even have (i.e. cannot afford) a wife. In part 
then, the desire for mingpai, provides evidence of a developing youth culture but it can 
also be related to a re-emergent importance of what may now be described as "packaging".
One situation where "packaging" had become important was in searching for 
employment, where students now had to present a "marketable self' (Featherstone 1991: 
171). The employment of students was no longer a "blind marriage" where neither party 
saw the other. Students who wanted a good job now had to use connections and/or appeal 
- often in competition with other candidates - to employers who could choose to accept or
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reject them. In addition, the lure of the West was especially strong for university students 
and they adopted the status symbols of the West. At the university I stayed in, male 
students wore suits and ties on a regular basis - ironically modes of dress that many 
Western students actively avoid. Shanghai youth dress up to be xiaosa - a phrase 
originally meaning "natural and unrestrained" but, after having been made popular through 
a Taiwanese pop song it has acquired the meaning "stylish" or "trendy" (note its use in the 
Gilletit advert mentioned above). Through being xiaosa, young people adopted the 
packaging of success and hoped that this would help them obtain the other accoutrements 
o f success - a good job, wealth, and a suitable spouse.
It is important to note that not all types of wealthy people were considered to want 
to buy mingpai clothing. A young businessman commented that whilst "getihu are openly 
(ming) rich, they have style (paitou), others may be even richer but were secret (an - also 
"dark, dim; unclear, hazy" CEP 1988: 6)), for example, officials who trade in real estate." 
A share exchange manager commented that those who spent the most freely were often the 
young, especially university students who relied on their parents. Others with a high 
expenditure level, he noted, were businessmen, who buy expensive clothes to display their 
social status (shenjia - literally "the value of their body", but also "the selling price o f a 
slave") and to facilitate their commercial activities. My informants felt that, in the absence 
of personal ties, businessmen were judged by the cost of the clothing they wore. In 
business, as in job hunting and mate selection, a good "presentation" was extremely 
important (Ewen 1990: 45). As one informant noted, "they must have this face (mianzi) 
in order to do business." The exchange manager felt that, by comparison, those who made 
a lot of money from share dealing "live very simply (pusu), for example, they eat bread, 
just drink hot water and wear five yuan shoes." My own observations suggested that this 
distinction was overdrawn but not entirely unwarranted. The manager suggested that rich 
share dealers may be afraid to reveal their wealth as people may harm them or want to 
borrow money from them. A young wealthy share dealer agreed with the manager’s 
distinction between share dealers and businessmen. However, he felt that share buyers 
were less likely to buy mingpai because they are in a "process of accumulation" which is 
insecure and that, in any event, "share dealers only interact with a computer." There were 
also people who ostentatiously displayed their ability to enjoy prestigious consumption 
patterns but who may be ridiculed for their trouble, an instance of the way that "[gjoods
can be used as fences or bridges" (Douglas & Isherwood 1978: 12).58
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5.5.3 Shanghai Christmas - A New Ritual Of Consumerism
In recent years anthropologists (e.g. Miller 1994, Parkin 1993, Stirrat 1989) have 
questioned the assumption that global cultural interconnectedness leads to cultural 
homogenization. David Parkin, for instance, sees global convergence only at the most 
superficial of levels. Rather than homogeneity he sees "an infinitely produced diversity" 
(97). He argues that "the way in which goods are recontextualized is of utmost 
significance" (90). Ethnographic examples highlight the rich vein such study offers. In 
Sri Lanka, for example, Stirrat (1989) shows how consumer goods can mean quite different 
things in different contexts. He describes fishing households which build car ports and buy 
televisions but have no cars, roads or electricity. Stirrat sees this consumption as "part of 
a symbolic struggle with the Sinhalese middle class" (108). Similarly, Daniel Miller 
observes that "Trinidad is not becoming more like anywhere else, except in the most 
superficial sense that it is using products of the global economy" (1994: 319).
I would argue that Christmas, like other forms of popular culture, "offers a rich 
iconography, a set of symbols, objects and artefacts" (Hebdige 1988: 74) which people can 
reassemble to suit their own ends. Miller cites the Trinidadian Christmas as an example 
of the way "consumption...takes the imported goods and gives them meaning in relation 
to local debates and symbolic struggles" (1994: 319). He suggests that "Christmas...is the 
single most important institution in creating a specific sense of the land of Trinidad" (319). 
Examples from around the world (see Miller 1993) demonstrate that "Christmas" has 
diverse meanings. A brief examination of the "Shanghai Christmas", a new ritual of 
consumption, contributes both to this trans-national ethnography and to an understanding 
of processes in contemporary Shanghai.
I noted earlier the ennui that many young Shanghainese felt for Spring Festival. 
This contrasted with their enthusiasm for the imported festival of Christmas.59 Amongst 
students in particular cards were sent, presents given and parties held. In many respects 
this "invocation of an exotic elsewhere" (Hebdige 1988: 9) had meanings very different 
from the places of its origin. In England, for instance, Christmas is generally seen as a
S8For instance, there was the comm on belief, mentioned in chapter tw o, that those in Shanghai who  
displayed the brand label o f  their suits on the cuffs o f  their jacket sleeves w ere "country bumpkins" 
(x iangxiaren ).
^Another example is St. V alentine’s Day (q ingrenjie).
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time for family gatherings at home. It is a ritual fully supported by both the state and the 
established church. In Shanghai, by contrast, the appropriation of this Western festival 
provided Chinese youth with a space in which alternative (and, perhaps, oppositional) 
meanings to dominant cultural traditions could be negotiated and expressed.
Young Shanghainese contrasted Christmas to Spring Festival, the latter being a 
ritual promoted by the state and supported by their parents. I was often struck by how 
close their descriptions of Spring Festival were to my recollections of an English 
Christmas. Both were dominated by the family and home, consumption of foods and 
television watching. For young Shanghainese, Christmas was a time to "play" (ba 
x/tfttg/baixiang), go out with friends, and for dancing parties.
The Shanghai Christmas contributed to the sense of a generation gap. It could also 
be oppositional to the state. In his examination of gangtai culture in the PRC, Tom Gold 
writes that "[cjonsuming it gives one a sense of participating in a sophisticated global 
activity" (1993a: 915). Christmas may be viewed in a similar way. The state attempted 
to dampen the enthusiasm for Christmas. For instance, a television programme producer 
told me that he had been forbidden to make a programme on Christmas festivities around 
the world. In danwei, I was told of instances in which young workers were prevented 
from organizing parties and taking time off. University students were told not to celebrate 
Christmas and threatened with punishment if they missed classes. I was curious to know 
why the university authorities should have adopted this attitude. One student I asked about 
this gave two interrelated explanations. Firstly, the university was anti-Christmas because 
it is a Western (xihua) festival. Secondly, she was convinced that their harsh attitude was 
related to June 4, it was a means both of retribution for the students’ involvement in the 
demonstrations and an attempt to restrict the influence of "Westernization" which had (in 
their view) encouraged students to call for such "bourgeois" ideas as greater democracy.
When Christmas "re-emerged" in the late 1980s it mainly involved university 
students organizing their own festivities. However, by Christmas 1993 it had spread 
beyond the confines of universities. Across the city hotels staged expensive events, 
restaurants were decorated with coloured lights and imitation snow, and street stalls sold 
bundles of Christmas cards and pots of poinsettia plants described as seng de 
/?o/shengdanhua - "Christmas flowers". The power of commercialism and consumerism 
to transform and appropriate cultural forms was very evident. This is a process familiar 
in Britain, where sub-cultural styles - punk rock for instance - are rapidly disengaged from
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their origins and incorporated into mainstream fashion. At least one young person 
complained to me that Christmas had become too commercialized (shangyehua) in 
Shanghai.
In the commercial Christmas there was also plenty of evidence that this was still 
far from global homogeneity. A brief description of a small two-storey private resltaurant 
I chanced upon in mid-December demonstrates this. It had just been refurbished and was 
ready to open but the manager told me that he was waiting until Christmas, a renao  ("hot 
and noisy") time, to reopen. The decorations o f the upper floor with its two round tables 
demonstrated a "mix and match" of cultural forms with a statue of the Buddhist Goddess 
o f Mercy (Guanyin), offerings of fresh oranges, little plastic models o f Father Christmas 
and fir trees and, dominating the room, a large, brand new Japanese karaoke outfit. I 
suspect that here, as elsewhere in Shanghai, the "Christmas" decorations would be kept on 
view throughout the year. Similarly, on New Year’s Eve 1993 I attended a party to 
celebrate the (Western) New Year. The midnight hour was marked by a karaoke rendition 
o f "Jingle Bells", a song associated with Christmas in Britain and America.60 This 
incorporation of Christmas into the local ritual and commercial calendar and the bricolage 
o f cultural artefacts is a fine illustration of the way imported cultural forms are adapted and 
incorporated in unique ways.
Concluding Remarks
This chapter has explored various notions surrounding consumption in Shanghai. 
It has shown that terminology from the literal consumption of food served, through 
metaphors and analogies, to describe many aspects of life and diverse relationships in 
Shanghai including that of Shanghai and its citizens to the state. I have stressed the 
changing and proliferating styles and contours of consumption and their implication in 
defining selves and others. The changed array of colours are indicative o f wider changes. 
The reform era has been marked by a shift away from primary colours - red, black and 
blue - including abstract notions of political "redness" to a kaleidoscope of colours. The 
Communist Party’s attempt to monopolize the only available bright colour - red - has 
failed. Alongside this diversity of colours there was now a much greater range of visual 
images and a limited emphasis upon verbal expressions of allegiance to the Party. The
b0"Jingle Bells" appeared on many karaoke song sheets and w as a popular song at any tim e o f  the year. 
In the same way, the m usic to the Scots song associated with N ew  Year, "Auld Lang Syne", was very 
popular as piped music on trains and elsewhere.
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surveillant gaze has been replaced by the "look".
The globalizing of Shanghai provides local people with many alternative images and 
products from which to fashion identities. Increasingly, these were less territorially-based 
identities than say, being Shanghainese. The inflow of media images and products from 
exotic elsewheres spurs aspirational identities, identities which are asserted or recognized 
by or through the consumption of products. Miller writes that with mass consumption 
"identity... is intrinsically an act o f forgery" (Miller 1994: 322). Certainly I found evidence 
o f this in Shanghai, although in this location it seems that pre-reform identities or 
presentations of self were also "forged". In Maoist rhetoric it was often said that humans 
had to be "forged" or "tempered" (duanlian) so as to be true revolutionaries.
Consumerism in 1990s Shanghai is producing, facilitating and marking out new 
divisions in society. These in themselves may involve potentially dangerous tensions. 
However, more dangerous still is the raising of expectations and aspirations if they cannot 
be met. The Communist Party presumably hopes that a generally improving economic 
situation will bring improvements to all (shui zhang chuan gao - when the river rises the 
boat goes up). Deng Xiaoping has held out the promise of a "comfortable living standard" 
(xiaokang shuiping) for all Shanghai citizens.61 At present this objective appears 
attainable, incomes generally are higher and the range and quality of consumer products 
is increasing.
Above all, it was the younger generation brought up in the reform era who expected 
far more than their parents. The latter generally described good health, a stable home and 
career as the main priorities. They had experienced great deprivations and disruptions over 
recent decades and were particularly likely to stress the importance of stability (anding). 
A magazine editor in his mid-fifties epitomized this approach. His aspirations in the public 
sphere were to "just muddle along (hun) for five or six years until retirement." His main 
hopes were in the private domain - for good health, the successful marriage and careers 
of his children, to have his family nearby and to have a grandson. Beyond this a larger 
living space and consumer items such as air-conditioning were considered highly desirable.
An informant told me, a sentiment voiced by many others, that "one of the good 
things about socialism is that one can eat from the big national pot (chi daguo fan) and 
just muddle along with little effort {hun nijialYmn rizi)." However, many young people 
had much higher aspirations that this. Some actively sought success, to be able to enjoy
6lDeng first used this term on 16 January 1980 (1983: 223).
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high class consumption. Their desires were fuelled by media images and advertising which 
deliberately aimed to create a "cycle of continual dissatisfaction" by playing upon intimate 
fears and desires (Ewen & Ewen 1982: 73). Many young people faced a choice between 
"social security" or material wealth (Bruun 1988: 56). Increasingly, this choice was 
circumscribed by necessity, as the pull of money grew greater and the security of state 
danwei jobs eroded. The need and desire to make money induced some to take risks. In 
some instances this involved the dangers of "taking an empty hemp sack to buy rice" 
(kong madai bei mi), that is, try to succeed in business even when one has no capital. 
More seriously still were the proliferating scams such as financial fraud and the 
counterfeiting of goods. Local consumers were increasingly aware that the famous brands 
they desired may be fakes, mere facades of the "real" product.
Even for those who had already successfully plunged into the "sea" of business 
there were risks. During a bear market even a wealthy share dealer may, as one dealer 
described it, see his large mantou (steamed bun, i.e. his fortune) become a daoqie mantou 
(slices o f steamed bun). In the event of a general economic downturn the newly emergent 
distinctions I have outlined may rapidly become fractures and fissures along which 
frustrations and discontent flow. During the 1980s there was a creation of "new hungers 
for a better life" (Stross 1990 501). In Spring 1989 these "hungers... expanded to the 
realm of political change" (Ibid). In the future, the aspirations of the laobaixing may once 
again extend to imported cultural products such as "democracy" and "freedom". It may 
also be that a new range of targets and scapegoats will serve as the focus for collective 
discontent amongst those denied access to popular consumerism or who lose their ability 
to participate in this consumption. Chief amongst these targets could be newly emergent 
strata of wealthy consumers, especially if they are considered to have achieved their wealth 
by unscrupulous means.
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Chapter 6 Taking Stock - Emerging Social Contours and Boundaries 
in 1990s Shanghai
The comedy play "OK Stock" performed in Shanghai in March 1993 portrayed in 
dramatic fashion many of the strands which were present and the changes which were 
taking place in early 1990s Shanghai.1 The lead figure was Ah Nai, a middle aged factory 
worker who has been made redundant but who becomes increasingly involved in the newly 
resuscitated Shanghai share market. By the end o f the play he has become a dahu, a rich 
man. Midway through the play Ah Nai delivers a short soliloquy which encapsulated 
much that I had heard and read about the lives of most Shanghai people before the 1980s. 
At this point in the play Ah Nai has just told his wife, Ding Yiying, that he has lost his 
job. She berates him and tells him that he should go to the factory and demand it back.
Ah Nai: What would I  go there for? To rebel? Since the higher authorities have already 
made a decision,2 I ’ve just got to accept it.
Ding Yiying: Accept, accept, accept! You only know how to accept.3 I t ’s easy to bully 
you. People just piss on your head! Regulations are dead, people are alive!
(Ah Nai moves to centre right stage and, illuminated by a single spotlight, sums up his life 
history).
Ah Nai: Whether they are dead or alive, I  carry them all out. In any case I ’ve always 
lived according to regulations, I ’m used to it... I  was told which primary school 1 should 
go to, so I  just went to that primary school; I  was told which middle school to attend, so 
I  just went to that middle school; when I  was told where to go and work in the 
countryside, I  went to that place to work in the countryside; when I  was ordered to return 
to the city\ I  returned to the city; when I was ordered to go to a particular work unit, that 
was the work unit I  went to. It even got to the point where I  was told which hospital to 
go to, which rice store to buy rice in, where to buy special purchases for Spring Festival, 
and 1 just fe ll in line with each and every one o f  these orders. Now I ’m told that I  am
'This play was written by the Shanghai playwright Zhao Nanhua in 1992. It was sponsored by Shanghai 
Shenyin Securities and such listed firms as Yanzhong, F eile  and Vacuum E lectron. It was performed in 
Shanghai during early 1993 and later in a drama com petition in B eijing. It received both offic ia l and w ide  
popular support. In late 1993 a Shanghai dialect version o f  the play was performed and in early 1994 a film  
more loosely  based upon the play w as screened in Shanghai.
2The terms I use here, "decision", "told", "regulate", "regulation" and "order" are all translations o f  the 
C hinese term gu id ing . In providing a passable English translation som e o f  the force o f  the original script 
is inevitably lost.
3The C hinese term I have g lossed  as "accept" is ren, which has the m eaning o f  "bear, endure, tolerate, 
put up with".
made redundant (daiye xiagang),4 so I  ju st xiagang.
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A review article described "OKI S t o c k "  as "sticking close to the real life o f 
Shanghai’s citizens. All the people and events it describes display the outstanding 
characteristics of local Shanghai culture."5 Another newspaper report described the play 
as "so close to home that many Shanghai audiences feel that they are part of the story."6 
In an interview in Spring 1993 a prominent local writer, a strong supporter o f reform, told 
me that the changes he had witnessed during the previous year were "of an order that a 
person like myself could never have imagined." High amongst this list o f unthinkable 
changes was the "stock craze" (gupiao re) of that period.
In this chapter I argue that the re-introduction of a share market in Shanghai has 
played an important part in redrawing the social contours of the city. Roy Dilley notes that 
a "market" should not be seen as "a transhistorical and acultural agent" but, rather, that 
"[a]ny study of markets...must recognise the participants’ understanding and conception of 
their own social and economic activity" (1992: 14-5). It is just such an exploration that 
I intend in this chapter. My focus is a "share market with Chinese characteristics",7 
apparent even in the slang term chao gupiao - "buying and selling shares" - which literally 
means to stir-fry stocks.
The reforms introduced in urban China since the late 1970s have broken down some 
of the rigidities of the preceding era and introduced new dimensions o f choice into the 
lives of many Shanghainese. In this chapter I focus primarily upon the reintroduction of 
the share market. My reasons for doing so are as follows: 1) The stock market "craze" 
closely coincided with my own period of research in Shanghai and I was drawn into 
studying this topic by its sheer topicality. It was a subject that people often discussed and 
I was in a position to make first hand observations of the changes it brought. 2) The
4The term d a iye  x iagan g  means "to step down from on e’s work post and w ait for work". U nlike sh iye  - 
"unemployment" - a x iagan g  worker retains a connection with his work unit, and receives reduced pay and 
social w elfare entitlem ents. In post 1949 China, especially during the M aoist period, m ilitary metaphors have 
often been used in civilian life. X iagan g  is a new exam ple, its original m eaning being "to com e or go  o f f  
sentry duty". It is illustrative o f  the degree o f  flux in Shanghai that on several occasions when I asked 
informants to explain this term they had not heard it yet, and I became the one to explain its m eaning to 
them!
s"Kan H uaju  ‘O K , G u p iao ' (W atching the Play ‘OK, S tock’) SW H Y SB  5 March 1993: 2.
b"New Drama Plays to the Markets" SS 5 March 1993: 15. Another review  described "OK, Stock" as 
"showing the changes brought by ga ige  kaifan g  to m odem  China" ("‘O K , G u p ia o ’ X ian sh i S han gh ai 
H uaju Shili" ( ‘OK, S tock’ Show s the Strength o f  Shanghai Drama) M ZW YJM B 7 June 1993: 1.
7The C hinese state currently defines its ideology and policies as "socialism with C hinese characteristics".
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novelty o f the share market means that little has been written on it as a research topic.8 
3) The share market has affected the lives of many people in Shanghai. 4) The re- 
introduction and rapid growth of a share market appears dramatically opposed to the 
policies and rhetoric which had gone before. The introduction of a stock market 
mechanism into a planned socialist economy was certainly "an unprecedented experiment" 
(Xie 1990: 25). I was intrigued to know how people would react to this U turn and what 
effect it would have upon people’s lifestyles and perceptions o f society. It is not idle 
speculation to suppose that investigating the repercussions of the Shanghai share market 
for social relationships in urban China is bound to be insightful.
The changes constituted, and encouraged, by the rapid development of the share 
market are first located through oral histories, particularly the kinds o f comments 
Shanghainese made about the lack of choice over their lives (during the Maoist era) and 
the relative egalitarianism. Next I outline several significant economic and policy switches 
that have affected Shanghai, especially the rapid development of the share market. In the 
early 1990s a new wealthy stratum emerged, of which successful share dealers comprised 
a substantial proportion. I outline some of the representations which were made of 
successful share dealers and draw attention to interstices between the new discourse on 
shares and pre-existing stereotypes, for instance, of gender and regional difference. I draw 
attention to some of the problems of the share market and the criticisms people made of 
it. I then suggest ways in which the share market has played an important part in 
redefining the relationship of the individual to society. Among the dominant trends 
emergent appears to be an increasing scope for individual agency and the rise of wealth 
as both indicative and constituent of social status. The share market has made a significant 
contribution to expanding what Martin Whyte (1992), in a talk given at SOAS, called the 
"zone of indifference". In this context, a more appropriate metaphor may be to say that 
the share market has contributed to "widening the margins".9
6.1 Setting the Scene: Shanghai Before the Reform Period
Before 1949, Shanghai was a major banking and financial centre with a stock
8An exception to this is the doctoral thesis by .Ellen Hertz, The Trading Crowd: An Ethnography o f  the 
Shanghai Stock Market (1994).
9This term derives from a remark made by the playwright Zhang Xian in a discussion on his play "The 
Karaoke Upstairs". The play stars "a Taiwanese ex-hippie-tumed-futures-trader" w ho falls in love w ith a 
bar girl and Zhang suggests that its punchline could be "we’re all margin traders now" (FEER 14 April 1994: 
51).
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market similar in size to that of Tokyo and considerably larger than that Hong Kong (see 
Karmel 1994: 1105-7). Fluctuations in the Shanghai stock exchange over the period 1919- 
49 exercised a significant influence over both these other markets. An official Chinese 
publication observed (with a note of irony?) that "[a]ll this disappeared with the founding 
of the People’s Republic in 1949."10 The new government regarded "stock ownership as 
a kind of capitalist exploitation of workers."11
For over three decades after the Communist Party took power in 1949, Shanghai 
lay at the heart o f China’s centrally planned socialist economy. The Party adopted a strict 
Marxist-Leninist approach which engaged with strands of Chinese traditional morality 
suspicious of the market (see Stockman 1992). The city’s previous role as an entrepot and 
an international financial and commercial centre was subordinated to a primary role as a 
domestic industrial producer. Most informants perceived the scope for individual choice 
and agency as extremely limited at that time.12 I was often told by Shanghainese that 
they felt the highly bureaucratic planned economy had been gradually stifling the city. A 
factory worker described Shanghai before the early 1990s, and especially before 1978, as 
ninggu, perhaps best translated as "coagulated", whilst a teacher reckoned it had been
"held fast in a frame" (kuangzi shi kuang de hen si).
Until the late 1970s the state defined just four ideologically acceptable classes of 
people - workers, intellectuals, soldiers and peasants - with limited movement both within 
and between these groups. The two classes of capitalist (zichan jieji) and petty capitalist 
(xiao zichan jieji) had been eradicated (xiaomie), or so it was claimed, by 1956. There 
were only two types of enterprise, state and collective.
A Shanghainese social science researcher, in a listing remarkable for its congruence 
with Ah Nai’s soliloquy, commented that "people’s food, clothing, accommodation, 
household registration, decision to have children, schooling, job assignments, type of work 
done and salary were all decided by the state." He added that "there was no other
alternative" (meiyou qita de chulu) and that "what each person was able to do and obtain
was more or less the same." There was little or no opportunity to change one’s job or 
place of residence, at least in terms of upward mobility, and most people knew what their
l0"Shanghai: Stock Market Re-established" BR 1989, 132(18): 21.
"Cited in Engle (1986: 36).
l2Though there was scope for individuals to adopt various strategies and counter-strategies (see Susan 
Shirk’s C om petitive Comrades 1982) and for use o f  particularistic relationships (gu an x i) to circumvent 
bureaucratic and egalitarian norms (e.g. see Walder 1986: 181-5).
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colleagues earned. In 1978, 99.9% of workers were employed directly or indirectly by the 
state, o f whom 78.5% worked in state danwei (Davis 1990: 89).13
6.2 Reform Era Policies: From Coagulation to Speculation
It was against this background of relative egalitarianism, limited scope for 
individual choice over key life events and a minimal range of social statuses that reforms 
began to be introduced into urban China from 1978 onwards. Policy changes have 
included measures designed to re-integrate Shanghai into the global economy, delegate the 
power to make economic decisions to enterprise managers, increase marketization and a 
de-politicization o f urban life. These reforms have introduced new dimensions of choice, 
indeed, the very concept of "choice", into the lives of many Shanghainese. For instance, 
to the original two types of enterprise have been added small scale private entrepreneurs, 
joint ventures, private businesses, wholly foreign owned companies and limited companies. 
However, until the early 1990s most of these changes were gradual and piecemeal with 
many fundamental elements of the Maoist era only barely modified.
According to numerous local testimonies changes of a new magnitude did not take 
place until 1992. A great number of informants considered comments made by Deng 
Xiaoping during his "southern inspection tour" (nanxun) at Chinese New Year in 1992 as 
the key stimulus to far-reaching changes in economic and social policy in Shanghai. A 
brief excerpt from a radio broadcast during his visit forms the prologue to the play "OK 
Stock". Deng was widely reported to have said that Shanghai should "seize the 
opportunity" (zhuazhu shiji), have "more courage" (danzi da yidian) and "take faster 
steps" (buzi kuai yixie) in reform. These comments may sound highly enigmatic to 
Western ears but in Shanghai they translated into a qualitative change in the pace and 
scope of economic and social policy reforms.
In 1992 China’s central government declared a national aim to create a "socialist 
market economy" in China. As a crucial adjunct to this Shanghai was earmarked to 
become an international financial and commercial centre. The fledgling Shanghai share 
market has been a key beneficiary of this new emphasis.
n21.4%  were in co llective  industries and 0.1% in private occupations. In 1987, 70% were in state 
danw ei,  25.3% in co llective  and 4.6% privately em ployed (D avis 1990: 89).
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6.3 The Shanghai Share Market14
One Shanghai textile factory is recorded as having "quietly" issued stock in 1981 
(Engle 1986: 36). However, it was not until November 1984 that shares were first sold 
officially to the Shanghai public when the collectively owned Shanghai Feile Audio 
Company issued 10,000 shares at 50¥ each. A couple o f months later Yanzhong Industrial 
Company issued shares to the public. In August 1986, the People’s Bank of China 
established an over-the-counter market in Shanghai (another was set up in Shenyang). At 
this time Feile and Yanzhong were the only stocks traded on this market. During this 
"experimental phase" transactions were carried out in eight offices.15 Prices were 
relatively static and most transactions completed by hand with little in the way of 
electronic equipment. Lack of communication facilities meant that sometimes the same 
stock had different prices at different trading centres. Little over five years later, the 
Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE) had moved to paperless trading - a system deemed too 
costly to introduce on the London Stock Exchange - and real time trading via satellite 
across China. Despite this, a distinct Chinese characteristic is that the SSE still closes for 
lunch from 11.30am until 1pm.
The Shanghai Stock Exchange was officially opened on 19 December, 1990 just 
over six months before China’s other official stock exchange in Shenzhen.16 By 1994, 
on an active day its daily turnover rivalled that of the Hong Kong stock exchange (Karmel 
1994: 1111). The SSE uses a real-time dealing system - Securities Trading Automated 
Quotations System (STAQS) - based on the US NASDAQ. The eight quoted stocks had 
a combined capitalization of just one billion yuan. As early as the closing months of 1990, 
some 400,000 people (1-3%) of Shanghai’s population had already taken part in securities 
trading activities.17 However, it was in 1992 that "share fever" really took hold. In that 
year trading volume increased tenfold and the SSE index quadrupled in the space of a few 
months.18 Until late 1991 only the original eight companies were listed on the Shanghai
l4The main sources for the information in this section are Karmel 1994, "Shanghai: Stock Market R e­
established" BR 132(18): 19-23, Xia et a! 1992, "China’s Stock and Bond Market" BR  1989, 32(44): 20-23 , 
Engle 1986: 35-38.
l5China N ew sletter N ov-D ee 1987 (71): 19-21.
l6C hina’s second stock exchange in Shenzhen was set up on 3 July 1991.
l7The lower figure is from Xia el a l 1992: 113, the higher figure o f  3% (for 1989) from BR 1989,
132(18): 22.
18Source BBC World Service, World Business Report, 25 March 1993.
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share market. By the first half o f 1993 there were 67 stocks with a capitalization o f 200 
billion yuan. By the end of 1993 there were about one hundred listed stocks.19
In one year (to November 1993) the number of centres where one could buy and 
sell shares increased from 25 to over 300. The manager of one of these dealing centres 
told me that such centres "now outnumber state rice selling depots in the city." Trading 
volume on the SSE increased at an incredible rate - in 1992 turnover was US $11.17 
billion - six times the figure for 1991. By 1994, dealing on a single day could be more 
than the whole of 1991. Between January-June 1994 turnover was 563 billion yuan (US 
$64.7 billion) 14% more than the total for 1993.20 By May 1994, Shanghai listed stocks 
had a market capitalization o f over US $25 billion.21
By mid 1993 the number of Shanghainese registered on the SSE rose to over one 
million with 60,000 new stock exchange accounts being opened each week.22 One report 
in August 1993 gives the number of Shanghai investors as two million,23 a Chinese 
source has the same figure in December 1993.24 Even taking the lower figure o f one 
million, if each registration represents one family and each family has four members one 
can estimate that the stock market touches the lives of about four million people, roughly 
one third of Shanghai’s population, in a significantly direct fashion.
The Shanghai "stock craze" was sparked off by the issuing o f share purchase 
certificates (rengouzheng) in February 1992. These certificates were a form of lottery 
system, in which winning tickets gave the holder the right to buy shares at their issue 
price. Whether by design or accident the proportion of winning coupons was far higher 
than originally expected. On the black market coupons with a face value of 30¥ were soon 
being sold for as much as 1,400¥. One tragi-comic motif in the play "OK Stock" concerns 
an uneducated elderly men who unwittingly buys 3,000¥ of rengouzheng whilst trying to 
deposit his life savings in the bank. Once he realizes his mistake he desperately tries to
l9There are tw o main types o f  share, A and B. A-shares are in C hinese yu an  and can on ly  be bought 
by C hinese citizens. B-shares, first issued in Shanghai in early 1992, must be paid for using hard currency 
and are intended for foreigners or C hinese bringing in m oney from overseas. M ost o f  the data in this paper 
relates to the far larger A-share market, although many aspects w ould be equally applicable to the B-share 
market. B y the end o f  1993 there were about a dozen B-shares.
20SS 12 July 1994: 7.
2l"Bears in a China Shop" The Econom ist 14 May 1994: 111-2.
"Source BBC World Service W orld  Business R eport 24 June 1993.
23Econom ic Reporter China Market 1993 (8): 25.
24XMWB 5 December 1993: 5.
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get a refund for this "waste paper". He finally manages to off-load the coupons, at a 
discount, on a sympathetic neighbour. Only then does the value o f these coupons become 
apparent... An initial outlay of 3,000¥ could ultimately translate into shares worth 
300,000-500,000¥ - in the space of a few weeks a new wealthy group was created in 
Shanghai. These certificates have passed into Shanghai popular mythology with stories of 
people who bought them by mistake and unexpectedly became wealthy overnight. One 
informant remarked to me that they had become like a child’s fairy tale which people hope 
will be repeated.
6.3.1 "Socialist Shares Can Only Go Up!"25
The Shanghai stock index is characterized by sharp fluctuations. The first big crash 
was in 1992 when prices plummeted to 300 after the SSE index had reached over 1,300. 
Then after reaching over 1,500 in early 1993 the A-share index fell for eighteen months, 
losing around 80% of its value, to a low of 328.9 at the end o f July 1994. On one day 
alone, 21 April 1994, the market fell by 5.8% to 552.5. In August the government 
announced a series o f "market rescue measures" including a freeze on new issues for the 
rest of the year.26 Investors reacted with "volcanic enthusiasm."27 In the week 29 July 
to 5 August 1994 the SSE index rose by 104%, up from 349 to 683 with a weekly turnover 
of US $3.9 billion and 5.7 billion shares traded. Just over one month later, by 7 
September, the SSE had exceeded the 1,000 level. A rise of this magnitude would take 
several years on the London or New York stock exchanges. By mid October the index had 
fallen back to 650. Individual shares can be even more volatile. In October 1993 
Yanzhong Company was subject to a takeover attempt and its share price fluctuated 
dramatically - at one point its value quadrupled in the space of a few hours.
Unlike Western share markets which are dominated by pension funds and other 
institutional investors on the Shanghai market individuals accounted for 90% of the dealing 
in "society individual shares" (shehui geren gu).28 In work places, homes, buses and 
restaurants all over the city shares became a main topic o f conversation. A vogue
23A line spoken by one o f  the characters in "OK Stock". Later in the play this character attempts suicide 
after losing all his m oney and the savings o f  his best friend.
2bD etails and fo llow in g  figures from SS 9 August 1994: 7.
27C P  5 August 1994: 1.
28ln the UK less than 20%  o f  shares are held by individuals. China is considering whether to allow  
pension funds and other institutions to trade in shares.
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expression asserted that quanguo jiegu - the whole country likes shares. A scientific 
research worker told me that "in Shanghai everyone buys shares, from elderly housewives 
who normally just stay at home doing the housework to high level cadres and intellectuals, 
from teenagers to old people in their seventies and eighties." In 1992-4, every day, on 
television, after the early evening news the latest shares prices of all the increasing number 
listed companies were read out to the sound of a piped version of A Whiter Shade o f  Pale. 
These bulletins and numerous newspaper, television and radio references to shares all 
contributed to a high degree of awareness and a considerable degree of active involvement 
in the share market.
Many people could hardly believe the changes now taking place in their city. A 
retired teacher noted how some people could now make millions from shares, and 
described how his neighbour’s house had been searched by Red Guards during the Cultural 
Revolution. The neighbour had been dragged from his house, beaten, paraded through the 
streets, and abused as a "capitalist". His "crime" was that a few dozen yuan o f worthless, 
pre-1949 share certificates had been found. Faced with this incongruity the retired teacher 
remarked that along with many other people he had not yet "changed his thinking" (huan 
naodai) in the way official rhetoric now exhorts citizens to do.
The expression chao gupiao, literally to "stir fry" shares, refers to the rapid buying 
and selling of shares. The verb here is taken from the action used in stir frying food in 
a wok. Following Lakoff and Johnson’s (1980) contention that metaphor may be both 
expressive and constitutive of meaning I will use the indigenous term rather than the 
English "buying and selling shares" which lacks the pungency and sense of rapid motion 
implicit in the Chinese term. In Chinese cookery timing is often crucial with fierce heat 
and a short cooking time. An expert share dealer told me that one should "stir fry" stocks 
until they are very hot, that is buy and sell them very rapidly, and thereby cook-up a profit. 
The way shares were often bought on a short term basis was paralleled by a more general 
short-termism, a sense that one had better make money whilst it was still possible. Some 
of my informants describes the current apparent economic boom in Shanghai as just 
paomo, a "bubble". Many people feared that unrest may follow the death of Deng 
Xiaoping. One dahu commented that on the day Deng dies Shanghai stocks will fall by 
80%. Although he added that, if you held your nerve, this could be an ideal buying point.
One dealing centre manager, a man in his early forties and a keen football player, 
provided some fascinating remarks which highlighted the "Chineseness" of the Shanghai 
share market. In one of several discussions I asked him if many people had their own
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computer software and could buy and sell shares from home. He estimated that about one 
hundred people in Shanghai had a home computer loaded with market analysis software. 
However, he considered it unlikely that many people would deal from home in this way 
because of the nature of the Shanghai share market. In his estimation, if they were so 
isolated (gejue) they would be unable to deal successfully since Shanghai has an irrational 
(feilixing) and highly emotional share market (ganqing nong de gushi) in which shiqi and 
renqi are extremely important. These terms defy simple translation. Shi means "city", ren 
has various meanings including "person, human being, people" but also "personality, 
character" and "state o f one’s health, how one feels. " Qi, he explained, was used here in 
the sense it is used in Chinese medicine - the dictionary definition for qi is "vital energy, 
energy of life" - and that it includes, for example, "people’s feeling or mood" (ren de 
qingxu). He noted that because the share market has this character it is necessary to hear 
the "talk of the masses" (qunzhong yilun) in order to pick up on the renqi. He added that 
the share market is affected by "a climate created by everybody" (dajia zaocheng de 
qihou) and that even factors such as the weather can effect it. The way in which he 
describes the share market as affected by "feelings" (ganqing) ties in with wider 
indigenous notions of China as a "feelings country" (renqing guojia).
It is interesting to mention the official reasons why a nominally socialist state 
should have so successfully implemented policies which Margaret Thatcher described in 
Britain as "popular capitalism". An article in China Daily on the stock system noted that 
"some people rejected it as a capitalist practice" but added that this belief has "faded".29 
A prime motive for issuing stocks and bonds was to raise funds for investment and 
construction. In 1992, issuing stocks to the public raised 11.8 billion yuan (US $2 billion) 
for construction in the city.30 Indeed a Chinese newspaper article suggested following 
the example of countries like Britain where shares of government-owned monopolies were 
sold to the public to "get rid of the financial burdens posed by subsidies to these 
enterprises."31 Stock holding promotes decentralization, making enterprises answerable 
to stock holders rather than government ministries. It was also intended to consolidate 
companies’ decision-making power and enhance employees’ participation and motivation
29"Companies Face Major Reform in Share-holding" CD 21 Septem ber 1992: 4.
30C P  13 January 1993: 1.
3l"Stock Market Problems Require Ironing Out" CD 4 February 1993: 4.
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by making them share-holders in their companies, thereby strengthening "enterprises 
vitality."32 The government also regarded huge personal bank deposits as a "caged tiger" 
which, if  released would cause havoc in the consumer marketplace (Xia 1990: 18). Issuing 
shares would be a positive way to use this money. In addition, the state receives tax 
revenue from share transactions - 3/1000 of each deal is earmarked for the government and 
the exchange receives 4/1000.
Local commentators often used a metaphor from computing to talk about changes 
in their city, they speak of "hardware" (yingjian) and "software" (ruanjian). "Hardware" 
includes plant and machinery, organizational structures and economic efficiency. 
"Software" - my main concern in this chapter - refers to changes in people’s way of 
thinking (ren de sixiang gaibian) and mode of lifestyle (shenghuo fangshi), that is, 
‘culture’ in the two senses of symbolic expression and organizational practices. Inevitably, 
this vocabulary is also linked to discussions of the share market and its effects.
Proponents of the stock exchange experiment argued that it brings benefits to both 
the "hardware" and the "software". They stressed that issuing shares would "enliven" 
(bianhuo) the "dead" (si) economy and lead to increased efficiency and better quality 
products.33 However, I heard contesting views in Shanghai. In local slang some shares 
were referred to as "rubbish shares" (lajigu), shares in companies which produced 
unmarketable goods and issued shares primarily as a means for staving off bankruptcy. 
A similar term was "mistress shares" (qingfugu). It was explained to me that such shares 
could be profitable if "fooled around with" for a short time but definitely should not be 
held for a long time. It was also said that workers who had now become shareholders in 
their companies had a more positive attitude towards their work. I did not research this 
specific topic but a television comedy sketch I watched hinted at potential problems. In 
the sketch a female shop assistant has just become a shareholder in her company. The 
comedy dwells upon her repeated and unsuccessful attempts to be polite to customers now 
that she will benefit, indirectly, in the profits of the company.
6.3.2 The Nouveaux Riches in Shanghai
The Shanghai stock market has made a significant contribution to the formation of
32"China’s Stock and Bond Market" BR 1989, 32(44): 22-3 .
33Ajit Singh (1992 ) suggests that over the last forty years non-stock-market econom ies such as W est 
Germany and Japan have performed much better than stock-market-dominant countries such as the U S and 
the UK. He concludes that a stock market in China w ould make little contribution to the "forces o f  
production" and could be negative by contributing to overall instability.
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a new wealthy stratum in Shanghai. I met one dahu in the coffee lounge o f the five star 
Garden Hotel. I asked him about the impact of the share market and other reforms on 
Shanghai. He motioned to the luxurious surroundings. "Five years ago the guests here 
were all foreigners, now look, they are mainly Chinese."
The consensus of opinion among my informants was that the new wealthy stratum 
in Shanghai was comprised of people in the following categories: share dealers (dahu);34 
private businessmen (siying qiyejia); small-scale private entrepreneurs (getihu); business 
people who act as middle men for foreign companies; those who had been abroad, made 
money and returned to Shanghai (guowai huilai de); families who had property 
confiscated during the Maoist era returned to them; labour contractors (baogongtou) - 
who arrange for labourers from poorer areas to come to Shanghai; popular singers and 
actors; and the sons and daughters of high Communist Party cadres (gaogan zidi). O f 
these nine categories successful share dealers were considered the most numerous. Rich 
share dealers I interviewed had appropriated a dialect term ma ma /za/momohei ("inky 
black") to describe a large amount of money - the image is of so much money that it 
cannot be clearly seen, it conveys a sense o f uncountable, unimaginable riches.
Until the late 1970s the state advocated "class struggle" (jieji douzheng) to root out 
and eradicate any class deemed antagonistic to the proletarian. Since the official rhetoric 
and ideology remains socialist, or more exactly "socialism with Chinese characteristics", 
it would be a radical step to admit that there is now a new "class" (jieji) in Chinese 
society. At present the nouveaux riches are officially described as a stratum (jieceng), 
although there is some debate about whether they constitute a class (Jieji), a far more 
ideologically loaded term. I asked a social science researcher in Shanghai about this 
debate. In answering my question he neatly sidestepped this issue by referring to peasants, 
workers, cadres and intellectuals before 1979 as constituting "groups" (qunti) or "circles" 
(quanzi). He then used the same terms to describe a new qunti consisting of bosses 
(laoban), small scale private entrepreneurs (getihu), factory managers (changzhang), 
businessmen (shangren) and managers (jingli). He commented that alongside the 
emergence of this new quanzi that there is now much greater social mobility between the 
other four quanzi.
34Som e people used this term to refer to all wealthy people. Shanghainese often com m ented that the 
B eijing equivalent o f  dahu was dakuan, a term which referred to rich people in general. The degree o f  
semantic confusion is sym ptom atic o f  the new ness o f  the term and the degree o f  flux in Shanghai.
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6.3.3 "Share People": Shanghai Punters
Share dealers in Shanghai were collectively referred to as gumin - "share people". 
They were divided into three categories, xiaohu or sanhu (small or "dispersed" hu), 
zhonghu (middle hu) and dahu (big hu).35 The vast majority o f share buyers were 
"small hu" with no more than several thousand yuan.26 The crowded ground floor of 
each securities house branch office was where "small hu" chao gupiao, unheated in the 
freezing winter, stifling in the hot, humid summers. The latest share prices were displayed 
on a large black electronic screen, the audience peering anxiously at the constantly 
changing red figures making careful notes and computations. Shares were bought and sold 
over a counter. These places had all the noise, bustle and excitement (renao) of more 
traditional markets. Individuals who wished to buy and sell shares must first register and 
make an initial deposit of 5,000¥. They were then issued with a plastic magnetic card on 
which details were kept o f their account balance, deals and share holdings.
Each of Shanghai’s more than three hundred dealing centres had a special dealing 
room or rooms, dahushi. These were "special spaces" (teshu kongjian) for the sole use 
of those dahu who pay a monthly membership fee.37 One medium-sized centre I visited 
had 6,000-7,000 registered "small hu" and three dahushi. Typically, these rooms had 
comfortable seating, air conditioning, individual computer terminals loaded with systems 
to analyze and track share movements and a receptionist who used a "hot line" (rexian) 
to phone direct to the SSE to buy and sell shares for members. In slack periods dahu 
chatted or played mahjongg. Many dealing centres also had a separate room for "middle 
hu", these provided a lower level of service than the dahushi. The entrance requirement 
for a zhonghushi was around 300,000¥, whilst the monthly wage of most Shanghainese 
was between 300-l,000¥.
There were no statistics for the number of dahu nor was there a strict definition of 
who could be called a dahu. In the early years of the agricultural reforms propaganda 
praised "ten thousand yuan households". A local Shanghai rhyme adapted this and 
exaggerating somewhat asserted that: ten thousand yuan households are not even worth 
considering, one hundred thousand is just a first step, one million can be considered small
35The categories o f  dahu and sanhu  are discussed in detail in Hertz 1994: 115-78.
36A survey in Shanghai found a preponderance o f  younger investors - 68% being under the age o f  40. 
Those with shares valued under 50 ,000¥  totalled 90.7% , under 5 ,000¥  were 26.49% . ("Z hongguo G um in
R eng Z ai ‘Y inger Q i‘" (C hinese Share Buyers Still at ‘Infant Stage’) X M W B 22  March 1993: 12.
37"Gupiao Dahushi" (Big Time Share Dealers Room) MZWYB 17-23 May 1993: 4.
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fry, ten million is a dahu (wan yuan bu shi hu, shiwan cai qibu, baiwan suan xiaohu, 
qianwan shi dahu). The manager of a dealing centre estimated that there were between 
ten and twenty thousand dahu in Shanghai. This estimate, which seems reasonable, was 
based upon the assumption that each centre had an average of thirty dahu. The funds 
required to be entitled to use dahushi varied. In some centres it required 500,000, in 
others 1,000,000 even 2,000,000¥. During the extended eighteen month bear market 
(xiongshi) - described as a "cold" (leng) period in the market - the requirement in some 
centres was lowered to 200,000¥. Some dahu used funds o f friends and colleagues or 
acted on behalf of danwei. Not all share dealers who might be eligible wished to use a 
dahushi. Certainly the dahu constituted only a tiny percentage in a city of some twelve 
million people, an exceptional elite par excellence.
Some of the new indigenous terms concerning share dealing indicated that not all 
participants made a profit. One such term was ge rou - to cut or slice a piece of meat 
(from one’s own body). This referred to selling shares at a loss, in the expectation that 
they would fall further still. Another term was taozhu ("stuck fast"), which occurred when 
shares fell below the price they were bought for and the owner waits in the hope that their 
value will rise again. A problem for those with such negative equity was that Shanghai 
shares were extremely volatile - they "turn somersaults" (fan gentou). It was difficult to 
gauge when prices had reached their lowest point or, in picturesque local slang, when the 
market had "shat itself clean" (gu si sa qing zawg/gushi la qingchu). Another term was 
tiaolou. which has two meanings. One is to commit suicide by jumping out of a tall 
building - for several decades Shanghai was the only city in China with tall enough 
buildings to make this a feasible means of suicide. The second meaning is o f shares 
falling rapidly in value.
A whole new mythology of anecdotes and stories propagated by magazines, cheap 
novels and endless gossip surrounded dahu. An early hero of this sort (from c. 1989) was 
Yang Baiwan, "Millions" Yang, a former warehouse worker and the first person to publicly 
make a million on the share market from an initial capital of just 2-3,000¥. A dealing 
centre manager mused that "Yang Baiwan is no big deal now. There are people with far 
more money than him but they keep quiet about it."
Aside from celebrities such as "Millions" Yang there appeared to be a tendency for 
dahu to maintain a low profile. The manager of a dealing centre noted that many dahu 
live "very simple and hard lives" (shenghuo hen pusu, hen jianku). He suggested that 
they may be afraid to reveal their wealth as people may harm (anhai) them or try to
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borrow money from them. He added that while many Chinese people seek fame and 
wealth (jiang mingli) dahu mostly want only wealth (li) and not fame (ming). I share this 
impression. A particulary striking example was the home o f one female dahu I visited. 
Single and just under forty, she displayed no evidence of her wealth. Her tiny one room 
flat, where she lived alone, had no television, no new furniture and no heating. In fashion­
conscious Shanghai she still wore the deeply unfashionable black canvas shoes one now 
only sees worn in the countryside. Some dahu wore the latest imported brand name 
(mingpai) fashions. However, as in the instance of this woman, some showed no outward 
signs of wealth. Another dahu remarked that wealthy businessmen were more likely to 
wear famous brand names since they need to display their status to foster their business 
activities whilst "share dealers only interact with a computer (gupiaozhe zhi he diannao 
da zhaohu)." Entrances to dahushi often appeared to be deliberately discrete. One I 
visited was reached via a narrow passage, past overflowing rubbish bins and up a flight 
of stairs and into an unmarked door.
I was curious to know how dahu used their new wealth. In popular perceptions 
those who rapidly made a fortune (baofahu) spent money lavishly and wastefully, 
especially on restaurant meals and leisure pursuits such as karaoke bars. Dahu I spoke 
with agreed that some may spend a portion of their wealth in this way but were keen to 
stress that further investment was more common. They bought more shares, and/or moved 
into other "craze" sectors, opening restaurants, real estate or futures. Some would "chao" 
anything from golf club membership cards to a tiny plot of land in the United States. One 
young dahu, a 26 year old man, spent part of his cash on compact discs of British heavy 
rock music. Another dahu bought three houses for US $30-40,000 each in the nearby city 
of Suzhou which he described as long term investments. He also owned a restaurant and 
had set up a small factory. When we discussed his plans for the future he talked about his 
hopes for his daughter. He suggested that he may arrange for her to study at Oxford or 
Harvard. These were long term plans, for his daughter was only three months old.
Since 1949 the Chinese state has promoted a series of selfless models for emulation. 
Most famous of these is Lei Feng. In the early 1990s some successful share dealers were 
joining this august panoply with press articles giving examples of dahu who used their 
money in a socially useful way. For example, Nanfang Zhoumo carried a story of a 
woman who came to Shanghai as a maid but made a fortune share dealing.38 Instead of
•)8"The W omen W ho Surge into the Share Wave" ("Yongjin G u ch a o  de  N urenm en") N FZM  18 June 
1993: 1.
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staying in Shanghai she decided to return to her home village and set up a factory. In a 
similar way, newspaper articles'commended "Millions'' Yang for giving money to a poor 
rural school and taking up an unpaid university post.39 He was also praised for not 
moving from Shanghai’s "lower quarter" where he grew up.
Perceptions of who was successful and who failed in the share market engaged with 
indigenous notions about the characteristics of different categories o f person. For instance, 
gender-based stereotypes were evident in explanations for the predominance o f male dahu 
- only about one in eight of the dahu was female.40 One female dahu felt that men have 
"greater boldness" (poli) and are "more decisive" (guoduan) than women. Women she 
characterized as "irresolute and hesitant" (you rou guaduan). She added that often if a 
husband and wife embark upon share dealing one of them retains a danwei place in order 
to retain benefits such as free medical treatment for themselves and their children.41 In 
such cases this was generally the female, since, in my informant’s view, they are 
"domestic-natured" (jiatingxing), whilst men are "naturally inclined to gamble" (duxing 
da).
A younger woman who did not feel attracted to buy shares felt that standing around 
outside a securities exchange was inappropriate for women. A young teacher noted that 
since men and women chao gupiao in a different way that a husband and wife ought not 
to cooperate in this (bu hao hezuo) activity. Men he considered as having "greater 
courage" (danzi da) and "blacker hearts" (xin hei yidian) whilst women are "less 
courageous" (danzi xiao yidian) and more "flexible" (tanxing).
One dahu commented that the way people buy shares depends upon such factors 
as their "cultural/educational level" (wenhua cengci), amount of capital and their 
"personality" (xingge). Regional stereotypes also entered the share discourse. 
Shanghainese expressed pride in the orderly way in which shares were issued in their city. 
They compared this favourably to the situation in Shenzhen in August 1992 when up to 
one million people tried to buy share application forms. In the ensuing chaos, and amidst 
allegations of official corruption over share allocations, there were demonstrations in which
39"Yang Baiwan" (M illions Yang) SW H Y SB 4 -10  June 1993: 4.
40A Chinese article disagrees with the v iew  that "shares are a m ale hobby". It points out that "of course" 
most dahu are men but that there are also fem ale dahu. ("Shanghai T an  de Nu Gum in" (Fem ale Share 
Dealers in Shanghai) Dadi M onthly 1993 N o. 6: 22-3).
“ Fam ilies who adopt this type o f  strategy were described to me as having yi j ia ,  lian g  zh i ("one fam ily , 
two system s"), a play upon the "one nation, tw o systems" policy  offic ia lly  adopted for the adm inistration o f  
Hong Kong after 1997.
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the riot police fired tear gas.42
There were two main types of view about the kind of people who were dahu. 
Sometimes there was a sense of injustice, that "fools" (shagua/gandu) did well where 
experts lost out. A young teacher who bought shares himself suggested that those who most 
successfully chao gupiao tended to be "people without much wenhua and of rather low 
quality" (suzhi bijiao di).43 He considered that few intellectuals successfully chao gupiao 
because they read too many books which left them "rather lacking in courage" (danzi bijiao 
xiao). The contrary and, I gauge, dominant view was that dahu were people who "have 
great ability" (benshi hen da) and good connections. A young television worker said that 
the rich in general were "sharp witted" (<dii zi hua /0 /touzi huatou) and could "exploit 
loopholes" (zuan kongzi). A cotton factory worker in her mid forties felt that dahu were 
laozhu who knew to buy the share purchase certificates (rengouzheng) mentioned above. 
Lao zu is the dialect term for laogui - literally "old devil". She explained that a lao zu is 
somebody who is "experienced" (laolian) and "extremely sharp" (men ke jing  le *zVmenkan 
feichang jing) and can analyze shares. Some regarded the nouveaux riches as "upstarts" 
(baofahu). However, a female office worker told me that Shanghai share dealers who got 
rich quick were not baofahu and that this term was more appropriately used of Cantonese 
who became rich quickly. She reasoned that Cantonese are "without ability" (meiyou 
benshi) while to be a dahu requires "ability" (benshi). In her estimation "dahu are not like 
ordinary people", she seemed to consider them as possessing almost superhuman powers.
6.4 Criticisms and Problems of the Market
To present a balanced account it is now necessary to highlight some of the negative 
comments which were made about the market. An extremely visible and potentially highly 
divisive development in early 1990s Shanghai was the increasing gap between rich and poor. 
The ambiguous nature of the newly rich was brought home to me in a chance meeting with 
a university student. This young man, from Hunan province, had made some money by 
buying and selling televisions and then by chao gupiao. Like other Chinese students he 
lived in a dormitory with six other students. I asked if his room mates knew about his 
activities. He said they did not and that they would be jealous (duji) if they knew. The 
exclusivity of space was notable. I met him in a comparatively expensive restaurant little
4:"Chinese Speculators Riot over Shares Chaos" FT 11 August 1992: 14.
43The term suzh i is defined as "innate quality" but the am bience o f  this word is very broad.
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over one hundred metres from the main entrance to his university. I asked him how he 
w ould explain being able to eat in such a place if  his room mates should chance upon him. 
H e said that this w ould not happen, since the restaurant was so expensive for them "they 
w ould not even dream o f  com ing near here." H is other leisure tim e activities also placed 
him in spaces w'here his fe llow  students w'ould not contem plate going such as expensive  
karaoke bars and the dance floor o f  expensive international hotels such as the Portman.
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Cartoon 12 Caption "Money Can Make...  [from left to right, top to bottom] a rural 
household registration into an urban one, a worker into a cadre, a guilty person into 
an innocent one, an illiterate person into a university student, a nobody in ^o  a 
famous person,. ..  into a guilty person."
( \lan h u a  Shijie - The World of Cartoons - 1994 No. 16)
On the occasion I met a dahu in a large five star G arden H otel the coffee and small 
cakes eaten by us that afternoon cost the equivalent of two weeks salary for most Shanghai 
workers. This is symptomatic of the rapidly growing inequality within China, an inequality 
which often bred resentment. A cotton factory worker in her. mid forties complained to me 
that "those of us who have to go out to work miss out. We cannot spend all our time at the 
dealing centre, we can only scrabble to pick up the crumbs left behind by the dahu." She 
added that dahu get to eat the "big meat" and "small hu" only the "small meat" (dahu chi 
da rou, xiaohu chi xiao rou). In part, she believed, like many others, that dahu may act 
together to deliberately push a share's price up or down, for example, by spreading
......
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rumours.44 She also stressed the necessity in chao gupiao of having quick access to 
information (xiaoxi lingtong) feeling that dahu had information which people such as herself 
lacked. Communications technology was increasingly important in Shanghai and the degree 
of access or lack of access to it an important factor in redefining the social contours of 
Shanghai. This factory worker complained that "small hu";w ere "put at a disadvantage" 
(chikui) by dahu because dahu could act much more rapidly. Whilst "small hu" had to 
queue at the trading counters and wait to buy or sell shares, dahu could deal by phone. 
Some people also had an "information machine" (xinxyi), a pager which could show the 
latest share prices and other messages.
However, dahu also had their complaints. All shares listed on the SSE are at least 
51 % owned by the state. Add to this the tight grip the state still retained over information 
and it takes little imagination to realise that it could be the ultimate "insider trader". One 
dahu told me that "the laobaixing can tell from the volume of turnover in a share whether 
the government is buying or selling them." There was a widespread belief that the market 
was frequently manipulated by this hidden hand to the benefit of those in positions of power 
and that the sons and daughters of high party officials (gaogan zidi) gained the most. For 
instance, their special privileges (tequan) enable them to obtain shares at their low issue 
price. A retired worker expressed the view that those with access to information could 
become rich but that the laobaixing could not get into this circle (quanzi). This sense of 
unfairness and exclusion was common in Shanghai. Equally typical was the way in which 
the laobaixing are depicted as an entity acted upon. Legal regulation over the market was 
minimal and there was often no fair means of enforcing such laws as did exist. For 
instance, laws were introduced to stop senior officials buying shares but this did not prevent 
relatives buying them on their behalf.45 Foreign commentators also consider the Shanghai 
share market an "insider’s market" with insider trading rampant, a highly confused 
regulatory framework, lack of disclosure and dubious use of flotation proceeds.46
^H ertz found evidence o f  dahu  acting in cartels in order to manipulate the market, she describes them as 
"manipulating the crowds o f  sm aller investors, w hose losses are the dahu  gains" (1994: 227). B y the time o f  
my research, I was told by dahu  that the increased capitalization value o f  Shanghai's share market made such 
manipulation much less possible.
4,An article described how  "when the stock econom y just opened, in order to encourage the m asses, the 
secretary o f  the Shenzhen M unicipal Com m ittee o f  the CPC took the lead in subscribing for stocks". But once  
m unicipal government cadres ow ning stocks became "a sensitive and exp losive  problem  in Shenzhen" it w as 
clearly stipulated that cadres w ere not allow ed to hold stocks ("R ising Stocks" W om en o f  China 1992, 10: 32- 
3).
^For instance see "Babes in the Bourse" FEER 16 July 1992: 48-54^-and "Shanghai: Capital o f  China’s 
Get-Rich-Q uick Capitalism" FEER 23 June 1994: 54 -56 .
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The disruptive effect of the share market upon many work units included not only 
unsanctioned absences from work but also the impact of the craving for information. 
Shanghai radio stations recited the latest’ share prices every hour. In many work places 
workers were forbidden to listen to the radio during work hours since they paid more 
attention to stock prices than their work. Many work units forbade workers from carrying 
pagers for the same reason. A worker at the giant Baogang steel plant commented that 
there, not only were pagers prohibited but also workers were not allowed to discuss shares 
whilst at work. I watched a short play, a black comedy, called "Three Minutes Late" 
(Wanle San Fen Zhong) put on by a neighbourhood drama group. This illustrated, 
melodramatically, popular perceptions of this problem. It featured a young girl who was 
injured and taken to hospital. The doctor is busy on the phone checking the latest share 
prices impervious to the frantic demands of the girl’s distraught father. The inevitable 
outcome is that the girl is dead by the time he has finished his dealing. Actual experience 
may be just as cruel. Following the first big market crash of October 1992 there were 
reports of suicides of people who had lost their life savings and often money borrowed 
from friends and relatives.47
The share market provided new scope for criminal activities and Shanghai 
newspapers had begun to report the first crop of court cases of people caught using their 
company’s funds to buy shares in the hope of making a quick profit and replacing the 
"borrowed" money before anyone noticed. In one case a 24 year old accountant used a 
total of 840,000¥ of company money to get into a dahu dealing room and buy and sell 
shares.48 In another case four securities workers were jailed because they had 
misappropriated company funds to finance their own stock trading.49 One of them, a 20 
year old computer operator, used 4.8 million yuan (US $842,000) to trade shares. He was 
given a twenty year jail sentence for this. In another case a 35 year old female accountant 
in a hotel in Yangpu district used fake receipts to obtain some 10,000 yuan to give to her
47In March 1994, in the first court case over suicide, the w idow  o f  a factory worker w as awarded a 
50 ,000¥  "humanitarian settlement" (FEER 5 May 1994: 82).
48"Chaogu Dahu Y uansh i T anw u Dahu" (Share D ealing Rich Man O riginally was a Corrupt Rich Man)
XM W B 6 December 1993: 3.
49"Four Securities Workers Jailed for Corruption" (CDBW 5-11 September 1993: 2).
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husband to buy shares.50
Even share market officials I met in Shanghai rarely described share buying as 
investment. Instead they invariably said that the Shanghai share market was speculative 
(touji) and, unlike share markets in other countries, did not follow economic laws Qingji 
guilu). More antipathetic views described it as "abnormal" (bu zhengchang). Some 
dealers considered chao gupiao as akin to gambling, one informant described his feeling 
on entering a share dealing centre as just the same as "entering a gambling house 
(duchang)." It should be borne in mind that gambling is illegal in China. A man in his 
nineties who characterised his outlook on life as predominantly Confucian commented that 
when he was 40-50 years old in Shanghai that making money on shares was regarded as 
bu yi zhi cai (ill-gotten gains/wealth). He added that it was what the Communist Party 
had called "speculation and profiteering" (touji daoba) to abuse capitalists. He felt that 
"China is becoming a gambling nation (dubo guojia) where everyone is ‘doing business’" 
and that this is "extremely dangerous".
Similarly an academic of nearly seventy who stressed his Confucian outlook 
condemned shares as "speculation" (touji) and as not "dependent upon labour" (bu kao 
laoli) and "reaping without sowing" (bu lao er huo).51 He stressed that it is "not 
honourable" (bu guangcai) for intellectuals to discuss money or to buy shares. He pointed 
out that in Shanghai dialect to call somebody (I believe that he was referring especially to 
intellectuals) a ‘sang yi nin’ (shengyiren) - a business man - is derogatory. It is equivalent 
to saying that their "way of doing things is not good" (zuofeng bu hao). I was particularly 
struck by the degree o f correspondence between the Confucian views of these two men and 
the rhetoric of the Maoist period. There is particular piquancy in this regard since both 
these men had been extremely antipathetic towards the Communist Party since the early 
1950s. It also highlights the extent to which certain very traditional morals - which are 
now being undermined - were upheld and promoted during the Maoist era under another 
‘label’.
6.5 Widening the Margins
The share market has played an important part in redefining the relationship of the
S0"Tanwu W an  Y uan Zi Z h u  Z hangfu  Chaogu" (Ten Thousand Yuan o f  Capital Expropriated to Help 
Husband Buy Shares) JFRB 6 June 1993: 3.
5'It is notable that share dealing may also be described as "wan gupiao". The verb w an  is often  
translated as "play" but has a w ider range o f  m eanings than this. The m ost salient point is that it is used 
for leisure activities and in opposition to work.
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individual to society notably by increasing the scope for individual agency and generally 
widening the "zone of indifference". The opening of the share market has furthered the 
loosening of the reliance o f the populace upon the state and provided a new space for 
individual initiative and creativity. As a local newspaper commented, "[i]n the turbulent 
wave of the commodity economy, everyone faces opportunities and choices."52 A local 
sociologist remarked to me that "previously everything was arranged (anpai) by the 
government but now the market plays a much greater role." In his view, the self (ziji, 
ziwo) now had more power (quanli) and the government less. Such a view was also 
conveyed in a common expression that China now had a "small government" and a "big 
society" (xiao zhengfu, da shehui). An important site to examine such changes is the 
work unit (danwei).
As shown in earlier chapters, during the reform period the functions of danwei 
have, to an extent, been eroded. The introduction of the share market has hastened this 
erosion. The degree to which people could take time off work, officially or unofficially, 
to chao gupiao was indicative of this erosion. Some dahu resigned from their state 
danwei jobs and may be called gupiaozhe, that is, people whose profession is shares. In 
this event people were entirely free of danwei restrictions (and benefits). I gained the 
impression that "middle hu" generally regarded their share dealing as a subsidiary activity, 
a "second job" (di er zhiye). Those who retained the security of a place in a state work 
unit but did not work there in practice were said to gua, literally "to hang" (in the sense 
of "hang a shop sign") a danwei. The business card one dahu proffered to me showed 
that he was a clerk in a state transport unit. It soon transpired that he had not been 
anywhere near the unit for months but continues to gua this danwei. He observed that 
those at his danwei are jealous (yanhong - literally "red eyes") of his wealth. On his rare 
visits he did his best to avoid the topic of shares, for fear o f arousing the resentment of 
former colleagues who only earned about 400¥ a month when he could make 10,000¥ on 
a good day. He considered it a characteristic of Chinese people that they look down upon 
(kanbuqi) those who have no money, but are jealous of those who are rich. He noted that 
this was one reason he had not bought a car.
I asked a young dahu who had recently resigned from his state job whether he was 
concerned about the associated loss of social welfare benefits (laobao). He agreed that 
some fear a loss of this guarantee but that he was young and expected that by the time he 
retired there would be no laobao. He expected that in future welfare provision would be
5:"Watching the Play ‘OK, Stock”' ("Kan Huaju ‘OK, G u p ia o ’") WHYSB 5 March 1993: 2.
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covered by insurance systems and "will be a matter for society and not danwei."
Share dealing provided opportunities for the emergence of new forms of association 
and interest groups. Those who became friends through meeting at the share market may 
be called guyou - "share friends". It was also suggested that those whose shares had fallen 
in value and "await liberation" may be called taoyou - "stuck-fast friends". A newspaper 
article described how several "small hu" may combine to form a "joint naval force" (lianhe 
jiandui).53 These small groups may be of three kinds: friends and relatives; work
colleagues; those who meet by chance in the securities exchange. Most of these combined 
naval forces have a single person who acts as its "helmsman" (duoshou). It should be 
added that Mao Zedong used to be referred to as "the great helmsman". In the early 
1990s, these watery metaphors indicate that individuals may now chart their own course 
in the stormy waters of the "share sea" (guhai).
Another article discussed a different type of "warship captain" (jianzhang).54 
These were "fake dahu" who operated using danwei funds. Although this activity was 
illegal the article observed that "above there is a strategy, below a counter strategy 
(shangmian you zhengce, xiamian you duice)." It added that these "fake dahu" may be 
acting with the full support of their danwei heads. The latter may give their employee 
access to funds and provide them with a mobile phone and a car. From comments people 
made to me, it appeared that especially danwei which were unable to make money in any 
other way delegated a person to buy and sell shares in this way. In the play "OK Stock" 
the factory in which Ah Nai works ceases to function and the leader visits Ah Nai with a 
proposal that they set up a "company". In practice this amounts to Ah Nai acting as a 
dahu on behalf of the danwei. A local newspaper gave an instance of a young female 
dahu, a former teacher, who had paid 500¥ to a doctor to sign a sick note so that she did 
not have to work at the school.55 She was called into the school expecting to be 
reprimanded but instead the department head told her that the other teachers had pooled 
together 100,000¥ and wanted her to chaogu on their behalf. An almost identical request 
was made to one of my informants. She refused this role for exactly the same reason 
as Ah Nai, saying "if I make money that is fine, but what if I lose money?." If a dahu 
operating on behalf of a danwei was successful and produced substantial bonuses for
“^ "Shanghai T an de Nu Gumin" (Fem ale Share Dealers in Shanghai) Dadi M onthly 1993 N o. 6: 25.
S4"G upiao Dahushi" (B ig  Time Share Dealers R oom ) M ZW YB 17-23 May 1993: 4.
‘s"Shanghai Tan de Nu Gumin" (Female Share Dealers in Shanghai) Dadi Monthly 1993 No. 6: 24.
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fellow employees this could increase workers’ benefit from being part of a work unit in
opposition to the more general trend.
The share market discourse also provided more general insights into the way
Shanghainese thought about the state and its actions. A middle aged man, a party member,
told me that workers in his danwei were not allowed to buy shares since it was felt that
to do so would distract them from their work. However, he was aware that colleagues did
buy them stealthily, and he tacitly connived in this action. He noted, using the same
expression as the newspaper article mentioned above, that "the higher levels have a
strategy, the lower levels have a counter-strategy". This phrase was heard quite often in
Shanghai. I would suggest that it conveys the sense ordinary Shanghainese had that they
could, en masse, affect the way things are done. There is a sense that the laobaixing is
not always acted upon but can constitute a kind of composite agent. This expression
demonstrates the degree of space that many ordinary Shanghainese considered they now
had. Such a phrase, were it uttered during the Maoist era, would have been taken as
evidence of counter-revolutionary thought.
The generally declining role of the Communist Party was evident in chao gupiao.
Party membership appeared to be irrelevant in the dahushi. I asked one dahu if he knew
whether dahu in his dahushi were party members. He said that he had no idea but added
that he did meet party members in his other business activities and said that he found many
of them "useless" (wonang) and lazy. His portrayal of them struck me as similar to the
way a self-made businessman might talk about an hereditary aristocracy.
In a long freewheeling discussion the dahu from the state transportation danwei
elaborated on his views on life. He remarked that:
The government tells us that money is not omnipotent (wanneng), but if I have 
money I can do many things. For example, when I go travelling tickets are often 
sold out, but if you pay more you can always get a ticket. I can always get a 
ticket. Being a share dealer I can give full vent to my talents (fahui). There is 
nothing which restrains or binds (yueshu) me, I am free, unrestrained (zizai). 
There is no one to tell me what to do. At my work unit the people there just sit 
around and drink tea and read newspapers all day. At least if I don’t go there I 
don’t drink the Communist Party’s tea, I can drink my own tea at home.
Until a couple of years ago his main hope, like countless others in Shanghai, had been to
go and study in America. But this had changed. "I no longer want to go to the United
States" he told me, "I feel that it is easier for me make money here in China."
This man's comments make clear the way in which the share market and success
in it allowed individuals a new realm of freedom. In another instance a "middle hu" who
had spent several years working in Australia told me that he had not looked for a job since
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returning to Shanghai. On returning from Australia he had felt that the most important 
thing was freedom (ziyou). He considered that this required an economic basis (jingji 
jichu) and in order to achieve this aim he had decided to chao gupiao. I should note that 
I heard several stories of Shanghainese who had embarked upon this same route and lost 
all the money they had saved from years working abroad (dagong).
Many kinds of slang and new expressions appeared with the share market. Some 
of these terms cast an ironic light on the state. I noted earlier the term taozhu - "stuck 
fast" - when shares are at a lower level than one paid for them. When shares rise back 
above their original level some dahu call this jiefang - liberation - the same term as is 
used for the Communist takeover in 1949. One dealer told me that since the SSE index 
had been as high as 1,500 and was currently at 800 that "the common people are waiting 
for ‘liberation’ (laobaixing dengdao ‘jiefang’)." At one dahu dealing room I visited a 
group of dahu grouped around a computer terminal likened the events on the screen to the 
1946-9 Chinese civil war. A block graph coloured red and green showed the volume of 
shares being traded - red being shares bought and green those sold. They called the red 
the People’s Liberation Army and the green the Nationalist Army, and used expressions 
such as "the red army are coming" and "Mao Zedong has reached Beijing".
The share market gave people the chance to be agents and it was notable that the 
market was often spoken about in personified terms. It was often described as "childish" 
(youzhi) and "lacking in maturity" (bu chengshu) a term more usually applied to a person 
lacking maturity or an unripe fruit. The Shanghai share market was still at the "infant" 
(yinger) stage.56
Inevitably a desire to make money was the key motive to chao gupiao - sometimes 
this was described using an expression learnt from Marxism as yuanshi jilei, "primitive 
accumulation". However, other reasons people gave indicated a strong sense o f an 
increased scope for individual agency and individualism. The following selection of views 
from various dahu makes this clear. An unmarried woman o f forty who had recently 
resigned from her danwei told me that chao gupiao brought her "self fulfilment (fahui 
ziji). I chao gupiao to test my ability (ziji zhangwo nengli)." She added that now she 
worked for herself the "feeling o f oppression/constraint" (yayigan) she had felt when at 
her danwei had gone. One of her favourite lines from literature was by the Russian writer 
Gorky: "let others say what they will, go your own way." A young dahu of 26 said chao
56"Z hongguo G u m in  R eng Z ai ‘Y in ger  Q i‘" (C hinese Share Buyers Still at the ‘Infant Stage’) X M W B  
22 March 1993: 12.
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gupiao gave him a "feeling of newness" (xinxiangan). He stressed that in chao gupiao 
one should have "one’s own characteristics" (ziji de tese) and added that he relied upon 
"feelings" (ganjue) and his "own judgement" (ziji de panduan). Since resigning from his 
bank job a few months earlier he had felt more relaxed (qingsong) and, above all, 
appreciated being able to arrange his own time. On another occasion I asked a group of 
dahu what they derived most from chao gupiao. There was a common agreement that it 
was "excitement" (ciji).
It would be a mistake to overemphasize the new degree of agency and individual 
choice. Many people in Shanghai undoubtedly still felt that their fate was largely beyond 
their hands. I spoke with a low-ranking local government worker of about fifty, who had 
just become a party member, soon after there had been an announcement that the number 
of government cadres was to be reduced. His attitude echoed almost word for word the 
soliloquy delivered by Ah Nai. He commented that even if he lost his present job he 
would not worry since "the state will always arrange things" (zong you guojia anpai). 
The dahu who retained his place in a transportation danwei felt that there had been no 
change there. It was just the same as before with people spending all day "reading 
newspapers and drinking tea."
6.5.1 Change From The Top?
It is possible to view the widening of the margins outlined above as a direct 
consequence of state-led reforms. However, it is intriguing to observe the extent to which 
economic policies adopted by the state often appeared to be reactive and ad hoc, in many 
instances legitimizing what was already happening on the ground. One informant who 
remarked to me on the current pace of change in Shanghai added that "what was illegal 
two or three months ago may now be promoted." She gave the instance o f local cadres 
setting up street stalls, a development which had undergone just such a process. The 
Shanghai share market provides another good instance of this.57
Much evidence suggests that companies began issuing shares counter to state 
wishes. I noted above the Shanghai textile factory which "quietly" issued stock in 1981. 
Across China, between 1981-88, some 98 billion yuan in various stocks and bonds were
S7Several other C hinese cities including Wuhan, Tianjin, B eijing and Tianjin have prepared facilities for 
a third stock exchange. Wuhan is reported to have 400  operating terminals all ready and plans a forty-storey  
financial centre. In each instance the local authorities hope to present the central governm ent with a f a i t  
accom pli (FEER 17 January 1994: 60).
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issued, many of them centred in Shanghai.58 By the end of 1989, 2,700 Shanghai 
companies had issued stocks and bonds (Xie 1990: 24). It appears that it was especially 
from 1984-5 onwards that many enterprises issued shares. According to Engle, this was 
primarily in response to measures introduced by the central authorities to restrict 
enterprises finance during 1984 (1986: 37). Similarly, another researcher on Chinese 
capital markets concludes that their emergence was primarily "driven by the rising 
investment demands of economic agents who tried to circumvent various financial 
restrictions and barriers" (Tam 1991: 525).
Initially most stocks were sold to employees of the issuing enterprises. Engle notes 
that in some instances enterprises could only "sell" stock by coercing employees to buy it 
(1986: 38). However, stocks were increasingly traded unofficially with especially large 
kerb markets in Shanghai, Sichuan and Shandong. In Shanghai, stocks were traded by 
"yellow oxen" (huangniu), a local term for black market traders.59 I met a man in his 
early thirties who had engaged in this trade in Shanghai. I asked him about the legality 
o f this trade. He agreed that it is a black market but added that "it seems to be permitted." 
The official SSE grew out of and has replaced this black market. In other parts of China 
many semi-official kerb markets continue.60 My informant in this instance now bought 
and sold unlisted stock all over China. He travelled by plane, and claimed that his 
suitcases stuffed with wads of Renminbi. An official publication makes clear that one 
reason for the establishment of stock markets in 1986 was "so as to eliminate the black 
market which has already appeared."61 It is, of course, a moot point how far the state 
permitted such black markets as an experiment - leaving open the option to crush or 
legalize them at a later date. However, the sense of events moving much faster than the 
Party expects is evident in comments made by former Shanghai Mayor, now Deputy 
Premier, Zhu Rongji at the Beijing showing of "OK Stock". After watching the play Zhu 
is reported to have commented that when he left Shanghai two years before he would
58"Shanghai: Stock Market Re-established" B g  1989, 132(18): 19.
59The main role o f  h uangniu  in the 1970s and 1980s w as trading in ration coupons. With the 
elim ination o f  rationing their other main activities are as touts for theatre, cinem a and other types o f  tickets, 
currency dealing and trading in tax exem ption certificates for imported goods.
60At tim es the state has m oved to prevent the unauthorized issuing o f  stocks and bonds. The State 
C ouncil halted the Urumqi state-ow ned H ongyuan Investm ent Trust from issu ing 56 m illion  yu an  (U S $9 .9m) 
o f  shares. Tens o f  thousands o f  Urumqi investors were already involved in a kerb market dealing in share 
purchase certificates and exchanging information on this company ("Share Float Torpedoed" FEER 20 May
1993: 58-9 .
61 "Shanghai: Stock Market Re-established" BR 1989, 132(18): 21.
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never have envisaged Shanghai’s share market developing in the way it has.62
6.5.2 Blurring the Margins
Set against the growing inequality is the way the opportunities of the market can 
re-configure social contours. For example, I visited one dealing centre where a woman of 
about 35 who looked like a poor peasant came in with an old battered handbag. From it 
she took out an old, crumpled bag for dried milk. Inside this were 500,000¥ o f Chinese 
government bonds. This woman’s father had pulled a cart from which he sold water 
melons. At the same time in this room was a man in his early seventies dressed in a smart 
suit, complete with a gold watch and dark glasses. He lived in the exclusive Portman 
hotel. From 1945 he had begun to speculate on shares, gold and other commodities. He 
had two White Russians as bodyguards when he went to school. He once again deals on 
the share market. I found it interesting that these two people from very different 
backgrounds had now achieved a level of equality in the non-egalitarian 1990s denied to 
them in the Maoist age. This man advised me that "now is the best time to make money 
in Shanghai as it is chaotic (luan). When there is stability there are fewer opportunities 
to get rich."
By providing a new source of income the share market contributes to the generally 
increasing degree of ambiguity over people’s incomes and tended to increase the realm of 
privacy. Before the reform era people had just one source of income from their work unit 
and would readily tell others how much this was. Now with "blurred/indistinct salary" 
(mohu gongzi) and diverse sources of "outside money" (waikuai), that is income apart 
from one’s salary such as income from a second job or overseas remittances, there was a 
much larger zone of privacy. An economics professor suggested to me that the reluctance 
to ask about others salaries in the West and the comparatively common questions of this 
kind in China are not cultural differences per se but, rather, relate to the different types of 
economy. He suggested that as China’s economy becomes increasingly similar to that of 
the West that in China too income levels will increasingly become a zone of privacy. He 
located this alongside a series of changes notably increasing individual freedom (geren 
ziyou) and competition (jingzheng). Although I am wary of taking this economic 
determinism too far, it is clear that the stock market greatly contributed to and increased 
the degree of ambiguity over people's incomes. This professor added that he would
62"Fangfu Chonghui Shanghai Shiguang" (Just Like Returning to Shanghai) XMWB 5 December 1993:
5.
328
readily tell somebody his danwei salary but that he would be far less likely to divulge his 
full income including waikuai. In any event, he was unclear himself how much this would 
total.
The location of dahushi, "special spaces", in the share dealing centres paralleled 
the structure of Shanghai restaurants. In restaurants the better rooms are often on higher 
floors and/or in separate anterooms. This similarity o f increasing exclusivity and privacy 
occurred to me one day when I went from visiting a dahushi to a separate dining room 
in a nearby restaurant with a group of dahu. ' In densely crowded Shanghai space is a 
highly desirable luxury. This physical zone of privacy also extends to personal behaviour.
The share market can also affect family relationships. In many Shanghai families 
husbands (occasionally these roles are reversed) turned over their monthly salary to their 
wives who controlled the family income (dangjia). The wife returns a portion o f this to 
the husband for him to buy cigarettes and other small daily items (si fang  t///sifangqian). 
A newspaper article cited the instance of a 43 year old female factory worker called "iron 
calculator" (tie suanpan) by her colleagues.63 She began to buy shares secretly without 
telling her husband. She could do this because she is the family’s "finance minister" 
(caizheng buzhang). Until she became a successful dealer she also kept her visits to the 
exchange from danwei colleagues by saying that she is going to the doctors.
In one family where the husband had made money on shares he continued to hand 
over his salary as before. However, his daughter-in-law said that he retained his waikuai 
(extra income) and does not disclose how much it is to the rest of the family. In another 
family the daughter noted that her parents’ cooperation in share buying was a source of 
dispute between them since they each had different ideas about which shares to buy and 
when to buy and sell them. An example of this occurred during the East Asian Games. 
Both felt that the government was interfering in the market at this time but they could not 
agree what effect this was having. Their dispute centred upon whether to buy shares 
during or after the games.
The female cotton factory worker remarked that initially female colleagues "did not 
dare buy shares" but that this had changed. Her explanation was that at her danwei people 
talked about shares and that listeners were envious (yanhong) and wanted to get rich 
(xiang facai). She recalled that "at first colleagues did not talk openly about shares but 
only bought them secretly (toutou momo de). Now people at my danwei discuss shares
“ "Shanghai Tan de Nu Gumin" (Female Share Dealers in Shanghai) Dadi Monthly 1993 No. 6: 25.
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and listen to their prices on the radio every day."64 This women had borrowed 3,000¥ 
from her mother. She made enough to pay her back and continue buying shares. She now 
also chao gupiao on behalf of her two brothers, phoning them each day to tell them which 
shares she had bought or sold. In this instance one can see how family interdependence 
plays an important role in a new economic situation and is promoted by new technology.
Once somebody had become a dahu they had some license to recreate their past 
in the light of what they have now become. One 36-year-old dahu had been unable to 
study at university when he left school because of the Cultural Revolution. Instead he had 
worked in a factory doing heavy manual work for seven years before going to university. 
He stressed the importance of fendouxing (fendou - struggle, xing - nature) and felt that 
he had always had a fendou sixiang (thought, thinking). I asked him about his seven 
years in the factory. He responded, "then there was no choice...[and] although the job 
involved great hardship all one could do was endure (renshou) [cf. the comment by Ah 
Nai’s wife that all her husband could do was ren]. Now there is an opportunity (jihui) 
to earn money and I seize (zhua) this opportunity." It is interesting how closely his words 
echo those of Deng Xiaoping given above that people should "seize the opportunity". He 
followed these comments by expressing his dislike for traditional family relationships. He 
felt that people must struggle (fendou) for themselves. I had the distinct impression that 
he had had to fend off requests from family members for financial assistance. His retelling 
of his life story was like a dramatic account, with himself cast in the starring role. He said 
that he felt he had a "sense of mission" (shiminggan), an expression with religious 
connotations.
In Shanghai I was often told that "people now dare to take risks" (ganyu mao 
fengxian). A dealing centre manager believed that the share market had played a 
significant part in encouraging people to take risks by "raising people’s conceptual abilities 
(ren gainian tigao)." For instance, participation in the market had enhanced their ability 
to accept competition and the pressures of a market-orientated economy (xinli chengshou 
yali). He believed that "last year [1992] if somebody lost 600¥ they might commit suicide, 
but now they would not." He felt that after the SSE index had fallen heavily and shares 
been "cold" for a while that "small hu" were now more mature (chengshu). The manager 
stressed the need to "foster mature share people" (peiyang chengshu de gumin). Such a 
concern seems firmly placed in a Confucian ideal of moulding people through education.
64A young teacher observed that co-workers often either all chao g u p iao  or none did and that usually 
one person leads (d a itou ) the others into it.
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6.5.3 A New Need To Know
One dealer told me that "choosing shares is harder than choosing a wife."65 In 
opening up the share market the government created a new need for individuals to have 
access to information which they must then critically assess, in ways that may be quite 
different to official statements. It was suggested to me that the burgeoning number of 
magazines, tip sheets and newspapers devoted to the share market were amongst the most 
"democratic" of publications. It was notable that in 1994, it was reported that several 
Shanghai stock market tip sheets such as Shanghai Stock Express and Shanghai Stock 
Information had been banned. The official reason given was that these sheets "lacked 
proper authorization and spread unfounded rumours."66 A young teacher who dealt in 
shares explained to me the factors he considered in deciding which shares to buy, 
including: considerations over the sector in which the company operates; the type of
products they produce and the market for them; the government policy towards each 
sector; the character and skills of the head of the company; and his own expectations on 
future development in Shanghai. For instance, he avoided one electrical company whose 
main product was black and white televisions. He saw this as having limited prospects. 
He preferred companies which had diversified and become involved in the "craze" (re - 
literally "hot") sectors in contemporary Shanghai such as taxis and restaurants. Similarly, 
he favoured "concept" shares - these were for companies involved in Pudong construction 
projects which are still at the "concept" stage but had central government support.
One dahu remarked upon the accuracy of Bacon’s dictum that "knowledge is 
power" (zhishi jiushi liliang). She commented that initially she had relied upon feelings 
(pin ganjue) when she bought shares. However, after resigning from her danwei and 
devoting all her energies into chao gupiao she now used technical analysis (jishu fenxi). 
She proudly showed me a selection of carefully drawn graphs and charts, her own 
meticulous analysis of market trends. She commented that this kind of analysis is only 
partial and must be combined with analysis of "the general social situation", including state 
policy and politics.67 The main sources of information she used in her "analysis of
^C ontinuing this analogy he added that "if you choose too many you w ill not be able to control them!"
66"Stock Sheets Banned" FEER 2 June 1994: 63.
67Contrast this need to know about key current events to a w ealthy business woman 1 interviewed the 
same day w ho told me that she rarely read newspapers or watched the telev ision  news.
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society" (shehui fenxi) were the "media world" (xinwen meijie) and personal contacts. 
The former included newspapers, broadcast media and magazines - she noted that the term 
meijie (intermediary, vehicle, medium) is derived from mei, a go-between or matchmaker. 
Personal contacts appeared to be especially important. She remarked that dahu, "small hu" 
and friends who work in newspaper offices often phone her with various items of news. 
She stressed that the dahushi was the best place to hear the latest news and rumours. In 
her tiny flat there was a stream of visitors and telephone calls. All hinged on the latest 
news in the share market.
Another dahu believed that dahu were successful because there was a lot of contact 
(lianxi duo) and discussion amongst them and because they had many sources of 
information. He added that this information may be incorrect or false but that "even false 
news may have an effect upon the market." When I asked about rumours of the death of 
Deng Xiaoping he noted that Deng had already been killed off and revived by the share 
market seven or eight times. Every day he studied five newspapers and some of the 
numerous pamphlets devoted to stocks.68 He explained that he did this because what 
politicians do and say affects the price of shares. However, he considered the "grapevine" 
(xiaodao xiaoxi) the most rapid source of news followed by broadcast media. Television 
and the telephone were his main sources of information and he carried both a pager and 
a mobile phone (dageda). The mobile phone was an important symbol of, and means for 
attaining, success. It was pointed out to me that whilst an employer may buy an employee 
a pager that a dageda was only bought by oneself. The status of the mobile phone is 
implicit in its Chinese name "big brother big", a term I was told had originally been used 
in Hong Kong to denote the head of a triad organization.
On one occasion I unwittingly found I had been in possession of potentially 
valuable information. This occurred when I visited the home of a dahu on a day when 
government policies designed to raise the value of the Renminbi against the US dollar had 
been announced. This news had been released in Hong Kong before the mainland and 
reported a couple of days before on the BBC World Service. This dahu commented that 
she wished she had known because this revaluation had affected share prices.
Some of Shanghai’s dahu also belonged to various share salons, where people meet 
and discuss the share market (see Hertz 1994: 168-71). One salon was reported as
68 He told m e that he read newspapers such as J iefan g  R ibao  (Liberation D aily) for the "important news" 
(da de xinxi). He explained that J iefan g  R ibao was the "party newspaper" w hilst X inm in  W an b ao  (N ew  
P eople's Evening N ew s) "the laob a ix in g  read".
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charging a monthly membership fee of 1,000¥.69 Salons o f this type are a clear indication 
o f a "solidifying" of an economic interest group. However, amongst dealers I met, there 
was a preference for more informal meetings and social interaction.
That the need to exchange information was not restricted to dahu was evident in 
the rapid proliferation of magazines and news sheets devoted to the stock market. There 
did not appear to be professional advisors on shares. However, there were adult education 
classes on shares (see Hertz 1994: 165-8). One dealing centre I visited organized a share 
market salon and regularly invited speakers. There were also informal salons - when the 
exchanges closed at 3pm small groups o f people clustered outside their doors discussing 
shares. Outside at least two especially highly rated exchanges these informal information 
exchange groups continued their discussions until past midnight even on freezing winter 
nights. Ellen Hertz (Ibid: 151-8) describes these gatherings as "crowd clusters" and 
stresses the way that they are comprised of strangers, and the openness o f these anonymous 
crowds which allows participants to enter or leave at will. The only other time I witnessed 
such "clusters" in Shanghai was during the demonstrations o f 1989.
The importance of information was exemplified during an interview which took 
place in a local government office. Once word got out that there was a dahu in the 
building my interview was soon taken over by an assortment of people who came in and 
began discussing share prices with him and asking his opinion on various shares and 
market trends in general. Our conversation took place in the office o f the man who had 
introduced me and he was present throughout. When we were alone again he commented 
that many of those who had joined the conversation were not supposed to buy shares 
because of their rank.
6.6 Back To The Future?
The share market has hastened and facilitated a redefinition o f the individual’s 
relationship to society. A key aim of promoting the market is to redefine Shanghai’s role 
by developing the city as a national and international financial centre. Since 1992 an 
increasing number of non-Shanghai companies have been listed on the SSE. In September 
1993 the SSE began to transmit real-time stock information via satellite to twelve Chinese 
cities including Fuzhou, Guangzhou, Haikou and Hefei.70 These links now cover most
69"Shanghai Tan de Nu Gumin" (Female Share Dealers in Shanghai) Dadi Monthly 1993 No. 6: 24.
70"Stock News Sent By Satellite" CD 20 September 1993: 2.
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of China with some 40-50 million share holders across the country. A SSE spokesperson 
said the hope is that by the year 2,000 the Shanghai exchange will be ranked with London, 
New York and Tokyo.71 Foreign banks and brokerages have begun to return to 
Shanghai.72 In June 1994 the Dutch bank ABN-Amro became the first foreign bank to 
return to its pre-revolutionary site at the Peace Hotel on the Bund.73 Some share dealers 
I met looked forward to China joining the GATT so they can deal in shares in Hong Kong 
and Tokyo.
A dealing centre manager told me that over two-thirds of the 300-plus dealing 
centres in Shanghai are run by non-Shanghai companies. He remarked that many centres 
are run by young men from out of Shanghai and noted that whilst this was a recent 
phenomenon it was also a return to the situation which had begun with the Opium War. 
From this time Shanghai had become an "adventurers’ paradise" (maoxianjia de leyuan) 
which attracted people from all over China and the rest of the world to come to do 
business.
It is interesting to ponder the consequences of Shanghai’s redefined role and its 
reinscription into global financial markets. Despite the developments noted above the SSE 
was still extremely insular with politburo policies having the most important effect. Even 
the Shenzhen and Hong Kong markets appeared to have little influence on the SSE. In 
October 1993 the first takeover bid was made when the Shenzhen Baoan Company began 
buying up shares - flouting exchange regulations in the process - of the Shanghai listed 
company Yanzhong. It is clear from this that new, more complicated systems of ownership 
and control are developing. In future, will foreign companies be able to take over Chinese 
listed companies? Re-internationalization also raises questions such as how, without free 
access to information, can Shanghai traders be successful in a global market? What impact 
might the integration of China’s economy into the world economy have on future economic 
and political developments?
Further extension of stock-holding and "the market" generally poses many problems. 
For instance, replacing state directives by the profit motive brings the distinct danger of 
far higher levels of unemployment, which could be a source o f instability. I asked one
7l"Shanghai G ushi J iak u a i F azhan Sudu" (Shanghai Share Market Speeds Up its Pace o f  D evelopm ent) 
(SY B  18 January' 1993: 1.
72Foreign observers expect many Western banks to return to their "old haunts" (see "Bears in a China
Shop" The Econom ist 14 May 1994: 111-2).
77"Shanghai: Capital o f  China’s Get-Rich-Quick Capitalism" FEER 23 June 1994: 54-6.
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exchange manager about the possibility of bankruptcy in Shanghai. He observed wryly 
that this was unlikely since "the government still wants ‘stability and unity’ (anding 
tuanjie) - his own perception o f Deng Xiaoping’s statement to this effect.
Another interesting area to speculate upon is the share market’s role in Shanghai’s 
emergent civil society now that stock-holding is no longer just an experiment and' "shares 
have already formed an indissoluble bond with Shanghainese."74 It would be tempting 
to portray some of the attention to politics and economic affairs by share dealers mentioned 
above as indicative of a nascent civil society. However, it would be a mistake to infer 
from this an interest in politics as a citizen. The dahu mentioned above who daily reads 
five newspapers told me that he had "no interest" (bu guanxin) in politics, describing it 
as "nothing to do with the laobaixing." This attitude was shared by other dahu I 
interviewed.
Despite this it is clear that new interest groups were beginning to coalesce around 
the share market. At the higher reaches were the share dealing companies themselves - 
these often have highly complex organizational links and an ambiguous relationship with 
state departments. Then there were the share dealers who met, exchanged information and 
may form the "joint naval forces" mentioned above. One article observed that these groups 
(tuanti) are comprised of people with a common will and purpose (zhitong daohezhe) - 
an expression from which the term "comrade" (tongzhi) derives.75 It will be interesting 
to observe the extent to which emergent interest groups press for recognition o f their own 
interests. A sign o f potential problems may be the way that already the government’s 
involvement in the market led some to "curse the state" (ma guojia) when share prices fell. 
The share market has also revealed the weakness of the party-state. Hertz describes a 
situation in September and October 1992 when the government spent billions of yuan 
attempting to prop up the market. She describes how "[ijnvestors throughout Shanghai had 
watched while the government repeatedly failed to manipulate the market to suit its needs" 
(1994: 218).
The further growth, role and impact of the Shanghai share market depends upon 
many factors. It should, however, be evident from this chapter that this market is both 
indicative and constitutive of the dramatic pace of change in Shanghai; the share discourse 
is both evidence of the widening "margins" in Shanghai and has contributed to an
74"Shanghai T an de Nu G um in" (Fem ale Share Dealers in Shanghai) Dadi M onthly 1993 N o. 6: 22.
75Ibid: 25
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extension and blurring of these contours. The share market contains and is fostering many 
ambiguities and actual or potential points of tension. In all these respects the share 
experiment is a fascinating microcosm of the wider project of gaige kaifang of which it 
forms a part. The forces and trends unleafed (or constitutes of) gaige kaifang, whether 
those planned by the party-state or those which result from citizens everyday actions are 
remaking the social landscape of Shanghai. The party-state often takes the blame when 
problems arise but holding back the "tides" or putting the genie back in its bottle may be 
beyond its power.
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Impressions and Speculations
Ethnography tends to fix in aspic cultural phenomena which are in process, in flux. 
Research in an urban context highlights the limitations of this anthropological fic tion . The 
activity of undertaking ethnographic research in Shanghai, a city where the state promotes 
policies deliberately designed to produce "some change every year and a great change every 
three years", problematizes the reduction of diverse activities, everyday situations, and a 
plurality of voices to the two dimensionality of the written page. A key aspect of this 
ethnographic account of China’s largest city has been to highlight the degree of flux and 
diversity in this metropolis and to sketch some of the boulders, tides and shifting currents.
China’s dominant political figure since 1976, Deng Xiaoping, has described the 
process of reform in China as mozhe shitou guohe - crossing the stream, by feeling the 
boulders. I have incorporated this term into my thesis title. It has the dual merit of being 
an apposite and vivid metaphor both of Shanghai’s social landscape and the practices of its 
inhabitants, and for my own practices of research and writing. In this concluding section 
I first summarize the main findings of this thesis. I then explore further some of the trends 
which have been traced and conclude by speculating on future developments in Shanghai.
Each chapter may stand alone as a "perspective" on Shanghai, in the sense used by 
David Parkin with his suggestion of ethnography as analogous to impressionist painting. 
Each of these perspectives is comprised of a vignette of brush strokes of differing thickness 
and intensity. Occasionally, I have made light strokes "like a dragonfly skimming the 
surface of the water" (qingting dian shui). At other times I have made broad, sweeping 
strokes, but always with special attention to the craquelure, the fine details of daily life. 
Daniel Miller writes that "ethnography.. .goes beyond the abstract solutions of philosophical 
or political programmes, to encounter these struggles in the compromised pragmatics of 
everyday life" (1994: 322). In the shifting sands of "Shanghai beach", I, too, often found 
that the discourses and practices of people’s quotidian existences presented quite different, 
and frequently mutually contradictory, contours to those of over-arching meta-narratives 
whether those of Marxist-Leninist Mao Zedong Thought or sociological notions of global 
homogenization, or the accounts "from a height" of changes in contemporary China 
presented by economists and political scientists.
My intention is that each perspective should be meaning-full in its own right and 
provide substantial new and nuanced information on Shanghai and its people. Each of six 
separate vignettes may then combine, collage-like, to form, a whole greater, perhaps, than 
the sum of its parts. These perspectives share, of course, the topic of "Shanghai".
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However, the selection of themes was not random apd there is a submerged logic, an 
undercurrent, which structures this thesis. These themes are formulated in, but also derived 
from, Chapter One where I sketch a broad "picture" of early 1990s Shanghai as given 
emphasis in indigenous representations.
In Chapter One I noted informants’ descriptions of pre-reform Shanghai and the socio- 
spatial and watery/irrigation metaphors which permeated discourses on gaige kaifang. A 
predominant view was that pre-gaige kaifang Shanghai had been like a woman with bound 
feet, made into a lame city (bojiao chengshi)1 by the central government’s expropriations 
o f the wealth created in the city. The city was portrayed to me as having been "stuck in 
a frame" and as having "solidified"; lack of change in the city’s physical structure was 
frequently presented as paralleled by and indicative of a similar fixity and immutability in 
people’s daily lives, careers and expectations.
In early 1990s Shanghai, with the opening of the "sluice gate", the contours of the 
Maoist period had already been, or were in the process of being, reconfigured. Even the 
most casual visitor to Shanghai could not fail to recognize that there have been "enormous 
changes in the sights and sounds and tastes of urban life" (Stross 1990: 501). Where 
politics had once been in command and the hand of the party-state had weighed heavily on 
the shoulder of each citizen, informants now characterized Shanghai as having a "big 
society, and a small government" (da shehui, xiao zhengfu). As William Jenner notes, 
for the last half century "the state has wanted its subjects kept in their boxes" (1992: 101) 
but now "[s]ome of the state’s boxes are losing their lids" (102). Much more "space" had 
evidently opened up for many citizens. However, the lack of investment in the city’s 
infrastructure has saddled both China, and more particularly the residents of Shanghai, with 
a huge debt. Above all, a dilapidated housing stock and a groaning transport network were 
"millstones around the neck of the city"2 and strenuous efforts were being made to "shed" 
these burdens of the past.
From this first chapter it should be evident that my informants often depicted a 
social landscape comprised of binary oppositions. These contrasts were generally asserted 
with a degree of certainty and explicitness which was remarkable in itself, even though in 
practice the dichotomies were readily modified, shifted, and even, contradicted. Frequent
'This term is used in "Da S h an gh a i, Ni H ai B eideq i Z hongguo Ma?" (Great Shanghai, Can Y ou Still
Carry China?) D u /h e  W enzhai 1992 (9): 43.
-Ibid: 44.
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"sharp-edged" contrasts were drawn between a range of inside (nei) and outside (wai) 
dichotomies. Particularly pervasive spatial and territorial contrasts were those made 
between Chinese and non-Chinese - with overseas Chinese as an intermediate category; 
between Shanghainese and non-Shanghainese; between urban and rural; between work unit 
and "society"/home; and between home and "outside". These distinctions, which
informants used to describe the world around them, are examined in detail throughout this 
thesis and the central themes are outlined in this conclusion. In a later section of 
Impressions and Speculations I comment upon a further range of sociological distinctions 
which have been touched upon only tangentially in this thesis.
When discussing changes in Shanghai, and/or in their own lives, informants 
frequently had recourse to a number of chronological dichotomies. The main chronological 
contours they referred to, and which, therefore, suffuse this thesis were: Pre-Opium
War/feudali sm: post-Opi urn W ar, pre-Liberation: after Liberation, pre-gaige kaifang/Cultural 
Revolution:after gaige kaifang/now. Informants often contrasted the present to "before" 
(yiqian). Sometimes the "before" referred to was specified, as in the routinely used 
expressions "before Liberation" (jiefang yiqian) and "after Liberation" (jiefang yihou). 
On other occasions the "before" referred to was dependent upon the context. I frequently 
had to follow up informants’ comments which included this term by asking "when was 
‘before’?".3 When the Communist Party took power in 1949 it actively sought to draw a 
clear line between "Old" and "New" China. "Now", and with, it seemed, with the 
encouragement of the Party, the populace often drew a line between the present and the 
Maoist past. Fixed expressions that had come into everyday use and which paralleled 
"before Liberation" and "after Liberation" were "before gaige kaifang" and "after gaige 
kaifang". The term gaige kaifang appeared to be used in two rather distinct ways. Often 
informants spoke of gaige kaifang yihou, that is, "after gaige kaifang" - this depicts gaige 
kaifang as something that had happened in the past, a stream that already been crossed. 
For instance, a share dealer in his early forties told me that people such as himself could 
compare pre-gaige kaifang to the present since they had "crossed over from that time" 
(neige shihou guolai de). To use a Chinese proverb, the river had been crossed and the 
bridge demolished (guohe chaiqiao) - there was no turning back. Informants would also
3"Fixing" when events had occurred could be particularly problem atic since grammatical structures to 
create tenses are much more limited in the Chinese language compared to E nglish. For instance, the verbs 
rendered as "had/has/have" and "be, w as, w ere, are, is" in E nglish each has only one C hinese equivalent. 
W illiam  Jenner has also com m ented on the degree to w hich the C hinese language, unlike E nglish , blurs past 
and present. He notes that im ages of' history and the present often "coexist tim elessly" (1992: 7).
3 3 9
say "xianzai shi gaige kaifang" - now is gaige kaifang. In this second sense, gaige 
kaifang seems akin to a Zeitgeist and to have a more processual meaning, as an evolving 
set of policies and developments of which there may be more or less in the future.
In Chapter Two I explored the increasing porosity of Shanghai’s boundaries with 
regard to both intra-national and global flows - of which my own research opportunities 
were a distinct beneficiary. Before the 1980s China was largely closed to global flows - 
the various "scapes" described by Arjun Appadurai. The blocking of the Voice o f  America 
and the BBC World Service are indicative of China’s "closed door" at that time. Shanghai 
at that time could be depicted as having been vertically integrated, cellular and relatively 
closed to both global and intra-national flows. Informants told me that with this "closed 
door" Shanghai’s laobaixing "did not know what the outside world was like, for only the 
higher levels had access to foreign media." The laobaixing were depicted as having been 
"blind" (mangmu), unable to see (kanbujian) and unable to hear (tingbujian) what the 
"outside" was like. They had a very narrow view and were "looking at the sky from the 
bottom of a well" (zuojing guantian). This pattern has altered significantly since the mid- 
1980s with Shanghai’s (partial) reintegration into the global economy, a greater stress upon 
horizontal linkages, and extensive global and intra-national flows. The "information 
landscape" (Wark 1993: 141) of the city has changed dramatically. In contemporary 
Shanghai, global events intrude on one’s daily encounters, and certainly "are not external 
to what the anthropologist finds before him...they are an ingredient in it" (Geertz 1995: 
95).
I examine the consequences of various flows for "Chinese" and "Shanghainese" 
identities in Shanghai. The conclusions I reach are ambiguous because, I would affirm, the 
discourse of informants was ambivalent. There is evidence that these flows may help to 
sustain "Chinese" and "Shanghainese" identities, but also that they may redefine, fracture 
or deconstruct these imagined communities. I found considerable vitality to identifications 
by residents as both "Chinese" and as "Shanghainese". Since "ethnic" boundaries of this 
type are generally of most significance when they are breached, then these identifications 
may have acquired greater valency in the reform era. Shanghai was regaining its attraction 
- lost since the 1950s - as a "paradise of adventurers". Once again, migrants flooded into 
the city from all over China and the rest of the world. A substantial proportion of the 
Chinese migrants swell the "sizeable, ‘second class’ of urban citizens without permanent 
urban household registration status" (Chan 1994: 134). Identification as "Shanghainese" 
was most conspicuously asserted in contrast to these rural migrants. The dominant view
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of my informants could be formulated as Shanghainese:"developed" countries::rural 
migrants: Shanghai.
With rising regional autonomy, long-term central government expropriations and the 
post-Mao influx of rural migrants who breached Shanghai’s "wall" I had anticipated the 
beginnings at least of a more overtly political assertion of regional "voices". However, I 
found little evidence of such an assertion. When I asked informants if  there was any 
conflict between "being Shanghainese" and "being Chinese" such questions were regarded 
as nonsensical. Appropriate analogies for the relationship between identification as 
"Chinese" and as "Shanghainese" were derived from the comments of informants. Thus 
"being Shanghainese" could be described as a "different flavour" of Chineseness. 
Similarly, in the same way as regional operas differ greatly in style but tend to stick to a 
range of common basic plots so regional identities contribute to "different meanings of 
being Chinese" (Siu 1993: 19) - they are variations on a theme. It was perhaps my own 
presuppositions, coming from a continent fraught with local nationalisms, that I should have 
expected a greater assertion of Shanghai "nationalism". Even though much of the seed com 
exists for an assertive localism there was scant evidence of this happening.
Global mediascapes facilitated by new technologies and allied with China’s 
burgeoning media had begun to provide residents with many "more contemporaries" 
(Hannerz 1992: 30). Where once there was little alternative to the state’s monologic voice 
and its interpretations of how things were or should be, in contemporary Shanghai there 
was now a proliferation of alternative images, rationalizations, and explanations. For 
Shanghainese, who frequently asserted their urban sophistication and superiority, the 
"others" with whom they tended to identify (or, at least, sought to emulate) were those with 
wealthy metropolitan lifestyles. As I observe, this cosmopolitan identity to which they 
aspired (and felt entitled) neglected and failed to include the poor of rural China, hundreds 
of thousands of whom were visibly and industriously engaged upon building a city which 
fitted this vision.
Joshua Meyrowitz (1985) rightly argues that electronic media have profound effects 
on altering the significance of time and space. However, I do not accept his view that 
electronic media have "homogenized places and experiences" (viii). Homogenization takes 
place only at the most superficial of levels. Rather, global cultural flow and rising 
prosperity were increasing the repertoire of possible identities and communities to which 
Shanghai citizens could belong. Shanghainese residents, like ourselves, now "live in a 
world of fluid, blurred, overlapping cultural identities" (Jenner 1992: 209). Not only was
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the city becoming, it seemed, one vast physical construction site, but also Shanghai’s re- 
internationalization was providing many new (deterritorialized) sites for the construction of 
identities. Included amongst the new range of "aspirational identities" were various 
consumer "lifestyles" and youth sub-cultures which could cross-cut with territorial 
identifications - for instance, with notions of Shanghainese sophistication and style.
Sinologists such as Tom Gold (1993a) and Tu Wei-ming (1991) stress the impact 
of gangtai cultural imports upon the PRC and their role in undermining the Communist 
Party’s attempts at ideological control. Tu Wei-ming describes these imports as having a 
"transformative potential" (925) and as playing a part in "creatively constructing a new 
vision of Chineseness" (28). However, I noted something of a differential "take-up" of 
gangtai phenomena; their appeal was much greater to younger informants. Older 
informants tended to stress the need for the retention of "traditional Chinese values" such 
as respect for the elderly and moderation in expenditure. Additionally, in this and 
subsequent chapters I showed that it was not solely gangtai products which appealed to 
Shanghainese - often "Western" products were considered desirable too.
In Chapter Two I showed the lack of opposition between identification as 
"Shanghainese" and concurrent identification as "Chinese". In Chapter Three, I provided 
further strands of complexity to senses of being "Shanghainese" by exploring the differential 
attribution of qualities and identities which residents made of places and people in, or from, 
different parts of Shanghai. The persistence and apparent reinforcing of representations of 
"upper" and "lower" quarters during the Maoist era demonstrates the way in which socio­
economic policies of that time often operated to produce consequences in direct opposition 
to the ideals espoused.
In Chapter Three I also investigated aspects of the rapidly altering cityscape of 
Shanghai. Many physical boundaries were being dismantled or transformed and new 
"walls" created. I concentrated upon trends by which danwei lost their all-encompassing 
functions, and became less enclosed and bounded. Concurrently homes became 
increasingly privatized and cloissoneed. Under the Maoist model, workers were clustered 
in all-encompassing work units, often inside walled compounds. The ideal was for such 
units to be cellular, functionally autarkic and answerable to superiors in a vertically ordered 
structure of command which reached, ultimately, to a government department in Beijing. 
In the reform era, these vertical links have been loosened and each danwei encouraged to 
finance its own running costs. To achieve this, many units have turned their component 
service segments "inside out": that is, they turn their activities into outward facing
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commercial entities. Processes within danwei were often paralleled by the rupture and 
reconfiguration of their physical boundaries. The cityscape was being directly altered by 
the logic of commercialism as danwei physically opened their perimeter walls onto the 
street.'
Home styles were also changing - in ways which were often a mirror image of the 
trends affecting work units. A combination of factors including the impact of past political 
campaigns, the rehousing and relocation of residents in high-rise housing, a fear o f rising 
crime (often blamed on rural migrants), and the spread of new technologies such as 
television, video-players and air-conditioning were all increasing the home’s separateness 
and closure from the world outside. Alongside changes at home and work I also noted the 
proliferation and diversification of leisure activities which provided alternative sites and 
whose vitality and variety "is an important indication of how far the state’s ‘indifference 
zone’ has extended" (Wang 1995: 165). However, in leisure pursuits, as in many other 
aspects of life in early 1990s Shanghai, access and opportunities to these sites often 
depended very largely upon one’s ability to pay or status.
In the final section of Chapter Three I suggested ways in which communication 
technologies may be regarded as indicative of social status. A term which Chinese 
newspapers used, for instance, was "mobile phone stratum" - those with cellular phones 
were perceived to be quite distinct from those enclosed within the cellular walls of danwei. 
The mobile phone owner was marked out as a successful person. At the same time a 
mobile phone provided access to opportunities denied to those with inadequate, immobile 
communications facilities. This is an instance of the way, in contemporary society, 
consumption of products can be used to ascribe identities. Such instances also demonstrate 
how electronic media can both facilitate "connections" but also create new boundaries and 
types of exclusion.
In Chapter Four I explored representations of interpersonal relations and especially 
trust in other persons, in self and abstract systems. Trust was shown to have been affected 
by diverse political, cultural and other socio-economic factors. A clear finding is the extent 
to which informants felt that the state had affected human relations in China. In the case 
of kinship, for instance, it appears that political pressures, economic imperatives and 
cultural preferences conjoined to maintain dependence upon, and trust in, close kin. 
Despite this, current trends, especially an increasingly elderly population and the one child 
policy, will make individuals more reliant upon abstract systems in the form of pensions 
and social insurance.
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I found some evidence of what Anthony Giddens phrases the "transformation of 
intimacy". There was clearly an increasing emphasis upon romance and sexual intimacy 
as indicated by numerous magazine articles, books and radio phone-ins on these topics. 
However, cultural and material imperatives could outweigh, or at least impinge upon, 
"emotional" factors. In mate selection, for instance, marriage was viewed by most as a 
cultural and economic imperative. Moreover, possession of appropriate household 
registration and access to housing were fundamental requirements for a couple considering 
marriage.
In this chapter I also examined indigenous notions of "friendship". Giddens suggests 
that this personalized relationship of trust will increase in importance in conditions of 
modernity. However, I outlined how, in Shanghai, the English term "friend" encompassed 
a range of relationships from the highly instrumental to those resembling "pure 
relationships". Beyond deconstructing a simplistic notion of "friendship" as a single 
category, I also demonstrated ways in which actions by the state had affected these human 
relations.
Giddens also posits an increasing focus upon abstract systems as loci for trust. The 
project to propagate comradeship can be construed as an attempt to popularize an abstract 
system. In Shanghai, I found little trust in the abstract systems of comradeship, the 
Communist Party or socialism. An array of factors lay behind the loss of trust in these 
systems. However, from my informants’ comments the key factors imbricated in this lack 
of trust were maladministration by the Party and a loss of faith in the party-state as an 
economic manager - this latter perception fuelled by images flowing through the "open 
door" which showed living standards elsewhere as much higher than citizens had previously 
been told. Loss of trust in the Communist Party and socialism as expert systems had been 
replaced by cynicism, a profound pragmatism and "this-worldliness". However, I also 
found trust in historical and economic laws (guilu) and (the inevitability of) "progress" - 
notions which were highly reminiscent of positivist type approaches and which accorded 
with Marxist type world views. I also noted a marked tendency toward trust in the 
"market".
I also found an increasing trust in the self, although there appeared to be distinct 
generational differences in attitudes and values. Many young people asserted an increasing 
trust in the self whilst elderly informants tended to express nostalgia for the ideal of selfless 
comradeship. Informants noted a general shift from collective (jiti) towards more 
individualistic (gerenhua) activities and a greater stress upon the self. A frequent comment
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was that during Mao Zedong’s time people had no mind (tounao) and little or no sense of 
self (ziwo). With the complex collective amnesia which surrounds much of the Maoist past 
it is difficult to know how to understand the collective denial of agency which accompanied 
it. Perhaps the strongest assertion of this disavowal of agency came from the woman in 
her mid-twenties who told me that "previously everybody had a single point of view 
allocated by the state, now we have our own."
In this chapter I also showed how Simmel’s (1990) insights on the impact of a 
monetized economy provide a useful means of understanding events in contemporary 
Shanghai. Simmel’s comments on the liberating effects of a money economy were echoed 
by informants’ description of the reform process - with its attendant monetization of the 
economy - as China’s second "liberation" (jiefang).4 However, increased monetization in 
Shanghai had also been accompanied by an inflation of wants. For instance, young couples 
may have become more dependent on their parents to meet the rising costs of marriage gifts 
and ceremonies. Simmel also highlights the sense of alienation and loss of values which 
accompany this liberation. In the case of Shanghai, there was plenty of evidence to support 
these insights of Simmel, although much disaffection appeared to be a legacy of the Maoist 
period.
In Chapter Five I explored various notions surrounding consumption in Shanghai. 
In some detail I explored the way terminology from the literal consumption of food served, 
through metaphors and analogies, to describe many aspects of life in Shanghai. A 
particularly interesting aspect of this were the depictions of the state as a consumer of 
Shanghai’s wealth and of individuals consumption of the state or the laobaixing’s wealth. 
The ideal propagated during the Maoist period was for danwei to be "iron rice bowls". 
By 1992-94, this notion conveyed a sense of dependency and idleness. Moreover, it was 
felt with gaige kaifang that many people had refined the ability to consume and 
parasitically live off the state.
Further I stressed the ways in which consumption in Shanghai was producing, 
facilitating and marking out new divisions in society. Shanghai’s re-intemationalization 
provided local people with many alternative images and products from which to fashion 
identities. The inflow of media images and products from exotic elsewheres spurred 
aspirational identities, identities which were asserted or recognized through the consumption
“It is interesting to hear in mind com m ents made by Anita Chan. Chan records that in researching a book  
on the Cultural R evolution "again and again people remembered having felt that sam e heady sense o f  
‘liberation’ in 1966-7 when they had first joined colleagues in casting free from subservience to their w ork- 
unit leadership" (1991: 126).
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of products. I showed that this "influx does not enter into a vacuum...but enters into 
various kinds of interaction with already existing meanings and meaningful forms" (Hannerz 
1992: 262). In Shanghai, for instance, imported cultural festivals such as Christmas were 
becoming important but with quite distinctive "Shanghainese characteristics".
Other cultural imports were similarly understood in "Chinese" local contexts and 
subject to subtle redefinitions. For instance, the imported notion "democracy" had great 
appeal to some informants. However, I would agree with Anita Chan’s view that 
"democracy" in China, like "freedom", often meant paramountly "freedom from all the 
petty restrictions that were daily imposed" (1991: 126). In other instances imported cultural 
products could facilitate the development of deterritorialized consumer identities. However, 
such identities could also contribute to and cross-cut with notions of Shanghainese 
cosmopolitanism and sophistication.
A "dramatic revolution of rising expectations" (Goodman 1991: 15) was most 
obvious among young people; unlike their parents they took the benefits brought by gaige 
kaifang for granted and expected much more in the future. Some actively sought to be able 
to enjoy high class consumption, their desires fuelled by media images and advertising. 
Young people were both forced and encouraged to "look towards money" (wang qian kan - 
a homonym of "look to the future") not least as the security once provided by state danwei 
was being eroded, and the general expectation was that this process would continue. The 
need and desire to make money in Shanghai’s newly commercializing economy induced 
some to take risks and in the scramble for money fraud, theft and counterfeiting were 
increasingly common.
In Chapter Six I outlined the emergent discourse on stocks and shares in Shanghai. 
If the recently completed Shanghai Radio and Television Tower is a physical icon of change 
and "set to become a new symbol of Shanghai"5 then the stock market is a parallel 
institutional icon. The share discourse provides a microcosm of the forces and trends 
unleashed by gaige kaifang including inflated expectations, hopes, dangers, risks and 
unpredictability. The share market has hastened and facilitated a redefinition of the 
individual’s relationship to society, contributed to "widening the margins", and 
to the rapid social differentiation in the city. The Shanghai share market has played a 
significant role in the creation of a substantial number of nouveaux riches and, thereby, has 
contributed to and fuelled the sense of injustice many Shanghainese felt over rising wealth
5CD 15 Novem ber 1993: 5. The 460  metre high television tow er, nicknam ed the "Oriental Pearl", is in 
Pudong, directly across the Huangpu River from (and a sym bolic retort to?) the colonial built Bund.
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inequalities.
Sinologists have recently focused upon the emergence of "civil society" in China 
(e.g. see Chamberlain 1993, White 1993: 198-232, Whyte 1992). Gordon White, for 
instance, sees "tendencies" towards civil society (230) and discerns "the shoots o f an 
incipient ‘civil society’" (199). The share market encouraged and provided an environment 
for civil society to emerge. Access to information was vital for traders and various formal 
and many more informal interest groups had already begun to coalesce around the share 
market. It will be interesting to observe the extent to which emergent interest groups press 
for recognition of their own interests.
The SSE also raises issues concerning Shanghai’s place in the global economy. A 
satellite net already links the SSE to punters across China and the intention is that this 
currently very insular market will play a part in the city’s reintegration into global financial 
markets. Foreign banks and brokerages have begun to return to Shanghai and China is 
actively seeking membership of the World Trade Organization. These developments and 
China’s reinscription into global financial markets will raise many issues over political and 
economic control.
It does not seem too far-fetched to draw a parallel between Shanghai’s changing 
status and that of changing family structures in the city. Pre-reform Shanghai was like a 
"traditional" daughter-in-law thrust into an arranged marriage, bound to a previously unseen 
groom, at the mercy of a tyrannical mother-in-law. The body of Shanghai was penetrated 
by the patriarch, her dowry used up, and her former good looks withered. With atrophying 
bound feet, and scarcely able to stand, this daughter-in-law was expected and commanded 
both to "stand erect on two legs" and to "hold up half the sky".
By the time the old Patriarch died, outlived by his now emaciated bride, family life 
had already begun to change. The "modern" woman marries whom she chooses, goes out 
to work, and is an equal (at least) of her husband. Shanghainese men were often described 
as suffering from the disease qiguanyan - "tracheitis". A homonymy of this term is "the 
wife controls strictly". In Shanghai men shop, knit, look after babies, and their incomes 
are controlled by their wives. They only enjoy sexual favours if they "kneel beside the 
bed" (chuangtou gui - a pun on "bedside cupboard"). The situation of the modem 
daughter-in-law is quite different in relation to the mother-in-law. The "traditional" 
stereotype of the subservient, exploited daughter-in-law has largely been replaced with one 
where it is the mother-in-law who is exploited. If Shanghai is construed as a newly
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assertive daughter-in-law it is interesting to recall, and ponder upon, Olga Lang’s 
description of the situation of mothers-in-law with such daughters. Lang’s assessment on 
the basis of research carried out in 1930s Shanghai was that "[t]he fate of these old women 
with modern daughters-in-law is tragic indeed" (1946: 237).
In addition, to the inside:outside spatial dichotomies and the before:after 
chronological dichotomies mentioned above, informants also made a series of contrasts 
between various sociological inside:outside categories. During the Maoist period the 
following categories appear to have predominated: Party members:non-Party members, the 
"people'Vgood classes:enemies of the people/bad classes - with intellectuals as an 
intermediary or "floating" category, state/collective:private. I examine ways in which these 
categories have been blurred and new contours have been emerging.
The Party/non-Party distinction was portrayed as of great importance during the 
Maoist period. Party members were extolled as "special material" and moral exemplars. 
To be "in" the Party was a mark of social approval. During 1992-4 the Party member/non- 
Party member distinction appeared to be of limited importance with regard to low-ranking 
cadres. Informants told me that generally they no longer felt any need to exercise caution 
in their conversations when low-level Party members were present. Despite this, the latter 
continued to receive some extra benefits, and a common complaint was that danwei cadres 
had better access to housing. Informants drew a much clearer distinction between 
themselves and high-ranking Party officials. The latter were described as a stratum or, 
more controversially, a class with special power (tequan jieceng/jieji) quite distinct from 
ordinary people (laobaixing or shim in).6 Any notion that Party members "served the 
people" had, it appeared, long since evaporated. Joining the Communist Party was 
overwhelmingly viewed by my informants as a route to career advancement - Party officials 
served themselves and their families first. Although gaige kaifang has opened up many 
more "routes" to success, Party membership remained the sole route to political power. 
Additionally, the distinction between merchant and bureaucrat had blurred (cf. Solinger 
1992). A popular view was that this blurring involved considerable unfairness and, often, 
corruption. As an observer in Shanghai during Spring 1989,1 gauge that official corruption 
(guandao) was the main focus of protesters’ anger.
T h is  distinction persisted beyond retirement w ith retired people classed as tu ix iu  or lix iu . Ordinary 
people tu ix iu  w hilst cadres lix iu  and receive higher pensions, liv ing space allow ances, and w elfare 
entitlem ents.
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Since the late 1970s the Party has ceased using class labels and has no longer used 
the rhetoric of "class struggle" in which "the people" were sharply distinguished from "the 
enemies of the people". This latter category included, for example, former capitalists and 
landlords. The only time I heard language of this type used was by politically dissatisfied 
individuals who described, with acerbic irony, the CCP as the "enemy of the people".
During much of the Maoist period there appears to have been little official 
acceptance of any notion of a positive "private" domain. From the mid-1950s until the late 
1970s, official rhetoric generally condemned private enterprise as morally bad. Even 
between the two "good" types of enterprise - collective and state - a distinct hierarchy was 
maintained. The highest prestige was accorded to state work units which could provide the 
full range of socialist style benefits. During the reform era the former distinctions between 
state/collective and private enterprise blurred. For instance, officially it became easier to 
move from collective to state danwei and private enterprises are now permitted. In 
addition, new forms of enterprise have been established such as share-issuing companies 
and arrangements whereby state or collective enterprises are contracted-out to business 
people. There has also been a reintroduction of various forms of foreign-funded ventures 
and proliferation of brokers - including latter day "compradors" - who operate along the 
interstices of these entities.
A distinction which appeared to be of growing significance was that between young 
and old. Significantly, an imported term - daigou - was used to described this widening 
gulf. Those under the age of about forty or so spoke a quite different language to those 
socialized in the Maoist period with its rhetoric of "class struggle". Amongst young 
Shanghainese I met the "insistency, repetitiveness, and monotony of Chinese [state] 
propaganda" (Nathan 1986: 172) had no appeal at all. Their most frequent reaction to this 
"thin discourse of control" (Weller 1994: 206) was boredom, and, occasionally, disgust. 
Increasingly government propagandists could only get their message across by competing 
in the cultural market place. In competition with the lure of the widely available gangtai 
popular songs, disco-dancing, karaoke, romantic novels, kung-fu fiction and melodramatic 
soap operas the CCPs univocal "drone" had no chance, not least because many informants 
assumed that Party officials had, themselves, long since ceased to believe their own 
rhetoric.
Another significant contour which appeared to be solidifying was an increasing 
assertion of self and the rhetoric of individualism. The depoliticization of everyday life 
played a part in this. During the Maoist era political education and the communal activities
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it involved were designed to promote a sense of common purpose and to link each citizen 
to the party-state. In the reform era these activities - which had in any case become subject 
to considerable cynicism - diminished both in scale and intensity. At the same time, trends 
such as work units becoming less inclusive and for a labour market to develop place the 
onus on individuals to make decisions and pursue their own goals.
The emerging "socialist market economy" undoubtedly makes greater demands on 
citizens, especially the young - they find their own jobs, may change employment and have 
greater opportunities to travel. The increased emphasis upon the self was evident, for 
example, in the promotion of fashion and cosmetics and by the way leisure pursuits 
increasingly cater to individual tastes. The rising divorce rate was further evidence of a 
stress upon individual desires and a search for self-fulfilment. The age cohort sent down 
to the countryside appears to have been pivotal in this shift. Nearly two decades later many 
still felt a sense of betrayal but also that this experience, far from their families, dependent 
upon their own resources and often in harsh conditions, had been a tempering (duanlian) 
through which they had learnt to rely upon their own abilities.
It seems reasonable to assume that the expressed belief in the self will become even 
more pronounced once the one-child generation reaches maturity. Already amongst the 
current generation of teenagers almost none has a brother or a sister and many have grown 
up not only with the undivided and close attention of two parents but also two sets of 
grandparents - the so-called "1-2-4 syndrome". It will be intriguing to observe the 
sociological and psychological contours which emerge as this uniquely cossetted cohort 
reaches maturity.
Two particularly striking and emotionally charged categories which were brought 
to my attention in daily conversations were those between laobaixing and non-laobaixing 
and between poor and rich. During 1992-4 the newly re-emergent differentiation between 
rich and poor was a fault line which seemed daily to widen. This distinction overlapped 
with that between laobaixing/non-Iaobaixing. A common way to depict wealth inequalities 
was as a contrast between those with "ways" or "roads" (you banfa/lu de ren), including 
those who took "crooked roads" (wai Iuzi), and those without "ways" or "roads" (meiyou 
banfa/lu de). High Party members were amongst those with "ways" and "roads" since 
their official posts gave them contacts and the power to allocate resources. Private 
entrepreneurs (getihu) were also routinely cited as wealthy. However, although this was 
the dominant (expressed) view, a "sub-text" sometimes appeared; if questioned further on 
this topic informants often acknowledged that many getihu were also poor. The rich:poor
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divide was often portrayed in terms of consumption styles. For instance, the wealthy were 
those who ate the best food, were car owners or in a mobile phone-owning "stratum".
The category of laobaixing was one which many of my informants used. Its 
components are reminiscent of John Fiske’s comments on "the people" which he describes 
as a "shifting set of social allegiances, which are described better in terms of people’s felt 
collectivity than in terms of external sociological factors such as class, gender, age, race, 
region, or what have you. Such allegiances may coincide with class and other social 
categories, but they don’t necessarily: they can often cut across these categories, or often 
ignore them" (1989: 24). The laobaixing were discursively present in thousands of 
comments. Typically the laobaixing were personified in remarks such as: "in 1949 the 
Shanghai laobaixing welcomed the Communist Party", "the laobaixing are honest and hard 
working", "the laobaixing would not accept great inequalities of wealth", and "the 
laobaixing are made angry by official corruption".
With the exception of high Party members - who were always excluded - 
membership of the category laobaixing was contested. Many of my informants excluded 
private entrepreneurs (getihu) from the category because they were considered to be rich 
and also morally suspect. For their part, getihu I met were keen to assert that they were 
laobaixing. Intellectuals inclusion as laobaixing was rather ambivalent. Those I asked 
directly would tell me that they were laobaixing. However, in their conversations these 
same individuals would differentiate themselves from laobaixing and from "ordinary 
people" (putongren). For instance, they would describe laobaixing as being "without 
wenhua", a definition which, logically, would exclude themselves from being laobaixing.
The term laobaixing (literally "old one hundred names") was so common and 
seemingly innocuous it would be easy to ignore i t . ' Early in my research when I asked one 
elderly man to explain who the laobaixing were, he summed up his exposition with the 
statement that "the laobaixing are always the victims." However, as has been shown in 
the previous chapters and as I show in examples given above, the laobaixing could also be 
represented in other ways. They were a long-suffering mass ("the masses") and could 
indeed be victims. Being laoshi - a term which means honest but also conveys a sense of 
naivety, even gullibility - they were potential victims of slick fraudsters or a pathological 
emperor. However, they could not, as in Abraham Lincoln’s dictum, all be fooled for all 
of the time. In a term favoured, for quite different motives, by both Orientalists and many 
of my informants there would come a time when they would wake-up (xingguolai). As 
such, risen from their slumbers, they were a force to be reckoned with. Imbued with an
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innate sense of right and wrong, capable of multiple resistances, they could thwart the 
ambitions of false prophets (or those who accrued undeserved profits).
Analysts who have examined the potential for "civil society" in China, and my own 
findings in Chapter Four indicate, as yet, a lack of institutional bases of sociality. In part 
this is because the party-state actively seeks to prevent the growth of, and to eradicate the 
shoots of, any form of organization which could threaten its own place. Additionally, the 
lack of trust between strangers, between those who do not "know" each other, seems likely 
to exercise a powerful constraint on the development o f associations. As Chamberlain 
comments "Chinese civil society seems not so clearly in evidence. Individual and parochial 
interests typically take precedence over the common good" (1993: 210-1). However, in the 
same way as Chamberlain suggests that Sinologists have wrongly focused their attention on 
intellectual elites and that, for instance, sites such as the industrial workplace may be more 
fruitful, so it may be that the nebulous category "laobaixing" requires further attention.
As I note, the laobaixing were often personified. Statements made on behalf of "the 
laobaixing" would invariably make perfectly good sense if the speaker used "I" in its place. 
The displacement of what were, presumably, the speakers’ own views and feelings (and 
their potential agency?) onto this category is not surprising. Traditional Chinese philosophy 
has tended to stress the collective good. Moreover, open personal statements of defiance 
have been dangerous at many times in Chinese history - a traditional proverb states: ren 
pa churning zhu pa zhuang - fame portends trouble for men just as fattening does for pigs. 
From a more positive perspective, however, the ways in which the term laobaixing was 
used does seem to indicate a moral economy of sorts, involving a sense of shared feeling, 
of collectivity, of the potentiality for forms of association that cross-cut everyday 
boundaries.
A theme of this thesis has been to show ways in which identities in Shanghai are 
(increasingly) contingent and contextual, there being a wide range of cross-cutting, possible 
identifications.7 Douglas Kellner describes identities in "traditional" societies as un-
7M y own identities in Shanghai as "foreign" and "English" are an obvious instance o f  this. Both o f  these 
identities were "imagined" on my behalf by people I encountered; they form ed a base-line, a reference point, 
against w hich my ow n presentation o f  se lf  w as compared, discussed and evaluated. In London, "being 
English" is usually a non-discursive, dormant identification.. In Shanghai, by contrast, I w as daily made aware 
o f  "being English" as others constantly referred to it. W hen I listened to Shanghainese residents depictions 
o f  E nglishness, they generally bore so little relation to my ow n understandings o f  this category that I felt 
m yself, by turns, a voyeur, an im poster and a trespasser on people’s fondly held stereotypes.
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problematic, as a "function of predefined social roles" (1992: 141). With "modernity", 
Kellner considers that "identity becomes more mobile, multiple, personal, self-reflexive, 
and subject to change and innovation" (ibid). Kellner also contrasts "modem" and 
"postmodern" identities. He writes that "[w]hile the locus of modem identity revolved 
around one’s occupation, one’s function in the public sphere (or family), postmodern 
identity revolves around leisure, centred on looks, images, and consumption" (153). It is 
interesting to ask, according to these formulations, whether Shanghai is "traditional", 
"modem" or "postmodern"? Initially, however, I would say that I find Kellner’s distinction 
between traditional and modem identities problematic since family roles, are, presumably, 
largely "predefined social roles". I would argue that a combination of these two 
appellations accords closely with the situation in pre-gaige kaifang Shanghai. For much 
of the Maoist era people were stuck with ascribed, and largely immutable, class labels, jobs 
they had probably not chosen, and egalitarian levels of consumption were strongly 
encouraged and, at times, enforced. The growth of advertising, media images, and the 
stress upon consumption which have been so marked in the reform era have all provided 
material from which to fashion a range of "postmodern" identities. Already, by
1985, Robert Weller found that the availability of proliferating styles of clothing and 
personal decoration had "opened up an enormous new range for the expression of new 
kinds of identity" (1994: 215). However, the degree to which individuals were both able 
to and wished to "buy" into such identities differed enormously. Additionally, for many 
of my informants, their main preoccupations were their "traditional" family roles as 
grandparents, parents, daughters or sons and as friends. These identities were, themselves, 
being influenced and subtly redefined by proliferating media narratives which explained, 
for instance, how to be a better mother or a more filial son.
Ulf Hannerz writes that "postmodern culture is characterized by a multiplicity of 
perspectives and voices. It is a thing of shreds and patches. Juxtaposition becomes the 
prevalent experience" (1992: 34). With its increasing degree of "imported cultural 
heterogeneity" (Ibid: 201) and "availability of cultural interfaces" (203), one may describe 
contemporary Shanghai as increasingly postmodern. However, like David Parkin (1993: 
85-6), I am sceptical of those who consider global cultural flow as primarily a 
contemporary phenomenon. Thus, when compared to accounts of the city in the 1930s, 
early 1990s Shanghai was still a rather insular place. Indeed, it is hard to imagine a place 
of more juxtapositions and more cultural heterogeneity than inter-war Shanghai with its 
Qing dynasty wooden houses, art deco experiments, classical style public buildings, mock
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Tudor style cottages, and the assem blages o f  migrants from all over China, W hite Russians, 
prostitutes, m issionaries, Jewish refugees, "underground" Com m unist activists, British 
"Shanghailanders", Sikh and Annam ese policem en, and Japanese soldiers.
Along with the need to interrogate ethnocentric biases it seem s that anthropologists
be
also need to be alert to what may^called a chrono-centrism : that is, the notion that all 
contemporary phenom ena are unique. What does appeaj to be unique in the late twentieth  
century7 is the ease and sheer speed with which cultural phenom ena may now  ricochet back 
and forth across the planet. The impact o f  electronic media has been a significant theme 
o f  this thesis. Their impact, like so many o f  the findings o f  this thesis, has been m ulti­
faceted and ambiguous.
Comments made by the human rights activist Harry Wu (1995) during a lecture 
delivered at London University's School o f  O rien ta l and African S tudies w'ere illuminating 
on this account. Wu described how he had been arrested as he tried to cross into China 
from Kazakhstan a few7 weeks before. In his estimation, his arrest at this remote border 
post could be attributed to the successes of gaige k a ifan g  w'hich had brought in funds for 
China's Public Security Bureau, thereby allowing them to computerise their activities. He 
was caught  in this new electronic web. This example demonstrates the ambiguity of 
elect ronic media - it would be mistaken to focus only upon and to overemphasize their "de- 
territorializing" effects. Such devices may be "technologies without boundaries" (cf. Noam 
1990) but they can also facilitate vastly improved means of surveillance and control and seal 
boundaries much more effectively. Wu, for instance, had intended to use micro-cameras 
to film secret labour camps,  places hidden in "dark corners". The aim of Harry Wu w'hose 
current  career and activities could be described as consisting of and embodying a "global 
positive feedback loop" (Wark 1993: 140) was to show- these images on the Western media 
and thereby bring pressure to bear on both the American and Chinese governments. As he 
discovered, electronic media can contemporaneously illuminate China’s interstitial places 
and close gaps in the "wall".
^ 9 S ^ Z H O N G G U O  RENMIN YINHANG*
MW*, i
k VT-.V . s
mmmmm 1 9 S 0
A Chinese one yuan  note.
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In Shanghai, as elsewhere in the world, electronic messages "steal into places like 
thieves in the night" (Meyrowitz 1985: 117). However, the Chinese state is busily ensuring 
that these "thieves" are kept out or, at least, do not steal anything of value. In Shanghai 
it appears that the government has recently engaged upon a large-scale project to install a 
cable system. The motive appears to be to preempt citizens acquiring satellite dishes which 
are less susceptible to state controls. Cable systems have the great advantage that they can 
be more readily filtered and, if need be, cut off. Similarly, recent reports describe how 
"China has laid the foundations of an electronic Great Wall to fend off invaders on the 
information superhighway."8 A Hong Kong-based subsidiary of China’s Xinhua News 
Agency is said to be "testing a politically correct version of the Internet. Purged of 
pornography, political dissent and other forms of ‘spiritual pollution’."9 A cartoon in the 
Financial Times refers to this China Internet as "a kind of information superhighway 
without the information".10 Nonetheless, the former of these articles adds that "this new 
barrier is already in danger of being overrun. In June, its defences lowered by the profit 
motive, China allowed citizens of Beijing and Shanghai to buy time on the real Internet." 
With some 40,000 Internet users already, and a 30% annual growth in computer ownership, 
this article sees an "unstoppable momentum" towards China’s integration into global 
information flows.
A further postmodern characteristic mentioned by Hannerz is the way in which the 
"past is raided for commoditizable nostalgia" (35). Compared to pre-gaige kaifang 
Shanghai there does seem to be evidence of this. For instance, CDs and karaoke tapes of 
"revolutionary" songs were extremely popular and I watched a Japanese car company’s 
advertisement on Shanghai Oriental Television which showed black and white footage of 
workers at the "model" Daqing oil-field. The slogans of this advert deliberately mimicked 
the style of Chinese government propaganda slogans. These were certainly evidence of 
commoditizable nostalgias yet were not those pre-war classical and Tudor style buildings 
similarly marketable nostalgias?
8"China Tries T o Shut Out Internet Anarchy" The Guardian 4 Septem ber 1995: 9.
9Ibid.
l0"Net For China: No Smut, No Politics, No Decadent Culture" FT 10 July 1995: 13.
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China matters because it was until 1850 the world’s largest economic power...  It has gone through a period of 150 years of hard times but it is reasonable to assume that within our lifetime this will once again be the world's largest economy, the world's, perhaps, most powerful state, certainly the most dominant state in the most economically booming economic area of the world, in East Asia. Therefore, it matters economically... strategically... and in terms of spreading its culture and values.
Gerald Segal (1996)11
Viewed as a place of trade, 1 fear that Hong Kong will be a failure.
Robert Fortune (1853, Vol. 1: 13)
If China is "crossing the stream" one is tempted to ask what lies on the other side? 
The long-term consequences of the far-reaching socio-economic changes now in motion in 
Shanghai can only be guessed at. Shanghai society displayed all the volatility and 
unpredictability of the city’s stock market. The only certainty over China’s political 
future is its uncertainty. As Robert Fortune’s words show (and his assessment was shared 
by many contemporaries) China "experts" have often been proved spectacularly wrong.
In speculating on the future contours of Shanghai it is interesting to compare the 
following two comments. The first, on urban China in general, states that "[a] sense of the 
incompleteness of change emerged strongly...from all the essays in this volume". The 
second, on Shanghai in particular, states that "[o]ld things are passing away and the new 
order is not yet firmly established." These remarkably similar assessments are separated 
by almost eighty years, the first from Barry Naughton’s (1995a: 26) introductory comments 
to Davis et aVs Urban Spaces in Contemporary China: the second quote is Mary
GameweH’s conclusion to her book The Gateway to China: Pictures of Shanghai published 
in 1916. It seems that while the present always consists of flux and indeterminacy that 
certainty and clarity are always just around the corner, in a mythological future which is 
constantly deferred. I deliberately avoided calling this chapter a conclusion for just this 
reason.
In the United Kingdom political imperatives often limit future planning to no more 
than a couple of years ahead. In Shanghai it was striking to hear so many media reports 
on plans for the twenty first century, often for projects which are only expected to reach 
their full fruition in, perhaps, one hundred years time. When I asked an elderly informant, 
born a citizen of the Qing empire, how he envisaged Shanghai’s future he mentioned the 
plans which are being made. Then he remarked that during the Cultural Revolution one 
could never have imagined Shanghai would be the way it is now. So, he added, "the 
decades ahead may be equally beyond our imaginations..."
""Asia Gold" BBC Radio 4. Broadcast January 4, 1996.
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When Deng Xiaoping spoke of China "crossing the stream" he envisioned that what 
lay on the other bank would be a rich, powerful nation state, with the Communist Party 
firmly in control. Continued social stability and the Communist Party’s legitimacy now 
appears dependent upon continued rising living standards for the majority of the population. 
There appear to be good grounds for the fulfilment of Deng’s prophecy and to support the 
comments of Gerald Segal. During the 1980s China’s GNP is reported to have doubled. 
China’s President, Jiang Zemin, recently reiterated that the aim for the 1990s is another 
doubling of G N P.12 Shanghai’s economic growth is expected to exceed this already 
impressive rate and it is certainly one of those "Chinese coastal cities and towns [which] 
today look more like Asian boom cities with the familiar vibrancy of bustling private 
businesses and street vendors, and problems ranging from pollution to prostitution" (Chan 
1994: 98). Moreover, my informants were mostly optimistic, believing in a bright 
prosperous and glorious (guangming) future for the city. There seems every reason to 
expect that the "truly momentous" changes underway in China will effect not only the way 
of life of most Chinese people but also "create a totally different dimension in the future 
global political economy" (Chan 1994: 154).
The description of Shanghai as a "paradise of adventurers" seems to have been 
subject to shifting meanings. This appellation was, perhaps, derived from the title of G.E. 
Miller’s (1937) novel Shanghai. The Paradise of Adventurers. A .Tingii Zhoubao 
(Economic Weekly) article of August 25, 1949 described Shanghai as "a non-productive 
city...a parasitic city ...a  criminal city... It is the paradise of adventurers...a city where 
waste is even greater than consumption" (cited in Gaulton 1981: 46). During 1992-4 I 
occasionally heard people use this term. However, it now seemed to express a positive 
nostalgia for a lost past or a hope for the future. Even the official media seem to support 
the notion of the desirability of Shanghai once again becoming more like it once was. A 
front page Shanghai Star report on a meeting orchestrated by Shanghai’s then mayor, Huang 
Ju, on the topic of the future of Shanghai described it as part of the "the city government’s 
efforts to revive the past glories of Shanghai."13
As I made clear in the Introduction, those for whom gaige kaifang had brought the 
fewest benefits and, above all, those whose livelihoods had been undermined, were the most 
reluctant to speak with a foreign researcher. However, even amongst the majority of my
|:SWB F E /2 3 5 7 /G /3 . 17 July 1995.
l3"City o f  Future" 2 July 1993.
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informants who believed their living standards to be improving I found many simmering
discontents and resentments. For some of my informants Shanghai was a city in which
there was change with each passing day (ri xin yue yi), a development they responded to
positively. However, there were others for whom there was little or no change, or for
whom change was unwelcome. For instance, a state danwei worker in her late twenties
complained to me that:
Most of the benefits and profit (liyi) from gaige kaifang goes to foreigners whilst 
many problems, such as pollution, are left behind for the laobaixing. It increases 
the weight of Chinese people’s burden (jiazhong Zhongguoren de fudan). The 
space (kongjian) of Shanghai is increasingly bad/poor (cha). There is no fresh air, 
no clean water. Everything is done for short term benefit, for money. People are 
alienated by material goods, people serve money (ren bei wu yihua, ren  wei qian 
fuwu). It used to be very quiet where I live [a compound owned by the army], now 
the roads around here are all being dug up and in disarray, there is rubble, holes, 
dirt and machinery everywhere.
Distinct patterns, which may create serious tensions in the future, had already begun 
to distil into visible contours. Issues which caused particular concern and which constituted 
fierce undercurrents of indignation, included rising inequalities of wealth, corruption by 
officials and crime - the latter often blamed upon migrant workers, "outsiders". These 
phenomena were already making Shanghai a less ordered, a less safe place. Deeper 
undercurrents of discontent included past mistreatment or a sense of a youth "lost" in the 
countryside. These concerns may not produce serious unrest provided that living standards 
of the majority continue to improve. However, real dangers will lie ahead if this growth 
is not sustained. Additionally, a potentially dangerous feature of the reform era has been 
the raising of expectations and aspirations. Great dangers lie in store if they cannot be met. 
The future of the Communist Party would appear to be largely entwined with the provision 
of constantly rising living standards - Deng Xiaoping has held out the promise of a 
"comfortable living standard" for all Shanghai citizens by the end of this decade. 
Expectations were often extremely high, and many of my informants considered Hong Kong 
and Singapore not only as models to emulate but to be surpassed. At present this objective 
appears attainable, incomes generally are higher and the range and quality o f consumer 
products is increasing.
A strong consensus of my informants was that the sluice gate which had been 
opened could not be closed again. Nethertheless concerns were expressed over the near to 
mid-term future. In some respects this matched the situation in Hong Kong over which 
"has always hung a threatening cloud of insecurity" (Baker 1983: 478). A commonly 
expressed fear was that in the event of economic recession and/or political instability these
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fractures and fissures will widen and become the courses along which frustrations and 
discontent flow.
It is interesting to speculate on where future protesters will look for inspiration in 
future protests. Western observers tend to consider greater democracy and political 
freedom as solutions to these problems. Although in Spring 1989 protesters tended to look 
to Western cultural symbols this need not necessarily be the case in the future. Western 
analystfpreoccupation with "democracy" in China tends to overlook the quite different 
cultural background in China. The dominant view amongst my informants was that 
Communist Party rhetoric on, for example, controlling crime and corruption was correct. 
Although a number of informants considered the Party too entangled in these activities to 
control them a more usual comment was that it had become too weak, too lacking in 
authority to control them. Similarly it was widely believed that the party-state was losing 
its ability to collect tax, to control the influx of rural migrants, to control pornography, or 
even to provide free health and education. The party-state’s weakness was believed, 
largely, to have been a product of gaige kaifang and its attendant dilution of Communist 
Party power. For most of my informants, press freedom and parliamentary democracy 
were not the solution. Rather, the Confucian ideal of an honest, upright official (qingguan) 
seemed more appropriate.
I noted above a common refrain on the Maoist past, as a time when people were 
fooled or duped (shangdang). Individual agency was denied, people had no "mind", no 
"self". However, alongside this denigration of the past - which serves the interests of the 
Communist Party if kept within bounds - there were also more positive assessments of the 
past. In rural China, Ann Anagnost (1989) found that egalitarianism although officially 
repudiated remains an important element of popular peasant values. She concluded that 
"the fear of polarization is based on a memory of the old society recreated in local 
histories" (215). In Shanghai, too, many of my older informants, in particular, harked back 
to the early 1950s as a time with little corruption, good order, equality and a sense of 
shared goals. The certainties of this past, a collective memory, rarefied, embellished and 
cleansed by the passage of time, and facilitated by "politically enforced amnesia" (Schwarcz 
1991: 98) were a basis for considerable nostalgia (huaijiu - "cherish/yearn for the past"). 
This nostalgia could also extend to those born after the 1950s, a nostalgia without memory. 
Of course, nostalgia may remain as just that, but these "memories" do provide a latent, and 
potentially fertile, source for the creation of a powerful political agenda.
Like Su Xiaokang I found that young people’s knowledge of the Cultural Revolution,
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let alone the 1950s, was generally extremely limited.14 It may be, therefore, that symbols 
from this era will become particularly malleable and capable of incorporation into new
-for
demands. Is it too fanciful to suppose that in future protests^participants who find 
themselves in a "present, which is confused, incoherent and disturbing" (Zonabend 1984: 
139) that the "memories" of a stable, well-ordered period may be particularly appealing? 
At a time when state officials appear to be busily re-inventing (cf. Hobsbawm & Ranger 
1983) Shanghai’s pre-1949 past as a desirable future is it possible that "Maoist" emblems 
of egalitarianism and class struggle could become the focus, the rallying call, for 
participants in protest movements?
It was the best o f  times, it was the worst o f  times, it was the age o f  wisdom, it was the age 
o f foolishness, it was the epoch o f  belief, it was the epoch o f  incredulity, it was the season 
o f Light, it was the season o f  Darkness, it was the spring o f  hope, it was the winter o f  
Despair, we had everything before us, we had nothing before us...
Charles Dickens A Tale of Two Cities 1960 [1859]
A particularly insightful informant told me how he had read A Tale of Two Cities at school
in the late 1930s. He remarked that:
Although I could not really understand them I especially liked the opening lines and 
can still recite them. Decades later, after experiencing many changes, I read them 
again. I felt that now I could understand what Dickens meant - he was also writing 
at a time of revolution. These lines are extremely appropriate to China.
It may seem rather eccentric to conclude an ethnography of contemporary Shanghai with
a quote from Charles Dickens, even though Dickens may, I would argue, be regarded as
one of the greatest of urban ethnographers. However, this ethnographic "snapshot"
encapsulates both the dialectic of my own practices of research and the quotation serves as
a fitting summary of Shanghai’s future. In the first instance this vignette evokes the
eminently reflexive and human character of ethnographic research. My understandings of
this text were informed and altered by the comments of this Shanghai citizen. Whenever
I read these lines again my understanding of it will always be imbued with the new
sensitivities and insights gained from those fleeting remarks in Shanghai. This seems an
apposite metaphor for ethnography - an encounter in which both the researcher and his or
her confidants are mutually, often imperceptibly, and irrevocably changed. The lines of
Dickens also seem to encapsulate both the promise and danger which lies in store for
Shanghai and its inhabitants. There is everything before us, there is nothing before us....
l4In N ovem ber 1988 Su X iaokang wrote that "[tlhough less than tw enty years have passed, the children 
o f  today are as ignorant o f  the Cultural Revolution as if  it belonged to another century; they find it extrem ely  
strange as w ell as inconceivable" (cited in Su & W ang 1991: 291).
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